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GERMANY i FRANCE : 



A POPULAK HTSTOEY OF THE 



FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 



BY 

ELIHU RICH, 

EDITOR OF THE "CYCLOPAEDIA OF BIOGRAPHY," AND NUMEROUS MILITARY AND 



HISTORICAL WORKS. 



ILLUSTRATED WITH STEEL-PLATE AND WOOD ENGRAVINGS, 

Representing Battle-scenes, from the pencils of Artists accompanying the Armies, Maps, Plans of Battle, 

Views of Remarkable Buildings and Localities, Fortresses, etc., etc. ; also a Series of Authentic 

Portraits of the most Celebrated Personages connected with the War. 



V> 



VOL II. 






LONDON: 

JAMES HAGGER, 67, PATERNOSTER ROW. 



A 



as? 

V.I 



y£ 



PREFACE. 



This history of the war of 1870-1871 was commenced at the moment when Paris was invested by the 
German armies. The issue of the struggle could not then be predicted with any certainty. Two thirds 
of the Imperial forces which took the field in the latter half of July had been destroyed ; but the Army 
of Bazaine lay around Metz and prevented the further advance of the First and Second German Armies. 
The first Loire Army and the armies of the North and West were in course of formation. If Bazaine should 
be able to detain the forces under Prince Frederick Charles for a sufficient length of time under the walls 
of Metz, it was certain the third and fourth armies investing Paris would themselves be invested. As a 
precaution against this contingency the corps of Werder was being moved down southward and westward 
from Strasburg ; and the centre of France, in a wide sweep around Paris, was being overrun by the 
cavalry of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. In these circumstances the issue of the struggle depended 
on several contingencies, any one of which might happen ; and it was necessary in planning a history of 
these important transactions, to adopt a method which should ensure some measure of literary complete- 
ness, whatever might be the issue of the struggle. Fortunately the method of solving the problem 
favoured the treatment of the subject from a point of view that was certain to be of more general interest 
than a mere chronicle of the war : to be independent of the result, it was of the first importance to survey 
a wider horizon than that commanded by the immediate theatre of war, and to deal with other materials 
than the records of current events. 

The struggle of 1870-71 has therefore been treated, in this work, as a grand episode in the drama of 
modern history. The chapters which summarise the recent history of Italy and Spain ; which refer to 
the revolutionary principles of 1789, and the rise of the secret societies ; in which the career of Garibaldi 
and the influence of Mazzini are traced, and much besides in the work which, on a hasty glance, might be 
thought irrelevant, are on the contrary to be viewed as integral parts of the author's plan. The result is, 
that while the late war is described with all needful minuteness of detail, the general causes which pro- 
duced that catastrophe have also been elucidated with a due regard to proportion and perspective. 

Like the war with Germany, the fierce struggle of the Commune is regarded by the author as an 
inevitable result of the inroads made on the power and authority of the Emperor Napoleon. The object 
has been to make this apparent, and to trace accurately the course of these two historical lines of de- 
velopment. The graphic accounts given by the correspondents of the press, and the harrowing details 
of the devastation wrought in France by foreign and civil war, are sparingly introduced ; not because the 
portraiture of such events which enriched the daily press was undervalued by the author, but because 
it was inconsistent with his general plan to make a free use of material still fresh in the public recollection. 

On the other hand, military details necessary to elucidate the strategy of the war have been carefully 
studied, both from German and French sources. The operations of the two Armies of the Loire and the 
Army of the East have in particular been sketched with the view of demonstrating that France 
was not lost for want of able generals, or for lack of devoted gallantry in her troops. The amateur 
strategy of the Delegated Minister of War, M. Gambetta, who controlled the military operations after 
the fall of Metz, is shown by accumulated proofs to have been the principal cause of the failure to 
relieve Paris, and consequently of the final catastrophe. The failure of moral in these armies, though 
important as a secondary cause of the continued disasters along the line of the Loire, is reduced to 
its proper proportions as a consequence of the War Minister's headstrong policy. 

It is early yet to speculate on the political consequences that may result from the transfer of the 
balance of power on the continent to the Imperial Government at Berlin. What all impartial observers 
regret to observe is that the late war, unlike the great struggle between the Catholic and Protestant States 
which resulted in the Peace of Westphalia, has ended in a truce, and not in a settlement. The sword as it 
fell from the hand of one Emperor, has been grasped, almost ere it touched the ground, by another, and 
that other a Protestant Prince. The causes of animosity between two great races have been strengthened 
rather than exhausted by the struggle, and no wrong has been righted. After other great wars, the 
nations of Europe have been able to reduce their armaments, and devote all their energies to the arts of 
peace. The termination of the Franco-German war has left them expectant and doubtful, and the con- 
sequence is that the armaments of the different powers are increased, and the subject of chief anxiety in 
every capital of Europe is its state of preparation for offensive and defensive operations in a future struggle. 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



PORTRAITS. Vol. I. 

•The Emperor Napoleon III., to 
face p. 6 

"William I., King of Prussia and 
Emperor of Germany, to face 
the Preface 

Christian IX., King of Denmark, 21 
♦Prince Bismarck, to face p. 27 

Friedrich Henri-Ernest, Count von 
Wrangel, 29 

Vice-Admiral Jachmann, 36 
•George V., ex-King of Hanover, to 

face p. 43 
♦Frederick William I., ex-Elector of 
Hesse, to face p. 43 

General Vogel von Falckenstcin, 48 
"Count von Roon, to face p. 50 

John I., King of Saxony, 56 

Francis Joseph I., Emperor of 
Austria, 89 

The late Marshal Neil, 113 

M. Emile de Girardin, 140 

Victor Hugo, 144 

Ladies of the Second Empire, 152 

M. Emile Ollivier, 160 

The Duke de Gramont, 169 

Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern,172 

M. Benedetti, 181 

Marshal Lebceuf, 189 

Marshal Macmahon, 193 

Marshal Bazaine, 197 

General Frossard, 201 

Count Beust, 217 

Admiral Bouet-Willaumez, 229 
•Prince Fred. Charles, to face p. 243 
*The Prince Imperial of France, to 
face p. 257 

Carl Wilhelm, 261 

Lieut. -General von Blumenthal, 276 

General von Manteuffel, 277 

General von Steinmetz 296 

Pr. Augustus of Wurtemburg, 297 

General von Zastrow, 305 

Count de Palikao, 313 

General Bourbaki, 329 
•Count von Moltke, to face p. 331 

Marshal Canrobert, 360 

General von Fransecky, 373 
*Cr. Prince of Prussia, to face p. 387 

Albert, Cr. Prince of Saxony, 393 
*M. Thiers, to face p. 407 

General von der Tann, 417 

Lieut. -General von Kirch bach, 424 

General von Rheinhaben, 429 

General de Wimpffen, 448 

General de Podbielsky, 449 
•General Trochu to face p. 471 
•Members of the provisional Gov- 
ernment to face p. 476 

General von Lutz, 513 

General von Starkloff, 520 

Vol! II. 

^*The Empress Eugenie, to face title 
♦The Empress Augusta, to face p. i 
Joseph Mazzini, 29 
Archduke of Austria, 61 
General von Werder, 92 
General Coffinieres de Nordeck, 96 
Major-General von Stiehle, 109 
General von Manstein, 116 
Lieut. -General von Glumer, 149 
Lieut.-General von Obernitz, 156 
General d'Aurelle de Paladines, 162 
Prince William of Baden, 168 
General Schumacher, 216 
King of Wurtemburg, 233 
Prince George of Saxony, 265 
General Chanzy, 272 
General Prim, 349 
Prince Louis of Hesse, 405 
Major-General von Schlothein, 441 
Lieut.-General von Fabrice, 456 

, *General Garibaldi, to face p. 460 
Lieut. -Colonel von Lescynski, 461 
General von Goeben, 473 
Colonel Denfert-Rocherau, 493 
General von Kamecke, 508 
•Members of the Commune, to face 
p. 598 
Colonel Rossel, 601 

INCIDENTS AND SCENES 
Vol. I. 

Home again, to face p. 3 

The Prussian Outposts, 17 

Copenhagen, 24 

The " Rolf Krake " in Action, 32 

Town and Harbour of Kiel, 37 

Danish Officers and Soldiers, 41 



Heligoland, 44 

Austrian Officers and Soldiers, 69 
View of Kbniggratz, 81 
Austrian Cavalry at Sadowa, 58 
'Prague and its principal Edifices, 
to face p. 88 



pp. 92-93 
•The Prussian Army, to face p. 100 
•The Fr. Imp. Army, to face p. 112 
Chasseurs d Afrique, 117 
View of Luxemburg, 125 
Lyons, Agitation at, 185 
•Artillery preparing for Action, to 

face p. 205 
Capture of a Mitrailleuse, 213 
•Ems, to face p. 220 
Reconnaissance, Neiderbronn, 225 
•General View of Berlin, between 

pp. 242-243 
Troops leaving Berlin, 244 
•The principal Edifices of Berlin, to 

face p. 246 
The Emperor at Saarbruck, 256 
Verdun, 268 

Cavalry crossing a River, 272 
•View of Cologne, between 276-277 
•View of Coblentz, to face p. 278 
Weissenburg and its Environs, 279 
• Battle of Weissenburg, to face p. 282 
Bavarian Infantry fighting with 

Turcos and Zouaves, 285 
Charge of Cuirassiers at the Battle 
of Worth, 288 
•Group of Turcos, to face p. 298 
Worth, 892 
Bitsche, 293 

Street Characters in Paris, No. 1, 
316, No. 2, 320 
•Battle of Borny, to face p. 322 
Uhlans Foraging, 333 
Girls of Alsace, 336 
Children of Alsace, 337 
Pont-a-Mousson, 344 
Charge of cavalry against a French 

Battery, 352 
View of Mars-la-Tour, 357 
•Capture of a Battery at Vionville, 
to face p. 338 
View of Rezonville, 364 
View of Gravelotte, 368 
•View of Metz, to face p. 370 

Seige Guns before Strasburg, 377 
•Strasburg and its principal Edifices, 
to face p. 382 
Burning of Strasburg, 385 
*An Adjutant's Midnight Ride, to 
face p. 388 
Naval Action off Havanna, 397 
Sedan and the Surrounding Coun- 
try, 433 
•Battle of Sedan, to face p. 438 
Fight in the Wood of Illy, 441 
View of the Town of Sedan, 443 
•Hussars in a Storm by Sedan, to 

face p. 444 
•Capitulation of Sedan, to face p. 450 
Wilhelmshohe, 453 
•General view of Cassel, between 
pp. 456-457 
Proclamation of the Republic, 473 
The Park of St. Cloud, 481 
German Head-quarters, at Ver- 
sailles, 497 
Batteries before Paris, 501 
German Artillery Officers at break- 
fast, 505 
Head-quarters of the King at 
Ferrieres, 509 
"Tours Cathedral, to face p. 510 
•General View of Tours, p. 517 
•Munich and its principal Edifices, 
between pp. 518-519 

Vol. II. 

Bridge broken down at Lagny, 10 
Advanced Guards of Austrian 

Jagers in a Snow-storm, 53 
Gambetta addressing the Troops, 73 
Battle near Orleans, Oct. 11th, 77 
Harbour of Bordeaux, 81 
Patrol of Bavarian Light Horse, 85 
Sortie at Metz, to face p. 98 
Horses at Metz, 121 

/Prussian Landwehr in action, be 

r tween pp. 122-123 

Attack on a house near Metz, 125 
Capture of Barricade before Le 

Bourget, 141 
Crossing the Vosges, 164 
Fight at the Bridge of Cussey, 172 
The Old Chateau at Blois, 180 



A German Requisitioning Party.l 89 
Advanced Picket before Paris, 201 
Men of the Barricades, 204 
Paris Amazons, 205 
Fight at Chatillon, to face p. 208 
Shelling the Germans, 221 



•General view of Frankfort, between, /Capture of a balloon near Pans, to 

face p. 224 
Castle of Montbeliard, 237 
Dome of the Invalides, 240 
French Troops entering Amiens,253 
German Troops marching out of 

Amiens, 260 
/General View of Rouen, between 

pp. 260-261 
Destruction of Ablis, to face p. 268 
Cathedral of Orleans, to face p. 274 
On the edge of the Forest, 281 
Before the Battle, 288 
After the Battle, 289 
/Battle of Beaune-la-Rolande, to 

face p. 296 
Engagement near Dreux, 297 
The Germany in Evreux, 301 
Reinforcements of German Art ery 

and Cavalry arriving on the 

Field of Loignyfrom Orgeres,313 
Fight for the Approaches to Or- 
leans, December 4th, 317 
Capture of a Gun near Orleans, 328 
/King William proclaimed Emperor 

at Versailles, to face 334 
Sans Soucci, the summer palace of 

the Kings of Prussia, 307 
King William, visiting the wounded 

at Versailles, 341 
Council of War at Versailles, 361 
Fight at Le Bourget, 365 
A German outpost in a bomb-proof 

excavation, 369 
The Works on Mount Avron, 389 
Night Bivouac at Le Mans, 417 
Fighting at Le Mans, 437 
, i*Street fighting in Le Mans, between 

pp. 440-441 
/Battle of St. Quentin, to face p. 449 
Street in Dijon, 468 
Battle of Villersexel, 481 
/Battle of Belfort, to face 482 
Advance of the Badeners in the 

Battle of January 15th, 485 
Artillery of the Baden Division in 

the Battle of January 15th, 489 
The Castle of Belfort, 500 
•Chateau Malmaison, 506 
iGreat Sortie of January 19th, to 

face p. 513 
Barracks at Vanves, 516 
German Band at St. Denis, 521 
The Welcome Draught, 525 
Destruction in a church, 541 
Entrance of the German troops into 

Paris, 549 
Review of German Troops at Long- 
champs, 556 
Return of the Landwehr Guard to 

Berlin, 564 
..•Two Widows of the War of 1870, 

to face p. 568 



Theatre of War in Belgium, 250 
•General Map, between pp. 260-261 

Political Divisions of the Rhine, 264 

Battle-field of Weissenburg, 281 

Battle of Woerth, 290 

Battle of Forbach, 302 

Railways leading to Metz, 323 

Battle of Borny, 325 | 

Advance of the German armies from 
the Rhine to the Moselle, 850 

Battle of Rezonville, 355 

German Positions, August 17th, 361 

Battle of Gravelotte, 363 
•Plan of Strasburg, to face p. 378 

Countermarch of Macmahon, 389 

Macmahon's Advance, 392 

Battle of Beaumont, 421 

The French Position beyond the 
Chiers, 426 

Advance of the Third and Fourth 
Armies against the Position of 
the French at Sedan, 427 

Positions around Sedan, 435 

Advance of the German Armies on 
Paris, September 3rd to 19th, 495 

Scene of the Fight at Clamart, Sep- 
tember 19th, 496 

Vol. II. 

♦Plan of Paris and its Fortifications, 

between pp. 4-5 
Fortress on Mont Valerien, 3 
The Defences of Strasburg, 13 
Plan of Rome, 23 
Engagement at Artenay, 82 
•Plan of Metz, to face p. 109 
Positions around Metz, 111 
Battle of Mdzieres, 124 
Prussian attack on Le Bourget, 152 
Battle of Coulmiers, 171 
Great Sortie at Paris, 247 
^>Map of the country around Amiens, 

to face p. 252 
Battle of Amiens, Nov. 27th, 256 
•Operations of the German Armies 

after the Capitulation of Metz, 

between pp. 262-263 
Battle-field before Orleans, 279 
Battle of Beaune-la-Rolande, 298 
•General Map of the Theatre of War 

on the Loire, to face p. 298 
The Position of the Conie, 300 
Battle of Loigny, 311 
Battle of Chevilly, and Retreat of 

the Loire Army, 320 
German " Feldwache," 373 
Chanzy's retreat on Beaugency, 394 
Battles of Beaugency, 397 
Retreat on the Loir, and Battle of 

Vendome, 413 
•Map of the country around Le 

Mans, to face p. 419 
Concentration and Battle at Le 

Mans, 433 
Chanzy's retreat on Laval, 444 
Dijon and its Environs, 469 
Battle of Nuits, 475 
Operations of the Garibaldians and 

the Army of the East, 477 



/The saddest task of all, to face p. 574 /Plan of Belfort, between pp. 478-479 

T*l i~* « ■ I!nH.5i-iT Vitt TVT nn 1 1 ii T> ni .I»I n _ r . *.C \\7 1 1 rt .1 i • 



The Commune : Battery by Moulin' 

de Pierre, 581 
Under the Commune : Archbishop 
Darboy in the Prefecture of 
Police, 589 
•View of Paris and its principal 
edifices, between pp. 600-601 
Under the Commune : Petroleuses 
at work, 605 
•Under the Commune : Coffee-house 
scene, to face p. 607 
Barricade Scene, 613 
•Debate in the Commune, between 

pp. 618-619 
•Ruins of the Hotel de Ville, to face 

p. 628 
•Execution of a Petroleuse, to face 
p. 630 
Letters for the Communist pri- 
soners, 621 

MAPS AND BATTLE- 
PLANS. Vol. I. 

•Map of Germany, to face p. 10 
The Battle of Langensalza, 46 
T he Prussian Columns on the Fron- 
tiers of Bohemia, 55 
The Quadrilateral, 73 
The Battle of Lissa, 75 
The Battle-field of Koniggratz, 83 
Rhine Frontier of France, 135 



'Potsdam, to face p. 42 

The Asterisk denotes Plates requiring to be placed by the Binder, and are to face pages indicated. 



Positions of Werder and Bourbaki 

on the line of Hericourt, 487 
Retreat of Bourbaki, 531 
Positions during the Armistice, 536 

MISCELLANEOUS. VOL. I. 

The Prussian Needle-gun, 97,99, 100 
The Mitrailleuse, 205, 211, 213 
The Chassepot, 208, 209 
•Autographs of Generals and other 
distinguished Germans, No. 1 to 
face p. 54. No. 2 to face p. 243 
•The Iron Cross, to face p. 214 
•Facsimile of the draft of the alleged 
secret treaty, between pp. 230, 231 
Siege guns before Strasburg, 377 
Giant Mortar at Strasburg, 381 
Coast Defence apparatus, 501 
Diagrams to show the pressure of 
the German immigration on the 
Celtic population of France, 521 

Vol. II. 

Great cannon captured in Fort la 

Briche, St. Denis, 5 
The Krupp gun, 8, 9 .. 

Siege battery before Paris, 229 
Tent Hospital, 377 
Loading Prussian mortars, 381 
Method of carrying projectiles, 383 
Arms of Alsace and Lorraine, 572 



/£ 



INDEX. 



V 



Ablis, destruction of, ii., 75, 278, n. 2, 178 

About, Edrnond, letter from, 286, at Saverne, 307 

Adolphus, Gustavus, 269, n. 14, 278 

Aeronauts, their adventures, ii., 218 — 226 

Alengon, engagement at, ii. 443 

Allix, Jules, ii., 598 

Alsace, early history of, 266, ii., 571 

Ambulance service, ii., 376, n. 23, 392 

Amiens, battle of, ii., 256, n. 6, 7, 8, 261 

Arago, M. Etienne, 475 

Arcey, engagement at, ii., 484 

Ardennes, forest of, 388 

Aries, 103 

Army of the East, ii., 477 

Army of the North, see Faidherbe 

Arnould, M., ii., 598 

Artenay, engagement at, ii., 81, n. 3, 93 

Asnieres, fighting at, ii., 614 

Assi, M., ii., 598 

Auerbach's, Professor, diary of the siege of Strasburg, 380 

Austria, military demonstration in 1850 against, 19 ; Bismarck 
resolves to crush, 26 ; and the Schleswig-Holstein Ques- 
tion, 21 — 44, or see Denmark ; Prussia declares war 
against, 45, n. 9, 49 ; the States allied in support of the 
Bund with, 55 ; Italian war of liberation, 66 — 79, or 
see Italy ; the army, 74 ; the navy, 75 ; the theatre of war 
in Bohemia, 80 ; the battle-field of Koniggratz, or Sadowa, 
ibid ; Treaty of Prague, ibid ; in Italy, ii., 25 

Autun, battle of, ii., 472 

Baden, appeal of the inhabitants to King of Prussia, n. 14, 524. 

Bagneux, fighting at, ii., 208 ; n. 3, 240, 612 

Balloons, ii., 217, n. 15, 242; gun, ii., 219; adventures~of 
aeronauts, ii., 220, 222 

Bapaume, battle of, ii., 452 

Bazaine at Metz, 322 ; appointed commander-in-chief of the 
Army of theKhine, 323, 341, n. 1, 348 ; retreating, 349 ; 
situation of, at Metz, 370 ; question of his inactivity 
considered, ii., 97, n. 1, 107 ; opinions of Rustow and of 
a Prussian General, ii., 98 ; question of his reserve, ii., 
99 ; why he held Metz, ii., 100 ; M. Regnier's interview 
with, ii., 105 ; and General Coffinieres de Nordeck, ii., 
114 ; proclamation, ibid; and the Empress Eugenie, ii., 
130 ; proclamation to his troops, ii., 133 ; popular 
feeling against, ii., 137, n. 42, 143 ; his letter to the Nord, 

Bazeilles, burning of, 436, n. 1, 444, n. 3, 445 [ii., 137 

Bazoches-les-Hautes, battle of, ii., 308 

Beaugency, battles at, ii., 396 

Beaumont, the battle of, 421 ; retreat of the French, 423 

Beaune-la-Rolande, battle of, ii., 293 

Belfort, investment of, ii., 236, 478 ; description and strength 
of, ii., 478 ; the situation in January, ii., 538 ; refusal 
of a truce, ii., 540 ; end of the bombardment, ii., 541 ; 
honourable surrender, ii., 542 ; price paid for, ii., 561 

Belgium, 132; the railway question, 132 — 137; the neutrality 
of, 248 ; the cock-pit of Europe, 249 ; discussions in the 
British Houses of Parliament and assurances of Mr. 
Gladstone as to the inviolability of, 252 ; renewed 
guarantee treaty of, 254, n. 6, 255 . 

Belleville, fighting at, ii., 627 

Benedetti, M., a letter from, n. 24, 112 ; his interview with 
the King of Prussia at Ems, 220 ; and the secret treaty, 
233 ; as a diplomatist, 240 

Bergeret, M., ii., 598 

Bei-nstorff, Count, correspondence between Lord Granville 

Beslay, M., ii., 598 [and, 192 

Billioray, M., ii., 598 

Bismarck, Prince, his preparations and policy, 25, 26 ; opposed 
to the transfer of Luxemburg to France, 126 ; letter from, 
n. 6, 130 ; his address to the Reichstag, 218 ; his denun- 
ciation of the causes of the war, 220 ; suspicions of an 
understanding between the Emperor Napoleon and, 248 ; 
interview with the Emperor Napoleon after Sedan, 447 ; 
his circulars, 503 ; attitude assumed by, 513, n. 1, 522 ; 
circular of, on the situation at Paris, ii., 76 ; his reply to 
Lord Granville's, suggestions of an armistice, ii., 146 ; 
his account of the negotiations for an armistice, ii., 150; 
at Versailles, ii., 209 

Bitsclw, ii., 238, 543 

Black Eagle, Order of the, 15 



Blanqui and the Patrie en Danger, ii., 215 

Blois, prophecy of the Nun of, ii., 178, n. 10, 179 

Bondy, fighting at ii., 243, n. 1, 251 

Borny, position of the troops at, 324 ; the fight, ibid 

Bougival, sortie and fight at, ii., 235 

Bourbaki, General, 329, ii., 95 ; his mission to Chislehurst, 
ii., 101, n, 14, 16, 108, n. 9, 283 ; appointed to the 
command of the Army of the North, ii., note, 359; with 
the Army of the East, ii., 477 ; defeated at Hericourt, ii., 
486 ; retreat into Switzerland, 533, n. 4, 543 

Boyer's General, mission to the Empress, ii., 106 

Brandenburgh, see Prussia 

Bretoncelles, the battle of, ii., n. 8, 270 

Burgundy, 103, n. 3, 111 ; Maximilian's claims on, 107 

Buzancy, fight at, 392 

Buzenval, the fight at, ii., 514 

Cambriels, General, ii., 163, n. 4, 179 

Caricatures on the war, 334, n. 1, 339, ii., 213 

Carlyle, Mr., his letter on the war, 103 ; his hero, Maxi- 
milian, 105 ; inapplicability of historical illustrations to 
the present circumstances of France and Germany, 110 

Cassagnac, M. Granier de, and Emile Girardin, 140 

Cathelineau's volunteers, ii., 174, n. 181, 274, 294 

Cavalry operations ; the Duke of Mecklenburg, ii., 263 

Chahaignes, engagement at, ii., 430 

Chalons, the deserted camp at, n. 5, 394; retreat from, n. 12, 
395 

Chambord, attack on the Chateau and Park, ii., 404 

Champigny, fighting at, ii., 247 

Chandordy, Count, circular of, 514 

Changarnier, General, the mission of, ii., 131 
Change", engagement at, ii., 431 

Chanzy, General, ii., 67 ; at the battle of Coulmiers, ii., 170 ; 
appointed to the command of the Loire Army, ii., 177 
retreat after the battles at Orleans, ii., 393, 404 ; at Le 
Mans, ii., 421 ; his retreat, ii., 436 ; after the armistice, 

Chartres, surrender of, ii., n. 1, 178 [ii., 535 

Chateaudun, capture of, ii., 163 

Chatillon, skirmishing at, ii., 208, n. 3, 240, 612 

Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 107 

Chassepot, the, 208 

Cherbourg, n. 9, 262 

Chevilly, fighting at, ii., 82, 319 

Clamart, fighting at, 496 

Cluseret, General, ii., 94, 615 

Coffinieres, see Nordeck 

Commune, question of the, 477 ; retrospect to the history and 
principles of the, 479 ; movement at Paris, ii., 86, 153 ; 
theory of the, ii., 157 ; the clubs and the, ii., 216, 387 ; 
attempt to establish the, ii., 517, 545, 576 ; principles of 
the proclaimed, ii., 590 ; election of the, ii., 598 ; true 
mission of the, ii., 602 ; organization of the, in Ten Com- 
missions or Bureaux, ii., 603 ; the first decree, ii., 604 ; 
the moderate members resign their seats, ii., 607 ; second 
decree relative to mortgages, ii., 608 ; preparations of 
the, to take the offensive, ii., 609 ; attack and repulse at 
Courbevoie, ibid ; fighting at Asnieres, ii., 614 ; hostages, 
ii., 615 ; decree for the demolition of the Vendome 
Column, ii., 616, 620 ; Committee of Public Safety, ii., 
617, 619 ; successes of the Versailles troops, ii., 620, 623, 
625 ; murdering the hostages, ii., 625, 631 ; attack on 
Montmartre, ii., 627 ; incendiaries of, ii., 629 ; the 
insurrection crushed, ii., 631 

Conlie evacuated, ii., 440 

Conti, M., and M. Jecker, ii., 228 

Corps Legislatif, and Marshal Niel on the reorganization of 
the army, 120 ; the foreign policy of the Emperor 
denounced by M. Thiers, 127 ; declaration in the, 202 ; 
convocation of the, 311 ; on the 9th of August, n. 1, 
414 ; scene in the on the 13th, 407 ; M. Jules Favre in 
the, 461 ; midnight meeting of the, 463 

Coulmiers, battle of, ii., 170 ; the German report of the, ii., 176 

Courbevoie, fighting at, ii., 609 

Cowmet, M., ii., 598 

Cremieux, \L, and the Goddess of Liberty, 465 ; short ac- 
count t f, 476 

Crown Pri- ^e, advance of the, at Worth, 291 ; his equipage, 
347 ; idvance on Chalons, 388 ; proclamation of the, 
394 ; his advance on Paris, 494. 



INDEX. 



' \ . fighting :it, ii. ( I ii I 

l>.un|'.ii'iTf, Count, ii., 2"S, n. 8, 240 

Darboy, Archbishop, arrest of, ii., 615; bis execution, ii., 

Demuin, engagement at ii., n. 259 [626 

Denmark and the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 21; the 
Duoby of Oldenburg, ibid; bistorj of the Duchies, ibid; 
alliance with Napoleon, 'J'J ; jiiuvhases peace by ceding 
Heligoland to England, and Norway to Sweden, ibid J 
union of Holstein and Schleswig by the Constitution of 
Hay, 1881, and the result, tftta; dynastic relations of 
Holstein and Sohleswig, ibid; the Dukes of Schleswig- 
Ilolsteiu Sonderburg-Augustenburg, n. 6, 26 ; invasion 
of Schlcswig l>y the allied troops under Wrangel, 29 ; 
treaty of Vienna, by which Schleswig-Holstein and Lauen- 
burg were ceded to Prussia and Austria, ibid. 

Diet of Frankfort, Prussian state policy and the, 19 ; its 
composition, n., 20 

Dijon, capture of, ii., 165 ; captured by Garibaldi, ii., 476 

Dorian, M. Pierre, 476 

Douav. (ieneral Abel, at the battle of Weissenburg, 282 ; bis 
death, 283 

Duclair, outrage to the British flag at, ii., 380, n. 24, 392 

Ducrot, General, plans, ii., 244; his address to the army, 
ibid ; his sortie from Paris on November 29th, ii., 245 ; 
renewed advance on the 30th, ii., 246 ; his gallantry, ii., 
247 ; fatal hesitation of, ii., 248 ; attacked by Fransecky, 
ii., 249 ; retreat, ii., 250 

Durnof, M. Jules, his experience in a balloon, ii., 219 

Duval, General, execution of, ii., 612 

England — Lord Granville's despatches, 190; Lord Lyons' 
conversation with M. Ollivier, ibid ; Lord Lyons' interview 
with the Ducde Gramont, 191; interview between Lord 
Granville and Count Bernstorff, 192; second interview 
between Lord Lyons and the Due de Gramont, 193, 
196 ; opinion of the Government, 197; correspondence 
with Prussia, 198; last efforts of the Government to 
avert hostilities, 215, n. 2, 221; note sent by Prussia to 
her ambassador in London, 219, n. 18, 221 ; communi- 
cations in the House of Commons regarding the neutrality 
of Belgium and Luxemburg, 251 ; purchase of arms in, 
for the French army, ii., 84; despatches of Lord Granville 
suggesting an armistice, ii., 145; Count Bismarck's reply, 

English vessels, seizure of, ii., 380, n. 24, 392 [ii., 146 

Etival, skirmish at, ii., 91 

Eugenie, Empress, 150; letter to the Emperor, n. 9, 230; 
interview with General Trocbu, 458; her flight, 466, n. 7, 
470; the propositions of M. Begnier, ii., 101; and 
General Bazaine, ii., 130 

European States, total number of soldiers in the, n. 4, 9 

Faidherbe, General, ii., 255, n. 5, 260 ; defeated at Amiens, 
ii., 258; bis position at La Scarpe, ii., 451; his defeat at 
St. Quentin, ii., 458; his situation after the armistice, 
ii., 537 

Failly, M. de, movements of, 387; beaten at the battle of 
Beaumont, 423 

Falckenstein, General Vogel von, n. 2, 523 

Favre, M. Jules; his speech in the Chamber, 461; his pro- 
positions declaring the Empire at an end, 464; short 
notice of, 476 ; his circular, 485 ; at German head- 
quarters, 504 ; second manifesto, 507 ; circular on the 
failure of the negotiations for an armistice, ii., 148; a 
prisoner at the Hotel de Ville, ii., 154 

Flo, General le, 476 

Flourens, M. Gustave, 166, n. 1, 171; bis party defeated, ii., 
87 ; at the Hotel de Ville, ii., 153 ; his death, ii., 611 

Flourichon, Admiral, 476 

Forbach, 300; Frossard taken by surprise, 301; the battle, 
302; defeat of the French at, 304; losses on either side, 
305; an incident after the battle, n. 5, 306 

France — its neutrality in 1866, 59; story of the old antago- 
nism between it and Germany, ibid; invaded in 1791, 
60; Republican war of independence, ibid; Napoleon 
Buonaparte, 61 ; campaign of Italy, 63 ; war with Russia, 
65 ; war with Austria in favour of Italian independence, 
ibid; after the Peace of Prague, 101 ; the Emperor's cir- 
cular, ibid; the press denounces a peace policy, 102 ; and 
the Carlylese French, 103 ; the historical truth about 
Burgundy and her Teutonic step-mother, ibid; Aries, 104; 
Charlemagne, first king of, 105; Francis I. competitor for 
the Imperial throne of Germany, 106; attitude, of, as infer- 
able from the Emperor's circular, 111 ; the sv premacy of 
Germany feared in, 124; Luxemburg garrisoned by Prussia 
menacing to, 126; negotiations with the King of Holland 
for the purchase of the Duchy, ibid ; M. Thiers denounces 
the Emperor's foreign policy, in the Corps Legislatif, 127; 
defended by M. Rouher, 128 ; the Belgian railway ques- 



tion, 132 — 137; character of the press, ibid; the Prince 
President and the Chamber, 141 ; the coup d'etat, 
142; appeal to the people, ibid; arrests, 143; prosecution 
of M. de Montalembert, 147, n. 17, 151 ; general pros- 
perity of the country under the Empire, 149; character 
of the Imperial Court, 150; ladies of the court, 150; 
political situation of, after Sadowa, 154; New year's 
addresses, 1869, at tbe Tuileries, 156; opening of the 
Chambers, ibid; the elections of May, 1869, 159, n. 8, ibid; 
the Emperor's speech at Chartres, 160; the ballot in Paris, 
ibid, n. 9, 165; remarkable speech of Prince Napoleon, 
161 ; question of a plebiscite, ibid ; the Scnatus Con- 
sultum, 162, n. 11, 165 ; letter of tbe Emperor to 
M. Rouher, n. 1, 164 ; anti-pldbiscite agitation, 166 ; 
conspiracy to assassinate tbe Emperor, ibid ; tbe ple- 
biscite of May 8th, 170 ; the Emperor's speech on 
receiving the report of the vote, 171 ; the acceptance 
of the Spanish throne by Prince Leopold a real danger 
to, 182, n. 7, 188 ; letter from Madrid to the Government, 
186 ; scene in the chamber, 187; diplomatic intervention, 
190; Lord Lyons' conversation with M. Ollivier, ibid; Lord 
Lyons' interviews with the Due de Gramont, 191,193; the 
King of Prussia declines to comply with the request of the 
French Cabinet, 194 ; the Due de Gramont's unenviable 
position in the Chamber, ibid, n. 13, 204 ; withdrawal of 
Prince Leopold,194; insulted in the person of her ambassa- 
dor, ibid; the Due de Gramont in the Senate, 200 ; M. 
Ollivier in the Chamber of Deputies, 202 ; declaration 
in the Corps L&gislatif, ibid; departure for the frontier, 
203, n. 29, 204 ; declaration of war by Prussia against, 
218 ; Count Benedetti's interview with the King of 
Prussia at Ems, 220 ; Count Bismarck's denunciation of 
the causes of tbe war, ibid ; address of the Senate, and 
reply of the Emperor, 226 ; address of the Corps Ligis- 
latif, and the Emperor's reply, 227 ; the Emperor's address 
to the people, ibid ; the Secret Treaty, 231 ; the Rhine 
frontier, 261 ; the press and the ministry, 308 ; procla- 
mations by the Empress and the Government, 309 ; 
convocation of the Corps Legislatif, 311 ; scene in the 
Chamber, 312 ; resignation of the Ollivier ministry ; 
the Count de Palikao to form a new Cabinet, 317 ; self- 
confidence of the people, 332 ; the merit of having com- 
pelled tbe Emperor to make war claimed for the press, 
333 ; proclamation of the King of Prussia to the people 
of, 335 ; scene in the Chamber on the 13th, 407 ; suc- 
cessive meetings of the Chamber on the 16th, 17th, and 
18th, 410 ; the Council at Chalons, 457 ; speech of M. 
Jules Favre in tbe Chamber 461 ; midnight meeting of 
the Chamber, 463 ; propositions of M. Jules Favre, de. 
claring tbe Empire at an end, 464 ; the Republic pro- 
claimed, 467, n. 10, 470 ; Delegates at the Hotel de 
Ville, 472 ; last meeting of the Chamber, 474 ; tbe 
Provisional Government, afterwards called the Govern- 
ment of National Defence, 475 ; leading members of 
the new Government, ibid; abolition of the Senate, 
477, n. 1, 486 ; proclamation of the Central Committee, 
478 ; counter-manifesto of the Moderate Republicans, 
ibid; tbe Commune, 479; the position assumed by the 
Government of National Defence and M. Jules Favre's 
circular 485 ; tbe military situation after q Sedan, n. 1, 
493 ; rumoured peace negotiations, 5 3 ; second 
manifesto of M. Jules Favre, 507 ; order of the day 
issued by General Trochu, n. 3, 510 ; circular of Count 
Chandordy, 514; and Italy, ii. 18; Garibaldi's arrival 
in, ii. 65 ; Gambetta's proclamation at Tours, ibid; 
summary of military transactions in, ii. 70 ; energy of 
Gambetta, ii. 71 ; decree of the Tours Government for 
fresh levies, ii. 75 ; operations in the Vosges, ii. 91 ; procla- 
mation of the Delegate Government at Tours after Metz, 
ii. n. 42, 143 ; the mission of M. Thiers, ii, 144 ; despatch 
of Earl Granville, ii. 145; reply of Count Bismarck, ii. 146; 
resumption sf negotiations after the fall of Metz, ii. 147 ; 
failure of the negotiations, M. Jules Favre's circular re- 
lating to that event, ii. 148 ; Count Bismarck's account 
of the negotiations, ii. 150 ; the Communists at the 
Hotel de Ville, ii. 153 ; triumph of the Government, ii. 
155, 158 ; the "Reds" and "Rurals," ii. 159; move- 
ments in the provinces, ibid ; Gambetta and the Tours 
Government, ii. 210 ; papers found at St. Cloud and the 
Tuileries, ii. 227 ; the Cabinet Noir, ii. 231 : the National 
Guards and Francs-Tireurs, ii. 233 ; romance of the guns, 
ii. 234 ; operations around Paris in November, ii. 236 ; 
discontent of the Mobiles, ii. 239; removal of tbe Delegate 
Government to Bordeaux, ii. 406; the armistice, ii. 519 ; 
Republicans and Communists, ii. 545 ; Anarcby in the 
Soutb, ii. 546 ; energetic measures of Gambetta and the 



INDEX. 



Delegation at Bordeaux, ii. 547 ; the armistice denounced, 
ii. 548 ; the electoral decrees of Paris and Bordeaux, 
ibid ; conflict of the Government of Defence with M. 
Gambetta, ii. 550 ; interference of M. Bismarck, ii. 551 ; 
proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon, ii. 552 ; elec- 
tions at Paris, ii. 553 ; the National Assembly, ii. 554 ; 
conditions of peace, ii. 560 ; the Assembly and the terms 
of peace, ii. 563; deposition of the Emperor, ii. 565; the 
secret " Central Committee " and the guns, ii. 578 ; pro- 
clamation of the Government, ii. 579 ; suppression of the 
Communist press, ii. 580, 582; removal of the Assembly to 
"Versailles, ii. 583 ; organisation of the National Guai'd, ii. 
584; last appeal of the Government, ibid; triumph of 
the insurrection ; murder of Thomas and Lecomte, ii. 
589 ; the Assembly at Versailles, ii. 595 ; the National 
Guard fire on the people, ii., 596 ; mission of the Mayors 
of Paris to Versailles, ii., 597 ; election of the Commune, 
ii., 598 ; the army of Versailles, ii., 607 ; explosion of a 
cartridge manufactory near Paris, ii., 622 

Fransecky's attack on Ducrot, ii. 249 

Frederick the Great, his conquests, 15 

French army, total number of men in the, n. 4, 9, n. 10, 122 ; 
comparison between the military strength of France and 
Prussia before and after the war of 1866, 113 ; statistics 
of the, 114 — 122 ; retrospect of the, 114 ; Louvois, the 
creator of the, 115; the Maison du Hoi, 116; Louvois' care 
of the troops, ibid ; the old royal army, ibid; Republican 
reorganization, 117; conscription established, and the law 
of substitution, 117 — 119 ; Legion of Honour created, 
ibid ; the grande armee, ibid ; provisional character of 
Napoleon's troops, ibid ; military institutions of France 
destroyed at Waterloo, ibid ; Marshal Gouvion Saint 
Cyr, ibid; term of service in the, 119 ; improve- 
ments in artillery, ibid ; the Imperial Guard, ibid ; law 
of exonerations, ibid ; the army in 1866, 120 ; Marshal 
Niel and the Corps Ligislatif on the reorganisation of 
the, ibid ; the Act of 1868 for the reorganisation of the, 
121 ; the militia of France, n. 4, 122 ; summary of the, 
as reorganised by the Act of 1868, n. 10, 122 ; services 
and death of Marshal Niel, n. 11, 123; strength of the, 
205 ; its constitution and moral, 206 ; the character and 
temperant of the troops at a disadvantage in modern 
warfare, 207, n. 7, 214 ; the chassepot, 208; the mitrail- 
leuse, 210 ; distribution and composition of the various 
corps, 222 ; plan of advance, 223 ; the Emperor's plan of 
campaign, ibid; the Emperor's address to the, 229 ; 
the Turcos and Zouaves, 298 ; the Emperor's last appeal 
to his army at Sedan, 425 

French fleet, the 228, n. 10, 230; the war fleet, 398, n. 2, 404; 
Admiral Bouet-Willaumez in the Baltic, 399; skirmishes 
with the Grille, ibid ; return of the fleet to Cherbourg, 
402; engagement off Havanna between the Bouvet and 
Meteor, ibid 

French Journals, the, 139, n. 4, 151, 154, 165, 333 

French prisoners, 338 

Fre'teval, engagement at, ii., 142, n. 2, 418 

Froschwiller, battle of, 286 

Frossard, General, at Saarbruck, 258; defeated at Forbach, 
304; his retreat on Metz, 322 

Gambetta, in the Corps Legislatif on the 13th of, August, 
407 ; his speech to the populace of Paris, 463 ; short 
account of, 476 ; his proclamation at Tours, ii. 65, 71, 
n. 26, 95; with the army, ii,, 90 ; and the Tours Govern- 
ment, ii., 210 ; in a balloon, ii., 222 ; address to the 
Army of the Loire, ii., 277 ; his correspondence with 
General D'Aurelle, ii., 284 

Garibaldi, during the campaign against Austria, 75 ; and 
"Young Italy," ii., 50 ; dispersion of his forces, ii., 51 ; at 
— Rome, ii., 54 ; at Mentana, ii., 64; his arrival at Marseilles, 
ii., o5, i 1 26, 69 ; in the Vosges, ii., 90, n. 24, 95 ; order of 
the day t" tne A>-my of the Vosges, ii., 159 ; jealousy and 
hatred o., ii., 166 ; chaicH.tcr of his troops, ii., 461 ; scene 
of his operations between the SaoneandtheOgnon, ii., 462; 
fighting at Talmay. ibid ; his proclamation at Amange, 
ii., 463 ; and the priests, ibid; destruction of the bridge 
of Pontailler, ibid ; at Autun, ii., 466 ; affairs of Auxon 
and Chatillon, ii., 467; expedition against Dijon, ii., 467 ; 
attack on Prenois, ii., 469 ; Darois captured, ii., 470 ; 
battle of Autun, ii., 472; actions at Chateauneuf and 
Nuits, ii., 474 ; occupation of Dijon, ii., 488 ; during 
the Armistice, ii., 538 ; in the National Assembly, ii., 

Garnier-Pages, M., 476 [557, n. 15, 575 

Gastein, treaty of, 43, n. 1, 49 

Germany, see Prussia 

Girardin, M. Emile de, and Cassagnac, 140 ; M. Girardin's 
wife, formerly Delphine Gay, ibid, n. 7, 151 



4- 



Glais-Bizoin, M., 475 
Goury, attack on, ii., 309 
Gramont, the Due de, Lord Lyons' interviews with, 191, 193, 
196 ; in the Chamber, 194, n. 13, 204 ; in the Senate, 200 
Gravelotte, the battle of, 363 
Grevy, M. Francois, 475 
Grousset, Paschal, ii., 598 
Hallue, battle of the, ii., 450 
Hanover, see Prussia 
Harfleur, ii., 262 
Havre, ii., n. 9, 262 
Hericourt, battle of, ii., 486 
Hoff, Sergeant, the story of, ii., 376, n. 20, 392 
Hohenzollern, see Prussia 

Hohenzollern, the Spanish crown and the Prince of, 178, 184, 
Holstein, see Denmark [194, 195 

Huetre, fighting at, ii., 327 
Hugo, Victor, his egotism, 138 ; his arrival in Paris, n. 12, 487; 

at the Porte St. Marten, ii., 214 
Inkermann, incident at the battle of, n. 1, 68 
Ironclads, note on the sea-going qualities of the Italian, n. 10,79. 
Italy; Napolean I.'s campaign in, 61 ; France makes war against 
Austria in favour of the independence of, 65 ; Count 
Cavour's reply to the Austrian ultimatum, n. 31, 70 ; 
policy of its alliance with Prussia, 71 ; Ricasoli continues 
the policy of Count Cavour, ibid ; General de la Marmora, 
72 ; summing up of the forces, 74 ; the Austrians guard 
the Quadrilateral, ibid ; advance of the king, and battle of 
Custozza, ibid ; the Italians retreat, ibid ; Garibaldi in the 
Tyrol, 75 ; the navy and its armament, ibid; naval engage- 
ment off Lissa, ibid, n. 6, 79 ; proclamation of the king, n. 5, 
78 ; Admiral Persano put on his trial, and convicted of 
incapacity, 78 ; n. 9, 79 ; sea-going qualities of the Italian 
iron-clads, n. 10, 79 ; Treaty of Prague, 88 ; a sufferer by 
the strife between France and the house of Austria (16th 
century), 108, 109 ; first occupation of Rome by the French, 
ii., 19 ; Napoleon I. and the Pope, ii., 20 ; abolition of the 
temporal power, ii., 22 ; the Pope arrested and carried 
a prisoner to Grenoble, ibid ; his return to Rome, ii., 
24 ; the tyranny of Austria established with the sanction 
of the Holy Alliance, ii., 25 ; origin of Carbonarism, ii., 28, 
n. 4, 45 ; ceremonies of initiation, ii., 29, n. 2, 44 ; revolu- 
tion of 1820 at Naples, ii., 31 ; reaction of Ferdinand 
supported by the Holy Alliance, ibid ; transfer of the 
head-quarters of Carbonarism to Paris, ii., 33 ; Mazzini's 
educational propaganda, ii., 38 ; first conception of 
" Young Italy," ii., 34 ; Mazzini's letter to the king, and 
its reward, ii., 38 ; statutes of " Young Italy " promul- 
gated, ii., 39 ; the Secret Societies, ii., 43 ; the brothers 
Bandiera, ii., 47, n. 2, 67 ; Pio Nono succeeds Gregory 
XVI. on the Papal Throne, ii,, 48 ; reaction and revolu- 
tion, ii., 49 ; appeal of Mazzini, ibid ; reforms in Tus- 
cany and Piedmont, ibid; insurrection in Milan follow- 
ing the revolution of February, 1848, ibid ; Venice sur- 
rendered to Daniel Manin, and a republic proclaimed, ii., 
50 ; retreat of Radetzky, and spread of the insurrection, 
ibid ; disastrous end of the campaign of 1848, ibid; Gari- 
baldi in the field with " Young Italy," ibid ; murder of 
Rossi, and proclamation of the Republic at Rome, ii., 51, 
n. 12, 67 ; flight of the Pope, and combined action of the 
Austrians and the king of Naples, ii., 51 ; defeat and 
abdication of Charles Albert, ii., 52 ; Victor Emmanuel 
king, ibid ; Rome besieged by the French, ii., 57 ; 
occupation of Rome, ibid ; Garibaldi at Mentana ii., 64 ; 
Rome evacuated by the French, ibid 
Jacoby, Dr., arrest of, 513 
Jecker, M., and M. Conti, ii., 228 
Keratry, Emile Comte de, 475 
Koniggratz, the battle of, 82 
Krupp balloon gun, the, ii., 219 
Krupp gun, the, ii., 8 
La Fere surrendered, ii., 239 
Lamartine on Napoleon I., 64 
Langensalza, battle of, 46 
Lanterne, the, 139, 154, 155 

Laon, surrender of, 491 ; explosion at, 492, n. 2, 493, ii., 267 
Laval, ii., 445 [n. 3, 270 

Le Bourget, severe fighting at, ii., 151, n. 3, 5, 161, 370, n. 

13, 391, 510 
Lecomte, General, murder of, ii., 590 

Le Mans, concentration on, ii., 429 ; the battle of, ii., 434, 
n. 2, 448 ; scenes in the streets, ii., 439 ; entry of the 
Germans, ibid 
Lissa, engagement at, 75 
Loigny, battle of, ii., 308, 310 
Loire, Army of the, composition o the, ii. , 79 ; the com- 



INDEX. 



mainler, General <le la Motterougc, ibid; defeated nt 

Oi leans, ii., 288 ; Central d'Aurelle do Paladines takes 
the connnand, ibid; movements of the, ii., 168; victo- 
rious at Coulniieih, ii., IT.'!, n. 8, 179; General Chanzy 
suooeedi D'Aurelle de Paladmee in the command, ii., 177; 
Gembetta'a address to the, ii., 277; retreat after the 
battles round Orleans, ii., 31)3, 401 ; at Le Mans, ii., 421 ; 
after the armistice, ii., 535 
l.illc, Qaxnbetts. at, ii., 458 
Longchamps, the review at, ii., 568, 572 
Longne, engagement at, ii., 442 
Longwy, ii., 238, 542, n. 11, 544 
LorTaine, ii., 571. 

Louvois, the founder of the French army, 115, 116 
Lullier, M., ii., 598 

Luxemburg, the Grand Duchy of, 126, n. 5, 130 ; the altered 
conditions under which, was garrisoned by Prussia 
menacing to Fiance, 126 ; France negotiates with the 
King of Holland for the purchase of, ibid ; conference 
in London to settle the question, 129 ; articles of the 
treaty, 131 ; neutrality during the war of, 251 
Lyons, the Red Flag at, ii., 89, n. 14, 20, 94, n. 21, 23, 95. 
Macmahon, at Worth, 290 ; retreat of, to Nancy and Toul, 
322 ; his arrival at Chalons, 388 ; march to relieve 
Bazaine, 390 ; character of his army, 391 ; dangerous 
position of, 393 ; retreat from Chalons, n. 12, 395, 417 ; 
his strategy questioned, 419 ; defeated at Beaumont, 
423 ; retreat on Sedan, 425 ; wounded at the battle of 
Magnin, M., 476 [Sedan, 437 

Malon, M., ii., 598 
Manin, Daniel, ii. 50, 52, 59, 62 
Manteuffel, his advance from Metz, ii. 52 ; victorious at 

Amiens, ii. 258 ; in pursuit of Bourbaki, ii. 530 
Marmora, General de la, 72 
Marseillaise, the, 163 

Mars-la-Tour, 349 ; position of the German corps, 354 ; the 
attack, 356 ; retreat of the French, 358 ; incidents, 359, 
Maximilian, Emperor of Germany, 105 ; his offer to Henry 
VIII. of England, ibid ; bribes the German electors, 106 ; 
his claims on Burgundy, 107 ; and the Reformation, 108 ; 
his character, 109, n. 16, 112 [70 

Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 66, 67; murder of, 68, n. 36, 
Mazzini, letter of, to a public meeting in his honour, n. 278 ; 
and the origin of Carbonarism, ii. 28 ; his earliest recol- 
lections, ii. 32 ; his educational propaganda, ii. 33 ; his 
arrest and imprisonment, ii. 34 ; release and exile of, 
ii. 36 ; letter to the King of Italy, ii. 38 ; his corres- 
pondence violated, ii. 48 ; appeal of, ii., 49 ; and the 
Papacy, ii., 58 ; on the theory of the dagger, ii. 60 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Grand Duke of, new German corps 
commanded by, ii. 71 ; march of the troops, ii. 175 ; at 
Laon, ii. 267, n. 3, 270 ; operations of the army under, 
ii. 263, 271, 395 
Medical staff, German, ii. 379 
Mercy-le-Haut, fight at, ii. 117, 119 

Metz, concentration at, 323 ; scenes around, 353 ; situation 
of Bazaine at, 370, n.l, 375 ; number of troops and refu- 
gees blockaded in, ibid ; sanitary state of the city, ibid ; 
Bazaine's emissary intercepted, 371 ; Bazaine's plans, 
372 ; sortie from, 373 ; driven back, 374 ; question of 
Bazaine's inactivity, ii. 97,n. 1, 107 ; M. Regnier in, ii. 105 ; 
strength and position of the investing forces, ii. 109 ; the 
army of Bazaine, ii. 110 ; ignorance of the population 
and the army concerning external events, ii. 112 ; Ba- 
zaine's silence and question of allegiance, ibid ; decision 
of a Council of War, ii. 113 ; breach between Bazaine and 
Coffinieres, ibid; proclamations of Marshal Bazaine and 
General Coffinieres de Nordeck, ii. 1 1 4 ; political factions 
in, ii. 115 ; fight on the 22nd of September, ii. 116, n. 
13, 139 ; renewal of the engagement on the 23rd, and 
fight at Mercy-le-Haut, ii. 117, 119, n. 16, 140 ; out- 
post tragedy, ii. 118 ; capture of prisoners and provi- 
sions by the French on the 27th, ii. 119, n. 20, 140; 
fighting at Grange-aux-Bois, ii. 120 ; destruction of 
villages by the investing force, ibid ; sortie of October 
7th, ii. 123 ; approaching famine, ii. 127 ; the question 
of surrender, ii. 128 ; Council of War on the 10th of 
October, ibid ; negotiations of General Boyer with Count 
Bismarck, ii. 129 ; Council of War on the 25th, and ' 
mission of General Changarnier, ii. 131 ; the capitula- 
tion, ii. 132 ; proclamations to both armies, ii. 133 ; 
scenes in the streets, ii. 134 ; the articles of the capitula- 
tion, ii. 135 ; marching out of the prisoners, ii. 136 
Meudon, fighting in, ii., 612 

Mexico, condition of the country, 67 ; Maximilian in, ibid 
Mezieres, Vinoy at, 428 ; battle of, ii. 123 



Mitrailleuse, the, 210 ; the railway, ii. 251 ; steam, ii. n. 251 
Moltke, at the battle of Gravelotte, 366 
Mciit.ilembcrt, M. de, the prosecution of, 147, 17, n. 151 
MontWliard, the castle of, ii. 237 ; its occupation, ii. 238 
Mi.ntinartre, the insurgents at, ii. 578, 627 
Montmddy, ii. 238 ; the capitulation, ii. 436 
Korean, campaign of, 274 
Moree, action at, ii. 412 

Motterouge, General Joseph Edward de la, ii. 79 
Moulineaux, engagement at, ii. 453 

Napoleon I., 61 ; his plan of operations against Austria, 63 ; 
appointed commander-in-chief of the army in Italy, 63 ; 
Lamartine on, 64 ; and the Pope, ii. 20 ; his dream of 
empire, ii. 184 ; his ambition in Egypt and Syria baulked 
by the British Government, ii. 185 
Napoleon III. and the Crimean war ; 65 ; his policy in Mexico, 
67; and the Papacy, 68|; his policy after the Peace of 
Prague, 191 ; his military policy one of peace ; 121 ; his 
foreign policy denounced by M. Thiers, 127 ; defended by 
M. Rouher, 128 ; means by which he rose to power, 139 ; 
proclamation to the people, 2nd of December, 1851, 142 ; 
speech at the opening of the Chambers, 1869, 156; 
letter to M. Olliver, 158; speech at Chartres, 160; 
letter to M. Rouher, n. 164 ; conspiracy to assassinate, 
166 ; his speech on receiving the report of the vote, 
171 ; address of the Senate, and his reply, 226 ; address 
of the Corps Ligislatif, and his reply, 227 ; proclamation 
to the French people, ibid; his departure for head- 
quarters and address to the army, 229 ; suspicions of 
an understanding between him and Count Bismarck, 
248 ; feeling against, 307 ; he throws up the com- 
mand of the army, 323 ; alleged surreptitious inter- 
ference of, with the subsequent military operations, 
341 ; proofs that it was the Council of War at Paris 
which interfered, ibid ; the question of his equipage, 
346, n. 7, 348 ; the further question of his responsibili* ' 
for the alleged appointment of incapable generals, 347 ; 
his letter to M. Rouher on the Fete Napoleon, n. 10, 
348 ; his departure from the army for Chalons, n. 1, 
358 ; attitude of the English press, n. 8, 416 ; last appeal 
to his army at Sedan, 425 ; his surrender at Sedan, 442 ; 
his courage in the field, 443 ; his part in the capitulation 
of Sedan, 446 ; interview with Count Bismarck, 447 ; 
interview with the King of Prussia, 451, n. 4, 455 ; his 
journey to Wilhelmshohe, 452, n. 6, 456 ; proclamation 
of, ii. 552 ; deposed by the National Assembly, ii. 565 
Needle-gun, a surprise, the, 20 ; Jean Nicolas Dreyse, the 

inventor, 93 ; detailed description of the, 9 
Neutrality, the question of, ii. 84 
New Breisach surrendered, ii. 238 
Niederbronn, cavalry skirmish at, 226 

Niel, Marshal and the Corps Ligislatif, 120 ; his bill for the 
reorganising the French army, 121 ; his services and 
death, n. 11, 123 
Noir, Victor, and Prince Pierre Buonaparte, 163 
Noisseville, battle of, 373 
Nordeck, General Coffinieres de, ii. 113 
Nouilly destroyed, ii. 120 
Nuits, battle of, ii. 475 

Ollivier, M. Emile, the Emperor's letter to, 158 ; his electoral 
address, 159; letter from, 168; in the Chamber of 
Deputies, 202 ; letter of, on the secret treaty, 251, n. 2, 
255; his speech in the Chamber, 312; his resignation, 
317 
Orleans, battle near, ii., 82 ; defeat of the French and occu- 
pation of, by Von der Tann, ii., 83, n. 5, 6, 93 ; entrance 
of Cathelineau's Volunteers, and grand religious service 
in the cathedral, ii., 274 ; battles around, ii., 308 — 333 ; 
re-occupation of, by the Germans, ii., 331 
Outposts, the Prussian system of, ii., 371 
Paladines, General D'Aurelle de, takp? ttie command of the 
Loire Army, ii., 83, 16C ; his strategy questioned, ii., 
173 ; resigns the command, ii., 177 ; risume, ii., 236 ; 
his correspondence with Gambetta, ii., 284 
Palikao, Count de, selected by the Empress to form a new 

Cabinet, 318 ; in the Chamber Aug. 13th, 408 
Paris, date of investment, n. 3, 9 ; scenes in the streets and 
boulevards at the time of the coup d'etat, 1 43 ; recon- 
struction of, 147; discontent of the students, 148; 
immense cost of the works, ibid; street scenes in, 193, 
203 ; the Prussian Ambassador leaves, 215 ; consterna- _ 
tion in, at the news of the defeat of Macmahon and 
Frossard, 286, 308 ; in a state of siege, 310 ; the defence 
of, 318, n. 4, 319 ; in August, 406 ; preparations for the 
defence of, 407, n. 6, 415, n. 11, 416; attempted insur- 
rection, 409 ; proclamation of General Trochu as governor 






INDEX. 



of, 411 ; question of a committee of defence, 412 ; a mob 
in, n. 1, 414 ; after Sedan, 457, 459, n. 1, 468 ; expulsion 
of Germans from, 459, n. 2, 469 ; General Trochu's 
speech to the populace, 462 ; Gambetta's speech on the 
steps of the Legislative Palace, 463 ; proceedings of the 
National Guard and the populace, 464, n. 4, 6, 469 ; 
invasion of the Tuileries and flight of the Empress, 466, 
568, n. 7, 470 ; Victor Hugo's arrival in, n. 12, 487 ; the 
investment completed, 498 ; attitude of the population, 
499 ; the fortifications, armament, and provisions, 502 ; 
the ramparts, or first line of defence, ii. , 1 ; the detached 
forts, or second line of defence, ii. , 2 ; Fort Valerien, ii., 
3 ; forts at St. Denis, ii., 4 ; armament of the ramparts 
and forts, ii., 6 ; positions of the various German corps 
in the line of investment, ii., 11 ; sortie under General 
Vinoy, September 30th, ii., 75, n. 9, 78 ; circular of 
Count Bismarck on the situation at, ii., 76 ; the Com- 
munistic movement at, ii., 86 ; the "Amazons" of, ii., 
n. 13, 94; revictualling of, refused, ii., 148; the Com- 
munists at the Hotel de Ville, ii., 153 ; recapture of the 
Hotel de Ville, ii., 155 ; General Trochu and the force 
at his command, ii., 203 ; General Trochu and hia 
" plan," ii., 207 ; sortie of October 13th, ii., 208 ; 
destruction of the Palace of St. Cloud, ibid, n. 5, 241 ; 
the food question, ii., 211, n. 6, 241 ; humour of the 
people of, ii., 212 ; theatres converted into hospitals, ii. 
213 ; visit to the Thedtre du Palais Royal, ibid; Victor 
Hugo at the Porte St. Martin, ii., 214 ; the clubs, ibid ; 
Blanqui and the Patrie en Banger, ii., 215 ; preaching 
Communism, ii., 215 ; general aspect of the town, ii., 
217, n. 11, 241 ; first sound of the enemy's guns, ibid ; 
balloons and carrier-pigeons, ibid, n. 242 ; romance of 
the guns, ii., 234 ; sortie and fight at Bougival, ii., 235 ; 
General Ducrot's sortie, ii., 245 ; retreat, ii., 250 ; 
precious food, ibid; the Garde Nationale, ii., 364 ; the 
Belleville battalion, ii., 366 ; the Gardes Mobiles, ii., 
367 ; the wounded in, ibid ; deficiency of wholesome 
food, ii., 368 ; price of provisions, ibid; distress of the 
women and children, ibid, n. 11, 391 ; tour of the 
enceinte, ii., 370 ; tricks of the besiegers, ii., 371 ; com- 
mencement of the bombardment, ii., 383, 501 ; Auron 
captured, ii., 384-; increasing distress in the city, ii., 386 ; 
clubs again, ii., 387 ; bombardment of the forts, ii., 502 ; 
effect of the fire in the city, ii., 504 ; theory of stray 
shells, ii., 505 ; sortie at Clamart, ii., 506 ; houses and 
barracks burned, ii., 507 ; sortie against Le Bourget, ii., 
510 ; great sortie on the west, ii., 513 ; the fight at 
Buzenval, ii., 514; General Vinoy appointed com- 
mander-in-chief, ii., 51 6 ; insurrection of Communists, 
ii., 517 ; incidents at the Hotel de Ville, ii., 518 ; state 
of the population and approaching famine, ii., 519 ; 
negotiations for the surrender, ibid ; end of the bom- 
bardment, ii., 520 ; occupation of the forts, ibid; the 
seamen and the forts, ii., 521 ; articles of the armistice, 
ii., 528 ; scenes in the streets, ii., 566 ; entrance of the 
Germans^ii., 567, n. 27, 575 ; aspect of , during the Com- 
mune, ii., 606-633 ; burning of the public edifices, ii., 628 

Patay, fighting at, ii., 327 

Pelletan, M., 476 

Pepe, General, ii., 30, 31, n. 7, 8, 45, 50 

Pere Duchesne, the, 139 

Peronne capitulated, ii., 452, n. 13, 459 

Peter the Great, the will of, ii., 182, n. 2, 198 

Phalsburg, fall of, ii., 406 [ment, ii., 154 

Picard, M. Ernest, 476 ; his prompt action saves the Govern- 

Pierre Buonaparte and Victor Noir, 163, n. 13, 165. 

Pigeons, carrier, ii., 217, n. 18, 242 

Poland and the Teutonic Knights, dismemberment of, 15 

Pomerania, 14 

Poupry, combat at, ii., 314 

Prague, the Treaty of, 88 

Princess Christian Buonaparte, 150 

Princess Clotilde, 150 

Princess Mathilde, 150 
1 Protot, M., ii., 598 

Proudhon and the Social Revolution, ii., 576 
i Prussia, military growth of, and the King's proclamation to 
his people in 1870, n. 9, 9 ; Germans always a fighting 
race, 10 ; derivation of the name, 10, n. 2, 16 ; migra- 
tion southward, 10; Henry the Fowler at Brandenburg, 
10 ; Conrad I., Duke of Franconia, elected Emperor of 
Germany, 11 ; commencement of the Electoral 
system, 11, n. 8, 16; institution of Markgraffs, 11; 
Ascaniau line of electors, 11, n. 10, 16; cradle 
of the Hohenzollerns, 11 ; Brandenburg ceded to 
Friedrich of Hohenzollern, 12 ; revolt of the 



nobles, 12; "Heavy Peg," 13; beginning of the 
sovereignty, 13 ; Pomerania, 14 ; acquisition of terri- 
tory eastward to the border of Russia, 1 4 ; the Teutonic 
Knights, 15 ; treaty of Westphalia and acquisitions 
westward, 15 ; title of King assumed, 15 ; Terri- 
tories acquired by Frederick I. and Frederick the Great, 
15 ; acquisitions since the Revolution, 16 ; military 
power in, 17; the Hohenzollern aptitude for discipline, 
17 ; the conscription, 19 ; state policy and the Diet 
of Frankfort, 19, n. 7, 20 ; military demonstrations against 
Austria in 1850, 19 ; its neutrality in 1854, 20 ; and the 
Schleswig-Holstein Question, 21 — 44; alliance with Italy, 
44, n. 5, 49 ; General Manteuffel in Hanover, 45 ; declara- 
tion of war against Hanover, Hesse, Saxony, and Austria, 
ibid, n. 9, 49; strength of the Hanoverian army, ibid; 
battle of Langensalza, ibid ; capitulation of the Hanover- 
ian army, 49 ; the States allied with Austria in support 
of the Bund, 55 ; position of the main army, ibid ; 
alliance with Italy, 71 ; the campaign in Bohemia, 80 ; 
the Austrians almost surrounded, 82 ; the battle-field of 
Koniggratz, or Sadowa, ibid; treaty of Prague, ibid; 
secret treaty between the Southern States 91 ; the King's 
speech at the opening of the Chambers, 91, n. 5, 92 ; Maxi- 
milian, 105 ; public opinion in Germany previous to the 
war, n. 2, 111 ; Luxemburg 126 ; preparations of, 
for war, 184 ; diplomatic intervention, 190 ; interview 
between Lord Granville and Count Bernstorff, 192 ; the 
King declines to comply with the request of the French 
Cabinet, 194 ; declaration of war against France, 218 ; 
Count Bismarck's address to the Reichstag, ibid; note 
sent by, to her ambassador in London, 219, n. 18, 221 ; 
Count Benedetti's interview with the King at Ems, 220; 
Count Bismarck's denunciation of the causes of the war, 
ibid ; the secret treaty, 231 ; departure of the King for 
the seat of war, and his proclamation to the people, 246; 
the strategy of the war long ago predetermined, 331 ; 
the King's proclamation to the French people, 334 ; 
rumoured peace negotiations, 503 ; feeling in favour of 
national unity, 512; attitude assumed by Count Bismarck, 
513, n. 1, 522 ; the press on the question of annexation, 
519 ; conquest of the Rhine frontier anticipated, 520 ; 
reconstitutiou of the German Empire, ii., 334 ; address 
to the King at Versailles, ii., 340, 344. 

Prussian army, peace exercises of the, 7 ; constitution of 
the, 18; after the Treaty of Tilsit, 18; organization of the 
Landwehr, 18; time of service in the, 19; its strength in 
1850, without the Landwehr, 19; mobilisation of the forces 
on the Rhenish frontier in 1859, 20; the field artillery, 20; 
increase of the royal troops, 26; system of officering the, 
50 ; a national one, 51 ; length of service in the, ibid; system 
of military districts and corps d'arme'e, ibid ; constitu- 
tion of the corps d'armee, 52, n. 3, 54 ; new infantry 
tactics, ibid; cavalry tactics, 53; revolution in artillery 
tactics, ibid; the needle-gun, 93; tactics of the, 93; the 
artillery, 96; comparison between the military strength 
of France and Prussia before the war of 1866, 113; 
enumeration of the corps d'armie, 245; plan of advance, 
245; supposed situation and strength of the forces, 247; 
the King's proclamation to the army, 259; advance of the 
armies from the Rhine to the Moselle, 350; the advance 
on Paris, 494; arrival before Paris, 498; positions of the 
various corps in the line of investment, ii., 11 ; before 
Metz, ii., 109; proclamations to the armies after Metz, 
ii., 133; advance of the armies from Metz, ii., 252; 
cavalry operations, ii., 263; the system of outposts, ii., 371 

Prussian navy, 396 ; enumeration of vessels in 1868 and 
1870, ibid; the naval ports, Kiel and Wilhelmshofen, 
ibid; the port of Jahde, 398, n. 1, 404; escape of Admiral 
Adalbert, 398; blockade of the ports, 399; duel between 
the Bouvet and Meteor off Havanna, 402 

Pyat, Felix, ii., 598 

Ranvier, M., ii., 598 

Red Cross, the, a disguise for scoundrels, 494, n. 1, 510 

Regnier, M., ii., 100; propositions submitted by him to the 
Empress, ii., 101; interview with Count Bismarck, ii., 
103; journey to Metz, and interview with Bazaine, ii., 
105; failure of the negotiations, 106 

Requisitions, beginning of the system of, 336 

Rezonville, see Mars-la-Tour 

Rheims, arrival of the Prussians, 494 

Rhine, the battle-ground between the North Sea and, 250; 

Rigault, M., ii., 598 [its history, 261 

Rochefort, M., and the Lanterne, 154, 155; duels, 156; and 
the elections of May, 1869, 159; the Marseillaise, 163; 
his condemnation, 164; at liberty again, 468, 475 ; 
resignation of, ii., 158 ; a prisoner at Versailles, ii., 624 



h 



JNDEX. 






Rome, m 1 1 1 1 \ 

Rowel, ii., 615—619 

Ro i, Count, murder ofj ii., 51 

Rouen, occupation <>f, ii., 269 

Rouher, M., defends the foreign policy of the Emperor, 128; 
the Emperor's letter to, l(i I 

Russia, 21 S ; her policy, ii., 182; the will of Peter the Great, 
ibid, n. 2, 198; Treatj of Kainardji, ii., 183; the Crimea 
annexed, ibidj Treaty of Jassy, ii., 184; in the East, ii., 
186; the Treaty of Paris, ii., 188; attitude of, on the eve 
of the War of 1870, ibid ; the neutralization of the Black 
Sea denounced, ii., 100; Prince Qortschakoff's note, ii., 
191, n. 14, 200; reply of Lord Granville, ii., 193; a 
Conference proposed l>y Count Bismarck, ii., 195; Mr. 
Mill and Bar] Russell, ibid ; Her Majesty's speech on the 
opening of Parliament, ii., 197; meeting of the conference 
in London, ibid; the new treaty, ibid, n. 23, 202 

Saarbruck, 257 ; the engagement, 258, n. 3, 260 ; arrival of 
the Emperor and Prince Imperial at, 259, n. 8, 260 ; de- 
feat of the Prussians, 259 

Sadowa, the battle of, 82 

Saint-Cyr, Marshal Gouvion, 118 

Saintillon, destruction of, ii. 163 

Saxony, the Crown Prince of, and 4th German army, 388 
498 

St. Cloud, destruction of the palace of, ii. 208, n, 5, 241 

St. Privat, the battle of, 360 

St. Quenfin, battle of, ii. 456 

Schlestadt, ii. 236 

Schleswig-Holstein question, see Denmark 

Secret Treaty, the, 231 

Sedan, Macmahon's retreat on, 425 ; arrival of General 
Vinoy's aide-de-camp, and his interviews with the Em- 
peror and Macmahon, 428 ; number engaged on either 
side, 432 ; bird's-eye view of the battle-field around, 
ibid ; positions taken up by the Crown Prince and 
the King, 434 ; the battle commenced, 436 ; attack of 
the Bavarian divisions on Bazeilles, ibid, n. 1, 444 ; Mac- 
mahon wounded, 437 ; General Wimpffen takes the 
command, 437 ; cavalry charges, 439 ; Wimpffen's 
sortie, 440 ; surrender of the Emperor and the French 
army, 442 ; the Emperor's part in the capitulation, 446 ; 
Wimpffen's proclamation to the troops, 448 ; terms of 
the capitulation, 449, n. 1, 454 ; scenes at the surrender, 
450 ; Macmahon's army in captivity, 450, n. 2, 454 

Semecourt, battle of, ii. 123 

Servigny, fight at, 374 

Steele, the, 139, n. 2, 151, 159, 309 

Sille'-le-Guillaume, engagement at, ii. 443 

Soissons, ii. 75, 236 

Spain, rule of the Bourbons in, 172 ; the reign of Ferdinand 
VII., and the claims of his brother, Don Carlos, 173, 
n. 2, 178 ; death of Ferdinand, and succession of his 
daughter, Isabella, 173 ; first Carlist war, and defeat of 
Don Carlos, ibid; marriage of Isabella, 174 ; military 
revolts, 175 ; the dethronement of Isabella, 177 ; Prince 
Leopold of Hohenzollern to be king, 178, 184 ; letter 
from Madrid to the French Government, 186 ; a 
Prussian prince on the throne a danger for France, 191; 
overtures to Amadeus, second son of the King of Italy, 
ii., 350; speech of Prim in the Cortes, ibid ; character 
of Prim, ii. 352 ; scenes in the Congr^so, ibid; election 
of Amadeus, ii. 353 ; speech of Admiral Topete, ii. 355 ; 
assassination of Prim, ii. 357 ; arrival of Amadeus, ii. 
358 ; swearing to the constitution, ibid; visit to Prim's 
widow and children, ii. 359 ; and of the Spanish episode 
in the war of 1870-71, ibid 
Speicheren, battle of, 300 
Spy fever, the, n. 12, 241 

Strasburg, fortifications of, 376, ii. 12 ; summons to sur- 
render, and General Uhrich's reply, 379 ; reconnoitring 
expedition, 380 ; sortie repulsed, ibid; Professor 
AueVbach's diary of the bombardment, 381 ; the 
citadel in flames, 384, n. 4, 386 ; artillery of the 
besiegers, and progress of the works, ii. 13, n. 1, 16 ; 
sortie on the 2nd of September, ii. 14 ; breaching 
batteries at work, ibid, n. 2, 16, n. 3, 17 ; number of 
projectiles thrown into the town and citadel, ii. 15 ; 
the capitulation, ii. 15, n. 7, 17. 
Sybcl, Herr von, on the situation, 506 ; and the cry for an- 
nexation, 519 



Talmay, fighting at, ii., 462 
Tamisier, General, n. 7, 511, ii., 87, 159 
Tann, General von der, inarching on Orleans, ii., 79, 82 ; 
occupation of Orleans by, ii., 83 ; his retreat from 
Orleans, ii., 174 
Tcgethoff, Admiral, 79 
Tergnicr occupied, ii., 239 
Tergolina, Count Vicenzo di, ii., 50, 52, 58, 62, n. 20, 68, n. 

24, 69 
Teutonic Knights, Preussen and the, 15 
Thiers, M., denounces the Emperor's policy in the Corps 
L&gislatif, 127; explains the ground on which he was 
opposed to the war, 406 ; mission of, to the European 
Governments, 508, ii., 144 ; elected President of the 
National Assembly, ii., 555 
Thionville capitulated, ii., 238 
Thomas, General, murder of, ii., 589 
Torpedoes, 400. 

Tourey, the French victorious at, ii., 80, n. 2, 93 
Tours, Gambetta at, ii., 65, 71 ; gloomy anticipations at, ii., 

169 
Toul, siege of, ii., 71 ; the surrender of, ii., 74, n. 2-6, 78; 

the captured garrison, en route for Germany, ibid 
Tridon, M., ii., 598 

Trochu, General, appointed Governor of Paris, 411 ; inter- 
views with the Empress- Regent, 457, 465 ; order of the 
day issued by, n. 3, 510 ; what the Parisians thought of 
him, 511 ; taken prisoner by the Communists, ii., 154 ; 
his escape, ii., 155 ; question of his capacity for the 
position he occupied, ii., 206 ; his celebrated " plan," ii., 
207, n. 1, 240 ; forced to resign his office of commander- 
in-chief, ii., 516 ; his defence, ii., 523 
Turcos, the, 298 

Turenne, Marshal, campaign of, 270 ; his death, 273 
Tiirr, General, letter of, to Count Bismarck, 237, n. 10, 242 
Uhrich, General Alexis, 379 ; his proclamation at the sur- 
render of Strasburg, ii., 15 
Val^rien, Fort, ii., 3 
Vaillant, M., ii., 598 
Valles, M. Jules, ii., 159, n. 11, 161 
Valli&re, action at, ii., 67 
Vendfime, battle of, ii., 415 

Vendome Column, destruction of the, ii., 616, 620 
Verdun capitulated, ii., 238 
Verdure, M., ii., 598 
Vermorel, M., ii., 598 
Versailles, Prussian head-quarters at, 498 ; the King and his 

staff at, ii., 209 ; the Assembly at, ii., 595 
Villafranca, treaty of, 66 
Villepion, the battle at, ii., 305 
Villers, engagement at, ii., 257, 390 

Vinoy, General, at Mezieres, 428 ; despatches an aide-de- 
camp and 'a party of Zouaves to Sedan, ibid ; his retreat 
after Sedan, 488 ; attacked by Uhlans, 489 ; his arrival 
at Paris, 592; appointed commander-in-chief, ii., 516 
Vitroy capitulated, 389, n. 6, 394 
Vosges, the Army of the, ii., 91, 159, 163 
Walewski, Count, n. 21, 151 

War of 1870-71, motives for the declaration, 8 ; a translation 
of the declaration, n. 7, 9 ; anticipated, 54, n. 6 ; Mr. 
Carlyle's letter on the, 103 ; profound causes of the, 124 ; 
Count Bismarck's denunciation of the causes of the, 220; 
its strategy predetermined by the Prussians, 331 
Weapons, 93, 208, ii., 7, 219, 234, 251 
Weissenburg, 279 ; the French surprised and defeated, 282, 

n. 7, 284 ; death of General Abel Douay, 283 
Wends or Vandals, the, 10, n. 5, 16 

Werder, General, before Strasburg, 380 ; advance of his 
army after the fall of Strasburg, ii., 90, 162 ; at Dijon, 
ii., 165 
William I., proclamation to the people, and departure for the 
seat of war, 246 ; proclamation to the army, 259 ; pro- 
clamation to the French people, 335 ; at the battle of 
Gravelotte, 366, n. 8, 369 ; interview with the Emperor 
Napoleon, 451 ; at Versailles, ii., 209 
Wimpffen, General, takes the command at Sedan, 437; 

defeat and surrender, 442 
Worth, battle of, 291, n. 15, 299 
Wrangel, Count von, n. 33 
Zouaves, the, 298, ii., 438 



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1 



AUGUSTA. 

EMPRESS OF CERMANY 



GERMANY AND FRANCE: 



A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 



CHAPTER LVI. 

PARIS INVESTED — THE FORTIFICATIONS. 

The Ramparts, or First Line of Defence— The Detached Forts, or 
Second Line of Defence — Grouping of the Forts relative to the 
Seine and the Marne — The Eastern Line from Charenton to 
Romainville — The five Southern Forts — Situation of Valerien 
on the West — New Works to complete the Defences on this 
side — Technical description of Fort Valerien — The Forts on 
the north side around St. Denis — Situation of the Forts on 
the three exposed sides of Paris within range of each other's 
fire — Relative height of the ground on which they stand — 
The Southern Forts commanded by the Heights of Clamart 
and Chatiilon — Bearing of this fact on the importance of 
Valerien — Armament of the Ramparts and Forts — French 
and German Guns — The Krupp Cannon — Illusions indulged 
in by the Parisians — Their disbelief in the Investment or 
Siege of the Capital — " II faut etre la" — Contradictory 
elements of the French character — Positions of the various 
German Corps in the Line of Investment. . 

We have stated the peculiar circumstances 
which caused the fortifications of Paris to 
combine the principle of a continuous ram- 
part round the capital with that of a system 
of detached forts (ante, p. 500). The follow- 
ing description of the works, aided by the 
coloured plan, will enable the reader to appre- 
ciate both the strength of the defences, and 
the military operations which took place 
around them. 

Paris, situated on both sides of the Seine, 
is surrounded by a rampart which may be 
conveniently described as commencing at the 
river, about a mile below the confluence of the 
Marne. This encircling wall, or enceinte, has 
ninety-four bastioned fronts, eighty-five of 
which are of regular formation. Bastion No. 1 



is on the right bank of the Seine, where the 
wall may be supposed to commence, and the 
numbers follow in order entirely round the 
city, until we return to the Seine on the left 
bank, where, accordingly, we find bastion 
No. 94. Accurately described, the wall is in the 
form of a huge irregular pentagon, so that the 
bastions face in five different directions. Their 
fronts measure 360 metres (about 1,200 feet) 
on the exterior side, and are revetted with a 
scarp of 10 metres (about 32 feet) in height, 
composed of rubble masonry, faced by a soft 
stone in courses of 8 to 10 metres, supporting 
the solid earthern rampart and parapet. The 
ditch has a width of 25 metres (about 80 feet), 
the counterscarp, which is not revetted, has 
a height of 6 metres (about 20 feet), and a 
slope of 45 deg. On the outside of the ditch 
there is no exterior work, but simply a glacis, 
separated by a slight berme from the counter- 
scarp, which, when the German armies ap- 
peared before Paris, time had almost reduced 
to the common slope of the counterscarp. The 
glacis covers the masonry of the scarps but 
partially. Behind the enceinte, the circum- 
ference of which is about 20 miles (30 kilo- 
metres), runs a wide military road, from which 
ramps ascend to the bastions and curtains. 
Within the road, also entirely encircling the 
city, is a line of railway ; and between it and 
the last houses of the city large spaces have 
been retained for military edifices and rendcz- 

1 



THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN FORTS. 



vous of troops, which, however, during the 
long peace had been encroached upon hy the 
improvements of the municipality. The in- 
terior of the bastions is entirely clear, with 
the exception of a few, on which it has been 
found necessaiy to construct earthern cava- 
liers, either for the defilement of the adjacent 
terrepleins, or of the military road, or to bat- 
ter and command the hollows on the exterior. 
The strength of the enceinte is considerably 
increased by the number of bastioned fronts 
it presents in a right line, owing to its great 
extension, as these numerous fronts protect 
most of its faces and curtains from rico- 
chet, and deprive the besieger of the oppor- 
tunity of concentrating his efforts to a centre 
by a converging circle of fire. On the other 
hand, the absence of the outworks technically 
called demilunes is a detrimental circumstance 
in this arrangement of numerous fronts on a 
right line, as it deprives the fronts of the 
advantage of a cross-fire, leaving them only a 
direct fire, which is no stronger beyond the 
ditches than from a front like an extended 
wall, or simply en cr&mxiilliere (like a saw), 
with the exception, perhaps, that it secures a 
good flanking defence of the ditches. On the 
whole, as the besiegers would find it impos- 
sible to enfilade the guns on the ramparts 
formed by a straight line of bastions of such 
extent, it is difficult to see that the attack 
could have any advantage over the defence 
from the absence of demilunes. 

The tortuous course of the Seine and its 
tributary, combined with the greater proba- 
bility of the capital being menaced by an 
army approaching from the east than from 
any other direction, has necessarily influenced 
the distribution of the detached forts, which, 
like the defences of Mayence, have this advan- 
tage from covering the junction of two rivers 
— the Seine andtheMarne — that the attacking 
army must be divided into three parts, operat- 
ing in three distinct fields of action, any one 
of which may be chosen by the garrison for a 
sortie in force. In grouping these defences it 
will be convenient to commence on the side 
most open to attack. 

The eastward group of outside defensive 
works comprises all the fortresses and redoubts 



stretching from the Seine, northwards to the 
eastern railway. These are (1) Charenton, 
between the Seine and Marne ; (2) the redoubt 
of Gravelle ; and (3) the redoubt of Faisanderie, 
connected by an earthen rampart, and occupy- 
ing the narrow neck of land formed by the 
bend of the Marne, behind the village of St. 
Maur; (4) the fort of Vincennes, with the 
ancient castle of that name, forming the key 
and arsenal of the whole field of battle on 
this side of Paris ; (5) the fort of Nogent, in 
front of Vincennes; (6) the redoubt of Fon- 
tenay-sous-Bois, a little northward of Fort 
Nogent ; (7) the fort of Rosny ; (8) the re- 
doubt of Boissiere; (9) the small redoubt of 
Montreuil; (10) the fort of Noisy; (11) the 
redoubt of Noisy; (12) the fort of Romain- 
ville, and other works on the Ourcq Canal. 
The redoubts are permanent works established 
on sites which command the hollows or ravines 
not seen from the forts, and the lines of fire 
from the redoubts and forts combined overlap 
each other so as to command the whole ground, 
of course, on the supposition that all the works 
are properly manned and armed. 

The southern group of forts occupies the 
ground between the confluence of the Marne 
and the bend of the Seine, near Meudon, op- 
posite bastions 68 — 94 inclusive. They are 
(1) Ivry, (2) Bicetre, (3) Montrouge, (4) Van- 
ves, (5) Issy. A little to the west of Vitry- 
sur-Seine, opposite the fort of Ivry, is the 
redoubt of Moulin-Saquet; farther west, oppo- 
site Bicetre, that of Villejuif ; and still more 
to the west, opposite Vanves, that of Moulin- 
de-la-Tour. 

The advantage accruing to the defence from 
the junction of the Seine and the Marne on 
the east has been mentioned. A similar, but 
not quite the same, advantage is obtained from 
the windings of the Seine on the west, which 
resemble the letter S reversed, co . On this 
side the city was thought to be sufficiently 
covered by one great fort, that of Mont Vale - - 
rien, as the river itself, which stretches some 
fourteen miles from St. Denis to Sevres, forms 
an immense fosse, at an average distance of a 
mile and a half from the western face of the 
enceinte, with the Bois de Boulogne within 
the first loop, to serve as cover. But artillery 



FORT VALERIEN. 



practice is not what it was thirty or forty 
years ago. After the capitulation of Sedan 
the French deemed it necessary to complete 
the exterior circle of defences on this side by 
interpolating two new works, the redoubts of 
Genevilliers and Courbevoye, between St. De- 
nis and Fort Valerien, and two others, the re- 
doubts of Montretout and Sevres, between 
Fort Valerien and Fort d'Issy. If these four 
works were not unfinished when the Prussian 
investment commenced, they were certainly 
unarmed ; for though, as we shall see hereafter, 




as being too much exposed to the guns of Fort 
Valerien. The redoubt of Courbevoye, oppo- 
site Neuilly, and about half-way between Gene- 
villiers and Mont Valerien, was probably never 
half finished. It was too near Fort Valerien 
to be of any use to the Prussians, and appears 
to have been abandoned by the French at the 
same time as Genevilliers. 

The great fort itself is a pentagonal one, the 
sides of which, measuring from 1,150 to 1,250 
feet, exceed the dimensions of every other fort 
around Paris. For the sake of technical ac- 



FOBTBBSS ON MONT 
VALERIEN. 

1. Commander's residence. 

2. Officers' quarters. 

3. Barracks. 

4. Arsenal. 

5. Artillery stores. 

6. Powder magazine. 

7. Sallyports. 

8. Shaft. 

9. Churchyard. 

10. Chapel. 

11. Telegraph tower. 



imJ 'Railway station at Suresnes. 
11 



— — ' 




Section through the line ABC, enlarged scale. 



the Prussians almost immediately occupied 
three out of the four, there was no mention of 
any guns being taken in them. The northern- 
most of the three in question is the redoubt of 
Genevilliers, situated within the loop formed 
by the Seine, opposite St. Denis. It is about 
two miles and three-quarters from St. Denis, 
and a little further from Argenteuil and Ar- 
rieres. The redoubts of Sevres and Montre- 
tout (the last immediately north of the Park of 
St. Cloud) were both occupied by the Prussians, 
but they subsequently evacuated Montretout, 



curacy, the description of Valerien which fol- 
lows is given in the words of Colonel Delafield, 
of the United States Corps of Engineers. 
" This hill (Valerien) is so conical as not to 
give sufficient space to occupy its summit with 
a defensive work; yet it was necessary to 
occupy as high ground as practicable to com- 
mand the adjacent and surrounding coun- 
try ; hence the line of its magistral, although 
horizontal, is some distance down the slope of 
the hill, leaving its summit as a great -traverse 
and parados for the whole interior of the work. 



i 



FORTS AT ST. DENIS. 



The summit of tlic hill forms a second terre- 
plein, which is partially surrounded with an 
earthen parapet, and upon which is located 
bomb-proof quarters and store-houses for ar- 
tillery, munitions, and equipments. Like all 
the rc.st.it has no demilunes, and only small 
places of arms opposite the centre of its front, 
with masonry counterscarps and covered ways 
on four fronts. In the bastions are high cava- 
liers, in a great measure amounting to a second 
work within the first trace on the slope of the 
hill, that elevates the crest far above the usual 
height of bastion cavaliers. The irregularity 
of the ground has caused a departure from 
parallelism in the faces and flanks of these 
elevated parapets, compared with those of the 
main enclosures ; and the same cause has in- 
troduced changes in the profile of the ramparts, 
not only on the several fronts, but on different 
parts of the same front. For example, on the 
gateway curtain there is no other defence than 
musketry from behind the crest of the scarp 
which forms a stone parapet of 3ft. 6in. thick, 
backed by an earthen banquette which is con- 
tinued on each flank, and a short distance on 
each face. The flank on the right of the gate- 
way, looking from the work, is thrown back 
from the scarp, joining that of the face of the 
bastion, which extends in the usual manner 
over the scarp. On the left there is a similar 
retired flank connected with the faces of the 
bastion, also thrown to the rear, giving the 
chemin-de-ronde on the faces or flanks of this 
bastion, within which is a high cavalier. The 
scarps and counterscarps of this front are of 
solid masonry, with a tambour of masonry 
covering the head of the bridge connecting 
with the main gate, and no covered way. An- 
other front has the parapet of both its faces 
thrown to the front over the scarp, with those 
of the flanks and curtains thrown back to give 
to the chemin-de-ronde and the top of the scarp 
when finished, 3ft. 6in. thick, serving as the in- 
fantry parapet. A cavalier in the right bastion 
has its flanks on this point prolonged to the rear, 
to intersect the steep slope of the natural sur- 
face of the hill ; while in the left bastion the 
cavalier flanks are prolonged greatly to the 
rear, and terminated by a ramp commencing 
in rear of the curtain, and ascending behind 



this cavalier to the upper plateau. There is a 
bomb-proof communication under this cavalier 
from the one flank to the other of the bastion, 
connected with one on the line of the capital 
leading to the gorge, serving as a shelter to 
the troops only. The counterscarp of this 
front is of masonry, with a narrow covered way 
and glacis cowpi on the left, the prolongation 
of which gives a ditch through a spur of the 
hill. In the re-entering place of arms is an 
open masonry loopholcd redoubt, with small 
retired flanks. The ascent to the ditch on 
this front is by a covered masonry staircase 
from the chemin-de-ronde on the curtain, and 
the communication from its postern across the 
ditch is covered by a slight tenaille and ca- 
ponnaire to the counterscarp. On another 
front the profile again differs. Upon it there 
is a double earthen parapet along one whole 
front, with a chemin-de-ronde on the curtain, 
and the flanks in addition, the superior parapet 
along the curtain being a junction of the bastion 
cavalier flank. The counterscarp and covered 
way, with the communications, are in this case 
similar to the preceding front. In the salients 
of one of these bastions, and in the salient of the 
corresponding covered way, are mounted 9|-inch 
long guns. The trace of this front is peculiar 
in the following respect, that the facings of the 
bastions produced fall upon and intersect each 
other on the centre of the face of the scarp of 
the curtain, and intersect the earthen parapet 
of the flank about twenty feet in advance of 
the curtain angle. The prolongation of the 
face of the scarp of the curtain divides this 
flank in nearly equal parts." 

Continuing our circuit of the city, we come 
to the forts on the north side ; namely, those in 
the neighbourhood of St. Denis, the West- 
minster Abbey of France, situated about five 
miles from the heart of Paris, and about half 
that distance from the enceinte. Three forts 
surround this ancient seat of the royalty of 
France. On the left, looking from Paris, is the 
Fort de la Bridie, commanding the railway to 
Montmorency, the St. Denis canal, and the 
Seine north of the town ; la Double Couronne 
du Nord ; and the Fort de VEst. These are 
all united by a wall and ditch, and at one of 
the redoubts there are means for flooding the 



PARIS AND I T SIP 



SHEWING THE LINE OF INVESTMENT 




G.G.G. PART OF PARIS OCCUPIE 



RATIFICATIONS. 

NGE OF FIRE ROUND THE FORTS. 




HE GERMANS MARCH 1.187 



GIANT CANNON. 




6 



ARMAMENT OF TL.3 FORTIFICATIONS. 



country ; so that this very strong series forms 
in reality a separate fortification in itself. Two 
inil<\s south-east from Fort de VEst is Fort 
d'Aubervillicrs. Between the two runs the 
railway to Soissons, and further on is the 
St. Denis canal. The earth dug from this 
canal was thrown up, and an earthwork made 
for its protection, strengthened by three re- 
doubts. At the distance of 9,800 feet more, 
and 4/200 from the wall of Paris, is Fort de 
liomainville, which belongs to the eastern line 
of defences, and thus completes our circuit of 
the city. 

The next point to be observed is that all the 
forts, from those of St. Denis in the north-east 
to Issy on the southern side, are so distanced 
from each other that their fire covers the whole 
ground by overlapping. On reference to the 
coloured plan it will be seen that two circles 
ai - e traced round each fort : the first is struck 
at a distance of 650 yards, which may be con- 
sidered the ordinary range of the chassepot ; 
the other at 1,300 yards, a distance which is 
more than covered by the range of ordinary 
cannon. The figures on the plan indicate the 
height from the level of the sea in feet. It 
will be seen on comparing them, that the five 
forts on the southern side are not well placed, 
in consequence of having been designed before 
the improvement of artillery. Being situated 
about midway between the ramparts and a 
parallel range of heights less than two miles 
and a half (4,100 yards) distant, they are com- 
pletely commanded by the latter. It was to 
provide a remedy for the weakness of the 
defences at this point that General Trochu 
occupied the range of heights referred to, and 
strove so desperately to hold the position 
against the Germans on the 19th of September, 
as previously related (vol. i., pp. 496 — 498). 
We shall see hereafter that the attempt was 
repeated, but with no greater success. 

Considering that the Germans had their 
batteries planted on these heights, there is 
some reason in the argument which has been 
used, that undue importance was attached 
to the possession of Vale'rien. Clamart and 
Chatillon are only a few feet below Vale'rien, 
and are a mile nearer to the centre of the 
city. The fire of the batteries planted on 



these heights overtopped the forts Issy and 
Vanves by more than 250 feet, and this within 
chassepot range. With such guns as the 
Prussians were certain to get into position as 
the siege progressed, every part of Paris worth 
bombarding could be commanded. In the mean- 
time, with less powerful pieces, Issy and Vanves 
would be compelled to succumb within a cal- 
culable number of days, in which case the 
villages of the same name in front of them 
would be occupied, and afford cover to the 
Prussians up to within 1,000 yards of the 
ramparts. 

The armament of the ramparts consisted of 
1,226 guns, most of the bastions being defended 
by eight or ten 12-pounders. Of the detached 
forts Charenton had 70 guns ; Vincennes, 117 
Nogent, 53; Rosny, 56; Noisy -le-Sec, 57 
Romainville, 49 ; Aubervilliers, 66 ; Fort de 
l'Est, at St. Denis, 52 ; La Briche, at St. Denis, 
61 ; Mont Vale'rien, 79; Issy, 64 ; Vanves, 45 
Montrouge, 43 ; Bicetre, 40 ; Ivry, 70. These 
figures include the guns of the outworks at- 
tached to the various forts, and the naval sruns 
that were added to the original armament. 
There were a few pieces of exceptionally large 
calibre, such as the giant cannon which the 
Germans found in Fort la Briche when Paris 
capitulated. The gates and sallyports were 
also mounted with large guns of compara- 
tively heavy calibre. On the other hand, 
there was no water in the ditches, and the 
encumbrances on the ground, consisting of 
villas, chateaux, woods, parks, and gardens, 
(notwithstanding the destruction that had 
been hastily wrought,) presented so many 
obstacles to the fire of the defenders, while 
at the same time they afforded excellent cover 
to the attacking force. 

With respect to the relative strength of the 
French and German artillery, we shall see, as 
the siege proceeds, that the guns in the Paris 
forts were sufficiently powerful in the hands 
of the trained sailors and gunners to keep the 
Prussians at a distance too great for breaching, 
even if they had ever entertained the idea of 
entering the city by assault. The naval guns 
sent up to Paris from the ports and ships, when 
it was found that nothing could be accom- 
plished on the coast or at sea, were made of 



FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN GUNS. 



cast iron, strengthened behind the trunnions 
with steel rings shrunk on. The breech ar- 
rangement is similar in principle to that pro- 
posed by Eastman, several of whose guns were 
purchased by the British Government during 
the Crimean war, but have never been used. 
They are of four dimensions, as follows : — 



Denomination 
of S ze. 


Weight. 


Calibre 


Battering Charge. 


Projectile. 


16 Centimetres 

19 

24 .. 

27 „ 


4 tons IS cwt. 

7 „ 17 „ 
13 „ 16 „ 
21 „ 13 „ 


inches. 

6 48 

7 64 
9 '45 

10-82 


16-5 lb. 
275 „ 
52 9 „ 
66 2 „ 


99 1b. 
165 „ 

317 „ 
476 „ 



The charge of the French naval gun is 
therefore more than one-sixth of the weight of 
the projectile. The cannon of ten centimetres 
has three grooves, the others have five. The 
carriages and slides are of wrought iron, on the 
box-girder construction. The projectiles, which 
have copper studs, are common shell, and both 
flat-headed and pointed steel shot, the flat- 
headed being for close quarters in naval 
warfare. One of the 24 c. m. guns, in the 
experimental trials reported by Lieut.-Col. 
Owen in 1867, stood over 1,000 rounds with 
battering charges and projectiles. 

A monster breech-loading smooth-bored piece 
of similar construction to the above, but of 42 
centimetres (16| in.) calibre, was exhibited in 
Paris in 1867. Its weight was 38 tons, and it 
was intended to fire a solid spherical shot of 
660 lb., with a charge of 110 lb., and a spheri- 
cal shell of 462 lb. (holding a bursting charge 
of 19-8 lb.), with a charge of 726 lb. 

The Prussian guns manufactured at Krupp's 
great establishment in Essen, Rhenish Prussia, 
are for the most part of crucible cast steel, 
made from a combination of puddled steel and 
pure wrought iron, in proportions which have 
been preserved secret, but which yield a metal 
equal in elastic and absolute strength to the 
best of English cementation steel, and that, too, 
without oil- tempering. This much, however, 
is known : the wrought iron used in the com- 
bination is produced from English and German 
haematite ores ; the puddled steel from the 
spathic ore of Siegen; and another component 
part, the spiegeleisen, which is used only in 
small quantities, from the long crystal variety 
of that ore found in Nassau. The metal is 
run in ingots of a cylindrical form ; and when 



sufficiently hard to admit of handling, the 
ingot is removed from the mould, and buried 
in ashes, where it slowly cools. Each part 
of the gun is formed from one ingot, which, 
when required for use, is brought to tne ne- 
cessary heat in an ordinary furnace, and drawn 
out to the proper length under a hammer. The 
barrel of the much-talked-of 9-inch gun is 
fashioned from one ingot, and its trunnion ring 
from another. Of these guns the magnificent 
establishment at Essen is able to turn out one 
every day. 

The following are the dimensions of Prussian 
breech-loading and rifle guns up to the 9i-inch 
or 96-pounder, as reported by Colonel Owen, 
at the Paris Exhibition : — 

1. Field and Siege Guns. 



Denomination 
of Size. 


Calibre. 


Charge. 


Weight of Shell. 


4-pounder. 
6 
12 

24 „ 


31 inches. 

36 „ 

4'7 

58 „ 


i to 1 lb. 

•4 to 12 „ 

■7 to 21 „ 

1-6 to 4-3 „ 


8 5 lb. 
13 8 „ 
29 „ 
54 3 „ 



2. Naval Guns. 



Denomination 
of Size. 


Calibre. 


Charge. 


Weight of ShelL 


24-pounder. 

72 

96 ',', 


5 8 inches. 
8-2 „ 
92 


12 1b. 
34 „ 
48 ,, 


711b. 

170 „ 
305 „ 



The 4 and 6-pounders are of steel (Krupp's) ; 
the 1 2-pound er is a converted bronze gun ; 
some of the 24-pounders are converted bronze ; 
others converted cast iron. The Krupp works 
have turned out heavier guns than the 9-inch 
or 9 6-pounders, but only in small numbers for 
experimental purposes. These exceptional guns 
are of 11-in., 12-in., and 13 in. calibre ; besides 
which a monster 1000-pounder, of 14-in. calibre, 
was exhibited in Paris in 1867. Colonel Owen 
states that this monster gun has a forged inner 
tube, strengthened with three layers of rings 
over the powder chambers, and two layers ove r 
the muzzle portion. Its manufacture went on 
day and night for fifteen months, and its cost 
was £15,750. On account of the complicated 
breech arrangement, considerable time would 
be taken up with the operations of loading. 
For practical purposes, considering the rapidity 
with which they can be turned out in sufficient 
numbers, the facility of handling, and the weight 
of the projectiles, the classes of guns in the 
above tables are those which compete with the 
French ordnance, and of these the 9-inch may 

2a 



THE KIMTP CiUN. 



be regarded as the typical one With the as- 
sistance of Hi" following section, the manner 

in which those powerful guns are built up 
may be made sufficiently intelligible for the 
] >ui| >oses of history. 

The Krupp gun consists of a central tube 
(A a), strengthened by a number of encircling 
hoops, (b c, etc.), so that in general shape its 
exterior resembles a soda-water bottle, growing 



charge. It is then covered with a coat of lead 
(aa ), in the manner following. It is necessary 
to premise that the object of the soft jacket 
is to prevent windage, or any irregular move- 
ment of the projectile as it leaves the gun ; but 
it is at the same time necessary that the weight 
of lead should be reduced to a minimum, in 
order to avoid loss of momentum on the striking 
of the shot, which would be caused by the 



' V ^,^"7'T""^ 




^'■■^1 i ° | c i .. [ L — I 

Fig. 1. section of t.ie krupp gun. 



gradually thicker where the strain on the 
metal is greatest. The 6-inch gun has one set 
of hoops ; the 8-inch and 9-inch two, and the 
11-inch and higher calibres, three. The tube 
(A a) is a cylinder, the walls of which are 
eight-tenths of the calibre in thickness from 
a point over the middle of the charge to 
that at which the rings terminate. From the 
latter point the exterior surface of the cylin- 
der is tapered off to the muzzle like a cone, 
its thickness diminishing to one-half cali- 
bre. Thus the tube of a 9-inch gun is four 
inches and a half thick at the muzzle, increas- 



l— / — Cv- 






Fig. 2. krupp projectile. 

ing to 7 - 2 inches under the hoops. These rings 
of metal are shrunk on at a black heat, and 
prevented from shifting along the tube, or an 
inner ring, by key rings (a a), which are half- 
hoops let into grooves cut to receive them. The 
projectile (fig. 2) is cast with undercut projecting 
rings round the body ; or, if made of steel, is 
forged, and bored out to receive the bursting 




flying off of the lead at the first instant of 
impact. To accomplish this, the projectile 
having been turned smooth on its cylindrical 
part, is placed in a bath of sal ammoniac to 
remove the oil, after which it is immersed, 
first in molten zinc, then in lead, and after- 
wards put in a mould where lead is run 
round it. The jacket is thus secured by a 
process of soldering. Finally, the projectile, 
thus coated, is taken to a lathe, where the lead 
is reduced by turning to the required thin- 
ness, and the rings at the same time left on its 
surface. 

The rifling of the gun is made to diminish as 
the grooves approach the muzzle, so that as 
the projectile passes along the bore, the lead 
coating is subject to an increasing pressure. 
Besides this provision of diminishing grooves, 
the chamber in which the shot and charge rest 
when the gun is loaded is of greater diameter 
than the bore, while its axis is excentric to 
and above that of the rifled part. This is done 
to give the necessary working room, and still 
retain the axis of the projectile as a prolonga- 
tion of the axis of the bore, so that no danger 
may exist of its head being canted upwards, 
which would allow of the escape of gas, and 
perhaps abrade the lead coating, and spoil the 
perfect finish of the bore. In guns which 
admit of windage, other arrangements are 



ILLUSIONS OF THE PARISIANS. 



9 



made to secure what is called the centering of 
the projectile; but these are scientific details 
which it is not necessary to explain. It is 
sufficient to remark that accuracy of fire 
depends very greatly on the steadiness of the 
axis of a projectile in the bore of the gun. 
This is effectually secured in the Krupp system 
of compression, but the strain on the gun is 
proportionately great ; and as no flame from 
the charge can pass the shell to light its fuse, 
this has to be done by a percussion arrange- 
ment, as shown in the section. 

The method of loading a Krupp gun with 
one of these formidable projectiles is shown 
in fig. 3* 




Fig. 3. loading the krupp 



gun. 



The Prussian siege trains were not up at 
the same time as the investing army, the 
larger guns especially being delayed by the 
broken-down bridges and other impediments. 
It was not till the middle of October that 
any of the siege guns were in line with the 
troops, and it was very much later before any 
of the batteries were got to work. On the 
whole, at the period we have reached (end of 
September), . it was incredible, even to the 
well-informed French, that Paris would be in- 
vested, much less bombarded. " Were it possi- 
ble to bombard the capital," said a retired 
colonel of the army, " the only result would 
be to draw down upon the heads of those who 
ordered such an act of Vandalism the execra- 
tion of mankind." A regular siege was not 
to be thought of: it would be too protracted, 
and present too many difficulties. A blockade 
was simply an impossibility. A line so im- 

* For some of the above details, more particularly the exact 
dimensions of the guns, the author is indebted to Lieut.-Colonel 
Owen's Principles and Practice of Modern Artillery. 
1 \ urray.) 



mensely extended would necessarily be weak, 
at almost any given point, and though the 
mobilised army of the defence might be nu- 
merically the weakest, it would easily beat 
the larger army of the besiegers, when dis- 
tributed over a line so extended in detail. 
Strong places had often been taken by assault 
or surprise by a few hundreds of the enemy ; 
but how surprise a populous capital, defended 
by some two or three hundred thousand men ? 
A whole army would be required for the 
assault ; but the necessity of moving an army 
to the attack reduced the idea of a surprise to 
an absurdity. If a regular siege were contem- 
plated, the answer was that it had taken 
eleven months to capture Sebastopol, and 
during the time that must necessarily elapse 
the pressure on the other Powers, which would 
be compelled to keep large armies on a war 
footing, would be certain to result in inter- 
national complications. Then the labours of 
the besieging force would be liable to per. 
petual interruption from the sorties of thd 
garrison, and when they had succeeded in 
establishing their first parallel, they would 
still be some three miles from the city ; nay, 
to carry on their works at all, the besiegers 
themselves would have to construct defensive 
works, and oppose one enormous entrenched 
camp by another still larger. Such were the 
arguments with which the Parisians comforted 
themselves while the enemy was drawing his 
cordon of fire and steel round Paris. Beneath 
all this speciousness it was easy to see that 
their reliance, after all, was on the chapter of 
accidents ; and the principal accident on which 
they calculated was the interference of one or 
more of the other Powers. Russia would cer- 
tainly never allow Prussia to continue a career 
of conquest which would place the destinies of 
Europe in her hand. England must feel that 
with France utterly subjugated and dismem- 
bered, the King of Prussia would next seize 
upon Holland, and dispute the empire of the 
seas. Then again, had not the Republic been 
proclaimed ? Had Count Bismarck no fear 
that democratic ideas would spread through 
the ranks of the investing army ? Granting 
the worst, Paris would make a gallant 
defence. It needed more courage to leave 



10 



RALLYING TO THE DEFENCE. 



the capital at such a time than to stay, as 
M. Sarcey has observed. On all great occasions 
there is always some stereotyped phrase which 



side, or to some inland watering-place ; others 
to Touraine and the South of France ; and they 
all returned as soon as this domestic duty was 



expresses public opinion, and serves to a great | performed, " The emigration to the coast of 




fiii' 
1 lJI 



I lii 









extent as a rallying cry : " Ilfaut etre to " was | Normandy had been considerable, and it was 
the phrase in vog-ue. Many persons of the a curious sight to see the railway stations of 
upper classes had, as a matter of prudence, the celebrated seaside towns crammed with 
removed their wives and families to the sea- men who were all returning alone to Paris, 



THE GERMAN LINES COMPLETED. 



11 



without being called there by any business, 
but who had said to themselves, ' II faut etre 
Id.' They formed into animated groups, and 
all of them, merchants, lawyers, barristers, 
functionaries, artists, speaking to each other 
without any previous acquaintance, began a 
conversation : ' May I ask if you are returning 
to Paris ? ' ' Well, yes ; not for the harm I 
shall be able to inflict on the Prussians, for I 
don't know how to hold a gun; still, 11 faut 
etre Id.' That was the one refrain ; and there 
was no end of quizzing at the men who, either 
from fear or personal motives, fled from Paris, 
without a chance of getting back." 

The "provincial municipalities, on the other 
hand, seem to have lost all moral sense. A 
French observer wrote from Orleans : " They 
imagine that the more they cringe before the 
enemy, the less reason they have to fear 
violence. ... At Dourdan, five Prussian 
hussars dashed into the railway station, cut 
the telegraph wires and posts, then came to 
the place, pistol in hand, and insolently de- 
manded eight hundred rations from the Mayor; 
and a thousand stupid men stood there, on the 
market-place of Dourdan, bowing their un- 
covered heads before five Prussian youths, the 
oldest of whom was not thirty. While these 
five pillagers scoured the adjacent communes, 
the municipality of Dourdan, with a zeal and 
activity which had never been shown in favour 
of French soldiers, hastened to provide for the 
requisites of the following day. Nothing was 
spared to feed the enemy sumptuously. At 
St. Arnold, fifty Uhlans condescended to do 
honour to a banquet served on the market- 
place. M. le Maire superintended the waiting, 
a napkin under his arm. At Trisan the fire- 
men had buried their guns and swords. The 
Maire ordered them to be disinterred, and ar- 
ranged before the Mairie at the service of the 
Prussians, which was actually done." Other 
incidents of the same kind might be cited, 
which savour of cowardice and servility; but 
these are sufficient, in conjunction with what 
was passing in Paris, to show what contradic- 
tory elements enter into the French character. 

The enemy arrived, as we have related (ante, 
chap, liv.), self-confident, full of pride, and im- 
perturbably calm in their resolves. We have 



seen how steadily the various corps marched 
on the ground designated for their oc pupation 
round the beleaguered city. The fight at 
Clamart on the 19th of September did not hin- 
der them from occupying the higher ground 
above Issy and Vanves. The cannonade 
opened on the redoubt at Villejuif had no 
effect in preventing the occupation of that 
outwork on the 23rd and 24th. The fire of 
Ivry and Bicetre, the sortie of Maud'huy, did 
not so much as force the German outposts. 
A reconnaisance towards Le Bourget and to 
Drancy and Pierrefitte on the same day 
brought only disheartening intelligence ; and 
the fire of the gunboats on the Seine, against 
the positions at St. Cloud and Sevres, made 
no impression on the stolid Germans. The in- 
vestment of the city was completed, and Paris 
was entirely cut off from all communication 
with the outer world. 

The positions occupied by the various corps 
in the fine of investment were as follows, 
commencing from the Seine at Choisy-le-Roi, 
and making the circuit of the city in the same 
direction that we enumerated the detached forts. 

From Choisy-le-Roi to Noisy-le-Grand, en- 
circling the windings of the Marne, the line 
was kept by the Wurtemberg division (a in 
the coloured plan). From the latter point, 
across the forest of Bondy to the convergence 
of the Eastern Railway with the canal at 
Livry, by the corps of Saxons (6). From the 
Eastern Railway to the Northern Railway, 
above St. Denis and the Double Couronne-du- 
Nord, by the Prussian Guards (c). From the 
latter point, along the right bank of the Seine 
to the cross roads at Bezons, west of Neuilly, 
by the 4th North German Corps (d). From 
this point to the bend of the Seine at Bougival, 
westward of St. Cloud, by the 5th Landwehr 
of the Guard (e). From Bougival to Sevres, 
across the loop made by the bend of the Seine 
and consequently almost under fire from 
Valerien, to St. Cloud and Meudon, by the 
5th North German Corps (/). From Meudon 
to Bourg-la-Reine, behind the forts of Issy, 
Vanves, and Montrouge, by the 2nd Bavarian 
Corps (g). From Bourg-la-Reine to Choisy- 
le-Roi, behind Bicetre and Ivry, completing 
the circle, by the 6th North German Corps (h). 



12 



SIEGE OF STRASBURO. 



CHAPTER LVII. 

THE CAPITULATION OF STRASBURG. 

The Defences of Strasburg— Tlio front of attack ; Lunettes and 
Bastions of tlio North-west Angle— Artillery of the Besiegers 
— Commencement ani) progress of the Works — Sortie on the 
'2nd of September — Fire Hot Kehl against the Citadel — 
Fighting in the neighbouring Villages — Completion of the ap- 
proaches to the Glacis of Lunettes 5*2 and 53 —Breaching Bat- 
teries at work— The Lunettes occupied — Fire against the 
Bastions — Sufferings of the Townspeople — Burning of the 
Theatre and great Loss of Life — Number of Projectiles thrown 
into the town and Citadel — Great destruction of houses and 
buildings — Renewed Sorties and Cannonades — Burning of 
the Citadel and Arsenal — Keduction of the Bastions at the 
North-w.°st Angle, and preparations for the Assault — Sur- 
render resolved upon — The Capitulation — Proclamation of 
General Uhrich — Formation of a 14th Army Corps. 

While Paris, with the German corps d'arm/e 
closing round her, hung Immortelles on the 
Statue of Strasburg, erected in one of the 
leading avenues, the defender of the " heroic 
city," brave old Uhrich, was making a last de- 
spairing effort to preserve the capital of his 
native province from the invader's grasp. Re- 
suming the story of this memorable siege, we 
take up the narrative at the point where it 
was dropped after the fierce bombardment 
during the last days of August (vol. i., p. 386). 
As the mortar fire was followed by a regular 
siege, it is necessary to be somewhat particular 
in our description of the place invested. 

The principal line of defence around Stras- 
burg consists of a rampart with seventeen 
bastions, and a fortress or citadel at the 
eastern angle, near the Rhine, having five 
bastions. The form of the entire place is 
nearly that of an isosceles triangle; the base } 
or shortest side, constituting the western front 
of the bastioned wall, and the northern and 
southern fronts being nearly equal. Beginning 
from the eastern angle, and counting the bas- 
tions westward, from one to seven, we arrive 
at Fort Blanc; thence northward, along the 
base of the triangle, five more bastioned fronts 
bring us to Fort de Pierre ; and the north side, 
from west to east, has five more, numbered 13 
to 17 inclusive. 

The principal outworks are on the northern 
and western fronts, where General Werder de- 
veloped his attack. Opposite the fronts 8 and 
9 is the hornwork numbered 40, 42. Opposite 
the fronts 10 and 11 is a similar hornwork, 
numbered 47, 49; and opposite the fronts 



11 and 12, in the north-western angle, are the 
lunettes 52 and 53, shown in the diagram 
page 1 3. Continuing along this front eastward 
is a third hornwork, numbered 59, to which 
succeeds a series of lunettes, and the great 
hornwork opposite the citadel, numbered 73, 
74. In the citadel were three powder maga- 
zines, the defences of which against the fire of 
modern artillery had been strengthened in 
1867. Except this absolutely necessary work, 
the fortifications of Strasburg had been but 
very slightly improved during many years. 
New powder magazines, however, were in 
course of being constructed under the bastions 
7, 9, and 11, and some masonry for shelter in 
the form of traverses in the opposite horn- 
work, when the war commenced. 

Where the 111 crosses the ramparts north 
and south the ditches could be easily flooded ; 
besides which, on the north and eastern front 
between the 111 and the Rhine, the ground is 
intersected by canals and dikes; it is also 
under the fire of the citadel at the eastern 
angle. The point most exposed to attack was 
therefore the north-western angle, which also 
fronts the way from which the enemy was 
.most likely to advance. Yet this point, in a 
military sense, is the weakest in the whole 
line of ramparts, notwithstanding the protect- 
ing lunettes and other works just alluded to. 
There had been some talk at various periods 
of the facility with which this angle could 
have been strengthened by detached forts, and 
it is admitted by Riistow, that, had this been 
done, and the forts armed with heavy rifled 
cannon, Strasburg would have been impreg- 
nable. The fact that it was not done is an 
additional proof added to the arguments we 
have previously used, that there was never any 
serious intention on the part of the Imperial 
Government to make war on Germany. 

It was at this angle, more particularly op- 
posite lunettes 52 and 53, that General Werder, 
after a few days' bombardment of Strasburg, 
commenced his regular siege works, as related 
at the end of chapter xliii. (vol. i., p. 386). We 
have stated that the heads of the German 
columns were first descried on the morning 
of August 11th. These proved to be the 
troops of the Baden division, which remained 



GUNS USED IN THE ATTACK. 



13 



alone before the place till the 17th. On the 
18th the Prussian reserve appeared before the 
fortress, and on the 21st the siege guns began 
to arrive. The bombardment commenced, as 
we have related, on the 24th, and the siege on 
the 29th. The guns before the fortress, from 
first to last, were 241 in number, composed as 
follows : — 



8 smooth-bore 60-pounder mortars (Baden). 
19 smooth-bore 50-pounder mortars. 
24 smooth-bore 25-pounder mortars (4 Baden). 
. 30 smooth-bore 7-pounder mortars. 
During the night of the 29th, when the first 
parallel was opened (vol. i., p. 386), ten batteries 
of rifled guns were got into position ready for 
work on the morning of the 30 th. 1 These 




58 rifled 21-pounders (16 Baden). 
80 rifled 12-pounders (16 Baden). 
20 rifled 6-pounders. 
2 rifled 21-centimetre mortars. 



batteries, aided by the mortars in the rear, 
silenced the fire of the garrison the same day. 
In the night of the 31st the approaches to the 
second parallel were successfully completed, 



It 



BREACHING BATTERIES AT WORK. 



and during the next night the second parallel 
was dug. On the 2nd of September the 
garrison made a somewhat daring sortie in 
two columns, one advancing northwards to- 
wards Jars and Wackcn, two islands formed 
by the windings of the 111 and the Rhine 
canal ; the other southwards by the Auslerlitz 
gate opposite the railway, so that both ex- 
tremities of the German line were attacked at 
once. The attack was repulsed on the Left by 
the 30th Prussian Infantry, on the Right by 
the 2nd Baden Grenadiers, the latter suffering 
considerable loss owing to the impetuosity 
with which they threw themselves against the 
enemy. 

Up to the 5th of September the total losses 
of tlie besiegers, including those who fell in 
the above sortie, were fifty-seven dead, includ- 
ing seven officers, 327 wounded, among whom 
were ten officers, and thirty missing. 

On the 9th, ninety-eight rifled guns and 
forty mortars were reported to be in position 
against the attacked front ; to which the garri- 
son could return only a languishing fire. Besides 
these, a detachment of Baden artillery opened 
fire from Kehl on the citadel, with thirty-two 
rifled pieces and eight mortars. It was thought 
probable that, after the reduction of the town, 
the citadel might be used by the garrison as a 
last refuge. The gate leading from the town 
into the citadel was demolished, and a fierce 
fire broke out among the neighbouring houses : 
the devastation it caused is shown by the 
dark shading in our engraved plan. 

A German press correspondent, writing from 
Mundelsheim under this date, observes that 
the term " sortie " was hardly applicable, the 
besiegers and besieged being so close together. 
There was severe fighting, however, in some 
of the neighbouring villages. Schlestadt had 
to be bombarded, and, in addition to its other 
defences, the surrounding country was put 
under water. St. Marie-aux- Mines was also 
bombarded, and a body of Francs-tireurs who 
advanced to the support of the village were 
repulsed, 2,000 of them being compelled to 
surrender. The reporter of these circum- 
stances added that people from Strasburg 
who had taken refuge at Mundelsheim, stated 
that shortly after the commencement of the 



bombardment the citizens had thoroughly 
made up their minds to force the Governor to 
capitulate, and even a large portion of the 
garrison had made common cause with them 
in this resolve. When, however, the Governor 
received information of the intended move- 
ment, he had copies of a supposed telegram 
posted at every street-corner, announcing a 
great defeat of the Prussians, and the arrival 
of 30,000 prisoners, and expressing a hope that 
the inhabitants would receive them with all 
due courtesy, upon which the inhabitants, feel- 
ing reassured, retired quietly to their homes. 

In the night between the 9th and 10th the 
besiegers completed their approaches from the 
second to the third parallel, and in the night 
between the 11th and 12th the greater part 
of the third parallel was laid, so that the lines 
were now pushed forward as far as the foot of 
the glacis of lunettes 52 and 53, shown in the 
above diagram. Notwithstanding the close 
approach thus made, the besiegers still made 
use of the flying sap, and, owing to the im- 
pression already made on the enemy's defences 
by their superior fire, sustained no additional 
losses. On the 11th they Were able to open 
the first breaching battery of four 24-pounders 
against the lunette 53, at the distance of 
1,100 paces. On the 12th another breaching 
battery of six 24-pounders opened against the 
bastion in the north-west corner, numbered 11, 
at the distance of 1,000 paces, 2 and the gar- 
rison attempted to interrupt the works by 
another sortie. To this rapidly followed the 
fire at 900 paces from a third battery of four 
24-pounders opposite the left face of bastion 
No. 12. A few days afterwards, the lunettes 
having been occupied on the 21st, 3 batteries 
were erected in them, and turned against the 
works. 

Before the assault on the lunettes, hundreds 
of permits had been granted by General 
Werder, authorizing people to leave Strasburg, 
and on the 13th 3,000 persons, mostly children 
and aged women, were allowed to depart and 
take up their residence in the neighbouring 
villages. It is doubtful if their condition was 
much improved ; for the distress felt in the 
town extended to the suburbs of Konigshofen, 
Ruprechtsau, and more especially to " indus- 



DESTRUCTION IN THE CITY 



15 



trial Schiltigheim." The splendid villas which 
abounded in these localities were burnt by 
grenades from the fortress, and scarcely a day 
passed that some of the poor inhabitants of 
the neighbourhood were not killed by the 
Strasburg cannon. Perhaps there was more 
suffering in the mass in Strasburg, and the 
imagination is more impressed by hundreds of 
persons immolated together than by the same 
or even greater numbers perishing in obscure 
isolation. Thus we in England heard with 
horror of the burning of the theatre, where 
two hundred • persons, the majority of whom 
were women, perished in the basement where 
they had taken refuge. Many similar inci- 
dents are recorded, but no other so shocking 
in degree. A shell burst in the midst of the 
young ladies assembled in a school-room, 
several of whom were wounded and lost their 
limbs. People were killed in the streets by 
the exploding shells and the crumbling houses, 
and many were burnt or buried in the ruins, 
of whom no record is left. From one hundred 
to two hundred acres of ground were covered 
with the debris of more than 500 houses. The 
number of projectiles thrown into the city 
and fortress before the surrender was 193,722, 
equal to 6,249 every day, 269 in the hour, and 
from four to five in every minute, during 
which the resistance lasted. These statistics 
alone would suffice to give a sufficiently vivid 
idea of the ruin and suffering caused by the 
siege ; but how greatly is that idea magnified 
when it is considered that this immense num- 
ber of projectiles covered a very small space, 
and that the above is only the average rate 
of their fall ! Sometimes they literally rained 
upon the houses and streets exposed to the 
besiegers' fire, so that the houses in the Fau- 
bourg de Pierre, and the Fauboui'g Nationale 
in particular, were reduced to heaps of rubbish, 
in which no semblance of a habitation was 
left. 

While the chief attack was made on the 
north-west front, some additional troops of 
the Baden division had crossed over the Rhine 
to the Isle des Epis, menacing the eastern 
front; and to these were joined a few Prussian 
battalions from Robertsau. They were op- 
posed by a sortie from the garrison on the 15th, 



in which the French Daniel Lambert, Colonel 
Fieve, lost his life, and the result, as usual, was 
fruitless to the besieged. 4 On the 24th the 
artillery fire between the garrison and the 
besiegers on this side lasted the whole day 
and when evening fell, and night succeeded, it 
only increased in intensity until five in the 
morning of the 25th, when the right side of 
the citadel was burnt down, and the arsenal 
was completely gutted. Fires had also broken 
out in the inhabited part of the town, and 
one battery was silenced. At the same time, 
by the concentrated fire of all the pieces 
against the bastions, after the occupation of 
the lunettes 52 and 53, at the north-west angle 
breaches had been made in both fronts, which, 
on the 27th, were so complete as to admit of 
storming. The fire against the lunette which 
covered the bastion numbered 9 and 10 on 
the western side of the rampart had been 
equally successful. Further resistance was 
hopeless ; yet two members of the Council of 
War voted against the capitulation. 

The surrender of Strasburg was announced 
in Paris and London on the night of the 28th. 
At five o'clock on the preceding evening, Gene- 
ral Uhrich caused the white flaw to be hoisted 
on the bastions 11 and 12, and at two o'clock 
in the night the capitulation was agreed upon. 5 
The interval had been occupied in endea- 
vours to obtain favourable terms. It was 
agreed that the Germans were to occupy the 
citadel and three of the gates at eight o'clock 
in the morning, and that the garrison was to 
surrender their arms and materials of war, and 
leave the city at noon. The humiliation was 
hard to bear, and the troops were wanting in 
the moral courage and the military virtue 
which would have enabled them to pass 
through the ordeal with the dignit} T that could 
have been desired. As they passed out of the 
city they had so gallantly defended, they broke 
their arms, or threw them into the moat with 
curses on their lips. The brave Uhrich had, 
however, set them a noble example in his pro- 
clamation addressed to the defending force and 
all the townspeople, in which he said; "To 
my latest hour I shall retain the recollection 
of the last two months, and the feeling of 
gratitude and admiration which you have ex- 



10 



THE Sl'KUKNDER. 



cited in mo will only lie extinguished with my 
life. Do you on your pari remember without 
bitterness your old general, who would have 
thought himself happy could he have spared 
you the sufferings and dangers which have 
befallen you, but who was forced to close his 
heart to his feelings for the sake of the duty 
he owed to that country which is mourning 
its children. Let us, if we can, close our eyes 
to the sorrowful and painful present, and turn 
our looks to the future ; there we still find the 
solace of the unfortunate — hope." The Mayor 
also issued a proclamation, in which he ex- 
horted the people to abstain from all offensive 
demonstrations, as the least act of hostility 
would entail severe reprisals on them. The 
laws of war decreed that any house from which 
a shot was fired should be demolished, and its 
inhabitants shot down. " Let everybody," said 
the Mayor, " remember this ; and if there are 
people among you who could forget what they 
owe to their fellow-citizens by thinking of 
useless attempts at resistance, prevent them 
from so doing. The hour for resistance is past. 
Let us accept the unavoidable." General von 
Ollech was appointed to be the new governor, 
and Major-General von Mervens the new 
commandant of Strasburg, by whom the in- 



habitants were warned that the state of sicce 
continued. The German troops marched into 
the town proudly, through a frowning mul- 
titude, though subsequently many of the 
German-speaking portion of the population 
chatted and fraternised with their conquerors 
in the public-houses. 7 The French either 
went into Switzerland, or joined the partisan 
corps already gathering in the field to oppose 
the further progress of Werder, to whom was 
given the command of the newly organized 
14th Army Corps. 

Thus the fall of Strasburg has set another 
German army at liberty to take the field in 
Central France, and still reserves in great 
numbers are pressing forward, and the army 
of Prince Frederick Charles cannot much 
longer be detained at Metz. As for Alsace, its 
fate is sealed, and more than the doom of the 
province is involved in the fall of its capital. 
When we read that " the king has directed 
the people in those departments which are not 
included in the government of Count von 
Bismarck-Bohlen, Governor of Alsace, to sub- 
mit to the orders of the Duke of Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin," we understand that the meaning 
is not only conquest, but dismemberment. 



Notes to Chapter LVII. 



1 The making of the first parallel was graphically described by 
a soldier belonging to the Prussian reserve, who was engaged in 
the work : " Five days have elapsed," he wrote on the 3rd of 
September, "since we completed the first parallel at Schiltigheim. 
We were called out on a bright sunny afternoon from Rupreeht- 
sau, where we were stationed as outposts, and led by roundabout 
ways in a zigzag direction, so as to disguise our design, up to a 
field behind Reichstett, where a halt was made to await sunset 
and the arrival of the engineers. When it became dark, we started 
again. Quiet, without speaking a word, we marched along the 
road through the three neighbouring villages of Hohnheim, Bisch- 
heim, and Schiltigheim. Armed with hatchets and spades, the 
handles turned down and the iron upwards, in order to make no 
noise, we proceeded through the streets between the shut-up 
houses, over the doors of which small lanterns were glimmering. 
At last we reached the spot. Posted at arm's length from each 
other we began to dig, eagerly, noiselessly, indefatigably. A 
tre.ach three feet broad and three feet deep was the task for each. 
The. night was pitch dark. The clear starry sky, with the moon's 
narrow crescent, had not illuminating power enough to show the 
faces of tie workmen. The fortress was 800 steps before us ; but 
"% saw nothing either of it or of the battalions placed before us to 
protect us. Close behind us a battery launched bombs ceaselessly 
into the silent city. The loud yelling of dogs resounded from 
Schiltigheim ; they, more visilant than the besieged, being dis- 
turbed by our proximity. Now and then the iron of a spade made 
a noise, and emitted a spark through contact with a flint. The 
work lasted almost the whole night. Our feet were chilled by 



the wet ground ; moist dew fell upon us ; no morsel of bread, 
no warming draught." — Vossische Zeitung. 

While making the approaches near Schiltigheim, the burial 
ground of St. Helen's Church was passed, and the besiegers 
worked amid coffins and skeletons. The locality is noted in the 
plan, page 13, ante. 

2 The special correspondent of the Carlsruhe Gazette wrote 
from Mundelsheim, on the 12th of September, as follows : — " In 
the early part of the morning the bombardment was again most 
vigorously sustained, and a sortie was again attempted ; but as 
the day wore on the firing was much diminished, and at the 
present moment ( five p.m.) a temporary suspension of the bom- 
bardment has taken place, as far as the batteries here are concerned. 
The dull roar of the cannon, heard from time to time, informs us 
that the bombardment is still being maintained by the batteries 
stationed at Kehl. Flames from burning houses can be seen 
issuing from the citadel ; but, on the other hand no fires can be 
remarked in the town. Yesterday, at the request of the Swiss 
International Society, 600 women and children were allowed to 
leave the town of Strasburg, and the society continue to take 
steps to further their humane projects." Official intelligence 
from the head-quarters of the Baden army at Lampertheim, dated 
the 14th, was to the following effect :— " The garrison at Stras- 
burg is actively engaged in arming the ramparts, razing the 
glads, and barricading the approaches to the town ; while the 
besiegers on >their part are at present occupied in disturbing and 
destroying these defensive works. On the 13th three small en- 
counters took place with successful results as regards that object, 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LVIT. 



17 



and in one of these skirmishes a Baden detachment set fire to a 
tr.iin standing in a railway station. A field battery was then 
advanced to within 3,000 paces of the fortress, and fired upon the 
work by the light of the conflagration. The Baden troops lost 
three killed and seventeen wounded.'' 

The correspondent of the Daily News wrote from Carls- 
ruhe, on the 13th of September, as follows : — " A boat con- 
veying a large quantity of munitions of war to Strasburg 
was captured by the Germans above Kehl. The firing from 
the fortifications is much weaker generally, and the outworks 
opposite the railway station are silenced altogether. That of 
the besiegers has increased in vigour, and the giant mortars 
have inflicted great damage. Last night a fire broke out in 
the citadel. Continuous rain has injured the besieging works, 
and seriously retarded their progress. The arrangements for 
storming are still incomplete. The belief gains ground among 
the German officers, that the capitulation cannot be long delayed. 
A Protestant clergyman of Alsace held a conference at Lamper- 
theim, on the 10th, to devi-e means to convince the people in 
Strasburg of the futility of resistance." 

Witb reference to the mortars mentioned above, another letter 
says : " Two gigantic mortars, each throwing a shell weighing two 
cwt., have been placed in position on the side where the railway 
branches off towards Paris. Parts of the fortifications which had 
resisted bombs of lesser weight were crushed to atoms when these 
enormous shells fell upon them." 

" On the 16th the garrison made a sortie in the direction of 
Ostwald, but was driven back with a loss of several men and three 
guus." 

3 A letter from Strasburg, in the Carlsruhe Gazette, dated 
the 9th, says: "The closer the circle of our batteries approaches 
the town, the area of the enemy's batteries is correspondingly nar- 
rowed. Hardly anything but shrapnel shells now pa?s over our 
first parallel, and these are mostly at a safe height, so that the 
balls fall almost powerless. The large mortars, as also the heavy 
guns, advance nearer and nearer to the town, and display their 
tearful activity irom a distance of a few hundred steps. When 1 
was at Sehiltigheim to-day, the six-pounders east of the road were 
laying with as much energy as pistol-firing, and the fire of our 
heavy guns is almost equally uninterrupted. Last night there 
was again a fire in the town south-west of the cathedral, and 
likewise in Sehiltigheim. According to the last news from the 
town, a further portion of the Stein Street and a considerable part 
of Castle Street have been burnt down, including the Hotel de 
Commerce. Requests for safe conducts still pour in from the 
towns and of late they have become numerous, even from Gardes 
Mobiles. The latter are of course unsuccessful, as well on our 
part as on that of the French military authorities." 

4 This attack and sortie were announced in the following 
telegram : — 

" Carlsruhe, Sept. 18. 
" The Germans have succeeded in erecting a battery on the 
left bank of the Rhine, opposite to Kehl. Last night a sortie was 
made from the citadel against this battery, when 1,600 French 
were engaged on one side, and 400 Badeners on the other. The 
latter held t'ieir ground till reinforced by the Prussians, when 
the French were driven back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners." 

5 The telegram from General Werder was as follows : 

" Mundelsheim, Sept. 28. 
" To Her Majesty the Queen. 
" This moment (two o'clock at night) I concluded the capitu- 
lation of Strasburg, tlirough Lieutenant-Colonel Leczynski : 451 
officers, and 7,000 men, including National Guards, hud down 
arms. At eight a.m. the gates of Strasburg will be occupied." 

6 Not the Mayor appointed by Gambetta, who reached Stras- 
burg by passing the German lines, and swimming across the 111, 
but a M. Kuss, who was elected by the inhabitants after it was 
known that a Republic had been proclaimed in Paris. The 
nominee of M. Gambetta was not acknowledged notwithstanding 
the courage and energy he had shown in making his way into the 
beleaguered city. 

' Hie correspondent of the Cologne Gazette stattd that the 



garrison, on marching out of the town, tried to throw away their 
knapsacks, and vented their rage at the capitulation, exclaiming 
" Nous somm.es vendus,'' " Uhrwh est un coquin." They 
broke and flung away their swords. The correspondent of the 
Carlsruhe Gazette says General Uhrich issued a proclamation, 
stating that as the enemy had effected two breaches, and he could 
no longer hold the citadel, being also threatened with a storm 
within twenty-four bom's, he was compelled to surrender. This, 
he added, would save the town from a great misfortune, and he 
urged that nobody should show hostility towards the German troops. 
The conduct of many of the garrison in throwing away and de- 
stroying their swords was not owing to the rage of despair, but 
to a hopeless and indeed senseless anger. Frowning countenances 
were to be seen among the civilians, but an aspect of resignation 
prevailed. "It has had to come to this with us," they said. There 
was some curiosity to see the Prussians enter the place, and 
children of the lower classes, at the cry, " Here come the 
Prussians! " rushed indoors in terror. The municipal council wasso 
threatened by the populace, and made fanatical through the confes- 
sional, that the National Guard had to be called out to protect 
them. More than one member could not venture out during the 
days prior to the surrender without a revolver. The capitulation 
was regarded by many as shameful treachery ; Francs-Tireurs 
wanted to pull down the white flag, and several shots were fired 
at, it. Happily the mob had no leaders. Some of the streets are 
heaps of ruins, but the bombardment made less havoc than might 
have been expected. Thousands of the inhabitants had lived for 
weeks in wooden huts alongside the canal, the houses being un- 
safe. The German troops marched into the town quietly, through 
a silent multitude, and made a good and, to some extent, an im- 
posing impression. 

8 In addition to the remarkable documents previously cited in 
elucidation of the causes which led to war, the following is 
extracted from the papers found at flie Tuileiies. It purports to 
be a letter written by General Ducrot, and addressed to General 
Trochu in December last : — 

" Since you are in a position to let wholesome truths be heard 
by the illustrious personages around you, pray add this. While 
we are pompously and slowly deliberating upon what is best to be 
dune to obtain an army, Prussia is simply but actively preparing 
to invade our territory. She will be in a position to bring in line 
600,000 men and 1,200 guns before we have thought of organizing 
the cadres indispensable for placing under fire 300,000 men and 
600 guns. On the other side of the Rhine there is not a German 
who does not believe in an early war. The most peacefully dis- 
posed, who by their family relations or personal interests are 
most inclined towards France, consider the struggle as inevitable, 
and cannot at all understand our inaction. As we must look for 
a cause for all things, they assert that our Emperor has be- 
come childish. Unless one is wilfully blind, it is not possible to 
doubt that war will break out on an early day. With our stupid 
vanity, our foolish presumption, we seem to think that we shall 
be allowed to select our own day and hour — that is to say, after 
the close of the Universal Exhibition — for the completion of our 
organization and our armament. Truly, I am of your opinion, 
and begin to believe that our Government is stricken with mad- 
ness. But if Jupiter has decided on our ruin, let us not forget 
the destinies of our country, and that our own fate is bound up in 
her destinies ; and since we are not yet afflicted with that danger- 
ous madness, let us use all our efforts to arrest this fatal tendency, 
which leads directly to fearful precipices. Here is a new detail 
to which I invite your attention, since it is of a character to open 
the eyes of the most purblind. For some time numerous Prussian 
agents have been overrunning our frontier departments, espe- 
cially that portion of them comprised between the Moselle and the 
Vosges. They sound the opinions of the people ; they agitate 
among the Protestants, who are numerous in those districts, and 
who are much less French than is generally believed. They are, 
indeed, the sons and grandsons of the men who in 1815 sent nu- 
merous deputations to the enemy's head-quarters to demand that 
Alsace should be added to the German country. The Prussians 
acted in the same manner in Bohemia and Silesia three months 
b.forc the commencement of the hostilities against Austria." 



13 



RETROSrF/TIYK. 



CHArTER LVIIT. 

THE EMPIRE AND THE PAPAL SOVEREIGNTY. 

The departure of the French from Rome, followed hy the Italian 
occupation— Sketch of the political relations between Prance 
and Italy resumed— Retrospect to the period of the Great 
Revolution— First occupation ot Rome by tho French — 
Proclamation of a Republic by Berthier— Restoration ot the 
Pope, and organization of the Cisalpine Republic by the 
first Consul — Religious Institutions restored to France— The 
policy of Napoleon considered— Establishment of the Empire, 
and opposition of the Pope— Meaning of a great historical 
incident in Notre Dame— Events tending to the second occu- 
pation of Rome in 1808, and tho subsequent abolition of the 
Temporal Power— Argument of Napoleon against the papal 
pretensions— Entry of the French Troops, and instalment of 
Eugene as Viceroy — Excommunication of Napoleon, and 
abolition of the Temporal Power— The Pope arrested and 
carried a prisoner to Grenoble— Disapproval of the Emperor 
— A residence appointed for the Pope at Savona— Removed to 
Fontaiuebloau in 1812— Return to Rome in January, 1814— 
Fall of Napoleon, and settlement of the affairs of Italy by the 
Congress of Vienna— The old order of things restored, and 
the tyranny of Austria established with the sanction of the 
Holy Alliance— State of parties in the meanwhile— Relation 
of these events to the War of 1870. 

While M. Jules Favre was negotiating at the 
German head-quarters for a brief truce, a little 
breathing-time for France, after the crushing 
blows that had fallen upon her, and the hosts 
of Germany were preparing to visit on the 
capital the last stroke of humiliation, the 
troops of the King of Italy were battering at 
the gates of Rome, and France was not there 
to answer the summons. Yet it was not long 
since that France, in all the pride of her 
imaginary strength, had sworn in the face of 
Europe that this should never be — never! 1 

We have already sketched the political re- 
lations between France and Italy at some 
length, and more particularly the immense 
effect produced by the Revolution of 1789 
upon her institutions and her people (vol. i., 
pp. 61 — 64). It is like recalling a dream to 
speak of the time when the ancient thrones of 
Europe were overturned as by an earthquake, 
and Napoleon defiantly exclaimed, as he placed 
the iron circlet of the Lombard kings on his 
brow in the glorious cathedral at Milan, " God 
has given it to me ; woe to him who touches 
it ! " 2 It is difficult to persuade one's self that 
those are living now who were alive when 
this scene in the historical drama of the great 
Revolution was enacted. Time is measured in 
feeling and imagination by the number and 
importance of the events crowded into it. The 



kingdom of Italy ruled by Buonaparte, like 
the Cisalpine Republic 3 which preceded it, 
fills a page of history which, as we try to recall 
it, recedes into the distance like an object seen 
through the wrong end of a telescope. The 
story of tho revived principalities and of the 
Austrian tyranny is also fully told, and the 
book sealed. Romo, the ancient mistress of 
tho world, is shaking herself free from the dust 
of ages while we write ; a highway pierced 
through the heart of the Alps has broken 
down the last material barrier to the spread 
of civilizing influences, and the history of the 
temporal power awaits but the last word to be 
written before that record likewise is closed 
for ever. With all these events the history of 
the war of 1870 is intimately associated in its 
causes and results ; and surely there is nothing 
more strange and impressive in history than 
the rise of the one power, and the decay of the 
other, if we consider the relative situation of 
the two countries a few years ago, when Italy 
was delivered from her shameful bondage by 
the now captive Emperor * and humbled people 
of France. It may not be given to us of this 
generation wholly to comprehend the meaning 
of this stupendous reverse of fortune ; but the 
barest record of the facts must carry with it 
an important moral and political lesson. 

The direct military intervention of France 
in Rome dates from 1798. It is necessary to 
explain that the Cisalpine Republic, organized 
by General Buonaparte, had for its immediate 
object the suppression of the power of the 
priests, whose influence over the elections in 
the sister Republics which had been esta- 
blished in Northern Italy by the Directory, 
was found to be subversive of Republican 
principles, and opposed in every way to the 
enlightenment of the people by the spread of 
knowledge. Cardinals and prelates came direct 
from Rome into the towns and villages of 
Northern Italy to dictate the lists, and induce 
the populace to vote in accordance with their 
views ; as Republican emissaries, on the other 
hand, spread themselves through Rome, and 
thus carried the war into the enemy's camp. 
The French General, Duphot, an enthusiastic 
Republican, charged by Buonaparte with the 
organization of the troops of the Cisalpine 



FIRST OCCUPATION OF ROME. 



19 



Republic, attempted to hoist the tricolor on 
the Capitol at Rome, and was killed by the 
Papal troops in the attack on the residence of 
the French ambassador which this incident 
provoked. This event occurred on the 28th of 
December, 1797, at which time Buonaparte 
was in Paris organizing an expedition against 
England, and otherwise busy at the War Office. 
News travelled leisurely in those days com- 
pared with the present ; but on the 11th of 
January, 1798, we find Buonaparte sending 
instructions, in the name of the Directory, to 
his friend Berthier, who then commanded in 
Italy, to avenge the death of Duphot. Prompt 
to obey an order so congenial to him, Berthier 
proceeded by forced marches, and on the 10th 
of February entered Rome with a large force, 
where he overthrew the Papal Government, 
and on the 15th proclaimed the "Roman 
Republic." The Pope was arrested in his 
palace, and conveyed to Sienna, from which 
place he was removed successively to Florence, 
Grenoble, and Valence, where he died a cap- 
tive in the eighty-second year of his age, 
August 29th, 1799. 

In the meantime (May 19th) the future 
Emperor had sailed for Egypt, and a coalition 
having been formed against France during 
his absence, the Republican forces were driven 
out of Italy by the allied troops of Austria, 
Prussia, and Naples, and Cardinal Chiara- 
monti elected Pope under the title of Pius 
VII. Before this event was actually consum- 
mated, the young General had suddenly re- 
turned from Egypt, and, on the famous 18th 
Brumaire (Nov. 9th, 1799), had dethroned the 
Directory, and established the Consulate, in 
which for a little while he shared the supreme 
power with Sieyes and Ducos. 

The renewed conquest of Italy, after the 
passage of the Alps (May, 1800), and the re- 
organization of the Cisalpine Republic, did 
not lead to the re-establishment of the Roman 
Republic, as might have been anticipated. 
Immediately after the battle of Marengo, one 
of Napoleon's companions in arms, Murat — 
soon to be a famous name — arrived in Rome, 
bearing the homage of the First Consul to his 
Holiness, and assuring him there was no in- 
tention to renew the work of the Directoiy, 



but that the temporal power would be main- 
tained. 5 The great Cardinal Consalvi, how- 
ever, was not satisfied. Not only Rome, but 
the Legations, Avignon, ought to be recovered, 
and the property of the Church restored to 
the clergy in France. The First Consul was 
willing to treat with his Holiness, but he had 
counter-propositions to make, such as a new 
arrangement of bishoprics, the submission of 
the clergy to the civil government, the recog- 
nition of the marriages contracted by priests, 
etc. These negotiations, in fine, led up to the 
signature of a concordat between Buonaparte 
and the Pope, on the 15 th of July, 1801, 
by the execution of which religion was re- 
instituted and its establishments re-organized 
in France — a fact which Pius VII. repeatedly 
acknowledged, not only when Napoleon was 
at the height of his power, and such an ac- 
knowledgment might have been deemed flat- 
tery, but when he was a captive at St. Helena. 
On the 6th of October, 1817, his Holiness wrote 
to Consalvi : " The family of the Emperor Na- 
poleon has communicated to us, through Car- 
dinal Fesch, that the island of St. Helena is a 
most unhealthy place, and the poor exile is 
dying by inches (se voit depe'rir d chaque mi- 
nute). We have heard this with infinite pain, 
which you will no doubt share with us ; for 
we ought both of us to remember that, next to 
God, it is to him principally that is due the 
re-establishment of religion in the great king- 
dom of France. The pious and courageous 
initiative of 1801 has long since caused us to 
forget and forgive subsequent injuries. Sa- 
vona and Fontainebleau are only errors of 
judgment, or mistakes of human ambition. 
The concordat was Christianly and heroically 
a redeeming act." 

In the re-establishment of the Pope, the 
First Consul already showed, in the opinion of 
many, that he aspired to play the part of a 
Charlemagne ; but there is really no need to 
credit him with a supernatural prescience of 
events. As in 1848 and 1871, there was work 
wanting to be done ; and he, in 1801, was the one 
man who had the courage to do it, as effectively 
as he could with his instruments and his lights. 
The boulevcrsement of society was complete. 
To attempt to govern in the midst of the 



20 



THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE. 



chaos to which French society had been re- 
duced, without seizing on some organizing 
-sower, were like attempting to drive a chariot 
drawn by a team of six. or eight horses with- 
out the harness necessary to keep them to- 
gether through the streets of a crowded city. 
A feat of the kind may be performed in a 
circus, but for the ordinary business of life 
ordinary means seem to be indispensable. If 
ever law and order were to prevail again in 
France, it was necessary to begin with the 
bases of all law and order in the religious 
sanctions to which the people had been accus- 
tomed. But there could be no religion in 
France without the priesthood — had not Pro- 
testantism been ruthlessly stamped out ? — and 
there could be no priesthood without the Pope. 
In Rome alone was found the "established 
centre of Hght" from which every ray that 
could illuminate the present darkness must 
proceed : the rehabilitation of Rome was there- 
fore the first necessity, the rest would all fol- 
low. Nevertheless, it would be unjust to the 
great Emperor if anything here said should 
suggest that he was willing to subordinate the 
interests of the people to the interests of a 
caste of priests. What he needed to restore 
something like calm — to create the possibility 
and clear the room for a better order — was an 
effective police ; and only a spiritual police was 
attainable at that moment. The civil code 
and the instruction and drill of the masses 
were to come afterwards, if time and grace 
were allowed. 

The arrangement being thus mutually ad- 
vantageous, a good understanding was pre- 
served between the French Government and the 
Pope till 1804, when Pius VII. went to Paris 
on the invitation of Napoleon, who in the in- 
terval had been elected Emperor, to sanction 
his coronation. The Italian historian, Botta, 
says : " The Pope was terrified by the great- 
ness of Napoleon's power, but the latter soothed 
his fears by his promises, by flattery, and still 
more by the services he required of him." We 
have said the Pope was invited, adopting the 
language of courtesy ; but Botta says, " With 
earnest requests, not unmixed with threats, 
he (Napoleon) besought the Pope to come to 
Paris to consecrate him." Whatever misgiv- 



ings the Pope may have had, they were in- 
creased by the remonstrances of Louis XVIII., 
the Emperors of Germany and Russia, and 
even the King of England himself, who all, 
more or less openly, exhorted him not to 
offend the Majesty of the throne, and the 
principles on which every modern sovereignty 
was founded, by an act so alarming to the 
monarchs of Europe. " He ought not," they 
said, to " abandon his ancient friends, and 
commit himsfclf to the faith of his new ally ; 
he ought not to authorize military violence, 
nor give his sanction to the ruin of Europe, 
He should remember that the reign of violence 
was fugitive, bringing ruin on itself by its 
excesses; he should consider that when this 
storm should disperse, he would require the 
aid of his ancient protectors. It was now no 
longer necessary to treat for the salvation of 
religion already secure, but to save the ancient 
thrones. The election was now to be made of 
legitimacy or usurpation, moderation or tyran- 
ny, law or military sway, civilization or bar- 
barism. Finally, they represented to him how 
unworthy it would be of the Roman Pontiff, 
the head of the Christian Church, to leave hi 
own dominions in order to sanctify the su- 
preme dignity in one who had employed reli- 
gion as a means of fraud, promises to deceive 
force to subvert. Italy was enslaved, Ger- 
many paralyzed by fear, France subjugated; 
and when he considered their state, he would 
perceive that it was not lawful for him to con- 
taminate his apostolical dignity by sanctifying 
that which every law, divine and human, had 
condemned." 

The end of it all was that the Pope jgreed 
to what was required of him, and on his arrival 
in France was everywhere received with reve- 
rence. At the coronation a notable incident 
occurred. The Pope appears to have under- 
stood that the consecration of the Emperor 
and his coronation constituted one indivisible 
ceremony, both parts of which were to be 
sanctioned by the Church. Having therefore 
performed, the act of consecration, he was 
about to set the crown on the Emperor's 
head, when Napoleon took the symbol of 
empire in his own hands, and crowned himself, 
as he did subsequently with the iron crown oi 



SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT ASSERTED. 



21 



Lombardy, in the cathedral of Milan. There 
was the pride of the soldier, perhaps, trampling 
on the greater pride and arrogance of the 
priestly order in this act ; but there was some- 
thing more too. Napoleon has been denounced 
for hypocrisy in his relations to the Church ; 
but there was no hypocrisy in an act which 
asserted the independence of the secular power 
in the face of the world, and at a trying moment, 
while paying due respect to the religious sanc- 
tion so far as it could really serve the purpose 
of religion. It is difficult not to believe there 
had been a private conference on the subject 
in which the Pope had claimed the right to 
place the crown on the Emperor's head, and 
that Napoleon, while apparently yielding to 
his arguments in order to secure his presence 
at the ceremony, had resolved on asserting the 
supremacy of the imperial power with which 
the people had invested him by an act sig- 
nificant in itself, and certain to appeal with 
irresistible force to the imagination of the 
French people. Other incidents of the coro- 
nation which support this view are less 
agreeable to recall, as they were wanting in 
the attribute of nobleness. The Emperor 
made the Pope await his arrival for an hour in 
the Cathedral of Notre Dame, and when there 
were symptoms of applause as the old man 
turned to meet him, he checked the manifesta- 
tion by an imperious gesture which there was 
no mistaking : it was remarked also, that 
when he quitted the church after the cere- 
mony, Pius was left like one of the vulgar, 
unnoticed, and crowded amidst the immense 
concourse of people. 

The Pope remained in Paris during the 
ensuing winter, but he could wring no con- 
cession from the crowned soldier, whose attitude 
recalled too vividly the memory of Ghibelline 
triumphs. In the year following Napoleon 
was crowned King of Italy (May 26th, 1805), 
and the son of Josephine, Eugene Beauharnais, 
was created Viceroy. Before the year expired 
a new coalition was formed against the Em- 
peror, who instantly raised the camp of 
Boulogne, crossed France and the North of 
Germany with incredible rapidity, and having 
defeated the Austrians in several actions, shut 
up 30,000 men in Ulm (Bavaria), where they 



were forced to capitulate (October 28th). Ad- 
vancing from this point at the head of 180,000 
men, he occupied Vienna (November 13th), and 
totally defeated the combined Austrian and 
Russian armies at Austerlitz (December 2nd), 
which reduced Austria to make a separate 
peace, and sent the Russians shivering home. 
The next year an alliance was formed against 
him by Prussia and Russia. Napoleon en- 
countered the former at Jena and Auerstadt 
(October 14th), and inflicted such loss upon 
them, that in a few weeks only 20,000 men 
remained with the colours out of 1 20,000 with 
which they had taken the field. The occupa- 
tion of Berlin, and the defeat of the Russians 
at Eylau (February 8th, 1807), and at Friedland 
(June 15th), were followed by the Treaty of 
Tilsit, which left virtually only two powers in 
continental Europe — Napoleon and Alexander. 
These events conspiring with the continued 
occupation of Ancona and Civita Vecchia by 
the French troops, revived the political quar- 
rel between the Emperor and the Pope. The 
Milan Decrees were Napoleon's answer to the 
new coalition, and he demanded, not only that 
all the ports of Italy in common with those 
of the rest of continental Europe should be 
closed against them, but that all Englishmen, 
Sardinians, Russians, and Swedes, should be 
expelled from Rome. 6 

The Court of Naples, acting a double part, 
treacherously violated the treaty of neutrality 
which had been concluded between Talleyrand 
and the Marchese di Galli, whereupon a French 
army 45,000 strong marched into the Papal 
States and the South of Italy, under Joseph 
Buonaparte and Massena, who were received 
as deliverers by the populace of Naples. 
Joseph was raised to the dignity of Grand 
Elector, and the kingdom of Naples was con- 
stituted a part of the great empire. The 
Pope, in addition to his disregai - d of the Milan 
Decrees, demanded the homage of the new 
sovereign in accordance with mediaeval usage ; 
while Napoleon, admitting that his Holiness 
was entitled to rule in the Pontifical States, 
declared that himself alone, as the successor 
of Charlemagne, was Emperor of Rome. It 
is important that these facts should be borne 
in mind in connection with the occupation of 



22 



ABOLITION OF TIIE TEMPORAL POWER. 



Rome, and the support of the Pope by the 
siime power which delivered Italy in 1859. It 
will be seen, when the circumstances arc fairly 
reviewed, that the attitude of France towards 
Italy, under the two Empires, has been ever 
the same in principle, and that principle was, 
in the first place, to support the independence 
of the Pope as the head of the Roman Ca- 
tholic faith, and secondly, to acknowledge his 
dignity as a temporal prince so far as it might 
be necessary to sustain him in the former cha- 
racter. Beyond this the Empire could have 
nothing to concede to the demands of an alien 
priesthood. And when Napoleon, rejecting the 
officious attention of the Pope, took the crown 
in his own hands, and proudly set it on his 
head in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, the 
whole principle of the controversy which has 
descended from generation to generation was 
expressed in the act. The second occupation of 
Rome in 1808, and the total abolition of the 
temporal power which ensued, was but a logical 
consequence of the situation. What Napoleon 
had first demanded was that the Pope should 
enter into the Italian confederation with the 
Kings of Italy and Naples ; that their enemies 
should be his enemies, and their friends his 
friends. Failing this, he next insisted on an 
alliance offensive and defensive with himself 
alone ; or its necessary alternative, an easy 
conquest. The Pope temporised, granted some 
things, and refused others ; but under all cir- 
cumstances asserted his duties and rights as 
the head of the Church by way of exonerating 
himself from his obligations as a temporal 
prince. The answer of Napoleon to all his 
arguments was simply that which the con- 
science of England and the spirit of the age 
have since fully approved. " Priests," he said, 
" were not fit to govern ; immersed in studies 
about God, they were unacquainted with 
man. Rome had been a disturbing cause in 
the political world long enough ; the age could 
no longer tolerate her usurpations. The pro- 
gress of knowledge had shown in what esti- 
mation the decrees of the Vatican were to be 
held. Every one was now convinced of the 
absurdity of uniting the sacerdotal and regal 
offices, the temporal with the spiritual au- 
thority, the crown and the tiara, the sword 



and the cross. Jesus Christ had said His 
kingdom was not of this world, the kingdom 
of His Vicar ought not therefore to be an 
earthly throne. Charlemagne had given the 
sovereignty of Rome to the Popes for the good 
of Christendom, and not to enable them to 
spread discord and war; and therefore, since 
they had chosen to abuse the gift, it ought to 
be revoked. Pius was to be no longer the 
ruler, but simply the bishop of Rome. By 
this means tranquillity and the interests of 
religion would be jointly provided for." To this 
resolution the Emperor inflexibly adhered. A 
corps of 7,000 French soldiers under Miollis, 
which had received the route for Naples in 
January 1808, went aside to Rome, while the 
French ambassador, Alquier, deluded the Pope 
with solemn asseverations that they had no 
hostile intention. On the 2nd of February 
they effected their entrance by the Porta del 
Popolo, seized the castle of St. Angelo, and all 
the military posts, and even planted their 
cannon open-mouthed towards the Quirinal. 
The abolition of the temporal power by decree 
(June 20th, 1809) followed in due course, and 
was the answer made by Napoleon to a bull 
of excommunication which had been launched 
against him eight days before. 7 

The Pope refused to quit the capital; but 
having barricaded the door and gates of the 
Quirinal, determined that he would yield only 
to force. The result is related by Cardinal 
Pacca. Miollis ordered General Radet, with a 
party of gensdarmes, and constables, to scale 
the walls, and seize the Pope in his own 
apartments. This was done on the night 
between the 6th and 7th of July. The Pope 
had gathered round him the most devoted of 
his adherents, and, dressed in full pontificals, 
awaited the act of violence he anticipated. 
Radet appeared, and invited him to abdicate 
of his own accord the temporal power. Then, 
as in our own time, the answer was a non 
possumus, upon which his Holiness was con- 
ducted to a carriage that had been placed in 
readiness, and conveyed to Grenoble. If it 
should be supposed that this incident was 
strangely at variance with that consistent 
continuity of purpose which we have but just 
claimed for the policy of Imperial France 



ARREST OF THE POPE. 



23 



towards Italy and the Pope — and it is mani- 
festly unlike anything that has been done 
under the Second Empire — the answer is that 
it was not done by the will of the Emperor, 
but by the initiative of the French Generals 



less he said, " What is done, is done." He 
would not have his Holiness in France, how- 
ever ; but if he had left off playing the fool 
(" si sa dimence finit "), he might return to 
Rome: as that was probably not the case, 




Miollis, Lemarrois, and Radet. On the 18th 
of July, Napoleon wrote from Schcenbrunn 
his grave disapproval of the arrest, which he 
denounced as an "act of great folly; "neverthe- 



he appointed him a temporary residence at 
Savona. As for Cardinal Pacca, he was to be 
shut up at Fenestrelle ; and " let him know," 
said the terrible soldier, " if a single French- 

3a 



24 



POLITICAL PARTIES IN ITALY. 



man is assassinated at liis instigations, he \\ ill 
be tin- first to pay for it with his head." 8 The 
Pope continued to play the fool, in Napoleon's 
opinion; at any rate, owing to his determined 
opposition to the policy of Napoleon for nation- 
alising the French Church, he remained at 
Savona till 1812, when he was removed to 
Fontainebleau, in consequence of a suspicion 
that a plot existed for his evasion at Genoa. 
It was not on the fall of Napoleon that he 
recovered his liberty, as generally stated, but 
previous to that event, an understanding for a 
new concordat having been arrived at between 
him and the Emperor in 1814. He was at 
Rome when he received the news of the 
Emperor's fall, intelligence which brought the 
tears into his eyes. Cardinal Consalvi, who had 
guided the papal counsels in the time of the 
Consulate, was then re-appointed Secretary of 
State to his Holiness, and in that character, 
after meeting the allied sovereigns at Paris, 
attended the Congress of Vienna. It is im- 
portant in relation to the further course of 
our history to review briefly the state of Italy 
at the time, and the settlement effected by the 
sovereigns of the " Holy Alliance." 

At this time the patriotic society of Car- 
bonari had existed for some years, and had 
spread from the mountains of the Abruzzi 
and Calabria into the Papal States. It will 
be necessary to speak of this confederacy, 
in connection with other secret societies of 
Italy, more particularly hereafter ; at present 
it will be sufficient to remark that the Car- 
bonari under the leadership of Capobianco 
had contributed a most important element 
to the revolutionary ferment of Italy since 
the time of Joachim Murat. In principle 
they were fervid Republicans, equally the 
enemies of the papal rule and of royalty in 
every form. Besides these, several political 
factions divided Italy in 1814. One section of 
the party of independence was headed by 
Marghela, the Minister of Police, who advised 
Murat, when Napoleon was preparing for the 
campaign which terminated so fatally at 
Leipsic, to play a bold stroke for his dynasty 
by abjuring all allegiance to the Empire, and 
proclaiming the unity of Italy under his own 
sceptre. 9 The King was not unwilling to 



profit by the advice, but he temporised until 
the opportunity escaped him, and he even 
alienated the Italian nobles of his party by 
promoting French officers over their heads. 
There were some immediately before the crisis 
of 1814 who dreamed of independence under 
Eugene as king, and some who were willing to 
believe that liberty might be secured under 
a prince of the House of Austria. Finally, 
there was also a faction which desired the 
restitution of Austrian rule, pure and simple, 
and the restoration of the old duchies. Eugene 
himself having understood that the Emperor 
Alexander was not unwilling that he should 
be king, if the people declared themselves 
in that sense, made an effort to influence the 
Government at Milan, and a warm debate 
took place in the Senate, on the proposition 
of Melzi to pass a resolution in his favour. 
Botta relates how Paradisi, Oriani, and other 
distinguished orators urged the cause of the 
Prince with the most powerful arguments, and 
were opposed by Guicciardi and Castiglione, 
with whom were joined many Milanese of 
reputation and illustrious birth. The sum- 
mary of the arguments used on both sides 
fairly represents the situation, and the dis- 
tracted counsels by which Italy was divided. 

In political changes, said the partisans 
of the Viceroy, it was easier to effect a me- 
dium than an extreme. Men were accustomed 
to the government of Eugene, already acknow- 
ledged by the princes of Europe ; they only 
desired that he should be independent of 
France, and this was precisely the object of 
their present deliberation ; although as to this, 
there was little cause for uneasiness. Napo- 
leon extinct, the independence of the country 
sprung up of itself ; and he who could believe 
that Eugene would in future depend on Bour- 
bon France, as he had done on Napoleon 
France, more especially if between Lombardy 
and France the kingdom of Piedmont was re- 
established, as was already proposed, under the 
princes of Savoy, deserved to be considered a 
mere simpleton, not a politician. Thus inde- 
pendence, they continued, was not only secure 
under Eugene, but must be the necessary 
consequence of his reign ; these considerations 
Nature herself dictated, and the intelligence 



THE QUESTION OF AUSTRIAN SUPREMACY. 



25 



from Paris confirmed. If another prince were 
demanded, what security was there of obtaining 
the petition ? In a deliberation of such mo- 
ment, the senators would be wise to trust 
rather in him they already knew, had already 
proved, than in one of whom they were wholly 
ignorant. After such tremendous convulsions, 
their political existence in Europe still so re- 
cent, how could they hope that to a kingdom 
so full of faction, so important from its situa- 
tion, a prince whose disposition was unknown 
would be conceded? The name of an Austrian 
prince was whispered about, continued the ad- 
vocates of Eugene; but they should weigh well, 
especially those who talked of liberty and 
national independence, the consequences of 
such a choice. Under an Austrian prince, did 
they then expect to live free and independent 
— under an Austrian prince connected by 
blood with the ancient sovereign of the king- 
dom, nurtured in maxims of absolute authority, 
necessarily in awe of Vienna, sovereign of 
Milan in name only ? Whose were the soldiers 
that now threatened them ? — Austrians. Who 
would flock to the frontier to keep them in sub- 
jection ? — Austrians. They knew these terri- 
tories, they knew them, and they coveted 
them. If cause were wanting, pretexts would 
be found, and at any moment an inunda- 
tion of Germans would devastate the king- 
dom. The cause and the pretext would be a 
failure in exact and humble obedience to 
Vienna. What independence would exist with 
perpetual fear, it was not easy to discover. To 
whom would these partisans of Austria have 
recourse ? from whom demand aid ? perhaps 
of avaricious England, who makes a traffic of 
all ? — of the absolute princes of Europe, who 
fear a constitution more than an army ? — of en- 
feebled France, who would not move but with 
Napoleon, and who now no longer could act 
with him ? An Austrian prince would be 
supported by all the friends of the ancient 
domination of Austria, by the lovers of 
despotic government, and by all the discon- 
tented; any sagacious man might decide 
whether recent interests, whether dawning 
liberty, whether the opinions which were of 
the growth of the last twenty years, could sur- 
vive in such a deluge of contrary elements. 



Who would be naturally, and almost from an 
internal necessity, the enemy of the freedom 
of the kingdom ? — certainly and truly, Austria. 
In what manner could liberty be defended 
from the attacks of foreigners ? — undoubtedly 
by soldiers in arms. Now, who could affirm 
that an Austrian prince would force Italian 
soldiers to oppose the cupidity of Austria ? It 
appeared also certain that the reign of an 
Austrian would not be independence, but 
dependence; not liberty, but servitude; not 
quiet, but discord and turmoil. Vienna, not 
Milan, would rule. With Eugene as king, 
every difficidty was smoothed ; with a foreign 
prince, not an Austrian, every difficulty would 
increase ; an Austrian prince would give pro- 
tection, but ensure slavery. Let the virtues, 
then, of Eugene, they concluded, be duly esti- 
mated ; his love for Italy, his attachments to 
her customs ; let not the happy auguries re- 
cently arrived from Paris be disregarded. It 
would be madness, in darkness so thick, to 
refuse to follow the only light that fortune 
held forth. If any one desired to wander in 
an endless labyrinth without a clue, without a 
compass in the pathless ocean, without light in 
an abyss, let him do so ; but such were not the 
desires or the intentions of the Transpadones, 
who believed that opportunity was never neg- 
lected with impunity. 

The opposition, on the other hand, could 
not comprehend how, with Eugene, they could 
possess either liberty or independence ; he 
would be more the vassal of Austria, more 
subservient to her than even a prince of that 
house ; for he was neither related to nor con- 
nected with any European potentate of the 
first rank ; for his own preservation he would 
be obliged to seek protectors ; where could he 
find them ? Austria alone could afford aid ; in 
her alone could he hope, from her vicinity and 
her power ; and her alone could he fear. His 
partisans believed, perhaps, that he would not 
thus succumb, from the loftiness of his senti- 
ments ; but, besides that princes never think 
that they derogate from their dignity by any 
mode of subjugating their people, provided 
they effect that subjugation, what tokens had 
Eugene given of an exalted mind ? Perhaps 
his having resigned the half of the kingdom 



26 



EUGENE' REJECTED BY THE SENATE OF MILAN. 



to Bellegarde ; perhaps his secret interviews 
with that general, of which more was known 
than was talked of; perhaps his spoliation of 
the regal palace at Milan ; perhaps the bribes 
promised for those same pernicious and fatal 
intrigues ; perhaps his agents, Mejean and 
Darnay, sent to seduce the minds of the 
people, — the same Mejean and Damay, who 
were not only strenuous supporters of tyranny, 
but also the assiduous calumniators of all 
that the kingdom boasted of as most ex- 
alted, most noble, most generous. Perhaps 
Eugene's elevated nature was proved by the 
contempt he "expressed for those soldiers of 
whom he was, by his own seeking, the 
stipendiary commander. The Italians were 
made the jest of a youth, who scarcely had 
attained to manhood, and who had no name, 
except that perhaps which he derived from 
him whose name was to the last degree odious. 
Let the purchased and welcome spies, let the 
exile of the most generous citizens, let the 
tyrannical restraints on the freedom of speech 
and writing, attest the magnanimity of Eugene ! 
There could be no doubt that, besides that he 
did not by nature abhor to act a subservient 
part, so he would also from necessity be 
constrained to it; and certainly the spirit 
of Eugene's government would be more tho- 
roughly Austrian than that of a prince of 
Austria. The edicts would be framed at 
Vienna, not in the regal palace of Milan. 
Manifest signs of this were given in the 
humble courtesy displayed to Bellegarde; in 
the surrendered fortresses ; in the messengers 
sent to the camp of the Emperor Francis, and 
those despatched to the scene of the Parisian 
treaties : it was demonstrated by the speeches 
that were now made from the senatorial 
benches. If, then, an Austrian prince were 
demanded, which would be an extreme resolu- 
tion that necessity alone could produce, had 
not Tuscany long been happy and independent 
under an Austrian prince ? The Austrian 
princes were certainly unwilling to swear to 
conditions of liberty, but they faithfully ob- 
served what they did swear to. The Napoleon- 
ists, on the contrary, betrayed by taking oaths ; 
betrayed by violating them, observing their pro- 
mises only when their own interest demanded 



it. They spoke of Prina as a delegate ; they 
spoke of Paradisi ! Prina certainly was such an 
ardent lover of liberty, and so was Paradisi, that 
they would throw themselves into every danger 
rather than hear of the Austrians — they well 
knew the reason why. These were the messengers 
of independence, these the defenders of liberty ! 
Finally, nations, not factions, change the con- 
ditions of states in important and unprece- 
dented situations. Who would affirm that the 
Italians desired Eugene as king ? the soldiers, 
who hated him, — the citizens, who did not love 
him ? To elect him would be esteemed the 
machination of a few, not the desire of all ; 
nor were the allied sovereigns so ignorant of 
prevalent opinions as not to be aware of these 
things. 

All the Milanese nobility rejected Eugene, 
and demanded freedom, while the people 
uttered menaces at the mere murmur of his 
name, at the bare mention of the continuation, 
if not of the domination, of the customs of 
France. The hands of the allied sovereigns 
were nobly armed ; generous motives animated 
them ; generous actions were meditated by 
them : the present moment was unparalleled 
in the history of ages. Propose to them, not 
the desires of a few individuals, but the desires 
of the people ; propose to them a noble pur- 
pose, not the demand of a paltry prince, the 
docile pupil of a tyrant ; ask them for an en- 
larged and liberal political existence, not an 
existence afflicted by spies and dungeons, and 
their wishes would be fulfilled. These were 
the wishes of the Italians, these the wishes 0/ 
the allies ; such the will of Heaven, which had 
not raised the world in arms, that Napoleon 
Buonaparte should continue to reign in Milan, 
under the name of Eugene Beauharnois. "No," 
exclaimed Castiglione, increasing in fury, " we 
will not have Eugene, neither will we have 
Prina, Mejean, or Darnay. We desire a prince 
connected by blood with some powerful 
European stock, who will have no need to 
maintain himself by flattery and concession. 
We wish for a prince who will swear to free 
ordinances, and who will not destroy liberty, 
but preserve it; we wish for a prince who 
knows and feels how noble this Italian king- 
dom is, how generous its inhabitants, how 



LEGITIMACY AND THE "NEW JACOBINS." 



27 



exalted the destiny prepared by favouring 
Heaven for them and for him. Enough and too 
much they had had of France — too long had 
they suffered from the caprices of the Napoleon 
system. Now, when such high expectations 
were abroad, when the world was so power- 
fully excited, was the Italian mind directed 
elsewhere. The sufferings of the past ought 
to make way for future enjoyments, not for 
fresh inflictions. 

The discussion in the Senate was followed 
by a popular tumult, accompanied with blood- 
shed; on hearing of which Eugene, who was 
at Mantua, delivered up that fortress to the 
Austrians, as previously mentioned (vol. i., 
p. 65). The result was that Italy, by the 
terms of the Congress of Vienna, returned 
almost to her original condition ; the French 
occupation everywhere ceased, and the as- 
cendancy of Austria was more firmly esta- 
blished than ever. Dynastic interests were 
alone consulted in these arrangements. An 
entrenched position, so to speak, was thrown 
up in favour of legitimacy by the " Holy 
Alliance," in which England, happily, took 
no part; and Austria commenced the soul- 



destroying work which we have seen brought 
to confusion in our day by setting her heel on 
the " new Jacobins," as Metternich called the 
patriots. These "new Jacobins" included 
with the association of Carbonari such men as 
Silvio Pellico, Foscolo, and Maroncelli. But the 
mental life of a nation cannot be so crushed out. 
There were times in after years when Italy 
seemed dead ; but the vital spark was never 
extinguished. The fire of revolution continued 
to smoulder in its ashes, now and then shooting 
out tongues of flame, which were instantly re- 
pressed, until a second Napoleon broke through 
the crust of cinder which had hidden its in- 
tense glow, and the fire blazed up fiercely as 
in a furnace. But we must proceed step by 
step, and make out with logical clearness the 
connection between the war of 1870 and the 
liberation of Italy. We shall find eventually 
that all the events and scenes upon which we 
have lightly touched, belong to the one revolu- 
tionary drama in which the chief character 
is still the crowned soldier who first gathered 
up in his hands, and wielded with destructive 
effect, the whole power of the democracy, and 
ended — by breaking his instrument ! 



Notes to Chapter LVIII. 



1 In the debate on the occupation of Rome in the French 
Chamber, November 18th, 1867, M. Thiers reproached the Go- 
vernment of the Emperor with having entertained the idea of 
reconciling united Italy with the Papacy ; and characterized the 
successive acts of unification as robbery. The House of Savoy, 
he said, had hunted with Garibaldi as a falcon, and he concluded 
by declaring that the honour as well as the interests of France 
would be compromised, if France declined to support the temporal 
power of the Pope. M. Rouher, who followed M. Thiers, de- 
fended the policy of the Emperor, and affirmed that the States 
which Piedmont had annexed had first been abandoned by their 
sovereigns. He agreed with M. Thiers in blaming the conquest 
of the two Sicilies, and the annexation of the Marches and 
Umbria. Coming at last to the real dilemma, that the Pope wanted 
Rome, and Italy could not do without it, M. Rouher continued 
emphatically, " We declare that Italy shall not seize upon 
Rome. France will never submit to such a violence committed 
on her honour, and on catholicity in general. She demands 
from Italy the rigorous and energetic execution of the Conven- 
tion of September; and if this be not conceded, she will supply 
the deficiency herself. Is that clear enough ? " Thus both the 
Government and the Opposition represented by M. Thiers were 
agreed in the necessity of maintaining the temporal dominion 
of the Pope. In this respect they were in perfect accord. 

2 These words are the legend of the Crown itself, and as 
Napoleon repeated them before the High Altar at the instant of 
pressing the crown upon his brow with his own hands, shouts of 
enthusiasm resounded through the cathedral. 

3 The Cisalpine Republic was constituted in June, 1797, and 
acknowledged by the treaty of Campo Formio, in October of the 
same year. The new State was formed by the junction of the 



Transpadane and Cispadane Republics which had preceded it; 
the former constituted of Lombardy and Modena, the latter of 
the Legations of Bologna, Ravenna, Ferrara, and Forli. In 
September, 1798, the Cisalpine Republic received a new consti- 
tution, and in March, 1805, was merged in the kingdom of Italy. 

4 The reader will, of course, bear in mind that this retrospect 
is supposed to date immediately after Sedan. 

6 Napoleon's instructions to Murat, when he departed on this 
mission, were to " treat the Pope exactly as if he (the Pope) had 
200,000 soldiers under his orders." The statement in the text 
concerning the substantial object of his mission is supported by 
the following passage in a volume of popular French biography : 
" L'un des compagnons de Bonaparte, le general Murat, apparut 
lui-meme, apportant au souverain pontife, avec les hommages du 
premier consul, cette declaration douce a cceur dePie VII., que 
la republique romaine, ceuvre du Directoire, ne serait pasretablie, 
et que le pape, niaitre dans Rome, verrait s'affirmir le principe de 
sa puissance temporelle, en meme temps qu'il serait retabli dans 
la plupart de ses droits." — Daudet : Le Cardinal Consalvi. 

6 Rome had become a focus of intrigue against the Emperor, 
chiefly because the ports of the Papal States remained open to 
all nations then at war with France, in defiance of the Imperial 
decree. 

7 Consalvi, p. 141. 

8 A part only of this letter is given in the memoirs of Cardinal 
Consalvi, but the whole is found in the correspondence of Napo- 
leon, published by order of the Emperor Napoleon III., vol. xix., 
pp. 265-66, n. 15,555. It is addressed to Fouche, the Minister 
of Police. 

9 Murat did eventually abandon his commission in the new 
army, and return to Naples. — Koch's Europe, p. 222. 



28 



ORIGIN OF CARBONARLSM. 



CHAPTER LIX. 

THE SECRET SOCIETIES AND THE REVOLUTION. 

The War of 1870 and (ho " Involution "— The story of the 
'• Revolution " and df (he Secret Societies inseparable— Com- 
mencement with Freemasonry and Carbonarlsm — Traditional 
Origin of the latter Association — Legend of the Wolf— The 
Carbonari under Cnpobianco— Their typical Ceremonials— 
Duplicity of Ferdinand of Naples, nnd atrocities in Calabria 
— Carbonarism organized by General Pepe— Revolution of 
1820 at Naples— Reaction of Ferdinand supported by the 
Holy Alliance— Division of parties in the French Chamber- 
Events in Sardinia, and alleged treachery of Charles Albert 
—Earliest recollections of Mazzini— Transfer of the Head- 
Quarters of Carbonarism to Paris — Revolution of July, 1830 
— Brcnk-up of the Society— Succession of the Apophasi- 
menes under the leadership of Buonarotti — The Carbomiri 
in Italy after 1821 -The educational propaganda commenced 
by Mazzini— His affiliation to Carbonarism— Difference of 
aim — Of a European Literature — Theory of Association — 
Crisis in France — Preparing for Insurrection in Italy — 
Arrest and Imprisonment of Mazzini — First Conception of 
La Giovine Italia— Italy needs Rome— The future of 
Europe and the initiation of the new order of Associated 
Nations — Rome and Italy in Mazzini's view necessarily 
Republican — The moral and spiritual character of Association 
opposed to the materialism of a Government under Kings and 
Constitutions — Release and Exile of Mazzini— Revolution of 
1831 in Central Italy crushed by the Austrians— The Italian 
exiles and French Republicans — Preparations to invade Italy 
—The movement stayed by the Governmentof Louis Philippe 
—Conflict at Rimini, and return of the Austrians under 
Radetzky— Failure of Mazzini's intended Expedition from 
Genoa— Constitution of " Young Italy " — Death of Carlo 
Felice, and succession of Charles Albert — Popularity of the 
new King —The question of his sincerity— Mazzini's letter 
and its reward — His residence in Marseilles — Statutes of 
"Young Italy" promulgated — Organization of the Society — 
Preparations for a combined movement — Premature dis- 
covery of the plot — Cruel reprisals of the Government — The 
Insurgent Column set in motion — Appearance of Garibaldi 
on the scene— Failure — Summary of Secret Societies. 

The connection between the war of 1870 and 
the liberation of Italy is not the only his- 
torical lesson we have to learn from our 
retrospect of events in the Italian peninsula. 
Entwined with the same series of facts is 
the more recondite thread of history which 
connects the terrible events that occurred in 
Paris, after the conclusion of the war, with 
" the Revolution." But the history of " the 
Revolution " as the word is now understood 
throughout the whole of Europe, is the history 
of the Secret Societies which had their origin 
in Italy as far back as the period of Napo- 
leon's satrapy in Naples, and of which Joseph 
Mazzini is the living representative. 

The earliest date which Mazzini himself 
assigns to Carbonarism is 1811 ; l but the 
association is spoken of by Botta under the 
date of 1808, in the first year of Joachim 
Murat's reign. Lamartine seems to have satis- 



fied himself that its origin is lost in the dark- 
ness of the middle ages, like Freemasonry, of 
which he thinks it was was by turns the ally 
and the enemy. The exact date of the rise of 
the brotherhood is of little consequence, as its 
proceedings, so far as we are concerned with 
them in this history, were at first very obscure. 
The account of their origin given by Botta 
may be taken as sufficiently exact for our pur- 
pose ; our chief interest centering in their de- 
clining days, when Mazzini's own conception, 
La Giovine Italia, arose like a phoenix from 
the ashes of the older organization. There is 
a tradition that the first Carbonari — the real 
" charcoal burners " of the Abruzzi traced 
their lineage to the Waldenses, and that the 
battle cry of the latter, " Revenge for the lamb 
torn by the wolf," was the origin of the pecu- 
liar symbolism of the Carbonari. Botta takes 
no notice of this, but traces their origin to a 
number of republican refugees who fled from 
the rule of Murat, and first hid themselves in 
the deepest recesses of Abruzzo and Calabria, 
carrying with them, besides their hatred of 
Joachim as a king, the fiercest animosity 
against the French and against all monarchy 
as a principle. In the wild and secluded fast- 
nesses in which they lived this feeling grew 
in intensity from year to year; and when they 
talked of clearing the forest of wolves, they 
signified their hatred primarily of the French, 
and secondly, of all who supported Monarchy 
even under their native Prince Ferdinand. It 
is thus at least we find their history written in 
the Stovia oV Italia (Botta), and perhaps with 
accuracy as regards the direct application of 
the expressions at the time mentioned. But 
this symbol of the wolf is of older date even 
than the Waldenses. Dante, the father of 
Italian nationality and independence, draws 
the contrast between the " she- wolf, full of 
all wants," and the greyhound who was to 
destroy her, and thus depicts the nobleness of 
the latter — 

" He will not life support 

By earth nor its base metals, but by love, 

Wisdom, and virtue." 

It is probable therefore that the idea of chas- 
ing the wolf out of Italy had descended from 
very early times, and that this tradition was 



CEREMONIES OF INITIATION. 



29 




JOSEPH MAZZINI. 



connected in the popular imagination with 
the struggle for deliverance from tyranny, and 
had then become a watchword araonj: the 
poor charcoal burners with whom the political 
refugees of Murat's time found safety, and 
whose name and calling they assumed for a 
disguise. 

At the time when their movements beoan 
to be known and talked of, their chief was one 
Capobianco, a man endowed with extraordinary 
powers of persuasive eloquence. They then 
found it necessary to adopt passwords and 
secret methods of initiation, which however 
they eventually carried to a ridiculous extreme. 
The initiated styled one another buoni cugini 
(good cousins). Any place in which they met 
was called a baracca, or hut ; its interior was 
the vendita, or place of sale (for charcoal) : a 
lodge, or larger place of meeting in a town, 
was an alta vendita ; and the outside, or neigh- 
bourhood round about, a bosco or foresta. If 
their organization was analogous in some re- 
spects to that of the Freemasons, 2 it differed 
from it in other important particulars. Their 
meetings were not enlivened by convivial 
songs and feastings, but all was severe and 
gloomy as befitted an association of men pre- 



pared for martyrdom. Under the type of the 
lamb destroyed by the wolf, Jesus Christ was 
figured; and kings in general, whom they 
invariably called tyrants, were meant by 
wolves. They also called themselves sheep, 
and any monarch they lived under the wolf. 
As the Freemasons engage to avenge their 
Hiram, so the Carbonari were sworn to 
avenge their Christ, whom they spoke of as 
the first and most exalted victim of tyranny. 
In their secret assemblies a bloody corpse was 
exposed, which they said was the body of 
Christ. At a later period the ceremony of 
initiation included an incident which Mazzini 
justly ridiculed. A pistol was loaded with 
ball, and primed in the presence of the initiate, 
who was then ordered to take it in his hand, 
put the muzzle close to his ear, and fire it off. 
As Mazzini observed when this ordeal was 
explained to him, if there was an arrangement 
in the pistol by which the charge was ren- 
dered harmless, the proceeding was childish; 
and if not, a man must be a fool who could 
swear to devote his whole future to the ser- 
vice of his country, and then blow out the few 
brains he had with which to serve her. This 
only shows by what fatuity the counsels of 



so 



THE CARBONARI ORGANIZED BY PEPE. 



the Carbonari were guided in their declining 
da}'s. 

The organization of the Freemasons on the 
Continent had been made use of to promote 
the first revolutionary movements in France ; 3 
but as the storm subsided under the strong 
government of Napoleon, statesmen and princes 
themselves became Freemasons, and were thus 
able to influence society in favour of ex- 
isting governments. The Carbonari in like 
manner allowed themselves to be made the 
tools of princes, but in the expectation of 
being the better able to accomplish their own 
ends. King Ferdinand himself, for example, 
as well as his wife, Queen Caroline, and his 
sons, were initiated into the Society during 
their long exile in Sicily. Deluded by the 
professions of this weak and vicious prince, who 
raised the standard of the Union and Inde- 
pendence of all Italy, they took up arms in 
Calabria against the soldiers of Murat, con- 
sisting of the French troops under Portonneaux, 
combined with the Provincial Guards and 
Neapolitans. This insurrectionary movement 
had been abetted also by the English Govern- 
ment as a means of harassing the French. All 
the usual consequences of civil strife and 
irregular warfare naturally ensued — burnings, 
devastation, pillage, violation, and not slaugh- 
ter only, but assassination. It is Botta himself 
who paints this dreadful picture of his coun- 
try, and he adds : " These horrible atrocities 
became the more frequent in proportion as, 
availing themselves of the confusion of a state 
of warfare, dissolute men of every description, 
banditti, thieves, and assassins, who cared nei- 
ther for Republic nor Monarchy, for Ferdinand 
nor Joachim, neither for the French nor the 
English, for the Pope nor for the Grand Turk, 
but were intent only on pillage and slaughter, 
issued from their mountain hiding-places in 
order to commit those actions which humanity 
abhors, and which the historian shudders to 
recount. From this time Calabria was for 
two whole years red with blood wantonly 
spilled, until at last the terror caused by judi- 
cial executions brought it to a more tolerable 
condition." General Manhes, the agent in 
these judicial proceedings, in fact, made little 
distinction between the Carbonari and the bri- 



gands of Calabria; and his subalterns ably 
seconded him in ferocity. Capobianco was 
betrayed to the troops by a pretended friend, 
and put to death : all who survived fled to the 
most rugged mountain fortresses. 

Ferdinand succeeded to Murat, and de- 
ceived every hope. He decreed the union of 
Sicily and Naples, and refused a constitution. 
The result was that those who had been fa- 
vourable to Murat joined the secret society. 
Hundreds of officers on half-pay flocked to 
their ranks, by means of the vendita, or sale, 
which, like the cave of Adullam, now rallied 
all the discontented of every shade of opinion. 
In 1816 their number was estimated by Count 
Nunziante, 4 the military commandant in 
Calabria, at 60,000 ; but this was probably an 
exaggeration. Let us suppose there was half 
that uumber. Before the revolutionary move- 
ments of 1820 the number was increased to 
650,000, whose avowed aim was the recon- 
stitution of Italy as a nation, on the basis of 
civil and religious Liberty. 

This extraordinary development of Car- 
bonarism had been greatly fowarded by an 
officer named Pepe, who first organized a 
militia to put down brigandage, and then 
induced his militia to join the Carbonari as 
a body, every company being formed into a 
lodge. 5 By this means the character of the 
secret association was itself raised in moral, and 
ceased to be a refuge for desperate and doubt- 
ful characters. Pepe unfortunately was not, 
either by temperament or the circumstances 
of the time, permitted to labour and to wait. 
Excited by the insurrection of 1820 in Spain, 
and provoked by the degrading tyranny to 
which Italians were subjected in almost every 
state of the peninsula, a determined band of 
the Carbonari, led by a body of cavalry under 
the command of Morelli, set out from Nola, 
where the soldiers had been cantoned, and 
advanced to Avellino, which was occupied by 
other corps, shouting for the Constitution, 
This occurred at daybreak on the 2nd of July, 
1820. The King, who was in the bay, going 
to meet his son, the Duke of Calabria, then 
returning from Sicily, heard of the movement 
on board his vessel, and knew well that he had 
but too much cause to feel alarmed as to the 



FERDINAND AND THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 



31 



possible results of the revolt. He returned 
with his son and his court to the palace, 
assembled the Council, and commissioned Ge- 
neral Pepe, then Commander-in-Chief of the 
Province, to meet the insurgents, trusting that 
his popularity would give the necessary force 
to his arguments, and check the movement. 
According to the account of the circumstances 
given in his own memoir, Pepe accepted the 
commission with the intention of turning the 
opportunity to account by declaring for a 
constitution. Ferdinand, however, immedi- 
ately afterwards grew suspicious, and having 
cancelled Pepe's commission, sent General 
Carascosa in his place, who lost some hours 
at Naples maturing his plans. Pepe in the 
meanwhile, indignant at the treatment he had 
received, set off to meet the insurgents on his 
own account, leading with him a regiment of 
cavalry from Naples, amidst cries of " Vive la 
Constitution!" among the agitated populace. 
By the time that General Pepe had joined the 
small force under Morelli, the latter had raised 
the towns and country all round ; the militia 
and the Carbonari alike flocked to their united 
standards, and General Pepe organized them 
in colums for marching on the capital. In a 
week afterwards he entered Naples in triumph 
at the head of his battalions, the King having 
first been compelled to sign a constitution. 

It would carry us far beyond the limits to 
which this retrospect must be confined to give 
a connected narrative of what followed. Be- 
fore the end of the year Ferdinand, who had 
been permitted by the Neapolitan Parliament 
to attend the Congress of Sovereigns, with 
such oaths on his lips as seemed a sufficient 
guarantee of the future, had conspired with 
the other members of the Holy Alliance 6 to 
trample upon the liberties of his country. 
The conspiracy of Troppau and Laybach ex- 
cited fierce debate in the French Chamber. 
. France had only sat in the gallery, so to speak, 
yet the popular feeling was strong against the 
Court and the Ministry. To quote Lamartine, 
whose historical fairness may be trusted in this 
matter, "the ultra-Royalists on their side lost 
all patience, and reproached the Ministers, 
Richelieu and Pasquier, for temporising and 
compounding with revolutions. Intermediate 



men who were most in the confidence of this 
party, and who had been admitted without 
portfolios into the Council, as guarantees for a 
Royalist administration, such as M. de Villele, 
De Corbiere, and Laine - , were already objects 
of reproach and bitter accusation by the Tri- 
bune. General Donnadieu, M. de Labourdon- 
naie, and M. de Lalot gave the signal for a 
schism between the Ultras and the Moderates, 
which threatened De Richelieu with an ap- 
proaching fall between the irritated Liberals 
and the unmanageable Royalists. These two 
parties exchanged over the heads of the Mi- 
nisters insults and defiance which seemed the 
prelude of a civil war. Spain and Italy were 
the text of these mutual provocations. Gene- 
ral Foy, Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, Casi- 
mir Perier, De Lameth, Manuel, Laffitte, and 
Girardin rivalled in anger and eloquence 
MM. De Serres, De Vaublanc, De Labourdon- 
naie, and Donnadieu. M. Pasquier, skilful in 
appeasing these debates by speeches which 
gave the victory to neither side, but made 
neither party desperate, secretly satisfied the 
Court, however, by sending to the Congress of 
Laybach negotiators agreeable to the Holy 
Alliance, such as M. de Blacas, M. de Caraman, 
and M. de La Ferronays. In this Congress 
France, fluctuating between England and 
Russia, declared herself neutral ; but in thus 
keeping out of the action she in reality gave 
up Italy to Austria. Sixty thousand men, 
commanded by General Fre'mont, were already 
marching upon Berne and Naples through 
Tuscany. The old King Ferdinand [it was 
thus the perjured despot returned from the 
Congress] advanced with them to reclaim his 
crown. What could a nation, disheartened by 
the desertion of all its natural allies, do against 
the whole of Europe ? It was in vain that 
General Pepe led the Neapolitan army to the 
defiles of Introdocco, to save at least the na- 
tional honour by a desperate but glorious 
struggle. The Neapolitan Revolution fell with- 
out a battle ; Pepe, abandoned by his troops 
at the first cannon-shot, could not rally a 
single regiment up to Naples. 7 He left his 
country for a long exile, which was to be dis- 
tinguished by the heroic defence of Venice in 
his old age ; a soldier worthy of a better for- 



32 



MAZZINI'S BOYHOOD. 



tune, betrayed l>y his countrymen and the 
necessity of the times." 8 

The national movement was not confined to 
the kingdom of the two Sicilies. An insurrec- 
tion also broke out in Piedmont; but the time 
was ill-calculated for co-operation, and equally 
ill-timed for success, had it been well planned. 
Turin declared for the Spanish Constitution at 
the moment that Europe, through its Congress 
of Kings, declared it to be incompatible with 
the existence of monarchies, and when Austria 
was triumphing at Naples. The King of Sar- 
dinia, Victor Emmanuel, abdicated in favour of 
his brother, the Prince de Carignan, who was 
at the head of the revolutionary movement, 
and who three days afterwards abandoned the 
capital in the night, at the head of the Guards, 
and placed himself with one half the army 
under the orders of the Austrian general. 9 It 
is only right that such acts of treachery should 
be put in evidence when we are called upon 
to pass judgment on the conspirators against 
what is called " law and order," and their 
bitterness against kings. The defection of the 
Prince ruined the hopes, but did not ex- 
tinguish the courage, of the insurgents, who 
attempted an attack upon the Austrians 
at Novara. The presence of the Prince de 
Carignan in the ranks of their enemies, and 
the masses of the Austrian army which had 
hastened up from Milan, baffled their heroism ; 
they could only seal with their blood the cause 
of the constitution and of their country. The 
King of Sardinia returned to Turin ; the leaders 
of the revolt, imprisoned and proscribed, paid 
for their experience of royal honesty by im- 
prisonment and exile. 10 It is precisely at this 
critical point of the history of Italy and of 
the secret societies of the Revolution, that 
Mazzini, who was destined to become the very 
soul of the Revolution, commences the story of 
his life. 11 

" One Sunday in April, 1821, while I was 
yet a boy," says the arch-conspirator, " I was 
walking in the Strada Nuova of Genoa, with 
my mother and an old friend of our family, 
named Andrea Gambini. The Piedmontese in- 
surrection had just been crushed; partly by 
Austria, partly through treachery, and partly 
through the weakness of its leaders. 



"The revolutionists, seeking safety by sea, 
had flocked to Genoa, and finding themselves 
distressed for means, they went about seeking 
help to enable them to cross into Spain. The 
greater number of them were crowded in S. 
Pier d' Arena, awaiting a chance to embark ; 
but not a few had contrived to enter the city 
one by one, and I used to search them out 
from amongst our own people, detecting them 
either by their general appearance, by some 
peculiarity of dress, or by the signs of a deep 
and silent sorrow on their faces. 

" The population were singularly moved ; 
some of the boldest had proposed to the leaders 
of the insurrection — Santa Rosa and Ansaldi, 
I think — to concentrate themselves in, and 
take possession of, the city, and organize a new 
resistance ; but Genoa was found to be deprived 
of all means of successful defence ; the fortresses 
were without artillery, and the leaders had 
rejected the proposition, telling them to pre- 
serve themselves for a better fate. 

"Presently we were stopped and addressed by 
a tall black-bearded man, with a severe and 
energetic countenance, and a fiery glance that 
I have never since forgotten. He held out a 
white handkerchief towards us, merely saying, 
'For the refugees of Italy! My mother and 
friend dropped some money into the handker- 
chief, and he turned from us to put the same 
request to others. I afterwards learnt his 
name. He was one Reni, a captain in the 
National Guard which had been instituted at 
the commencement of the movement. He ac- 
companied those for whom he had just consti- 
tuted himself collector, and I believe died — as 
so many of ours have perished — for the cause 
of liberty in Spain." 

The incident is interesting as the commence- 
ment of the story of Mazzini's life. It is the 
connecting link between the period we have 
just sketched — its abortive insurrections and 
its alliances of crowned heads against the 
liberties of Europe — and the comparatively 
successful struggles of the last forty years. 
Mazzini himself dates from it the first dawn of 
reflection in his own mind on the fate of his 
country; the first impression of an existing 
wrong against which it was a duty to struggle, 
and in which he too must prepare to bear his 



MAZZINI'S EDUCATIONAL PROPAGANDA. 



33 



part. lie began collecting names and facts, 
and studied as he best could the records of 
the heroic struggle which had terminated so 
disastrously. Then the idea of renewing the 
struggle began to take possession of bis mind, 
and as time wore on a circle of chosen friends 
aspiring towards a better state of things began 
to gather round him. The Carbonari had been 
proscribed throughout all Italy as traitors 
since the suppression of the revolts in Pied- 
mont and Naples in 1821. The result was 
that the head-quarters of the society were 
transferred to Paris, in consequence of which 
the association assumed more of a French 
character, and was more perfectly organized 
than it had been in Italy. The initiated were 
still called buoni cugini — but in French, bons 
cousins — while the uninitiated received the new 
name of pagani, or heathens. There was no 
such thing as a written document or communi- 
cation by letter relative to the doings of the 
society allowed among the brotherhood. There 
is reason to believe that all the. secret political 
societies of France that previously existed were 
now merged in Carbonarism, and therefore it 
is no wonder that, so long as the war between 
France and Spain lasted, the Government of 
Louis XVIII. was harassed by rumours of 
plots springing up in all parts of the country. 
The character of the society is further proved 
by the fact that its rules decreed death by 
assassination to any member who should be 
guilty of treachery. After the Spanish war 
rumours of intended insurrections died away, 
and the society seems to have confined itself 
to the dissemination of republican ideas till its 
dissolution in 1830, owing to the successes of 
the revolution of July. As usually happens 
in such cases, an attempt was soon made by 
some of the more restless members of the old 
body to resuscitate it in a new form. The 
society thus constituted under the leadership 
of Buonarroti took the name of the Apophasi- 
rnenes. Mazzini says : " It was a sort of military 
organization — a complex mixture of oaths and 
symbols, with a multiplicity of grades and ranks, 
and an exaggeration of discipline calculated to 
destroy that enthusiasm of the heart which is 
the source of all great enterprises ; and utterly 
devoid of any dominant moral principle." 12 



To return to Italy. 

While the proscription of the Carbonari, 
after the events of 1821, added to the loss of 
faith in their leaders, and the want of a 
distinct moral aim, were gradually reducing 
the association to the level of a vulgar con- 
spiracy against the existing order of things, 
devoid of all living recuperative force, the me- 
ditations of Mazzini and his select circle of 
friends were tending to an educational propa- 
ganda from which the mightiest results were 
to be anticipated. The study of literature and 
art led directly to this result. If there was 
no regular and progressive development, it 
was because there was no collective life in 
Italy, — a reflection which suggested the ques- 
tion, Are we to have a country ? Until this 
question was answered, the career of literature 
must be renounced, except in so far as the 
solution of the political problem could be pro- 
moted by it. Little by little the tendency of 
the writings put forth by Mazzini and his 
friends became more openly pronounced, and 
there were whispers of the revival of Carbo- 
narism. By-and-by one of his friends con- 
fessed to the future leader of the democratic 
movement that he was a member of the old 
association, and invited him to be initiated. 
Mazzini consented, and was soon advanced 
from the first rank to the second, in which he 
was authorized to ^affiliate others. As yet, 
however, he had learnt nothing of their pro- 
gramme. He only knew that they regarded 
their country as disinherited of all power to 
act, and that they professed Cosmopolitanism 
— a beautiful word, he says, if it be under- 
stood to mean liberty for all men ; but every 
lever requires a fulcrum, and whereas he had 
been accustomed to look for that fulcrum in 
Italy, the Carbonari looked for it in Paris, 
where, as we related, the society had esta- 
blished its head-quarters since the proscription 
of 1821. This idea of Cosmopolitanism, 13 de- 
fective as it was, served as a point of departure, 
from which Mazzini ascended to higher views, 
as the eagle wings his flight from some fast- 
ness of the rocks which he leaves beneath him. 
In his Essay on a European Literature, which 
appeared in the Antologia of Florence, in 
December, 1829, 14 Mazzini has shown in fact 



34 



CONCEPTION OF "YOUNG ITALY." 



how the intellectual development of the 
separate monarchies of Europe has prepared 
the way for this final development, and that 
"a common thought, an universal mind, is 
leading the nations through different paths 
to one and the same goal." The principle 
indicated is that of Socialism in the true sense 
of the word; for it is the social man — the 
moral of Collective Humanity — that is to be 
educated for its mission. 

As the struggle between Charles X. and 
the opposition in the French Chamber drew 
to a crisis, the Carbonaros of Italy began 
to bestir themselves, and Mazzini, who had 
been simply sworn on his initiation to obey 
whatever order he received from his unknown 
superiors, was sent to Tuscany, to plant the 
society there. He now saw too clearly what 
an ignoble thing this Carbonarism had become. 
Having received an order to be at a certain 
rendezvous by midnight, he was joined there 
by several of the young men he had himself 
enrolled, and by others who were strangers to 
him, all of whom had received the same secret 
order, and were as ignorant of the object as 
himself. 15 After waiting some time, one of the 
leaders, named Doria, appeared, and arranging 
the initiated in a circle round him, informed 
them that two of their number, who were 
muffled up in cloaks, would proceed to Bologna 
on the morrow to stab a Carbonaro there for 
having spoken against the chiefs, for that the 
Order no sooner discovered rebels than it 
crushed them. This was spoken at Mazzini, 
in answer to remarks of his which had been 
reported to the chiefs. He was at first indig- 
nant, and refused to go on his mission to 
Tuscany, but eventually thought better of it. 
He had scarcely returned to Genoa, when the 
insurrection of July broke out in Paris, and 
now the leaders of the Carbonari, expecting 
aid from Louis Philippe, began to bestir them- 
selves for action, but with no definite aim, and 
the younger men prepared for the conflict, 
which they thought certain to come, by cast- 
ing bullets. The police were also active, and 
Mazzini, the victim of treachery, found himself 
a prisoner. 

This imprisonment was only a part of his 
further education for the work before him. 



He managed by secret means to correspond 
with his friends, and to give them instructions 
in the interests of the order. On communicat- 
ing, this fact to a fellow-prisoner in the corri- 
dor between their cells, the latter instantly 
invested him with the highest rank ; " and 
then," says Mazzini, " tapping me on the head, 
in order to confer upon me I know not what 
indispensable Masonic dignity, — all confirmed 
me in the conviction I had acquired some 
months before, that Carbonarism was, in fact, 
dead ; and that, instead of wasting time and 
energy in endeavouring to galvanize a corpse, 
it would be better to address myself to the 
living, and seek to found a new edifice upon a 
new basis." This is of historical importance 
as the first conception of the Association of 
Young Italy (La Giovine Italia), which 
afterwards became a more powerful engine in 
revolutionary movements than had ever before 
been organized, and to which Italy is in a 
great measure indebted for her present exist- 
ence as a nation. "At that time" [in that 
prison], says the future Chief of the Revolu- 
tion, " even the immature conception inspired 
me with a mighty hope, that flashed before 
my spirit like a star. I saw regenerate Italy 
becoming at one bound the missionary of a 
religion of progress and fraternity far grander 
and vaster than that she gave to humanity in 
the past. The worship of Rome was a part of 
my being. The great Unity, the One Life of 
the world, had twice been elaborated within 
her walls. Other peoples — their brief mission 
fulfilled — disappeared for ever. To none save 
to her had it been given twice to guide and 
direct the world. There, life was eternal, 
death unknown. There, upon the vestiges of 
an epoch of civilization anterior to the Grecian, 
which had had its seat in Italy, and which 
the historical science of the future will show 
to have had a far wider external influence 
than the learned of our own day imagine, — 
the Rome of the Republic, concluded by the 
Caesars, had arisen to consign the former world 
to oblivion, and had borne her eagles over the 
known world, carrying with them the idea of 
right, the source of liberty. In later days, 
while men were mourning over her as the 
sepulchre of the living, she had again aiisen 



ROME A NEW CENTRE OF LIGHT. 



35 



greater than before, and at once constituted 
herself, through her Popes — as venerable once 
as abject now — the accepted centre of a new 
unity, elevating the law from earth to heaven, 
and substituting for the idea of right an idea 
of duty — a duty common to all men, and 
therefore source of their equality. Why should 
not a new Rome, the Rome of the Italian peo- 
ple — portents of whose coming I deemed I saw 
— arise to create a third and still vaster unity 
to link together and harmonize earth and 
heaven, right and duty; and utter, not to in- 
dividuals, but to peoples, the great word As- 
sociation — to make known to free men and 
equals their mission here below ? " 

Thus Mazzini in his cell at Savona, forty 
years ago, speculated on the future of Rome 
and Italy — worshipped Rome, he says. He 
had reached the conclusion to which Mr. 
Browning brings his hero, Sordello, when he 
reflected that men suffered much, whether 
Guelph or Ghibelline prevailed. Once launched 
on this theme, in the solitude of his prison, it 
was certain the logical consequences would 
follow in his case, as in the experience of 
the poet, during his year's retirement at 
Goito, like a revelation. The great crowd of 
mankind do not exist like a machine, that 
superior men may control them ; but they have 
rights and lives of their own. Those rights, 
that life, are not safe in the keeping of one 
faction or another. What men need to wor- 
ship as their guiding star is a righteous and 
holy authority, not its false semblance or 
shadow set up by selfish and ambitious rulers 
for their own purposes. But authority in 
this sense has vanished from the earth, and be- 
come utterly extinct, and a new initiative is 
required for its restoration. To whom should 
that initiative belong ? With Germany, its 
mission accomplished in the philosophy of 
individualism; with England, sunk in com- 
mercialism ; with France, lost in a vague cos- 
mopolitanism — what hope existed for Europe, 
except in Italy, whose nationality and whose 
mission among the nations of the modern 
world had yet to be realized ? For an Italian 
of Mazzini's enthusiastic temperament there 
could be but one conclusion. Italy renewed 
implied, in the nature of things, a new Rome, 



as Europe renewed and ordered by a righteous 
authority to which all would willingly submit 
themselves, implied a new centre of light — a 
real metropolis, or mother-city of civilization, 
at whose feet the future ages would reverently 
sit and learn. And who shall blame the phi- 
losopher, poet and patriot in one, who dreamt 
thus in the solitude of his prison, and after- 
wards shaped his whole life by the dream ? 
" Utopist and madman ! " Yes, for " the chil- 
dren of this world are wiser in their generation 
than the children of light ; " and there have 
been times in the career of Mazzini, when the 
bitterness of disenchantment and scorn has 
caused him to look back with longing and 
regret to his cell at Savona, between sea and 
sky, and far from the contact of men. 16 The 
future must declare whether his thoughts 
were visionary or prophetic : the present 
revival of Italy he does not recognize as the 
end of his hopes, for it is under the direction 
of "immoral materialists." 17 

But to revert to the dream — which events 
have proved was not all a dream — of Mazzini's 
youth, How renew and build up Rome again ? 
The answer which came to Mr. Browning's hero 
came to him also, " With the Very People." He 
felt that the work before him was not merely 
political, but moral and religious; and so 
feeling with all the intensity of his nature, he 
passed through and beyond the materialism of 
the schools in which he had been educated into 
the spiritualism of the old times and the Italian 
fathers. Henceforth, as he says of Schiller's 
hero — Posa, in Don Carlos — " Great in faith 
and sacrifice, strong in absolute purity of con- 
science, and a constancy beyond proof, he ad- 
vances upon the path traced out for him by 
the power that invested genius with its divine 
mission, calm, trusting, , and resigned as one 
who has renounced the happiness and hopes 
of life, and bidden adieu to the brief applause 
and the joy and glory of triumph, to all things 
save a principle, and martyrdom for its sake." 

For the present, Mazzini, having thus pro- 
fited by his few months' preliminary imprison- 
ment, was liberated after being brought to 
trial ; and then, notwithstanding the judgment 
of the Senate, he was forbidden by his "Most 
clement Majesty," Carle Felice, 18 to remain in 



36 



TEMPORARY TRIUMPHS. 



Genoa or any other largo town, anil ordered 
either to leave the country, or to select a resi- 
dence in some obscure place in the interior, 
like Asti, Acqui, or Casales. He chose exile. 
An insurrection had broken out in Central 
Italy — an after-throe of the July Revolution 
— and there was more probability of his being 
able to swim with the stream in France, than 
in a secluded Italian town under the surveil- 
lance of the police. Modena had given the 
signal, and the duke had fled to Vienna. 19 
Bologna had followed suit only a few hours 
later, and the papal governor had escaped to 
Rome. The new Pope (a Venetian, who took 
the name of Gregory XVI.) had just been 
crowned, and had not yet laid aside his cere- 
monial robes, when the news began to spread 
through the city that Modena had risen. The 
people were still in the Corso when fresh 
rumours began to circulate, that the fire had 
spread to Bologna, Ferrara, Urbino, and other 
provinces of the Papal States. In a few days 
Rome itself caught the fever of revolution, the 
papal troops fired on the people, and the 
gathering storm once more rolled away to the 
distance. But the lightning flashes were still 
seen on the horizon. Parma was lighted up 
by the lurid glare, and the duchess fled to 
Piacenza. Imola, Perugia, Faenza, Foligno, 
Forli, Ascoli, Spoleto, Ancona, Osimo, and 
Macerata, followed in rapid succession, and all 
Romagna was proclaimed by the Revolution 
as the " Province unite." Then the clouds 
gathered over Rome again — the Virgin Mary 
and the Saints who had " moved Providence " 
in favour of the city a fortnight previously, 20 
could not be everywhere, and were distracted 
by the demands made upon them. By the 25th 
of February, nearly two millions and a half 
of Italians were in arms, and the tricolored 
cockade was everywhere adopted. The Pope 
began to think of leaving the capital ; arrests 
were made, miracle-working pictures exhibited, 
a hundred years of absolution were promised 
to whosoever would pray for help to a par- 
ticular image of our Saviour ; while the more 
practical Bishop of Rieti led a force of 800 
men against a party of the insurgents, and, 
aided by a well-timed thunderstorm, returned 
in triumph with a captured cannon. Such an 



episode in the struggle would have availed 
nothing, but the insurrection was without 
money ; and before the deputies of the insur- 
gent provinces could be assembled to provide 
the necessary supplies in a legal manner, the 
Austrian army under Bentheim was advancing. 
One by one the insurgent places were occu- 
pied, for resistance was hopeless, and by the 
end of March " order reigned " again in Central 
Italy. 

It was in the crisis of this collapse that 
Mazzini went into exile, after his imprisonment 
at Savona, and his meditations on the revolu- 
tionary programme of the future. At Geneva, 
on his way to France, he had an interview 
with the historian Sismondi, who introduced 
him to Pellegrino Rossi. He felt an " inde- 
scribable sense of discouragement." France 
was everything in their eyes, and politics, as 
he judged from their conversation, a matter of 
" management, diplomatic calculation, and op- 
portune compromise," destitute alike of faith 
and morality. He went on to Lyons, where 
he found a knot of Italians, in whom he re- 
cognized " a spark of true life." Among them 
was Carlo Bianco, afterwards his friend ; 
Voarino, a cavalry officer ; Tedeschi, and others, 
all Piedmontese and Republicans. They had 
gathered at Lyons, to prepare an expedition 
in favour of the insurrection, trusting in the 
connivance of Louis Philippe, who had not yet 
been recognized by the sovereigns of Europe, 
while the citizen king, on his part, was seek- 
ing to enforce their recognition by frightening 
them with the imminence of a European 
revolution. We must add to this dynastic 
consideration that the Government of Louis 
Philippe was seriously averse, on grounds of 
general policy, to the intervention of Austria 
in Italy, and the French ambassador at Rome 
had entered a strong protest against it as a 
deadly blow at the political system of Italy 
and the independence of the Holy See. The 
prospect of a temporary alliance between Louis 
Philippe and the Revolution was not, there- 
fore, altogether the baseless dream it may now 
appear. Much depended on the chapter of 
accidents. If Austria defied France, if the 
Pope absolutely denied all reform, the citizen 
king might after all have no choice left him. 



ALLEGED TREACHERY OF CHARLES ALBERT. 



37 



■Neither of these possible events occurred. The 
Austrians, having conquered the insurrection, 
"withdrew from this and that point in defer- 
ence to the representations made by the French 
Government ; even the Pope reluctantly gave 
ground, and so at the moment when the expe- 
dition was about to start, a sharp proclamation 
appeared on the walls of Lyons, ordering the 
exiles to disband, and threatening with " the 
utmost rigour of the criminal law " any per- 
sons who should venture to compromise France 
with other governments by violating the fron- 
tiers of friendly powers. 

Mazzini says in allusion to this cruel dis- 
appointment : " I found the committee com- 
pletely crushed and overwhelmed. The 
banners had all disappeared, and a great 
number of arms had been sequestrated. Old 
General Regis was in tears, and the other 
exiles were cursing both the betrayal and the 
betrayer." A few who trusted in the king's 
honesty, believed that the proclamation was 
only meant to keep up appearances, and to 
test this it was suggested by Mazzini that a 
small body of armed men should be advanced 
on the road to Savoy. This was done, and 
they were stopped by a patrol of cavalry. 
Then the refugees were actively hunted down, 
and many were conveyed handcuffed to Calais, 
whence they were embarked for England. As 
for Italy, the Austrians had indeed evacuated 
the Legations, but at the same time had en- 
gaged to return if they should be needed, and 
the Pope's pretended reforms were mere illu- 
sion. The reaction brought on a conflict be- 
tween the papal troops and the patriots of 
Rimini on the 20th of January, 1832, when 
some fifty were killed on each side, and such 
excesses followed that the Cardinal Legate 
Antonelli made the expected call on the Aus- 
trians. The summons was instantly answered 
by the afterwards celebrated Radetzky, whose 
appearance before Bologna on the 20th of 
March, with a strong force of infantry, cavalry, 
and artillery, put an end to every hope of re- 
sistance. The wave of revolution, which had 
begun to roll in upon the shores of Italy in 
the days of July, 1830, was thus definitively 
driven back, and the hand of Austria lay 
heavy on the heart of the vanquished people. 



These events left Mazzini free to put into 
execution the design he had matured in his 
prison at Savona. As a last resource, in the 
interest of the insurrection he had gone to 
Corsica, where a plan was formed to cross 
over to the continent with two or three thou- 
sand armed men — a plan which failed for want 
of money to procure the necessary transports. 
Leaving Corsica, when all hope of this enter- 
prise was at an end, he arrived at Marseilles, 
where the exiles of Modena, Parma, and the 
Romagna had gathered to the number 
of more than a thousand. Calling round 
him the choicest and best of his country- 
men, he commenced his plans for the organiza- 
tion of "Young Italy." While he was thus 
engaged, Carlo Felice, the King of Sardinia, 
died (April 27th, 1831), and Charles Albert! 
the father of the present King of Italy, the 
same who had weakly gone over to the 
Austrians in 1821, succeeded to the crown. 
Notwithstanding his former defection, not- 
withstanding that he had since that event 
fought in the ranks of the French Grenadiers 
against liberty in Spain, there were those as- 
sociated with the popular cause in Italy who 
still believed in him. This fact alone ought to 
bid us pause in our judgment on his character 
and conduct. That he was a prince of noble 
aspirations, a real lover of his country, anxious 
to devote all his energies to the welfare of his 
people may reasonably be believed, and it is 
more probable that he was carried away by an 
impulse of generosity and patriotism when he 
declared for the Constitution in 1821, than that 
he was ever bound by personal pledges to the 
Carbonaros. Instead of treachery therefore, 
we may see in his conduet the weakness of 
doubt caused by his want of enthusiasm and 
faith in the popular movement. He was but 
twenty-three years of age, and Mazzini has 
told us what the secret societies of Italy had 
degenerated into. Is it wonderful that a young 
and high-spirited prince should have started 
back with alarm and horror, when he found 
that his espousal of the popular cause had 
brought out of their lurking places not merely 
the philosophical dreamers, the poetical and 
noble enthusiasts of the revolution, few of 
whom and little of whom he could have 



3S 



MAZZINI'S LETTER TO THE KINO. 



known, but a swarm of Booundrels " trained 

to answer with knives," who would have dis- 
graced any cause whatever. Something of 
this kind must have been felt by the " weak- 
minded," as Mazzini calls them, who looked 
up hopefully to the still youthful prince on his 
accession in 1831. The chief of the revolution 
does not acknowledge so much. He has 
nothing but contempt and pity for illusions, 
and scarcely tolerance for good intentions 
which fall short of heroic self-sacrifice. This 
is the fault, or the virtue, if we will, of the 
enthusiastic temperament. Charles Albert, 
however, proved his sincerity by the sacrifice 
of his crown, and the expenditure of his very 
life, for the redemption of Italy out of the 
hands of the Austrian, and no amount of ad- 
miration for the abstract justice, and the 
theoretical perfection of the views which have 
inspired Italy with a new soul, and which 
may prepare still greater triumphs for the 
national cause, should blind us to the merits of 
those who, it may be with less insight, or less 
stability of character, and even less deliber- 
ately contemplated self-sacrifice, have yet 
thrown themselves into the front of the battle, 
and proved their right to respect by what they 
have done and suffered. 

Mazzini did not believe in Charles Albert, 
and those who did believe in him " forgot that 
his conduct had never been influenced by an 
idea, but by an impulse of ambition." 21 This 
was a harsh judgment to pass upon a man, 
who soon afterwards, as we have said, threw 
his crown and his fife at the feet of Italy. 
But Mazzini was, and is now, incapable of 
believing in a king ; eveiy fibre in his moral 
and intellectual nature, and every principle 
that enters into liis philosophy of a national 
life is opposed to such a faith. 22 The theory of 
Constitutionalism, from his point of view, is 
only servility and cowardice. Still though he 
refused to share in the hope of the moderates 
— of those who saw the bow of promise arched 
over the throne of the newly crowned king, 
he made himself the interpreter of their 
feeling, and addressed an exhortation to 
Charles Albert — the first of his political wri- 
tings, (which his friend Libri warned him not 
to publish) ; but then he says, " Libri was led 



by that materialism which formed the basis of 
his every doctrine, and an excessive scepticism 
both as to men and things, to forget alike the 
dignity of his own soul and the duty which a 
man of his powerful intellect owed to his 
country." 23 

This letter to the King, which calls upon him 
to become " the Napoleon of Italian liberty," 
begins by reminding him of the enthu- 
siastic hopes awakened in the minds of the 
Italians by the accession of a Prince who had 
been a Carbonaro in 1821 ; 24 of their readiness 
to believe that his treason on that occasion 
was the result of circumstances ; and that being 
at last free to act, he would justify the faith 
put in his promises. There were but two 
paths open to him ; he had to choose between 
a system of terror and a system of concessions. 
He is warned of the danger to himself if he 
pursue the first — "Blood calls for blood, and 
the dagger of the conspirator is never so 
terrible as when sharpened upon the tombstone 
of a martyr." 25 

The system of concessions, the letter con- 
tinues, changes in the administration, eco- 
nomical reductions, ameliorations of the code, 
the abolition of the most crying governmental 
abuses, would prove abortive without the 
guarantee of fixed institutions, without a fun- 
damental pact, without any political declaration 
of faith, or a single word recognizing a right, 
a power, or a sovereignty in the nation. The 
King would have to achieve the difficult task 
of deceiving the people into fancying them- 
selves free, and of producing a semblance of 
effects, without giving the force of law to 
causes. Moreover, partial reforms would be 
liable to be regarded as arbitrary ; even the 
dismissal of unworthy employe's assumes a 
character of partiality and caprice in the eyes 
of a people who are deprived of their sole 
means of verifying the justice of such acts — 
certain invariable judicial laws, and publicity 
of trial. 

" The people are no longer to be quieted by 
a few concessions ; they seek the recognition 
of those rights of humanity which have been 
withheld from them for ages. They demand 
laws and liberty, independence and union. 
Divided, dismembered, and oppressed, they 



THE PROFFERED LEADERSHIP REFUSED. 



39 



~ave neither name nor country. They have 
heard themselves stigmatized by the foreigner 
as the Helot Nation. They have seen free 
men visit their country, and declare it the land 
of the dead. They have drained the cup of 
slavery to the dregs, but they have sworn 
never to fill it again." 

Mazzini then points out the dissatisfaction, 
and the hatred of Austria existing in all the 
States of Italy, and insists on the possibility 
of uniting them in the grand struggle for 
Italian independence. The King might strike 
out for himself a new path ; the people would 
prove a surer and safer ally than either France 
or Austria. Mazzini endeavours to rouse him 
to noble ambition by reminding him that 
there is a crown brighter and nobler than that 
of Piedmont, — a crown that only awaits a man 
bold enough to conceive the idea of wearing 
it, resolute and determined enough to conse- 
crate himself wholly to the realization of that 
idea, and virtuous enough not to dim its 
splendour with ignoble tyranny. If, on the 
other hand, the King should hesitate to put 
himself at the head of the struggle for Italian 
independence, he might retard, but could not 
prevent the fulfilment of the destiny of the 
Italian people as ordained by God Himself. 

Imploring him, therefore, to write on his 
banner, "Union, Liberty, Independence," and 
to proclaim himself the avenger and the inter- 
preter of popular rights, he continues, " Hurl in 
the face of Austria as your battle-gage the name 
of Italy, for that old and time-honoured name 
will work wonders. Invoke with it all that is 
great and generous in the peninsula. Her 
brave and high-spirited young men, urged for- 
ward by a thirst for vengeance and glory, — 
the two passions that make men heroes, — have 
fed for a long time upon one thought alone, 
and sigh for the time to come to put it in 
action." 

" Be not deceived," Mazzini says in conclu- 
sion, " by the popular applause that hails the 
opening of your reign. Interrogate the sources 
of that applause. It arises because the people 
believe you to be the representative of their 
own hopes and aspirations, and your name 
recalls to them the man of 1821. . . . Sire, I 
have spoken to you the truth. The men of 



freedom await your answer in your deeds. 
According to the spirit of that answer, pos- 
terity will either hail your name as that of 
the greatest of men, or the last of Italian 
tyrants." 26 

Other appeals of similar purport came to 
the King, whose answer to Mazzini was an 
order to arrest him if he should attempt to 
return into Italy. Charles Albert feared that 
Austria would be stronger than the people he 
was invited to lead. Mazzini therefore resolved 
once for all to trust to his own instincts, and 
draw together the youth of Italy under the 
flag of La Giovine Italia, the statutes of 
which, now promulgated as the basis of the 
Association, were as follows * : — 

Section 1. — Young Italy is a brotherhood of 
Italians who believe in a law of Progress and Duty, 
and are convinced that Italy is destined to become 
one nation — convinced also that she possesses suffi- 
cient strength within herself to become one, and 
that the ill success of her former efforts is to be 
attributed, not to the weakness, but to the mis- 
direction of the revolutionary elements within her 
— that the secret of force lies in constancy and 
unity of effort. They join this association in the 
firm intent of consecrating both thought and action 
to the great aim of re-constituting Italy as one inde- 
pendent sovereign nation of free men and equals. 

Section 2. — By Italy, we understand 1, Conti- 
nental and peninsular Italy, bounded on the north 
by the upper circle of the Alps, on the south by the 
sea, on the west by the mouths of the Varo, and 
on the east by Trieste ; 2, The islands proved 
Italian by the language of the inhabitants, and 
destined, under a special administrative organiza- 
tion, to form a part of the Italian political unity. 
By the nation we understand the universality of 
Italians, bound together by a common pact, and 
governed by the same laws. 

Section 3. — The aim of the association is revolu- 
tion ; but its labours will be essentially educational, 
both before and after the day of revolution ; and it 
therefore declares the principles upon which the 
national education should be conducted, and from 
which alone Italy may hope for safety and regene- 
ration. By preaching exclusively that which it 

* It is perhaps necessary to observe that the sub- 
stance of this document is not given for its historical 
importance merely, but because it comprises in a com- 
pact form the views of the party of Revolution, by 
which Europe is still convulsed, and of which we are 
not likely soon to hear the last word. As a general 
rule, we record nothing in these pages but what is 
needed to elucidate the events of our time. 

4 A 



40 



STATUTES OF "YOUNG ITALY. 



believes to be truth, the association performs a 
work of duty, Dot of usurpation. By inculcating 
before the hour of action by what steps the Italians 
must achieve their aim, by raising its flag in the 
sight of [taly, and calling upon all those who 
believe ii to be the Hag of national regeneration, to 
organize themselves beneath its folds — the associa- 
tion docs not seok to substitute that flag for the 
banner id' the future nation. When once the nation 
herself shall bo free, and able to excrciso that right 
of sovereignty which is hers alone, she will raise 
her own banner, and make known her revered and 
unchallenged will as to the principle and the funda- 
mental law of her existence. In the meantime, 
young Italy is Republican and Unitarian — 

Republican, because theoretically every nation is 
destined, by the law of God and humanity, to form 
a free and equal community of brothers ; and the re- 
publican is the only form of government that insures 
this future. Because all true sovereignty resides es- 
sentially in the nation. Because, whatever be the 
form or privilege that constitutes the apex of the social 
edifice, its tendency is to spread among the other 
classes, and by undermining the equality of the 
citizens, to endanger the liberty of the country. 
Because when the sovereignty is recognized as 
existing not in the whole body, but in several 
distinct powers, the path to usurpation is laid 
open, and the struggle for supremacy is inevitable. 
Because the monarchical element being incapable of 
sustaining itself alone by the side of the popular 
element, it necessarily involves the existence of the 
intermediate element of an aristocracy — the source 
of inequality and corruption to the whole nation. 
Because both history and the nature of things teach 
us that elective monarchy tends to generate anarchy ; 
and hereditary monarchy tends to generate despot- 
ism. Because, when monarchy is not, as in the 
middle ages, based upon the belief now extinct, in 
right divine, it becomes too weak to be a bond of 
unity and authority in the State. Because the in- 
evitable tendency of the series of progressive trans- 
formations taking place in Europe, is towards the 
enthronement of the republican principle, and 
because the inauguration of the monarchical principle 
in Italy would carry along with it the necessity of a 
new revolution shortly after. Because our Italian 
tradition is essentially republican ; our great me- 
mories are republican ; the whole history of our 
national progress is republican ; whereas the intro- 
duction of monarchy amongst us was coeval with 
our decay, and consummated our ruin by its con- 
stant servility to the foreigner, and its antagonism 
to the people, as well as to the unity of the nation. 
Because the populatibns of the various Italian 
States would not willingly submit to be governed 
by a man, the offspring of one of those States, but 



woidd cheerfully unite in the name of a principle 
which could give no umbrage to local ambition. 
Because, if monarchy were once sot up as the aim 
of tho Italian insurrection, it would, by a logical 
necessity, draw along with it all the obligations of 
the monarchical system — concessions to foreign 
courts ; trust in and respect for diplomacy, etc. 
Because the characteristics, successively assumed 
by tho late Italian movements, have proved our 
actual republican tendency. Because, before you 
can induce a whole people to rise, it is necessary to 
place before them an aim, appealing directly, and 
in an intelligible manner to their own advantage, 
and their own rights. Because, doomed as we are 
to have all our governments opposed to the work of 
our regeneration, both from cowardice and from 
system, we are compelled either to stand alone in 
the arena, or to appeal to the sympathy of the 
people by raising the banner of the people, and 
invoking their aid in the name of that principle 
which dominates every revolutionary manifestation 
in Europe at tho present day. 

Young Italy is Unitarian — because without unity 
there is no true nation — because without unity there 
is no real strength ; and Italy, surrounded as she is 
by powerful, united, and jealous nations, has need 
of strength before all things. Because federalism, 
by reducing her to the political impotence of Swit- 
zerland, would necessarily place her under the influ- 
ence of one of the neighbouring nations. Because 
federalism, by reviving the local rivalries now 
extinct, would throw Italy back upon the middle 
ages. Because federalism would divide the great 
national arena into a number of smaller arenae ; and, 
by thus opening a path for every paltry ambition, 
become a source of aristocracy. Because federalism, 
by destroying the unity of the great Italian family, 
would strike at the root of the great mission Italy 
is destined to accomplish towards humanity. Because 
Europe is undergoing a progressive series of trans- 
formations, which are gradually and irresistibly 
guiding European society to form itself into vast and 
united masses. Because the entire work of internal 
civilization in Italy will be seen, if rightly studied, 
to have been tending for ages to the formation of 
unity. Because all the objections raised against the 
unitarian system do but apply, in fact, to a system 
of administrative centralization and despotism, 
which has really nothing in common with unity. 
Thus, national unity, as understood by Young Italy, 
does not imply the despotism of any, but the as- 
sociation and concord of all. The life inherent in 
each locality is sacred. Young Italy would have 
the administrative organization designed upon a 
broad basis of religious respect for the liberty of 
each commune, but the political organization, destined 
to represent the nation in Europe, should be one 



ORGANIZATION OF "YOUNG ITALY." 



41 



and central. Without unity of religious belief, and 
unity of social pact ; without unity of civil, political, 
and penal legislation, there is no true nation. 

Section 4.— The means by which Young Italy 
proposes to reach its aim are — education and insur- 
rection, to be adopted simultaneously, and made to 
harmonize with each other. Education must ever 
be directed to teach by example, word, and pen, 
the necessity of insurrection. Insurrection, when- 
ever it can be realized, must be so conducted as to 
render it a means of national education. Education, 
though of necessity secret in Italy, will be public 
out of Italy. [The rest of this section which is of 
considerable length, consists for the most part of 
detailed instructions, of which it is sufficient to quote 
the following : " The one thing wanting to twenty 
millions of Italians desirous of emancipating them- 
selves, is not power, but faith. Young Italy will 
endeavour to inspire this faith,— First, by its teach- 
ings, and afterwards by an energetic initiative."] 

Section 5. Fixes the Subscription. 

Section 6. The banner of Young Italy will be 
white, red, green, and will bear on one side the 
words — Liberty, Equality, Humanity, and on the 
other — Unity, Independence. 

Section 7. Prescribes the oath to be taken by each 
member upon his initiation, in the following 
terms : — 

In the name of God and of Italy — 

In the name of all the martyrs of the holy Italian 
cause, who have fallen beneath foreign and domestic 
tyranny. 

By the duties which bind me to the land wherein 
God has placed me, and the brothers whom God 
has given me. 

By the love — innate in all men — I bear to the 
country that gave my mother birth, and will be the 
home of my children. 

By the hatred — innate in all men — I bear to evil, 
injustice, usurpation, arbitrary rule'. 

By the blush that rises to my brow when I stand 
before the citizens of other lands, to know that I 
have no rights of citizenship, no country, and no 
national flag. 

By the aspiration that thrills my soul towards 
that liberty for which it was created, and is impo- 
tent to exert ; towards the good it was created to 
strive after, and is impotent to achieve, in the 
silence and isolation of slavery. 

By the memory of our former greatness, and the 
sense of our present degradation. 

By the tears of Italian mothers for their sons, 
dead on the scaffold, in prison, or in exile. 

By the sufferings of the millions. 

I. A. B. 

Believing in the mission entrusted by God to 
Italy, and the duty of every Italian to strive to 
attempt its fulfilment — 



Convinced that where God has ordained a nation 
shall be, He has given the requisite power to create 
it ; that the people are the depositories of that power, 
and that in its right direction for the people, and by 
the people, lies the secret of victory — 

Convinced that virtue consists in action and 
sacrifice, and strength in union and constancy of 
purpose — 

Give my name to Young Italy, an association of 
men holding the same faith, and swear 

To dedicate myself wholly and for ever, to the 
endeavour with them to constitute Italy one free, 
independent, republican nation. 

To promote, by every means in my power — 
whether by written or spoken word, or by action — 
the education of my Italian brothers, towards the 
aim of Young Italy ; towards association, the sole 
means of its accomplishment, and to virtue, which 
alone can render the conquest lasting. 

To abstain from enrolling myself in any other 
association from this time forth. 

To obey all the instructions, in conformity with 
the spirit of Young Italy, given me by those who 
represent with me the union of my Italian brothers ; 
and to keep the secret of these instructions, even at 
the cost of my life. 

To assist my brothers of the association, both by 
action and counsel 

NOW AND FOR EVEE. 

Mazzini, the acknowledged originator and 
head of the movement, laboured indefatigably 
in the formation of committees throughout the 
peninsula, and as a bond of union and educa- 
tional agency, published a series of articles on 
the political, moral, and literary position of 
Italy, with a view to her regeneration. The 
first article was a "Manifesto," which ap- 
peared about the end of 1831. 27 Its entire 
tendency was of course republican. The name 
of the journal was that of the Association, 
" Young Italy." The history of the movement 
under his direction from that time to the pre- 
sent has been a steady development of the 
ideas first set forth in this publication, and in 
the statutes of the Association. 

Mazzini continued to reside in Marseilles, 
organizing the New Association and spreading 
its principles by means which defied the vigi- 
lance of the French and Italian governments. 
At last, on the demand of the latter 28 in 
August, 1832, he was ordered to leave France. 
He pretended submission but in reality con- 
cealed himself, and continued, his work. The 
spies employed by the government for a 



\-2 



ATTEMPTED MOVEMENT AND FAILURE. 



trifling stun of motley performed the same 
Bervice for Mazzini, and kept him informed of 
every move against him. Under these cir- 
cumstances he remained secreted at Marseilles 
another year. By the middle of 1833 the As- 
sociation had become very powerful, and ar- 
rangements were in progress for a combined 
movement which was to have its centres in 
Genoa and Alessandria. The conspiracy ex- 
tended to the Sardinian army, having links by 
means of the subaltern officers with nearly 
every regiment, and active centres of action in 
some. In Genoa and Alessandria, its relations 
were chiefly with the artillery. The aim of the 
conspirators was to enrol corporals, sergeants, 
and captains, these officers' being in closest 
contact with the men. Some of the generals 
were acquainted with the facts and promised 
to join later. At last all was so far prepared 
that Mazzini made his preparations for leaving 
Marseilles and going to Genoa, in order to 
organize the elements for the invasion of 
Savoy. Cavaignac and Armand Carrel were 
to co-operate in France, the one at Lyons, the 
other at Paris. The blow was to be struck 
suddenly, so that both governments might be 
surprised. But towards the end of March or 
beginning of April, two artillerymen at Genoa 
happened to quarrel about a woman, and 
from words they proceeded to blows. They 
were separated by some carabineers, when one 
of them was heard to mutter that he could if 
he chose tell of something. The words were 
caught at by the emissaries of the government, 
and a rigorous search having been instituted, 
the clue to the conspiracy was discovered, 
Mazzini heard of the incident, and instantly 
wrote to the leaders "Act at once, if possible, 
if not, you are lost." They did not act, and 
the prisons began to be filled with the sus- 
pected. At Chambery, Alessandria, and Genoa, 
numbers were condemned to death. The 
officers were shot in the back as a token of 
disgrace. The cruelties to which all the 
prisoners were subjected make a sad story, 
which we must not pause to recapitulate. It 
was a reign of terror, a festival of blood. The 
trials were a mockery of legality, and the 
mental tortures to which the prisoners were 
subjected previous to being impeached before 



the tribunal presided over by a general officer, 
were worthy of the worst days of the 
Inquisition. One of Mazzini's most devoted 
friends, Ruffini, was so broken in spirit that he 
feared he should not have moral courage to 
prefer death to dishonour on the day of his 
trial. As an alternative he cut his throat in 
prison, and dipping his finger in the blood 
had just strength enough to write on the wall 
before he died, " I leave it to Italy to avenge 
my death, by this my last testament." 

It was at the moment when Mazzini was 
preparing to leave Marseilles, that intelligence 
of these events reached him. The contem- 
plated movement had to be delayed, and in 
the meantime Giuseppe Garibaldi arrived at 
Genoa, and became a member of the Associa- 
tion under the nom de guerre of Borel. The ar- 
rangements went on for a movement at the 
end of the year. Fresh supplies of money 
and arms were obtained. The whole of 
November and December were occupied with 
active preparations, and it was hoped that the 
columns of invasion might march some time 
in January. The concentration of the various 
little companies of which it was to be com- 
posed was not effected, however, till the 1st of 
February, 1834, when at last the expedition 
set out from two points. The Piedmontese 
government was prepared, and the column 
which entered Savoy was surprised in the 
night and dispersed. The second column 
which was accompanied by Mazzini himself, 
and commanded by Ramorino was led astray 
either by design or accident, and broke up. 
When this occurred, Mazzini was completely 
prostrated from the fatigues of the march, 
added to the anxieties and labours of the pre- 
ceding three months, and had even lost his 
consciousness. 29 The collapse of the move- 
ment was irremediable. 

It had been arranged for the Republicans in 
Genoa to rise as soon as they heard of the 
success of the insurgent columns, and in this 
part of the movement Garibaldi was to per- 
form a distinguished part. That he might be 
in a position to strike a sturdy blow he went 
to Genoa, and engaged himself as a seaman on 
the strength of a Sardinian frigate, which it 
was his purpose to seize at the critical mo- 



SECRET SOCIETIES. 



43 



merit, and turn against the government. On 
hearing of the dispersion of the insurgent 
columns, he made his escape to Marseilles, 
where he supported himself and disguised his 
real character by giving lessons in mathe- 
matics. In the words of Mazzini, " the first 
period of Young Italy was concluded." 30 

Notwithstanding his failure in action up to 
this point, the merit of Mazzini in the creation 
of " Young Italy " is that he substituted for 
the corrupting fermentation of the former 
secret societies, their divided aims, and their 
infusion of brigandage, a pure and lofty, though 
impracticable, ideal. Much decaying and pru- 
trescent rubbish was swept away to clear the 
ground for the new organization, the high 
teaching of which could not fail to have a 
beneficial influence on the mind of Italy, and 
prepare the people for the unity they have 
since achieved, though not by means that 
Mazzini could either have desired or approved. 
Something, however, will remain to be said on 
this point as we trace the further progress of 
the Revolution in connection with events in 
France. We subjoin some particulars, in 
categorical form, by way of supplement to 
the information in this chapter. 

Secret Societies before 1830. 

1. Carboneria, namely, the Society of Car- 
bonari (charcoal-burners), or Buoni cujini 
(good cousins), of which we have given a 
sufficiently exact and detailed account in the 
preceding pages. 

2. Carboneeia Riformata. Several "re- 
formed societies" of Carbonari were consti- 
tuted at different times, and died a natural 
death. 

3. La Speranza ( Society of " Hope " ), 
founded in the year 1823 or 1824 by Count 
Eduardo Fabbri, of Cesena, in the then Pon- 
tifical Provinces. 

4. Pellegrini Bianchi (the Society of 
White Pilgrims), founded in 1826. 

5. I Veri Italian i (the True Italians), 
founded by General Belluzi, ultimately became 
royalist, before which, in 1833, it accepted 
the programme and alliance of " Young Italy." 

6. Societa Consistoriale (the Consistorial 
Society). This Society was one of those 
founded on the principle of political compro- 



mise, so energetically condemned by Mazzini. 
Its object was to deliver Italy from Austria, 
and drive out all the princes connected with 
the Hapsburgs, with the exception of the 
Duke of Modena, whose states were to be in- 
creased by the addition of Parma and Placentia. 
Lombardy and Venice were to be formed into 
an independent republic, the duchies of Massa- 
Carrara and Lucca added to the kingdom of 
Sardinia, and Tuscany given to the Pope. 
This society was willing to give the Emperor 
of Russia, who was supposed to favour their 
views, a seaport in the Mediterranean; and 
Ancona was spoken of as the price of his 
friendship. 31 

Secret Societies since 1830. 

7. Giovine Italia ("Young Italy"). See 
the preceding pages. 

8. Giovine Europa ("Young Europe"). In 
1833, previous to the intended movement on 
Italy, Mazzini left Marseilles, and went to 
Geneva, where many German and Polish exiles 
were gathered. The Germans were in the 
Cantons of Berne and Zurich ; the Poles in 
Neufchatel, Fribourg, Vaud, and Geneva. 
These were organized to co-op erate with the 
first column of invasion which entered Savoy. 
They formed the column that was accompanied 
by Mazzini and led by General Ramorino, who 
had been sent to Warsaw during the Polish 
Insurrection of 1830 by the Parisian Committee 
of the Friends of Poland. Their availability 
for the enterprise of "Young Italy" suggested to 
Mazzini the idea of raising at once the banner 
of European fraternity, and finking the cause 
of Italy with that of the other oppressed na- 
tions. "The formation of a Young Europe,' 
says Mazzini, " was, in my mind, a logical con- 
sequence of the parent thought of ' Young 
Italy.' " The German and Polish exiles ac- 
cepted the idea with enthusiasm, and laboured 
hard in the formation of committees and the 
necessary military organization. The reader 
knows the fate of the enterprise then entered 
upon ; but whether or not any part of the 
actual organization of "Young Europe" sur- 
vived, remains to be told. The International 
Society, however, is a growth of the same 
idea, modified by a different soil and circum- 
stances. 



44 



SANFEDISTI AND PAOLOTTI. 



9. CHARBONNERIE DfcMOCRATIQUE. The 
Society formed in Paris after the break up of 
the Carbonaros, but superseded by "Young 
Italy." 

10. I Vendicatori del Popolo (the Aven- 
gers of the People), established in 1836 by 
Giovanni Battista Tozzoli, but converted, in 
1838, into the " Associazione Nazionale," in 
alliance and harmony with " Giovine Italia " 
and ''■ Giovine Europa." The Society had its 
badge and legend : the former consisting of a 
sword and cross, with a bunch of laurel. Toz- 
zoli was arrested at Nismes in 1839, but dis- 
charged for want of evidence. In 1840 an 
International Assembly, of French origin, was 
gathered in Avignon, at which Tozzoli, as an 
Italian, was merely present; but in 1841 he 
was convicted at Montpellier of belonging to 
secret societies, and of having, as a member of 
the secret tribunal, caused persons to be 
assassinated; for which, although the latter 
accusation was not proved against him, he was 
condemned to fifteen years' imprisonment. 
Previous to this, in 1834, he had been 
condemned to death for homicide, which, 
according to his own statement of the facts, 
was committed in self-defence. The last year 
of his imprisonment was remitted, and, being 
unable to return to Italy in consequence of the 
old sentence of death hanging over his head, 
he emigrated to America. 

Secret Societies in the Interest of the Papacy. 
The secret societies have not been confined 
to the Revolutionists. Besides the Jesuits 



and the Passionisti, the following may be 
mentioned as influential and dangerously 
active antagonistic associations : — 

11. Sanfedisti (Society of the "Holy 
Faith"). Founded some time between 1840 
and 1850, to support the rule of the Papacy. 
The programme of this society was discovered 
in the convent of Spelo during the existence 
of the Roman Republic, in April, 1849, when 
three of the monks were sent to Rome for trial, 
and condemned to ten years' imprisonment. 
It was with difficulty they were saved from 
death at the hands of the populace, to whom 
it had become known that they were sworn by 
the statutes of their order to destroy the 
Liberals to the third generation, not excepting 
women and children. The condemned monks 
were set at liberty after the fall of the Republic, 
and there is reason to believe the society 
exists, and is acting energetically even now. 

12. Paolotti. This society took its rise 
between 1850 and 1855, in France, as an off- 
shoot of the order of St. Vincent de Paul. It 
is a rich and active religious brotherhood, 
organized for political ends, and is supposed 
to have been the earnest coadjutor of the 
Sanfedisti. Both societies may be regarded 
as outposts of the army of Jesuits and Pas- 
sionisti ; at any rate, as having been formed 
at their instigation. It is probable also that a 
society called the " Catholic, Apostolic, and 
Roman Congregation," formed before 1830, 
was of similar character and origin ; but this 
is mere conjecture. 



Notes to Chapter LIX. 



1 Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini, vol. i., p. 68, note. 

2 A more particular account of the ceremony of initiation will 
perhaps be interesting to the reader, and at any rate will enable 
liim to form his own opinion of its value, and of its relationship 
to the ceremony of initiation in Masonry. The symbols dis- 
played in the lodge or Vendita, included among other trivialities 
a cross, a ladder, a fire of coals, a little earth and salt, a basin of 
water, a linen cloth, a piece of thread, red white and blue rib- 
bon, etc. The grand master, when he presided, held an axe, 
with which he struck on a block as each of the earlier questions 
was asked. Axes were also held by all the members of the 
Association then present. Before the candidate was introduced a 
sack was put over his head, and a dagger hung to his girdle. He 
was then conducted to the lodge by such a circuitous route as to 
confuse his idea of the locality. Before the door was opened for 
his admission, certain formal questions were put and answered. 
After liis admission, questions of a more searching character were 
asked. This ordeal having been gone through, he h,ad to drink of 



the water, which was called the " cup of forgetfulness." Then 
he was led out of the lodge, and besides other ceremonies was 
made to wade through a brook or river, as a kind of clean- 
sing baptism. On returning to the lodge it was explained 
to him that the fire through which he was now made to pass re- 
presented the flame of love, and having been made to kneel on 
the white linen cloth, he took an awful oath of fidelity. After all 
this he was led through the ranks of the Cousins still muffled in 
the sack, and asked what he desired. He was instructed to 
reply, "Light;'' whereupon the sack was removed, and at the 
same moment all present raised their axes in a menacing manner 
and warned him that death was the certain reward of treachery. 
Full instruction followed concerning the meaning of all the sym- 
bols, and this completed the " apprenticeship." On the reception 
of the Apprentice as Master, he was led through scenes in imita- 
tion of the sufferings of the Saviour, and a cup of wormwood was 
presented to him, which he was compelled to drink, in token of 
his readiness to sutler in the cause he had espoused. In this part 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LIX. 



45 



of the ceremony, he was supposed to represent the Saviour. After 
this he took an oath which enforced more explicitly Republican 
principles. The explanation of the symbols was also different. 
The cross was for the crucifixion of the tyrant, the ladder was to 
lead him to the gallows, the thread was the halter, etc. Is not 
tlic scorn which Mazzini felt for Carbonarism, when its mysteries 
were revealed to him, sufficiently accounted for? 

8 It is true that Robison's work (Proofs of a Conspiracy, 
etc.) has been ridiculed, but ridicule proves nothing-. The evi- 
dence on the other hand that might be cited in support of the 
statement in the text is voluminous. 

4 Count Nunziante had received secret orders to supply the 
Government of Naples with information as to the number of Car- 
bonari in Calabria. His first step to accomplish this object was 
to gain over one of the members. Soon afterwards the dead body 
of this man was found with several stiletto stabs in it, and a paper 
lying by which warned Nunziante that he would share in the fate 
of the traitor if he persisted. On the other hand, take the follow- 
ing as an illustration of the character of the Government. In the 
beginning of 1816, Prince Canosa, Ferdinand's Minister of Police, 
resolved to make war on the Carbonari by establishing a new 
Association opposed to it. He began this work by obtaining lists 
of all the scoundrels still living who had participated in the san- 
guinary scenes of 1799, and these he incorporated with an old 
society known as the Calderari. The new society thus formed 
was elaborately organized, and 20,000 muskets were distributed 
among them, taken out of the military stores or bought of the 
manufacturers. A worse than St. Bartholomew was anticipated ; 
but the cowardly King was terrified into action, and not only 
stayed the execution of the plot, but banished Canosa. The an- 
tecedents of this drunken scoundrel make one of the most disgrace- 
ful pages of history. It was he who let loose Fra Diavolo and a 
rabble of brigands on the continent of Italy. It is not pleasant 
to recall that the chief abettor of his cruelties was a woman — 
Queen Caroline of Naples. 

6 Latnartino puts it the other way in his History of the 
Restoration of Monarchy in France. He says, " On his re- 
turn to Naples after the fall of Napoleon, the old King Ferdinand 
brought into military organization as a local militia, the 
Carbonari of the Calabrias ; thus arming with public power those 
whom the pre-existing organization of then- sect had already 
armed with the hidden power of the Association. 

6 The reader who wishes for fuller information on this shameful 
transaction, must consult whatever histories record the meeting 
of the allied Sovereigns at Troppau and the Conference at 
Lay bach. The Liberal opposition in the French Chamber 
denounced the government of Louis XVIII. as an accomplice 
or a dupe of the alliance, while it appears on the other hand, 
that General Pepe had trusted in France for help. 

7 Pepe, like Trochu in 1870, had his " plan " when he tried to rally 
the Neapolitans against their traitor King, and a part of his plan 
was to be his own war minister. Having weakly failed to put this 
part of his plan into execution, he found his military measures 
opposed by a Council of War, and a defensive campaign re- 
solved upon for a revolutionary army ! The consequences were 
only what might have been expected. The patriot army was 
divided into two corps. The 2nd corps under Pepe himself, 
consisting of thirty battalions of militia, 11,000 troops of the 
line, and twelve squadrons were to occupy that part of the 
Abruzzi touching on the frontier, with orders to fall back if 
necessary on the 1st corps, placed on the Volturno. By these 
arrangements the militia, being stationed near their homes, 
were tempted to desert ; besides which the army was so divided 
and dispersed that no aggressive movement could be ventured 
upon. Awaiting the attack till near the end of February, 1821, 
Pepe beheld the Austrians advancing slowly from Foligno and 
Narni, and threatening to surround his little army. At first he 
had an idea of leading a bc*v of 12,000 men along the crest of 
the Apennines, and entering p;°dmont, and thus endeavouring 
to make the war a great national cau?e ; but he abandoned that 
plan also, because he had neither mon^/, means of transport, 
nor exact intelligence of the position ot the enemy. It was, 
therefore, once more his lot — tempted to bold measures but 
deterred by real or imaginary difficulties — to e obliged to adopt 



half-measures that ruined everything. He now determined to 
execute some daring stroke that should plunge the intriguers in 
his rear into that war which -interested and unpatriotic — they so 
carefully sought to avoid. When at length the Austrian van 
appeared at Rieti, over against his own outposts, he resolved to 
attack the enemy, in order, if possible, to increase his reputation 
and to confirm the courage of his militia and young troops, and 
then to retire with his forces, still under the moral influence of 
success, into Calabria. On the day before the intended attack 
Carascosa sent Pepe word that the council ot war desired he 
should fall back upon Aquila, and make ot this town an in- 
trenched camp, but this the popular chief considered was but a 
plot for exposing him to the almost certain fate of being made 
prisoner. This contributed to strengthen him in his first resolve, 
of which he gave notice so late that the same did not reach 
Carascosa till the evening before the contemplated move. A 
command, emanating from the regent, not on any account what- 
ever to commence hostilities, arrived in Pepe's head-quarters too 
late, and even if delivered in time, would scarcely have been 
respected. Pepe now assembled at Cittaducale eight battalions 
of the line and fourteen of militia, with some cavalry, in three 
brigades, in order to attempt with these inexperienced troops, 
commanded by untrustworthy leaders, an attack on Rieti. The 
one brigade under General Montemaior, which was to advance 
on the left bank of the Velino, and appear before Rieti with the 
rising sun, did not arrive till about ten o'clock. This gave the 
enemy time to collect his reinforcements, and Pepe was obliged 
to change his intended attack on Rieti into a simple recon- 
noitring expedition. The two other brigades, under General 
Russo and Colonel Casella, which stood on the right wing, to- 
gether with Prpe's militia in the centre, and the brigade of 
Montemaior, suffered a while the enemy's fire without flinching. 
Encouraged by this conduct and by the hesitation of the sui prised 
Austrians, Pepe resolved to draw his troops together into one 
column, and to fall upon Rieti. But the Austrians had been 
reinforced in Mie meantime, and attacked the troops under 
Casella, stationed on the Neapolitan right wing. The weak reserve 
was of no avail, and the centre had too much work of its own on 
hand to be able to afford succour ; so that it became necessary to 
command a retreat, which soon degenerated into disordered 
flight. All of a sudden the militia, followed by the regulars, 
broke their ranks, setting up a cry about treachery, and, deaf to 
the representations of their officers, some two-thirds took to their 
heels, although unpursued by the enemy. In vain Pepe hoped 
to collect and reorganize the fugitives ; on the following morning 
there remained of the whole corps but the few horsemen and 
pioneers and some 2,000 men, militia and regulars. The militia, 
advancing to co-operate with those in the front, no sooner heard 
of the result of the affair at Rieti than they at once dispersed. On 
his arrival at Castel de Sangro, Pepe saw a battalion of his bravest 
Calabrian troops disband, and even his faithful pioneers could not be 
dissuaded from following their example. The Austrians now 
encountered no resistance as they advanced into the kingdom 
and occupied successively Borghetto, Introdocco, and Aquila. 
History of the Italian Peninsula, commencing ivith the Fall 
of Venice. 

8 Lamartine, cited above (liv. xxxviii. § 31) General Pepe 
once more became an exile in England after the capture of 
Venice by the Austrians in 1849, and died in 1855. 
9 Lamartine, cited above (xxxviii. § 32). 

i" Ibid. 

n Life and Writings, cited above (vol. i. p. 1.) 

12 Before the new society took the name of the Apophasi- 
menes, it seems to have been known as the Charbonnerie 
Democratique. Buonarotti had been implicated in the con- 
spiracy of Babceuf, who perished on the scaffold in 1797. 

13 Mazzini rejected Cosmopolitanism as a mere theory of 
brotherhood, which takes for its starting point the Individual 
Man, while for his own starring point, as a means of producing 
any practical result, he chose the Country. Individualism he 
regards as another word for Materialism, to which it logically 
tends. Nationality, or Country, on the contrary, admits of a 
high signification, and looks to the association of peoples, in 
order to work out their distinctive ideas through missions of 



46 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LIX. 



peace aud love. First, every people must be definitively con- 
stituted as a Nation, and secondly the Nations must be organized. 
( See the Essay on Cosmopolitanism; Life and Writings, vol. ill. , 
pp. 7-15.) 

14 The Essay is reprinted in the Life and Writings, vol. ii. 
pp. 4—48. 

16 About the same time a silly imitation of the thing existed in 
London, but iu this case it was understood that the secret orders 
came from "Spirits." People were sent on foolish errands in 
the dead of the night. On one occasion, certain of the initiated 
were ordered to go at midnight and throw, lighted torches 
against the principal public edifices, and utter a prophetic 
denunciation of their approaching destruction by fire. There 
were no policemen in those days, and the command was literally 
obeyed. The R( yal Exchange and the Houses of Parliament 
were among the public edifices subjected to this witch's 
baptism. 

16 Life and Writings, vol. i. 38—39. 

" Ibid. 

18 The King of Sardinia, in 1796, was Victor Amadeus III.j 
descended iu the direct line from the dukes of Savoy. In conse- 
quence of haviDg joined with the other European Sovereigns to 
crush the French Revolution he lost Savoy, died brokenhearted, 
and was succeeded by his son, Carlo Emmanuel IV., who abdi- 
cated in 1802, after being deprived of all his possessions except 
Sardinia. He was succeeded by his brother, Victor Emmanuel 
I., and the latter by a third brother, Carlo Felice, who 
reigned from 1821 to 1831. With him the elder line ended, and 
the crown devolved on Carlo- Alberto, the father of the present 
King of Italy, whose ancestor, the Prince of Carignano, at the 
end of the 17th century, was a younger son of Carlo Emmanuel 
I., Duke of Savoy. 

19 There was treachery at work here, as when the Prince of 
Carignano, went over to the Austrians {ante p. i:7.) The insurrec- 
tion was organized by the chief of the Secret Police, Ciro 
Menotti, probably at the instance of the duke himself, who 
either wished to take the disaffected in a sort of drag-net, or 
saw some way of deriving profit from a popular rising. Menotti 
seems to have been sincere himself, and to have believed in the 
sincerity of the duke, till a sharp musketry fire was opened 
upon his house in which the conspirators were assembled. This 
was on the 3rd of February, 1831. 

20 The Pope being infallible, the statements made by his 
ministers are probably more or less conformable to the truth, and 
if they are to be believed, the movement failed on the first 
occasion, owing to the ofheiousness of the Virgin Mary and the 
meddling policy of some of the principal saints. After a sullen 
peace had been restored to Rome bythe platoon firing of the 
Papahni, the Secretary of State, Bernetti, announced that 
" Providence, moved by the powerful mediation of the holy 
Mary, tlie peculiar patroness of the people so devoted to her, 
and by the prayers of St. Peter and St. Paul, continued to 
watch over Rome." 

21 Life and Writings, i. 52. 

22 Writing in 18C1, Mazzini says: "I did not then believe 
. . . and do not now believe, that the salvation of Iialy can 

ever be accomplished by monarchy ; that is to say, the salvation 
of Italy such as I understand it, and as we all understood it afew 
years since — an Italy, one free aud powerful, independent of all 
foreign supremacy, and morally worthy of her great mission. 
Nor have recent events induced me to alter this conviction. The 
Piedmontese monarchy would never have taken the initiative of 
an Italian movement, if the man of the 2nd of December had not 
offered the assistance of his army, and Garibaldi, with five-sixtlis 
of the republicans, their co-operation. Who could foresee such 
events as these at the period of my letter to the King ? 

"All that the Piedmontese monarchy can give us — even if it 
can give so much — will be an Italy shorn of Provinces which 
ever were, are, and will be Italian, though yielded up to foreign 
domination iu payment of the services rendered ; an Italy the 
abject slave of French policy, dishonoured by her alliance with 
despotism ; weak, corrupted, and disinherited of all moral mission, 
and bearing within her the germs of provincial autonomy and 
civil war." 



The statement that Victor Emmanuel would never have drawn 
the sword if he had not been sure of the support of France and of 
Garibaldi with five-sixths of the republicans, is only another way 
of saying that he would not have struck for the independence of 
Italy, if he had n it been sure of success. Yet it is impossible not 
to admire Mazzini's ideal, and even to envy him his enthusiastic 
faith in its ultimate realization. We are reminded of the voice 
which remonstrated with Sordello — 

" God has conceded two sights to a man — 

One of man's whole work, time's completed plan ; 

The other of the minute's work, man's first 

Step to the plan's completeness." 
They who will the end should will the means. " Why so sorrow- 
ful because the last step is not the first ? Could it be so, you 
were God ; be man now ! " 

23 Guglielmo Libri was a Florentine author of numerous works 
in high mathematics, and Professor at the University of Pisa. 
Having been compromised in the insurrection'of 1830 — 31 against 
the Grand Duke of Tuscany, he took refuge in France, and was 
naturalized there in January, 1833. He died in 1869. 

24 As previously remarked, this is by no means certain. 

26 When Daniel Mauin denounced the "Theory of the 
Dagger," Mazzini replied in a letter bearing that title to which 
it will be needful to refer hereafter, when we come to the " one 
only instance " in which Mazzini was a consenting party to the 
use of the dagger. 

26 That letter addressed by Mazzini to Charles Albert in 1831, 
of which a summary of the principal points is given in the text, 
was reprinted in Paris in 1847, at which time the writer was in 
London. In a letter to the printer, which appeared as a preface, 
Mazzini repeats emphatically, " I do r^ot believe that the salva- 
tion of Italy can be achieved note, or at any future time, by 
Prince, Pope, or King." He thought the republication of the 
letter might serve to convince those who were organizing a new 
party (the Moderates) that they were but "feebly reviving the 
illusions of sixteen years ago." Nevertheless, it is a fact that Italy 
is now independent, and is in possession of its capital — Rome. 

27 The Manifesto is inserted in the Life and Writings of 
Mazzini. Vol. i. p. 117 seq. 

28 The French Government had its own reasons also for desiring 
to send Mazzini out of the country. At the funeral of General La- 
marque in June, 1832, an insurrection broke out in Paris, which ren- 
dered it necessary to declare a state of siege, and an act of accusa- 
tion against Mazzini declared that letters had been intercepted 
which implicated him in the event ; and that another insurrection 
was being prepared in connection with a contemplated rising in 
Italy. Extracts from these letters were quoted, and the originals 
were said to be in the archives of the Sardinian police. Mazzini 
defied the Government to produce any such letters, and denied that 
he had ever written the lines upon which the case for the prosecu- 
tion was founded. The answer was — not the production of the 
letters, but the order mentioned in the text to leave France. 

29 The column had marched for four-and-twenty hours, and it 
was only by a supreme effort of will that Mazzini could collect 
his faculties to renew his remonstrances with Ramorino. He says, 
" I remember that, during the last words 1 had with him, 
and while he was most determinately resisting my entreaties 
some musket shots were fired by our little vanguard. I ran to 
the stand of guns, with a sense of deep gratitude to God that the 
decisive moment had arrived at last. " After this I remember 
nothing more. My sight left me, and I fell to the ground in 
delirium." When consciousness returned, he found himself in 
a barracks surrounded by Swiss soldiers." 

30 For their share in these events both Mazzini and Garibaldi 
were condemned to death by the tribunals — fortunately for them 
and for Italy in their absence. 

31 The absurdity of this programme throws some doubt upon 
it, but there were factions in Italy ready to adopt any means, 
however wild, to rid the country of Austrian tyranny. The 
simplicity of the arrangement in 1859 by which a cession was 
made to France of what had once been her own, and winch it 
had become a political neeessity for her to recover after the 
d*>Jiverance and unification of Italy, contrasts favourably with 
these schemes. 



STUPIDITY OF THE AUSTRIAN RULE. 



47 



CHAPTER LX. 

THE FRENCH FLAG AT ROME. 

Mazzini and Garibaldi after the failure of their first attempt — 
Predominance of Austria in Italy during the reign of Louis 
Philippe — Degrading bondage of the Italians — Oppression 
and cruelty in the Two Sicilies— Attempt of the Brothers 
Bandiera — Mazzini's violated correspondence — Question in 
the House of Commons — The fever and listlessness of despair 
— Pio Nono succeeds Gregory XVI. on the Papal Throne — 
General Amnesty — Enthusiasm of the people — Disappoint- 
ment and reaction — Appeal of Mazzini — Agitation in Rome 
and threatened conflict between the militaiy and the popu- 
lace — Reforms in Tuscany and Piedmont— Increase of the 
Austrian Garrisons — Insurrection in Milan following the 
Revolution of February, 1848— Retreat of Radetzky, and 
spread of the Insurrection from town to town — Venice 
surrendered to Daniel Manin and a Republic proclaimed 
—Charles Albert between two fires — He draws the sword 
for the Independence of Italy — Action of the Pope and 
the other Italian Princes — Disastrous end of the Campaign 
of 1848— Garibaldi in the field with " Young Italy "—Dis- 
persion of his forces and escape of their leader — Murder of 
Rossi, and proclamation of the Republic at Rome — Flight of 
the Pope, and combined action of the Austrians and the King 
of Naples— Campaign of 1849— Battle of Novara : Defeat and 
abdication of Charles Albert— Events at Venice— The French 
Expedition under Oudinot — Arrival of Garibaldi, who becomes 
Dictator — Rome besieged by the French — Progress and end 
of the struggle — The French occupation of Rome — War with 
Austria in 1859, incompleteness of the result — War of 1866, 
Venetia surrendered by the Austrians — Unification of Italy, 
and defeat of the French policy— Convention between France 
and Italy — False and untenable situation of the French- 
Garibaldi at Mentana— War of 1870, and necessary with- 
drawal of the French Garrison— Rome the Capital of Italy 
— Garibaldi in France. 

It is not necessary that we should follow the 
history of " Young Italy " step by step ; nor 
even that we should recount the sufferings 
and wrongs that had been endured by the 
Italian people, when the great political over- 
throw of 1848 proved at once the vitalitj^ of 
the popular movement, and the rottenness of 
the systems to which it was opposed. During 
the greater part of that period, — namely, 
from 1836 to 1848, — Garibaldi, a name as yet 
unknown to fame, was in South America, 
fighting for the republic of Uruguay, as 
commander of the squadron which operated 
against Buenos Ayres ; or leading a partisan 
warfare against Rosas, himself at the head of 
a small army of infantry and cavalry. Maz- 
zini at the same time was in London, secretly 
carrying on his crusade for the Liberation of 
his country, in accordance with the ideas pro- 
pounded in the statutes of "Young Italy." In 
the ill-fated Peninsula Austria was everywhere 
predominant, and it is only just to repeat a re- 
mark we have made in an earlier chapter, that 
the rule of the foreigner, so far as relates to 



the administration of justice by the ordinary 
tribunals did not always lose by contrast with 
that of the native princes. Still the tyranny 
of a paternal government by strangers was 
hard to bear, and harder still when the 
slightest sign of deviation from the will of 
their masters caused the Italians to feel the 
bit, to know that they were slaves. The 
money wrung from them by taxation was 
only the least part of the evils they had to 
endure. The police system and the conscrip- 
tion were brutal in their excess of espionage 
and severity. The former, in the words of 
Gallenga, "jealous, all-prying, hideous, .... 
spreading mistrust in the bosom of families, 
putting a check upon all domestic intercourse, 
giving the hearty and cheerful Lombard those 
habits of low cunning and dissimulation 
which are too falsely deemed innate." The 
latter purposely extended to a period of eight 
and even fifteen years' service, " with a view 
to wean the Italian soldiers from all domestic 
associations by a protracted sojourn on the 
borders of Hungary and Transylvania, to se- 
cure their allegiance by long habits of disci- 
pline, and to prevent by infrequent drafts the 
spread of national spirit among the great 
mass of the Italian people : " a a despotism 
as stupid as it was brutal, since it dared to 
deal with a people of noble lineage and fine 
genius — a people more renowned in arts and 
arms than its masters — a people, too, who 
numbered more than twenty millions of souls — 
as with a race of helots or savages, to be sub- 
dued by the whip, or ground down to the dust 
by despair. 

These long years of oppression were marked 
in the South of Italy more particularly by the 
cruelty of Ferdinand II., and the constant 
terror in which he lived of the storm of revo- 
lution. The fearful and the weak, if they are 
also base, are prone to cruelty. In 1837 an 
insurrection broke out in Sicily, when the 
people were shot down without mercy in the 
streets, and imprisonment and death were 
afterwards dealt out with unsparing rigour in 
cold blood. In 1842 the attempt of the brothers 
Bandiera, 2 first to place the whole Austrian 
fleet in the hands of the intended insurgents, 
and, when this failed, to raise Calabria in revolt, 



48 



PIUS IX. AS A REFORMER. 



resounded through Europe, and made a stir in 
England more especially, in consequence of a 
suspicion that the plot had been revealed by 
Her Majesty's Government, who were driven 
to acknowledge that they had opened Mazzini's 
correspondence. It was positively denied in 
the House of Commons that any such use had 
been made of the information gathered from 
his letters ; and Mazzini himself has satisfac- 
torily proved that he had done all inliis power 
to discourage the attempt of the brothers, 
knowing that it must have a disastrous termi- 
nation in the then condition of Europe. In 
fact, the nobler minds of Italy needed no in- 
stigation to strike a blow for freedom, if a cal- 
culating prudence did not restrain them. If 
there was comparative happiness in Tuscany 
at this period, which may perhaps be asserted, 
there was tenfold misery and degradation in 
Naples and Sicily. There was everywhere in 
Italy, among the more impassioned and appre- 
hensive natures, a feverish expectation of 
coming events — a state of moral tension and 
exasperated indignation which was certain to 
produce a catastrophe. The less imaginative 
and active temperaments were like the crew of 
a wrecked vessel, who look wistfully across the 
waste of waters to every point of the horizon 
for some sign of deliverance. To all alike the 
future was everything, the past an abyss. " In 
Italy nothing speaks," said Mazzini, writing 
in 1844; "silence is the common law. The 
people are silent by reason of terror ; the 
masters are silent from policy. Conspiracies, 
strife, persecution, vengeance, — all exist, but 
make no noise. They neither excite applause 
nor complaint. One might fancy the very 
steps of the scaffold were spread with velvet, 
so little noise do heads make when they fall." 3 
So Italy watched and waited in such man- 
ner as Rizpah sat by the bodies of her slain 
sons. But the long night wore on to the in- 
evitable dawn, though no gleam of it appeared 
till the death of Gregory XVI. in 1846, when 
Cardinal Ferretti became Pope, under the title 
of Pius IX. He was then in the prime of 
life, 4 and his liberal sentiments, his well-known 
benevolence, and his conciliatory disposition 
drew all eyes towards him. He dismissed his 
hated Swiss Guards, and granted an uncon- 



ditional amnesty. Italy rose to her feet, and 
looked, scarce doubting, scarcely daring to 
believe and hope, through her tears. The 
people flocked in crowds to the Quirinal, and 
their enthusiasm knew no bounds ; yet, if 
Mariotti is to be credited, it would be as 
reasonable to ascribe the merit of its rapid 
progress to a straw that is whirled along by 
a torrent as to the new Pope. Elected by the 
College of Cardinals, because they felt that a 
crisis was at hand, that the tension of the 
popular expectancy and hate had reached its 
extreme limit, and that the antecedents of the 
successor of Gregory XVI. must be such as to 
suggest hope, at least for the future, Pio 
Nono was a true Pope at heart ; and, to use 
Mariotti's own words, it was the Papacy itself, 
and not the people, that had been amnestied. 5 
Of this the chiefs of the revolution became 
sensible before another year had passed away, 
and the increasing demands of the people were 
met by increased resistance. 

The truth seems to be that the new Pope, 
like Charles Albert in 1821, was not unwilling 
to take the lead in certain measures of reform, 
and even to affect an enthusiasm which he 
did not altogether feel in the popular cause ; 
but when he saw the abyss that opened at his 
feet, when he understood the real extent of the 
popular demands, he shrank back appalled. 
Is it wonderful that this should have been 
so ? How many men in a thousand are born 
heroes ? We have been accustomed in the 
course of this history to sympathise with 
every assertion of freedom that was not licence, 
and every aspiration of a people to develop its 
own national life ; but we have the advantage 
of reflection after the event, and it is but his- 
torical fairness to place ourselves in the posi- 
tion of Pio Nono in 1847, when he saw the 
tendency of the national movement displayed 
like a scroll that was being gradually unrolled 
before his eyes, and which he saw at last was 
written all over with letters of fire. A man 
like Mazzini, like Garibaldi, might have faith 
in the people, for they were nurtured by 
the people's blood ; and if we may compare 
a nation rising in its might to an angry sea, 
these men had swam in its waves from their 
youth upwards. Pio Nono, like a child 



REACTION AND REVOLUTION. 



49 



brought to the shore for the first time, and 
tempted to tread in the sparkling foam, was 
terrified when wave succeeding wave of revo- 
lution rolled in upon him. France, Austria, 
even Sardinia, however wayward, he could 
understand, and to a certain extent trust ; but 
this trust in " the people," an unknown power 
with unknown dispositions, a giant in stature, 
a tempest in its wrath which swept all before 
it, was more than he dared. Once, so to 
speak, he laid his hand timidly on the lion's 
mane; but the beast shook himself up, and 
there was something terrible in his demonstra- 
tion of delight. It was safer, all things con- 
sidered, to part company with him. 

In November, 1847, when the reaction was 
already felt, and discontent was increasing 
day by day, Mazzini wrote : "The uncertain 
or retrogressive measures will not change the 
law that regulates events. The impulse has 
been given, and, well or ill, the movement will 
progress. The Italians are possessed of good 
instincts. They have, it is true, but a shadow 
of political wisdom and experience. I speak 
of the majority, not of the few capable of 
judging, who sin from want of courage ; and 
yet this illusion (as to the Pope's liberality) 
will also disappear, if only the few really 
good continue their work quietly, with pru- 
dence and patience. Pius is a good man; 
his subjects are now somewhat better off — 
that is all. All else is a scenic scaffolding 
erected round the Pope by the so-called Mo- 
derates, fellow to the one round Carlo- Alberto. 
The illusion will fade away, slowly but cer- 
tainly : the moment is approaching when 
people will understand that if they desire to 
become a nation, they must themselves work 
for that object; and then there will be mani- 
festations and outbursts which will oblige 
Austria to interfere forcibly, with or without 
the consent of the princes. When that hap- 
pens, if the Italians have a shadow of honour 
and a spark of courage, the struggle will 
begin." 

The agents of " Young Italy " increased in 
activity as the signs of reaction on the part of 
the Pope became more manifest. Mazzini 
followed up this manifesto by a letter dated 
from Paris a few days later (Nov. 25th), in 



which he urged the Pope to lead the national 
movement, else he asserted the people would 
go on their way without him, and the Church 
would be abandoned. The Pope was indignant, 
and the Austrian press compared this invi- 
tation to the temptation of Christ, when the 
devil offered Him all the kingdoms of the 
world ! It had become known before this that 
the Pope favoured the Jesuits, and tumultuous 
crowds assembled to denounce them. So time 
wore on to New Year's Day, 1848, when the cus- 
tomary procession was expected to take place. 
Instead of this, troops surrounded the palace; 
and such was the excitement of the people 
when the fact became known, that only the 
promise of the Pope to appear on the morrow 
appeased them. The procession took place 
accordingly, and the people having been 
further conciliated by the dismissal of the 
officials, who, it was alleged, had called out the 
troops without orders, the mistrust was in 
some degree removed. 

During all the time these events were oc- 
curring in Rome, the Pope's initiative had 
been followed by reforms in Tuscany and 
Piedmont; as his policy of reaction was on 
the other hand supported by the increase of 
the Austrian garrisons. The train was thus 
laid for the explosion that Mazzini had fore- 
told; and when, in February, 1848, the storm 
of Revolution broke out in Paris, it spread 
from capital to capital through all central 
Europe, and even Metternich was compelled 
to fly for his life from Vienna. It was for 
this hour that Italy had waited. The people 
of Milan rose against the Austrian Governor, 
and in a few hours the Italian tricolour was 
flying from the top of the cathedral, while 
Radetzky, withdrawing to the ramparts after 
a sharp struggle in the streets, swore to reduce 
the city to ashes rather than surrender. In 
a week from this time the Austrians in 
full retreat, and Mantua, Verona, Cremona 
were all in peril. In Venice the movement 
against the Austrians had commenced as early 
as the 17th of March, when the people led 
Manin and Tommasseo out of prison in triumph, 
and proclaimed a Constitution. On the 21st 
of March the news of the successful struggle 
at Milan encouraged the patriots of Venice to 



50 



GARIBALDI AND "YOUNG ITALY." 



proceed farther, and Daniel Manin spoke 
openly in favour of a Republic. Colonel Mari- 
novich, who commanded at the arsenal, 
prepared to bombard the city, and was killed 
on the morning of the 22nd by some of the 
workmen. On the same day Manin and his 
friends, among whom was Count Vincenzo di 
Tergolina, numbering about forty persons, 
marched to the Arsenal, manned only by 
Italian soldiers in Austrian pay, who were 
either overawed by astonishment, or secretly 
favourable to the revolution. Taking out his 
watch, Manin gave the Vice-Admiral seven 
minutes to surrender, and while he hesitated, 
the Italian tricolour was run up to the main 
by two Austrian men-of-war lying near. The 
magnificent arsenal was then yielded up, and 
an agreement made that the non-Italian 
troops should at once evacuate the town and 
the forts ; the governor, prince Zichy, re- 
maining as a hostage till all the conditions 
were fulfilled. Manin then formally pro- 
claimed the Republic, and took the lead in 
the Provisional Government which was imme- 
diately elected. 

The success of the Insurrection in Venetia 
and Lombardy kindled a fire in Rome and 
Naples. The Pope, still yielding to the 
pressure of the people, was compelled to send 
the Swiss troops with the Volunteers to the 
frontier ; while General Pepe, returning to 
Naples after twenty-seven years' absence, was 
placed in command of 14,000 men, to co-operate 
with the Lombards, and the Neapolitan fleet 
was sent to the Adriatic. The strength of the 
popular movement may be judged of from the 
fact that neither the King of Naples nor the 
Pope dared for the moment to resist its de- 
mands. Every hour that Charles Albert 
hesitated, the risk increased that his throne 
would be swept away by the republican move- 
ment. Under these circumstances he finally 
decided to draw the swor4 for the independence 
of Italy, and his troops entered Milan on the 
26th of March. The forces with which the 
King took the field consisted of 42,000 men, 
with 120 guns, but of these 80 were unprovided 
with horses. The strength of Radetzky's 
army was about 60,000. The campaign opened 
auspiciously. He beat the Austrians suc- 



cessively at Pastrengo (April 30th) ; Goito 
(May 30th) ; Rivoli (June 10th) ; and Somma- 
Campagna (July 24th) ; besides fighting the 
heroically sustained battle of Santa-Lucia 
(May 6th) ; from which he was able to with- 
draw his troops in perfect order, leaving a 
thousand dead and wounded on the field. The 
situation now became very complicated. 
Gioberti and Mazzini were both active at 
Milan, the former seeking to promote the 
union of Lombardy and Venetia with Pied- 
mont under Charles Albert as King ; the 
latter labouring to turn the circumstances to 
account for commencing the reconstruction of 
Italy as one indivisible and independent Re- 
public. The Princes of Parma and Modena 
were at the same time actively engaged in 
support of the principle of confederation; 
while their subjects, on the other hand, ap- 
pointed provisional governments and declared 
for incorporation with Piedmont. An addi- 
tional element of disturbance was found in 
the attitude of France. The Government of 
Louis Philippe was not favourable to the 
aggrandizement of Piedmont ; and even Lamar- 
tine had declared the acquisition of Nice and 
Savoy to be necessary for the safety of France, 
if the expectation of the unitarians should be 
realized. 6 The public sentiment of Italy being 
thus divided, and her leading men of all 
parties crossing each other's path at every 
turn, it is not surprising that Charles Albert 
should find, as the campaign was protracted 
into the autumn, that his efforts in the field 
were badly seconded. The result was, his 
defeat at San Donato by Radetzky (Aug. 4th), 
his retreat from Milan in a scene of popular 
commotion which nearly cost him his life 
(Aug. 5th), and the conclusion of a truce with 
the enemy. 

Garibaldi was hurrying on to Milan 7 when 
he heard that the city had already capitulated 
to the Austrians. He retreated from Monza 
in the direction of Varese, and a large number 
of his followers dispersed to their different 
homes, leaving him with about 2,000 men. 
At the head of this small force he was pro- 
claimed by the Mazzinists commander-in-chief 
of the popular army, and in this character, 
as the acknowledged leader in the field of 



MURDER OF ROSSI. 



51 



" Young Italy," he continued to carry on the 
war, on a small scale, on the slopes of the 
Alps. His little force gradually melted away 
in the unequal warfare, and was at length 
utterly dispersed by a night surprise at 
Murazzone (Aug. 26th). Garibaldi himself 
escaped with a few companions, and bore 
away with him the reputation of a skilful and 
daring leader. 

In the meantime a semblance of political 
peace had been restored in central Italy. The 
Pope and the King of Naples had withdrawn 
their troops 8 and the Austrian generals were 
masters of the situation almost everywhere, 
except in Rome. There, Count Rossi, who had 
succeeded Mamiani as the chief of the liberal 
ministry, continued to hold aloft the banner 
of independence, and urged the Pope to place 
himself unreservedly at the head of the na- 
tional movement. Rossi was an Italian by 
birth, who had been naturalized in France 
since 1832. Having acquired a great reputa- 
tion as a Legist, he had occupied successively 
the chairs of political economy in the College 
of France, and of constitutional law in the 
" Ecole de Droit" of Paris. In 1840 he rose 
still higher in the public service as a member 
of the Council of Education, and in 1844 be- 
came a peer of France. The next year he 
went to Rome as Minister Plenipotentiary, 
and, having gained the confidence of Pio 
Nono, became chief minister in the govern- 
ment, whose declared role was the unification 
and independence of Italy. Had Charles 
Albert kept the field against the Austrians, 
the party represented by Rossi might have 
been successful in their aims ; but the disas- 
trous termination of the campaign had embit- 
tered the popular feeling against all royal and 
ecclesiastical rule. The Pope was so ill- 
advised by the party of priests as to apply 
to the President of the French Republic 
(Cavaignac) for the aid of troops to keep 
order in Rome. This was denied him, and 
the demonstrations against his rule became 
more threatening day by day. The crisis 
came on the 15th November, when the Cham- 
bers were re-opened. Rossi had been warned 
that his life was threatened, and his friends 
entreated him with tears in their eyes not to 



appear in public that day. A man of un- 
daunted courage, labouring conscientiously for 
the salvation of Italy, his only reply was that 
he should go where duty called him, and he 
even dismissed the troops to barracks which 
the other members of the Government had 
thought necessary for the protection of the 
Chamber. Why speak of the excited popu- 
lace, of the omens of evil to come, through 
which the Minister passed to his doom ? Let 
us hasten to the tragedy which did more harm 
to the Republican cause than the loss of many 
battles. Rossi had just stepped from his car- 
riage, when he was surrounded by a crowd of 
ruffians who had assembled before the Cancel- 
laria : a naked dagger was uplifted ; its glitter 
was seen for a moment, and, so sure was the 
blow, in another instant he sank a corpse in 
the midst of his assassins. 9 The populace had 
tasted blood, and went in the wildest rage to 
besiege the Quirinal. The Pope yielded to 
the situation, and Mamiani resumed his place 
as the chief of a revolutionary government. 10 
In a few days (Nov. 24th) Pius fled to Gaeta, 
in the Neapolitan States, and the Republic was 
once more proclaimed in Rome. 11 Tuscany 
also, a little later, hoisted the colours of 
"Young Italy," and the Grand -Duke saved 
himself by flight. 

Feeling how impossible it was to breast the 
waves thus rising all around him, Charles Al- 
bert floated with the tide and recommenced the 
war with Austria at the expiration of the 
truce. He now took the field with an effec- 
tive force of 85,000 men, loosely organized in 
two corps d'armee ; while Radetzky had 
70,000 men under his command, most of 
whom were veterans. The artillery of the 
Austrians was also greatly superior both in 
quality and in the number of pieces. Charles 
Albert joined the army on the 20th of March, 
1849. After a first trivial success, the King 
was defeated at Mortara (March 21st) and on 
the field at Novara (March 23rd). This last 
battle for the freedom of Italy was gallantly 
fought in a scrambling sort of way. Prodigies 
of valour were performed by individuals. The 
Austrian artillery had opened fire about noon, 
and the struggle had continued past nightfall. 
At seven o'clock the King, who had recklessly 



52 



VICTOR EMMANUEL KING. 



exposed himself at other periods of the battle, 
stood under the walls of the town in a drizzling 
rain, exposed to a storm of leaden hail. In 
reply to Giacomo Durando, who had laid his 
hand on the bridle of his horse to lead him 
away, he only said, " General, all is over, let 
me die." But death does not come to those 
who call upon him : and some time afterwards 
the King, without speaking, slowly walked his 
horse towards Novara. At nine o'clock he 
called his generals and his sons around him, 
and said with touching pathos, " I have twice 
in vain, sought death : I will give myself up 
as a last sacrifice to my country : I lay down 
my crown and abdicate in favour of my son." 
The Duke of Savoy then sank on his knee be- 
fore his father, and the King, placing his hand 
upon his head, proclaimed him rightful King 
under the title of Victor Emmanuel II. The 
tears of all who stood by were the only answer. 
Charles Albert then dismissed his attendants 
with a letter to his wife, and at one o'clock 
presented himself at the Austrian outposts, 
where he narrowly escaped being shot down. 
He first announced himself as a Piedmontese 
noble ; but afterwards declared himself to 
Count Thom, who passed him through the 
Austrian lines, on his way to Nice. On the 
19th of April he went thence through 
France and Spain to Oporto, where he died 
broken-hearted, a martyr to the anarchy and 
the dawning freedom of his country. 

We might now pass over all the interven- 
ing incidents in the affairs of Northern Italy 
to the destruction of the Roman Republic 
and the occupation of the Eternal City 
by the French ; but fatal as this policy 
afterwards proved to the second empire, the 
changing fortunes of Venetia were of no less 
evil omen to that power. It is therefore 
necessary to recall, before passing on, that the 
incorporation of the Queen of the Adriatic, in 
the kingdom of Piedmont, was resolved upon 
by the Parliament assembled in the Ducal 
Palace, duiing the successful period of the 
campaign in Lombardy; Manin himself ad- 
vocating the fusion in these memorable words : 
" We are Republicans, therefore we must be 
virtuous ; and the first virtue of the patriot 
is to know how to make sacrifices for the good of 



his country." The truce concluded by Charles 
Albert caused the rupture of the relations that 
had been established under this self-denying 
ordinance, and on the 11th of August Manin 
became Dictator, in which post he was con- 
firmed by the deputies, who were soon after- 
wards assembled in parliament. To this 
chamber Manin's friend, Count di Tergolina, 
although a judge, was spontaneously elected 
by the people of Venice, and so great was the 
trust reposed in him as a true and single- 
minded patriot, that he was afterwards sent 
on a political mission to Florence and the 
Romagna. We are particular in our notice of 
these facts because Tergolina was confederate 
with Manin at Paris, in 1855 — 6, when the 
programme for the unification of Italy under 
the sceptre of the King of Sardinia was de- 
finitively agreed upon, and the line of policy 
adopted, which gave a clearly defined object 
to the intervention of the French at a later 
period. In estimating these circumstances, it 
is important to bear in mind the position 
taken by the friends of Manin in the first free 
parliament of the old Republic. In a land 
divided by faction, the men who had favoured 
the Incorporation of Venetia with the kingdom 
of Piedmont, had made a willing sacrifice of 
their opinions for the common good, and so 
distinctly was their patriotic disinterestedness 
recognized by their fellow-citizens, that, when 
in March, 1849, the ducal palace was surroun- 
ded by a tumultuous crowd, which menaced 
their party for its willingness to unite once 
more with Charles Albert against the Austrians, 
it was Manin himself who put an end to the 
demonstration by appealing to the populace. 

We are thus brought chronologically to the 
date of the French intervention in Rome. 
The Austrians had occupied Bologna and 
Ancona. The Neapolitans had crossed the 
border into Roman territory, and the Spaniards 
were watching at the mouth of the Tiber. 
Venice and Rome, like two island fortresses 
in the midst of a stormy sea, still flew the flag 
of the Republic. Garibaldi, who had been 
prostrated with fever in Switzerland since the 
dispersion of his little band, felt that he was 
again summoned to the field by the cry of 
distress which arose from all Italy, and 






THE AUSTRIAN ARMY. 



53 




iiil B 



if : ill. 



' Hi 

VOL. II. 



if 






54 



GARIBALDI AT ROME. 



gathering some of his companions around 
him, he marched over the mountains to 
Rome, and reached Anagni about the same 
time that the French were landing at Civita 
Vecchia (April 25-6th). The government of 
Rome had in the meantime been vested in a 
Triumvirate, consisting of Mazzini, Armellini, 
and Aurelio Saffi. This change had taken 
p*lace as soon as intelligence of the battle of 
Novara reached Rome ; its object was to 
strengthen the Executive for defence, the As- 
sembly still retaining the power it had 
hitherto exercised. 12 

i In the light of what we have previously 
related, it will be seen that the great question 
now at issue, was whether the Republic of 
Rome should be allowed to initiate the unity 
which the Piedmontese monarchy, under the 
stress of political circumstances, had failed to 
accomplish ? But the difficulty for the men 
of action at Rome was immense. In the creed 
of Mazzini and of Young Italy, the Eternal 
City was the natural centre of that unity, 
and it was all important to attract the eyes 
and the reverence of the country towards her. 
On the other hand, the Italian people had lost 
their religion of Rome, and had learned to 
look upon her as a sepulchre, or at the best 
perhaps, as a gigantic museum of ecclesiastical 
and pagan antiquity. In the words of Mazzini : 
" As the seat of a form of faith now extinct, 

, and only outwardly sustained by hypocrisy 
and persecution ; her middle class living in 
a great measure upon the pomps of worship, 
and the corruption of the higher clergy ; and 
her people, although full of noble and manly 
pride, necessarily ignorant and believed to 
be devoted to the Pope ;— Rome was regarded 
by some with aversion, by others with dis- 
dainful indifference. A few individual excep- 
tions apart, the Romans had never shared that 
ferment, that desire for liberty which had con- 
stantly agitated Romagna and the Marche. 
It was therefore essential to redeem Rome ; to 
place her once again at the summit, so that 
the Italians might again learn to regard her as 
the temple of their common country. It was 
necessary that all should learn how potent the 
immortality stirring beneath those ruins of 
two epochs, two worlds." 13 Mazzini has just 



reason to boast, that while others doubted, he 
did feel " the pulsations of the immense eter- 
nal life of Rome through the artificial crust 
with which priests and courtiers had covered 
the great sleeper as with a shroud." He at 
least had faith in Rome ; and when the ques- 
tion arose whether the city should resist the 
summons of France to enter, and the chief 
officers of the National Guard told him sadly 
that the co-operation of the troops could not 
be relied upon, he resolved to put this doubt 
to the test. Giving orders that all the bat- 
talions of the Guard should defile in front of 
the palace of the Assembly, he put the ques- 
tion as they marched by, and he says, "the 
universal shout of Ouerra that arose from the 
ranks drowned in an instant the timid doubts 
of their leaders." u Nothing was wanting but 
the entrance upon the scene of a military 
chief, to inspire that confidence and stir up 
that martial enthusiasm in the populace, 
Which so many feared had been for ever ex- 
tinguished by the corrupting influences of 
the ecclesiastical system. 

The priests had persuaded the ignorant in- 
habitants of Macerata and other places, that 
Garibaldi was a mere brigand, and many 
scowled upon him when he passed; but as 
he advanced further, hundreds of the no- 
blest youth of Italy, — university students and 
others — fell into his ranks, and he finally 
entered Rome (April 28th, 1849) amid thun- 
ders of acclamation. A young Swiss, named 
Gustave de Hoffstetten, was an eye-witness 
of this memorable event. He describes Gari- 
baldi at that time, as " a man of middle 
height, his countenance scorched by the sun, 
but marked by lines of antique purity. He 
sat his horse as calmly and firmly as if he had 
been born there. Beneath his hat — broad- 
brimmed, with a narrow loop, and ornamented 
with a black ostrich feather — was spread a 
forest of hair. A red beard covered the whole 
of the lower part of his face. Over his red 
shirt was thrown an American poncho, white, 
lined with red, like his shirt. His staff wore 
the red blouse, and afterwards the whole 
Italian legion adopted this colour. Behind 
him galloped his groom, Aguyar, a stalwart 
negro, dressed in a black cloak, and carrying a 



CAVAIGNAC SENDS TROOPS TO ITALY. 



55 



lance with a red pennant. All who had come 
with the chief from America, wore pistols 
and poniards of fine workmanship in their 
belts .... Ever as these bronzed, bold-eyed 
men, bowed to the cheers that greeted them, 
the Roman people pressed forward to grasp 
their hands with vivas and grateful tears. 
' Garibaldi has come ! Garibaldi has come ! ' 
ran like an electric thrill through the heart of 
old Rome. ' The man of Providence,' they 
called him that day, as they leaped with joy 
like men distraught, and hurled their caps 
up in the air. If ever their hearts wavered, 
they were reassured now. What even Maz- 
zini's fiery declamation had at times failed 
to effect, the mere sight of Garibaldi had 
accomplished." 15 This went bravely ; but it 
was not within the limits of probability that 
Rome would be able to withstand the power 
of France, if the threatened interference were 
earnestly meant, to say nothing of the inde- 
pendent action of Austria and Naples. Even 
the friendship of Piedmont could not be re- 
lied upon, for the reason at which we have 
already hinted. 16 What then were the pro- 
babilities that France would really oppose her 
strength to the Republican Government at 
Rome ? 

Prince Louis Napoleon, afterwards Emperor, 
had succeeded to the Presidency of the French 
Republic on the 20th of December, 1848. 
This extraordinary change in the personnel of 
the Government might have suggested a doubt 
whether the policy of France would continue 
to be the same now as when Cavaiernac was 
entrusted with the power of a Dictator, and 
the Revolution, which had spread like fire 
from city to city all over Central Europe, Was 
still unsubdued. In fact, however, the iDolitical 
situation had entirely changed; a gulf had 
been opened between France and Rome by 
the murder of Rossi, and Cavaignac him- 
self had sent troops to Civita Vecchia, to 
protect the Pope ; nay, had he not only a few 
months before extinguished the fires of Social- 
ism in Paris in the blood of 16,000 French 
citizens and soldiers ? Then it was well 
known that the ferment of society in France 
had been kept alive by the secret associations 
which had their origin in the Carbonarism, or 



reformed Carbonarism, of Italy; and it was 
manifest to all the world that Rome was at 
this moment the centre of the subversive 
movement. What leader of the Fauboums, 
what chief of the barricades could be likened 
to Garibaldi, beneath whose standard were 
gathered the insurgent rank and file of all 
nations ? What trained conspirator was to be 
compared with Mazzini, the very Pluto, the 
monarch of the subterranean fires which 
smouldered beneath the crust of society in all 
parts of Europe ? If it was politically and 
socially necessary to combat the revolution in 
Paris, it was tenfold more necessary, at this 
particular crisis, to wrestle with it in Rome. 
Germany, France, England, had produced 
socialists, ideologists, and any number of 
gloomy and guilty dreamers ; Italy, where the 
genius of Socialism seemed to pass over the 
heads of the masses to whisper its dark coun- 
sels, and concentrate its whole force in a few 
individuals, alone produced the practical work- 
ing agents and emissaries of anarchy. Italy, 
in short, morally dead since 1815, was a corpse 
swarming with worms, which would breed a 
pestilence in Europe, if it were not either 
buried out of sight, or restored to life, and 
animated with a new soul. 

While it is probable that this view of the 
case would have been shared in common by 
Cavaignac and the Prince President, the points 
on which they would certainly have differed, 
namely, the military situation and the political 
prospects of Italy, were such as to render it 
still more certain that France, under the rule 
of the latter, would carry out to a more 
decided issue the policy commenced by the 
former. The Austrians had beaten the national 
armies in the field; and the revolution in 
Rome, had it been ever so acceptable in prin- 
ciple, was like an army that had been crushed 
and broken standing at bay in its last strong- 
hold. In the disasters which had produced 
this result, France had incurred no respon- 
sibility. The divided state of opinion in Italy 
was solely accountable for them ; nay, so far 
as France had acted at all, her influence had 
been favourable to the revolution ; and, as we 
have related, the Pope had appealed for help 
in vain, until he had actually fled from his 



56 



THE PRINCE PRESIDENT AND THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. 



capital, in consequence of the assassination of 
his minister. Now Austria had recovered the 
positions from which she had been driven, the 
Neapolitans threatened the borders of the 
Republic, and the Pope was at Gaeta with the 
ambassadors of the Foreign Powers around 
him, who still acknowledged his sovereignty. 
All this, added to the former considerations, 
certainly favoured the presumption that France 
would interfere ; and if it were reasonable to 
suppose that the Prince President was likely 
to follow the policy of his uncle, such as we 
have sketched it in the preceding chapter, that 
presumption rose almost to a certainty. Against 
this, indeed, was to be set the preamble to the 
Constitution, which had been promulgated 
before the election to the presidency took 
place, namely, that "the Republic respected 
all foreign nationalities in the same manner 
that she expected her own to be respected ; 
that she undertook no war with the idea of 
personal aggrandizement, and would never 
employ her strength against the liberty of any 
nation." Confident in the soundness of their 
own patriotic views, which aimed to make of 
Rome an established centre of light for all 
Italy, and by this means to give Italy a 
national existence, the undaunted Triumvirate 
must be pardoned, if they were blind to the 
political situation and to the exact force of 
words, and if therefore they interpreted this 
declaration in a larger sense than it would 
bear. 

The reader will see that we are anxious 
to account for what afterwards happened, by a 
just estimate of the motives and views on 
both sides. The declaration of the French 
Constitution would perhaps have put an iron 
constraint on the heart and brain of a man 
like Garibaldi, had he been the president of 
the French Republic, and the result would 
have been in all probability — a coalition against 
France ! But the Prince President, who could 
not show himself less careful of the interests 
of the Church than the Republican General 
Cavaignac, might have been expected to look 
at the matter somewhat thus : There is no 
such thing as a nation of Italy, or if there be, 
that nationality certainly does not exist in 
Rome, but in Piedmont and Lombardy, where 



the Republic is not in favour — where indeed 
it is seen to be impracticable. It is not, there- 
fore, against the liberties of a nation that 
France would fight at Rome, but against a 
faction of enthusiasts, whom the better part of 
the nation would gladly see suppressed, and 
whose continuance at Rome is besides incom- 
patible with the independence of the head of 
the Church, whose cause is common to all 
Europe. So strongly is this felt, he would 
further observe, that Austria and Naples have 
already taken the first steps to intervene, and 
if Austria become mistress of the Romagna, 
the result must be a still further sacrifice of 
Italian liberty, and a more hopeless prospect 
for the future than heretofore. France is the 
only power that can intervene with the happy 
effect of conciliating all interests, while she 
performs her duty, at the same time, as the 
eldest son of the Church. The real people of 
Italy Expect her intervention, and there are 
many in Rome itself who long to see her flag, 
as the only solution of difficulties, which have 
become intolerable in their consequences. 

Such were the circumstances — such the line 
of reasoning by which any ruler of France was 
likely to justify his intervention at this crisis, 
and Mazzini himself could not be bhnd to the 
force of the argument, though he chose to at- 
tribute the whole course of events to the sel- 
fish ambition and the treachery of the Prince 
President. 17 He knew that victory in a con- 
test with France was impossible, unless Rome 
received help from the other provinces of 
Italy ; but though he could not calculate on 
such assistance, he thought it to be the abso- 
lute duty of Republicans in Rome to co- 
operate with the Republican opposition in the 
French Chamber, namely, with the friends of 
the Mountain — the partisans of the insurrec- 
tion which had been so recently crushed by 
Cavaignac. He therefore sent orders to 
Civita Vecchia, to resist the landing of the 
forces of Oudinot at any cost. 

No such resistance was offered ; and it is 
another proof, added to the many we have 
already advanced, of the divided state of 
opinion in Italy, that the French were able to 
commence their march on Rome unopposed. 
Even Mazzini and Garibaldi were not agreed 



~.^.r** 



THE FRENCH AT ROME. 



57 



on a common line of policy, as will be seen 
immediately. If the reader will turn to the 
plan of Rome {ante, p. 23), he will remark an 
entrance into the city on either side of St. 
Peter's, namely, the Porta Cavallegieri, and the 
Porta Angelica. General Oudinot's plan was to 
attack by both gates, and then, confidently 
calculating on success, unite the two columns 
in the Piazza of St. Peter's. In the neighbour- 
hood of these two gates, Garibaldi massed his 
troops for resistance, though strategically it 
would have been better to march out and 
meet the enemy ; to this Mazzini had objected, 
on the ground that a final victory was impos- 
sible either within or without the walls, and 
if they were destined to fall, it was their duty, 
in view of the future, to proffer their morituri 
te salutant to Italy from Rome. 18 

On the 30th of April the French advanced to 
the attack, and to their surprise were received 
with the roar of cannon from the walls, in 
spite of which they pressed gallantly on. A 
desperate struggle ensued, which lasted some 
four or five hours, at the end of which time 
Oudinot was compelled to fall back with the 
loss of 1300 in killed and wounded. An 
armistice followed, of which Garibaldi took 
advantage to attack the Neapolitans, winning 
in succession the battles of Palestrina (May 
9th), and of Velletri (May 19th). In the 
meantime Oudinot was drawing reinforcements 
around him, and on Sunday the 3rd of June 
the outposts of the Romans at Villa Pamphili 
and Villa Corsini, in front of the Porta San 
Pancrazio, were surprised. But Garibaldi and 
his devoted followers speedily rallied to the 
defence, and the struggle for the capital lasted 
thirty days, when any further resistance b eing 
impossible, Garibaldi quitted the city with a 
force of 4,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, to 
continue the struggle in some other part of 
Italy. He succeeded in passing the enemy's 
lines, but was pursued by greatly superior 
numbers, and his force dispersed. During his 
wanderings after this event, his faithful wife 
Anita, who had shared in all his perils, suc- 
cumbed to the fatigue and misery they had to 
endure. 19 The hero himself finally escaped to 
America; while Mazzini, after remaining a 
week in Rome, made good his retreat to Geneva. 



In no part of his political writings is 
Mazzini more eloquently bitter than where he 
denounces the destruction of the Roman Re- 
public, and the occupation of the capital in 
the interest of the Papacy. We have fairly 
stated the arguments by which the parties to 
the struggle were respectively influenced, but 
some facts must be added in order to a just 
appreciation of the fatal policy which France 
had thus inaugurated. The Roman Republic 
was proclaimed some time after the city had 
been left absolutely without a government by 
an Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, in 
which only eleven votes out of one hundred 
and forty -four were thrown into the opposite 
scale; and only^ve out of the same number 
were in favour of continuing the temporal 
power of the Pope. Out of the total number 
of deputies present only one was born out of 
the Roman States ; and no less than two hun- 
dred and sixty-three municipalities had sent in 
addresses approving of the action of the As- 
sembly. All the Prefects and employe's of the 
Republican government were Romans ; as 
were all the officers of the army, except Gari- 
baldi and his legion, 800 men; Ancioni and 
his legion, 300 men ; Manara, now " dead for 
liberty," and his Lombard riflemen, 500 men ; 
200 Poles ; the Foreign Legion, 100 men; and 
the handful of brave men who defended 
the Vascello under Medici. All told, these 
may have made 2,000 men out of 14,000, and 
it must be remembered that they were nearly 
all Italians, if not Romans. There is no doubt 
that the capital enjoyed a better administra- 
tion under the Republican government than 
it had known for ages ; and with perfect 
liberty, there was also perfect security and 
tranquillity. All this was changed when the 
French flag was hoisted on the castle of St. 
Angelo. A council of war was instituted for 
the trial of political offences ; clubs were dis- 
solved and meetings forbidden; exemplary 
punishments were threatened for the protec- ' 
tion of persons having friendly relations with 
the French troops ; the Civic Guard was dis- 
solved, and the people completely disarmed ; 
the journals were suppressed, and the prisons 
filled with men who were for the most part 
guilty only of having obeyed the Republic, 



58 



MAZZINI AND THE PAPACY. 



and who had been pointed out by spies as fit 
marks for the vengeance of the priests. As 
an example of the injustice and cruelty of 
these arrests, it may be sufficient to name the 
case of Manin's friend, Count Vincenzo di 
Tergolina, mentioned before in connection 
with events at Venice. Unable to return to 
his own city in consequence of its renewed 
occupation by the Austrians, he made his way 
to Rome, and remained there for some months 
free, but in constant peril of arrest. His hour 
came on the 7th of October, 1851, when he 
was seized in the streets, and after nine 
months' detention, arbitrarily condemned to 
the galleys. 20 Yet Count Tergolina had com- 
mitted no offence against the Papal govern- 
ment, and was besides the representative 
of one of the oldest houses of the Italian 
nobility, a judge by hereditary right in his 
native city, a doctor of the University of 
Padua, and a freely elected deputy of the first 
free parliament of Venice. Ah, but herein lay 
his offence ! When the hour came to strike 
for the freedom of Italy, and " glorious Milan " 
had Radetzky at bay, Count Tergolina, then 
young and enthusiastic, and already a sufferer 
for the cause of Italy, had marched with Manin 
to the Arsenal, and assisted in substituting the 
Italian tricolour for the hated flag of Austria. 
He had afterwards acted as the political agent 
of the Republic at Florence, and had welcomed 
Garibaldi, at Todi, under the civic flag. How 
could the sacrifice he had made for his country 
be forgotten or forgiven by the Grand Lama of 
Christianity, when he had once more placed 
his foot on the neck of Italy ! 

In a letter addressed to M. Montalembert, 
and inserted in the Italia del Popolo — a re- 
view that was published at Lausanne during 
] 849-50 — Mazzini refuted the calumnies that 
had been circulated against the Republican 
government at Rome, and then, turning his 
scorn upon the Papal government — he warned 
M. Montalembert that he was seeking to build 
a house upon the sand : " Sir," he eloquently 
, said, " you discuss what was but is not . . . 
The Papacy is dead ; dead in blood and mire ; 
dead for having beh'ayed its mission of pro- 
tection of the weak against the strong; dead, 
for three centuries of fornication with Princes; 



dead, for having crucified Christ a second time 
in the name of egotism, before the palaces of 
the unrighteous, unbelieving, and hypocritical 
governments ; dead, for having uttered words 
of faith in which it believed not; dead, for 
having denied human liberty, and the dignity 
of the immortal soul; dead, for having con- 
demned science in Galileo, philosophy in Gion- 
dano Bruno, religious aspiration in John Huss 
and Jerome of Prague ; dead, for having con- 
demned political life by crying anathema upon 
the rights of the peoples, civil life by Jesuit- 
ism and coiTuption, and family fife through 
confession made espionage, and division set 
between father and child, brother and brother, 
husband and wife ; dead to the princes since the 
Treaty of Westphalia ; dead to the people since 
Gregory XI. and the Schism ; dead to Italy 
since Clement XL and Charles V. signed the 
infamous pact that crushed expiring liberty in 
Florence, as your soldiers now seek to crush 
the new-born liberty of Italy in Rome ; dead, 
because the people has arisen ; because men 
who for fifteen years made war upon the 
priesthood in the name of Voltaire, now hypo- 
critically defend it; dead, because Pius IX. 
has fled, accursed of the multitudes; dead, sir, 
because you and yours defend it with arms 
and intolerance, and declare that the Papacy 
and liberty cannot co-exist. . . " 

If these were idle words it is idle to believe 
in the future existence of a church of free men 
and equals, wherein he shall be first who has 
best served his brothers, and the religion of 
the Prince of Peace is not supported by 
bayonets. But time has proved that these 
words were deeply and solemnly true, for what 
the wisdom of God was not allowed to accom- 
plish by one means, it has accomplished by 
another, and Italy, at least politically speaking, 
is at last rid of her Old Man of the Sea. If 
anything in the history of the world can be 
supposed to prove that Providence is a Force, 
and that the law of that Force is justice, it is 
the history of the last twenty years. 

France, supporting the Papacy at Rome, 
against the will of Italy, was France in alliance 
with the dead instead of the living. If any 
man in Europe knew this, besides Mazzini, 
it was the Emperor Napoleon himself, who 



THE PARTY OF DANIEL MANIN. 



59 



became the victim of that alliance, and whose 
aim it was to break the chain which bound 
him to a corpse link by link, had time been 
allowed for the full development of his policy. 
How hard the task was may be inferred from 
the fact that the National Assembly supported 
the policy which Cavaignac had initiated, and 
which the President had followed up by the 
occupation of Rome, by a majority of three 
hundred votes; and the attempt of the Red 
Republicans, led by Ledru-RolMn and Victor 
Considerant, to organize an insurrection in 
Paris, was crushed by the prompt action of the 
Legislative Body itself, which instantly declared 
itself en permanence, and placed the capital in 
a state of siege. 

From this time till the war of deliverance in 
1859, the drift of events is connected with the 
story of Daniel Manin, and the line of policy to 
which he had sacrificed his own abstract con- 
victions. In 1855, the ex-President and Dicta- 
tor of Venice, was rejoined at Paris by Tergo- 
lina, whose imprisonment at Rome, after four 
years of suffering, had been commuted to per- 
petual exile. The friends took counsel together 
about the political programme of the future, 
since it was manifest that the unification of 
Italy could never be realized under the Repub- 
lican flag, in consequence of the overwhelming 
opposition which it would have to encounter. 
The political formula they adopted was that of 
" L' Italia col Re Sarde" — " Italy under the 
Sardinian King," as proclaimed in a pamphlet, 
entitled, "Partiti Nazionale Italiano; Inde- 
pendenza ed Unijicazione," published at Turin 
in 1856, by the Marquis Pallavicino. This 
pamphlet was based on a letter of Manin 's, 
dated May 20th, 1855, and inserted in the 
Estafette, in which Manin declared that the 
government, which would prefer to the equi- 
vocal neutrality of Austria, its open enmity, 
would be supported by the energetical concur- 
rence of three-fourths of the inhabitants of the 
Austrian Empire. In a letter dated the 20th 
of September of the same year, and inserted in 
the Siecle he declared, that, faithful to his ban- 
ner "Independence andUnification," he rejected 
whatever might be opposed to that programme, 
adding, " If regenerated Italy must have a 
King, he can be no other than the King of 



Piedmont." This was followed by a letter on 
the 10th of December, inserted in the Presse 
agreeing with the principles proclaimed by 
Mazzini, that Independence and Unification 
were the essential conditions of a national life, 
and that neither France nor England would 
oppose themselves to the realization of these 
conditions in Italy. 

On the 11th February, 1856, he reproduced 
his arguments in the "Diritto," urging that 
when the time came to renew the struggle for 
freedom, the Piedmontese monarchy must not 
sheath the sword till Italy had been made one, 
risking without hesitation the smaller throne 
for the greater. At the same time, true to his 
Republican principles, he declared that he still 
thought the Republic the best form of govern- 
ment, but as a politician he sought to achieve 
what was practically possible. The day 
following he appealed in the " Opinione" to 
his compatriots to be at peace one with an- 
other, if they desired that their war-cry should 
ever be terrible to the enemy. 

In the meantime the policy of Count Cavour 
had guided the councils of the King of Sar- 
dinia, who sent a contingent to the assistance 
of the allies in the war with Russia, and thus 
established a claim on the gratitude and con- 
fidence of the Western Powers. This event 
was followed by the Conference of Paris, at 
which, as Manin proclaimed in a letter 
dated the 11th of May, and inserted in the 
"Diritto" the Piedmontese monarchy had faith- 
fully sought to further the national cause. 
Indeed, the firmness and tact of Cavour has 
long since been matter of history; and such 
was the impression made by his policy, that 
no one doubted henceforth the great part 
that the Piedmontese monarchy was destined 
to play. In a letter, dated the 20th of the 
same month, Manin declared anew his con- 
fidence in the monarchy of Piedmont, and 
called upon the Italian patriots to agitate and 
unite for the independence and unity of Italy. 
But he followed this up by a letter on the 
23rd, in which he explained that agitation 
did not mean insurrection, and thus drew a 
marked distinction between his policy and 
that of Mazzini, which, as we have seen, incul- 
cated the duty of insurrection. Again, on the 



60 



THEORY OF THE DAGGER. 



25th, he denounced with all his energy the 
doctrine of " political assassination " as the 
great enemy of Italy, "worthy only of the 
Jesuits and the Sanfedisti." This brings us 
to our promised remarks on Mazzini's protest 
against the accusation that he advocated or 
counselled the use of the dagger. 

It is not denied by Mazzini, in his letter to 
Manin " On the Theory of the Dagger," that 
he counselled insurrection. He makes it his 
glory that he preached insurrection as the first 
duty of a nation groaning under foreign 
oppression : " Arise in holy wrath ! " he ex- 
claims ; " if your oppressors have disarmed 
you, create arms to combat them ; make wea- 
pons of the iron of your crosses, the nails of 
your workshops, the stones of your streets, the 
daggers you can shap^ from your workman's 
files. Snatch by artifice and surprise those 
arms by which the foreigner takes from you 
your honour, your property, your rights, and 
your life. From the dagger of the Vespers to 
the stone of Balilla and the knife of Palafox, 
blessed be in your hands every weapon that 
can destroy the enemy and set you free." This 
language he avows ; but at the same time de- 
clares that it does not and was not meant to 
incite to private assassination. There has been 
assassination, because there has been treachery 
and cruelty added to oppression, and men have 
been goaded to desperation. He cites some 
instances. A Lombard, named Cervieri, re- 
ceived twenty lashes every day for a week in 
Mantua, for having continued to give money 
to Calvi that he might pay a debt he owed a 
fellow prisoner, before he was strangled by 
the Austrians. Afterwards the Austrian s re- 
fused to pay the debt, keeping the money for 
the expense of the cord and the executioner. 
"Would you," asks Mazzini, "if a son or a 
brother of Cervieri, or of Calvi, had seized a 
weapon and stabbed in the market-place the 
first he met of their oppressors — would you 
call that the result of the theory of the dagger?" 
Again : a man (Vandoni, in Milan) seeks by 
every possible artifice to induce an old friend 
to take from him a note of the Italian National 
Loan, and then goes to the police of the Foreign 
Ruler to denounce him, and a workman arises 
and «lays the Judas in the broad daylight in 



the public streets. Would you have the cour- 
age to cast the first stone at the man who thus 
takes upon himself to represent social justice 
and abhorrence of tyranny ? Such use of the 
dagger, Mazzini, however, does not justify, but 
simply explains as deplorable facts, which he 
does not wonder at, and cannot curse. The 
cases in which he justifies assassination are 
those in which oppression is struck down in 
the person of the oppressor, as illustrated by 
examples in the following peroration : " Sacred 
in the hand of Judith was the sword that took 
the life of Holofernes ; sacred was the dagger 
which Harmodius encircled with roses ; sacred 
the dagger of Brutus ; sacred the stiletto 
of the Sicilian who began the Vespers ; sacred 
the arrow of Tell. Whenever justice is ex- 
tinct, and the terror of a single tyrant cancels 
and denies the conscience of a people, and the 
God who willed them to be free ; if a man, pure 
from hatred and every baser passion, arises in 
the religion of country, under the name of the 
eternal right incarnate within him, and says 
to him, " You torture millions of my brothers ; 
you withhold from them that which God has 
decreed theirs ; you destroy their bodies and 
corrupt their souls; through you my country 
dies a lingering death ; you are the keystone 
of an entire edifice of slavery, dishonour, and 
wrong : I overthrow that edifice by destroying 
you. I recognize in that manifestation of 
tremendous equality between the tyrant of 
millions and a single individual, the finger of 
God. Most men feel in their hearts as I do. 
I express it." 

In one instance Mazzini confesses that he 
became a party to an intended assassination, 
sanctified, in his opinion, by this transcen- 
dental theory. In November, 1833, a short 
time before the expedition of Savoy, a young 
man introduced himself to Mazzini at the Hotel 
de la Navigation, in Geneva, and spoke of his 
resolution to destroy Charles Albert, " the traitor 
of 1821, and the executioner of his brothers." 
Mazzini says he tried to dissuade him from 
his purpose. He admitted that Charles Albert 
deserved death, but his death would not save 
Italy. The man who assumed a mission of 
expiation must know himself pure from every 
thought of vengeance, or of any other motive 



AN INCIDENT AT GENEVA, 



61 




ARCHDUKE OF AUSTRIA. 



than the mission itself. This young man, 
however, whose name was Antonio Gallenga, 12 
ended by persuading Mazzini to believe that 
all this could be said of him ; " that he really 
was one of those beings whom, from the days 
of Harmodius to our own, Providence has 
sent among us from time to time, to teach 
tyrants that their fate is in the hands of a 
single man." He supplied him with money 
and a passport, and Gallenga then proceeded 
on his way, and, as he crossed the Alps, pros- 
trated himself on those towering heights, and 
solemnly devoted himself to the deed ! He 
then made his way to Turin, and arranged 
the time and place of the assassination ; but, 
fearing to purchase a weapon, sent his friend 
Sciandra to Geneva to procure one from 
Mazzini. The latter says : " A little dagger, 
with a lapis lazuli handle, a gift, and very- 
dear to me, was lying on my table. I pointed 
to it. Sciandra took it, and departed. Mean- 



while, as I did not consider this act as any 
part of the insurrectionary work upon which 
I was engaged, and in no way counted upon 
it, I sent a certain Angelini, one of our party, 
to Turin, upon business connected with the 
association, under another name." From him 
Mazzini heard of the failure of Gallenga's 
design; but these are details with which we 
need not concern ourselves. The language we 
have quoted, and the example we have given 
of a case in which he was willing that his 
theory should be reduced to practice, re- 
move all ambiguity from the teaching of 
Mazzini. He denounces all such acts of 
reprisal that he has been accused of conniving 
at or ordering, as being foolish blunders com- 
mitted in some moment of exasperation by 
passionate men, whom it would be more 
just to pity than to punish for the crime. So 
far as the language of Manin, and the accu- 
sations repeated by others, glanced at him as 



(52 



THE FORTRESS OF ALESSANDRIA. 



the promoter of such deeds of violence, they 
were doubtless unjust. On the other hand, 
the language we have quoted was too well 
alculated to excite to that fanatical hatred of 
men in high places, which led to the attempts 
of Pianori, Tibaldi, and Orsini, on the fife of 
the Emperor Napoleon, in the period from 
1855 tp 1858. There is a difficulty in under- 
standing how a philosopher, a man of genius, 
who abhors all ideas of vengeance as the basis 
of a penal code, whether applied by individuals 
or by society — as Mazzini certainly does — 
could have brought himself to justify the 
murder of a " tyrant " as a justifiable ex- 
ception. The reasoning is plausible, but it is 
not convincing ; the only excuse that can 
be made for it is, that the best blood in Italy 
was poisoned by the tyranny under which the 
country groaned, and the noblest natures per- 
verted by the atmosphere they were compelled 
to breathe. The one man who preserved his 
perfect integrity of heart, and would rather 
have faced single-handed a charge of Austrian 
cavalry, than have struck a blow, or whispered 
a word of counsel in the dark, is simply a 
marvel among his compeers, a type of man- 
hood for which we have at present no name 
but that of — Garibaldi ! 

Manin, still continuing to take counsel of 
his friend Tergolina, who worked with him as 
a brother, availed himself of every opportunity 
to agitate in favour of the unity of Italy 
under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel. When 
the Gazzetta del Popolo of Turin proposed a 
subscription for putting the fort of Alessandria 
in an efficient state of defence, he entered 
with enthusiasm into the movement, opened a 
subscription at his own house in Paris, and 
made the project known to all Europe by a 
letter in the French and English press, dated 
Sept. 1st, 1856. It is of historical interest to 
observe that M. Pietri, the chief of the French 
police, instantly interdicted the subscription, 
but the next day sent for Manin again, and 
informed him that on communicating what he 
had done to the Emperor at Biarritz, His 
Majesty had instructed him to withdraw the 
prohibition — a singular proof that the " sacred 
dagger " was misdirected when it aimed at the 
heart of Napoleon III., and a fortiori a fair 



cause qf argument that the whole theory o* 
assassination — general or select — is not less a 
blunder in policy than it is base and criminal 
in act. The man who dares to lift the " sacred 
dagger," howsoever pure his conscience and 
unselfish his purpose, is guilty at the least of 
an act of awful presumption. Judge, jury, and 
executioner in his sole person, he may yet be 
quite incapable qf appreciating the conse- 
quences of his act, and what he recognizes as 
the finger of God, may after all be the devil's 
claw crossing purposes too deep and inscrut- 
able for his shallow judgment. " Thou shalt 
do no murder," is plain to the meanest capa- 
city ; and it is hy far more probable that the 
mysterious Providence which overrules the 
affairs of men and nations, works in harmony 
with that command, than that men are raised 
to the rank of God's ministers by an act of 
impious rebellion against it. 

While the people of Italy were being fami- 
liarized in the manner we have related, with 
the idea of securing their unity and inde- 
pendence under the King of Sardinia, the arma- 
ment of the great fortress went on, and when 
Austria, in reply, prepared to move her armies 
towards the frontier, the army of Piedmont 
was put on a war footing. The gravity of the 
situation was exposed at the famous reception 
on New Year's Day, 1859, when the Emperor 
Napoleon addressed those memorable words to 
the Austrian Ambassador, which sent a thrill 
through Europe. 22 The situation, to use a 
French idiom, had become tres-accentuee. If 
France drew back, the only result reasonably 
to be expected was, that Austria would not 
only have the strength, bat the leisure to 
assimilate the Italian provinces to the rest of 
the empire. She would certainly, after a 
second conquest, extend and augment her 
influence over all the States of Italy, and in a 
few years France would have on her southern, 
and even her Mediterranean frontier, a power- 
ful military state, hostile by all its ideas, hostile 
by its traditions, and hostile by its interests ; 
holding the commercial enterprize with the 
East in the hollow of her hand, dominating at 
her pleasure the Holy See, and able at any 
time to arm against France, not only her own 
numerous and valiant populations, but those 



\ 



THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION. 



63 



of Italy, reorganized under her autocratic rule 
If Germany was undecided, and no longer the. 
friend of Austria, England, on the other hand, 
was her most ancient and steadfast ally. The 
Empire of the West would thus be re-estab- 
lished outside of France, and against France, 
to the exclusiye profit of the astute and 
powerful House of Hapsburg. If, on the 
other hand, Austria did not pursue the course 
thus worked out, but modestly retired within 
her own borders, after razing the walls and 
bastions of Alessandria, and crushing the army 
of Piedmont, Italy would still be left a prey 
to her present despair, and the nations would 
not much longer witness the agony of a people 
which every interest, every consideration, 
engaged them to help. What then might be 
expected to happen ? The Italians, abandoned 
by their natural protectress France, filled 
with hatred of the Papacy, upon which all its 
miseries would be charged, would throw her- 
self into the arms of any other Power willing 
to aid. If England took up the quarrel, her 
hatred of the Papacy, her commercial interests, 
her possessions of Gibraltar, Malta, and the 
Ionian Islands, would enable her to strike such 
a blow as would make her the arbitress of the 
destinies of Eastern Europe; or, if she fell 
back, Russia would certainly precipitate her- 
self upon Austria with terrible effect ; and in 
either case, the interests of France and her 
political prestige would suffer : nay, the Latin 
Church would be as grist between the two 
millstones of Orientalism and Protestantism. 
The result was the war of 1859 (ante, vol. i., 
pp. 65-6), when the Emperor Napoleon re- 
deemed his pledges to Italy by joining the 
King of Sardinia in arms : and Lombardy was 
united to Piedmont, with the glories of Monte- 
bello, Palsestro, Turbigo, Magenta, and Sol- 
ferino, for her dowry. It is true the promise 
of Napoleon was to free Italy " from the Alps 
to the Adriatic ; " but the menaces of Prussia, 
and the insufficiency of his reserves, alike 
counselled him to secure what had thus far 
been gained by the peace of Villafranca. 
Venetia remained under the sceptre of Austria, 
but it was nevertheless brought within the 
family compact, by being confederated with 
the other provinces unde>r the nominal presi- 



dency of the Pope. If all was not yet gained, 
Italy was freed from her chains, and placed 
erect on her feet, so that henceforth, as the 
Emperor expressed it in his proclamation, she 
was the " mistress of her own destinies." a3 
The whole of her great inheritance had not 
been restored to her, but the part still alien- 
ated was certain, in good time, to fall in. In 
the meantime, Italy was rather a gainer than 
a sufferer by the delay, and the evil results of 
leaving the fate of Venetia in suspense were 
destined to be felt in France ; for it was this 
unfinished task of the Emperor which gave 
Count Bismarck his much needed ally in the 
war with Austria in 1866, to the consequences 
of which may be directly traced the war of 
1870. The surrender of Venetia by the Aus- 
trians, after the event of Sadowa, virtually 
completed the unification of Italy, and, at the 
same time, defeated the policy of France, 
which aimed at a confederation of States. 
This done, i t must have been evident to the 
meanest political capacity that the acquisition 
of Rome by the new kingdom was only a 
question of time. 

Nevertheless, what is generally called the 
"September Convention," concluded between 
the kingdom of Italy and the French Empire, 
extended the perspective to an incalculable 
distance. Italy had solemnly engaged not to 
attack the territory of the Pope, and " to pre- 
vent, even by force, every attack upon the 
said territory coming from without," on con- 
dition of France withdrawing her troops. The 
Pope, at the same time, was to be permitted to 
organize an army of foreign Catholic volunteers, 
without hindrance or remonstrance from the 
kingdom of Italy. And, as if to ensure the 
permanence of this state of things, it was 
decreed soon afterwards that Florence should 
be the future capital. One party, however, 
had not been consulted in these arrangements, 
namely, the party of young Italy who followed 
the lead of Garibaldi. These, at least, were 
faithful to their old programme for the acqui- 
sition of Rome, though Garibaldi had so far 
broken with the Republicans, as to hail Victor 
Emmanuel King of Italy, after the defeat of 
the Neapolitan army. 

In September and October, 1867, when the 



64 



TRAGEDY OF MENTANA. 



French troops had been withdrawn, in accord- 
ance with the provision of the September Con- 
vention, numerous bands of volunteers crossed 
the frontier in different places, and established 
themselves in the Papal territory, under the 
command of Garibaldi's son, Menotti, who fixed 
his head-quarters at Nerola. Various engage- 
ments took place between them and the Papal 
troops, ir^ which the latter were defeated, and 
finally compelled to fly in disorder (Oct. 13th). 
By these occurrences the Convention was 
broken, and the Emperor Napoleon was bound 
in honour, from his own point of view, to 
proffer that assistance to the Pope which the 
negligence of the King of Italy had rendered 
necessary. AH the arguments which justified 
to French statesmen the war. of 1859 were 
besides almost equally applicable in the present 
circumstances,. If France should fail the Pope, 
the allies of IJis Holiness would be found else- 
where ; if the Emperor hesitated to combat the 
revolution in Rome, it might not be long be- 
fore he was compelled to fight it nearer home, 
and a question, which was one of external 
policy at present, might soon become one of 
life or death for the Imperial System. Under 
these circumstances it was resolved once more 
to send a French force to Rome, with which 
accordingly General de Failly arrived off Ci- 
vita Vecchia on the 28th of October. In the 
meantime Garibaldi himself had escaped from 
Caprera, and had hastened to join the insur- 
gents, apparently with the connivance of the 
Sardinian Government, whose troops were also 
advanced towards the Roman frontier, which 
treaty stipulations forbade them to cross. 

On the 30th of October the French entered 
Rome ; and, as the troops of Victor Emmanuel 
immediately crossed into the Papal territory, 
there was a terrible moment of suspense when 
it was not known whether or not a collision 
would take place between the Royal army and 
the Imperialists. We must conclude that the 
greatest prudence and forbearance were exer- 
cised on both sides to avoid a collision ; but, 
on the other hand, there is too much reason to 
believe that Garibaldi was mystified by the 
advance of the Royal troops, and had good 
reason to expect the support which failed him 
at the last moment. The whole truth relative 



to these events will not be known, perhaps, to 
this generation. The result with which we 
have to do is the defeat of Garibaldi's ill-armed 
followers at Mentana, after a sharp conflict 
which lasted four hours. The Garibaldians 
left 600 dead on the field of battle, besides the 
usual proportion of wounded. Garibaldi him- 
self was captured, and conveyed a prisoner to 
Verignano, on the Gulf of Spezzia. 

The relations between France and Italy 
were now extremely complicated. Was the 
September Convention in existence ? The 
Papal States had been invaded by the volun- 
teers of Young Italy, who had been routed not 
by the Royal troops, but by the French bat- 
talions. The Royal troops had, indeed, moved 
across the frontier ; but had they been designed 
to support the movement, or repress it ? If 
the former, why had they not been moved up 
in time to prevent the invasion of the Roman 
States ? Their presence in the Papal territory 
was itself an infringement of the Convention. 
On the other hand, they had re-crossed the 
frontier to their own territory immediately 
after the dispersion of the Garibaldians, and 
what pretence had France for remaining ? 
The obvious reply was that France demanded 
fresh guarantees, since the former had proved 
insufficient, especially as the Government of 
Victor Emmanuel still upheld the popular flag, 
by reasserting the right of Italy to possess 
Rome. So the French troops remained to guard 
the Pope, and thus guarded, he summoned the 
famous Oecumenical Council, which assembled 
in the hall of St. Peter's on the 28th of Decem- 
ber, 1869, and on the 13th of July, 1870, 
passed the audacious decree of Infallibility. 
It was in vain that the Government of the 
Emperor Napoleon opposed itself to this 
crowning consummation of priestly arrogance 
before the event, and when the decree was 
voted, it was itself on the verge of the de- 
clivity which ended in its ruin : two days 
later, viz. July 15th, 1870, the sword was 
drawn against Prussia, and a fortnight later 
France knew that she needed every bayonet 
that could be mustered on the Rhine frontier. 
On the 3rd of August the Imperial troops 
evacuated Viterbo, and by the 9th the last 
detachment had embarked at Civita Vecchia, 



GAMBETTA DESCENDS FROM THE CLOUDS, 



65 



leaving the Pope at the Very moment when he 
had thrown his cartel of defiance in the face 
of the conscience and the intellect of Europe.- 
to his own feeble resources. 

The Republican movement was instantly re- 
commenced, and the Garibaldians were every- 
where in motion. The moment was a critical 
one for the dynasty of Victor Emmanuel ; a 
catastrophe could only be averted by prompt 
action. Mazzini was arrested, notwithstanding 
the excitement caused by this act in the 
Chamber; and a few days afterwards, the 
Royal army, commanded by General Caderna, 
was ordered to march to Rome. The Papal 
Government resolved that it would only yield 
to force, and a cannonade was necessary to 
make a breach in the Walls, through Which, ori 
the 20th of September, the troops of the King 
of Italy poured into their world-renowned 
capital; The transfer of the Government to 
Rome was voted on the 5th of December 
following. 24 

Since the tragedy of Meritaria and the 
honourable captivity which followed it, Gari- 
baldi had settled down in his island home of 
Caprera. After the Revolution of September 
4th, 1870, there was a general impression that 
his well-known devotion to the Republican idea 
would induce him to take the field against the 
Prussians, to prevent which the island was 
watched by three Italian ships of war. The 
great popular leader showed no disposition to 
move ; and on the 27th wrote, positively, that 
it was not his intention to go to France. 25 
Then the Italian Government relaxed its vigi- 
lance, and about the same time the delegate 
Government at Tours invited Garibaldi to come 
over and take command of the irregular troops 
of France. The investment of Paris was now 
complete, and but little hope was left for the 
blockaded army, unless aid could come from 
without. The old General could resist his 
own inclination to draw the sword, in what he 
regarded as a people's cause, but not an appeal 
from a Republic in distress. He lost no time 
in obeying the summons, and having succeeded 
in leaving his island without being observed, 
unexpectedly presented himself at Marseilles 
on the 7th of October, 26 and reached Tours 
at half-past seven on the morning of the 9th. 



About noon on the same day, Gambetta also 
arrived, having escaped from Paris in a bal- 
loon; he had descended like a thunderbolt 
from the clouds; and it amused people at a 
distance to learri that he entered Tours in a 
storm of rain, thunder, and lightning. The 
arrival of Garibaldi having been Unexpected, 
no preparations had been made to receive him 
at the station, but the lieutenant of a line 
reginient who happened to be there, Offered 
to escort him. Garibaldi replied that he wa9 
not accustomed to be escorted, and added, "We 
shall meet again on the field Of battle to de- 
liver the territory of the French Republic from 
the invader." Arrived at the Prefecture, he 
was soon afterwards visited there by MM. 
Cremieux, Glais-Bizoiri, Laurier, and others. 
He was appointed General Of Division in the 
French army, and Commander-in-Chief of the 1 
irregular forces of France, and left Tours for 
Chambery on the morning of October 12th, to 
join the mixed bands of French, Italian, Polish, 
Spanish, Hungarian, and American adven- 
turers, who were operating against the Baden 
troops under General Werder, in the defiles of 
the Vosges. We have before related that 
General Werder was set at liberty by the fall 
Of Strasburg (ante, p. 16), and that he was 
organizing another of those formidable German 
army corps t'o oppose whatever troops France 
in her despair could throw across his line of 
march. We shall see hereafter the result of 
these preparations on either side. This chap- 
ter of our history may conveniently close with 
the proclamation of Gambetta, who now "be- 
came the life and soul of French resistance in 
the field. Having assumed the post of Minis- 
ter of War in the Delegate Government, he 
issued the following address on the day of his 
arrival at Tours ; — 

"By order of the Republican Government, I 
have left Paris to convey to you the hopes of the 
Parisian people, and the instructions and orders of 
those who accepted the mission of delivering France 
from the foreigner. For seventeen days Paris has 
been invested, and offers the spectacle of two 
millions of men who, forgetting all differences to 
range themselves around the Republican flag, will 
disappoint the expectations of tbe invader, who 
reckoned upon civil discord. The Revolution found 
Paris without cannon and without arms. Now 






S3i}j >-. *•.-;•■** « 



CG 



PROCLAMATION AT TOURS. 



400,000 National Guards are armed, 2 ? 100,000 
Mobiles have been summoned, and 60,000 regular 
troops are assembled. The foundries cast cannon, 
the women make one million cartridges daily. The 
National Guard have two mitrailleuses for each 
battalion. Field-pieces are being made for sorties 
against the besiegers. The forts are manned by- 
Marines, and are furnished with marvellous artillery, 
served by the first gunners in the world. Up till 
now tbeir fire has prevented the enemy from estab- 
lishing the smallest work. The enceinte, which on 
the 4th of September had only 500 cannons, has 
now 8,800, with 400 rounds of ammunition for 
each. The casting of projectiles continues with 
ardour. 

" Every one is at the post assigned to him for 
fighting. The enceinte is uninterruptedly covered 
by the National Guard, who from morning until 
night drill for the war with patriotism and steadi- 
ness. The experience of these improvised soldiers 
increases daily. . 

" Behind the enceinte there is a third line of 
defence formed of barricades, behind which the 
Parisians are found to defend the Eepublic — the 
genius of street fighting. All this has been exe- 
cuted with calmness and order by the concurrence 
and enthusiasm of all. It is not a vain illusion 
that Paris is impregnable. It cannot be captured 
nor surprised. Two other means remain to the 
Prussians — sedition and famine. But sedition will 
not arise, 28 nor famine either. Paris, by placing 
herself on rations, has enough to defy the enemy 
for long months, thanks to the provisions which 
have been accumulated, and will bear restraint and 
scarcity with manly constancy, in order to afford 
her brothers in the Departments time to gather. 

Such is without disguise the state of Paris. This 
state imposes great duties Upon you. The first is 
to have no other occupation than the war ; the 
second is to accept fraternally the supremacy of the 
Republican Power, emanating from necessity and 
right, which will serve no ambition. It has no 
other passion than to rescue France from the abyss 
into which Monarchy has plunged her. This done, 
the Republic will be founded sheltered against con- 
spirators and reactionists. Therefore, I have the 
order, without taking into account difficulties or 
opposition, to remedy and, although time fails, to 
make up by activity the shortcomings caused by 
delay. Men are not wanting. What has failed us 
has been a decisive resolution, and the consecutive 
execution of our plans. That which failed us after 
the shameful capitulation at Sedan was arms. All 
supplies of this nature had been sent on to Sedan, 
Metz, and Strasburg, as if, one would think, the 
authors of our disaster, by a last criminal com- 
bination, had desired, at their fall, to deprive us of 
all means of repairing our ruin. 29 Steps have now 



been taken to obtain rifles and equipments from all 
parts of the world. Neither workmen nor money 
are wanting. We must bring to bear all our 
resources, which are immense ; we must make the 
provinces shake off their torpor ; react against 
foolish panics ; multiply our partizans ; offer traps 
and ambushes to harass the enemy, and inaugurate 
a national war. The Republic demands the co- 
operation of all ; it will utilize the courage of all 
its citizens, employ the capabilities of each, and 
according to its traditional policy will make young 
men its chiefs. Heaven itself will cease to favour 
our adversaries ; the autumn rains will come, and 
detained and held in check by the capital, far from 
their homes, and troubled and anxious for the fu- 
ture, the Prussians will be decimated one by one 
by our arms, by hunger, and by nature. No, it 
is not possible that the genius of France should be 
for evermore obscured, it cannot be that a great 
nation shall let its place in the world be taken from 
it by ah invasion of 500,000 men I Up, then, in a 
mass, and let us die rather than suffer the shame of 
dismemberment ! In the midst of our disasters we 
have still the sentiment left of French unity, and 
the indivisibility of the Republic. Paris, sur- 
rounded by the enemy, affirms more loudly and 
more gloriously than ever the immortal device which 
is dictated to the whole of France : — ' Long live 
the Republic ! Long live France ! Long live the 
Republic, One and Indivisible.' " 

In the first reports of Garibaldi's arrival at 
Tours, it was stated that he had been wel- 
comed at the railway station by the Arch- 
bishop, who clasped him warmly by the hand. 
This was afterwards indignantly denied by 
that prelate, who added that so far from feel- 
ing grateful for Garibaldi's services, he con- 
sidered that his arrival in the character of 
"Saviour of the country" had filled up the 
measure of France's humiliation. He parties 
larly requested that "theinsulter of the priest- 
hood" might be prevented from darkening his 
door. Such a feeling was of ill-omen for Gari- 
baldi's success in his contemplated crusade. 
In the eyes of the French peasantry, and of 
the class who entered so largely into the irre- 
gular levies, a heretic could only be an abomi- 
nation; and we have seen that it was possible 
for the priests, even in Italy, to work upon the 
similar feeling of the ignorant country people 
in places where the hero was personally un- 
known. Besides the mistrust and hatred thus 
stirred up against him, it was certain the en- 
thusiastic General would inspire natures 1° < 



GARIBALDI IN FRANCE, 



67 



noble than his own with envy and jealousy of 
his popularity ; and what would avail his 
simple honesty of purpose against the political 
cunning and unscrupulous intrigues of his 
rivals in arms ? His faith in the cause for 
which he drew the sword once more in his old 
a£e, Would sustain him through the darkest 
trials : of that there could be no doubt. But, 
granting that his charm of manner and dis- 
interestedness of motive would dispel these 
gathering clouds of detraction, he was now 
about to oppose his enthusiasm and devotion 
to the trained skill of the most perfectly dis- 
ciplined soldiery in the world ; and there were 
many in England who felt that the chances of 
any good result were by no means equal to 



the costliness of the risk. Garibaldi should 
have lived in the Homeric age, arid warred 
with the heroes of classic story. His pure 
example and unselfish devotion had been of 
inestimable value to the cause of freedom' and 
independence in Italy; and, magnet-like, it 
might draw forth similar virtues in the breasts 
of French soldiers. But that his valour would 
avail to arrest the march of the indomitable 
German infantry was scarcely believed in Eng- 
land. Everywhere might be heard expressions 
of regret that the one remaining representa- 
tive of the olden chivalry was about to be 
swallowed up in the same gulf with the vain- 
gloriousness of France, and the mad ambition 
of her self-constituted leaders. 



Notes to Chapter LX. 



1 Antonio Gallenga, who passed at one period of his career 
under the name of Mariotti, and of whom Mazzlni relates a 
curious story, to which it will be necessary to refer when we come 
to speak,'a few pages fufther on, of the " Theory of the Dagger." 

2 Attilio and Erailio Bandiera, the Venetian brothers, were the 
sons of an admiral in the Austrian service, and were themselves 
naval officers. In 1842 they corresponded with Mazzini, and pro- 
posed to deliver the fleet into his hands if an insurrection could be 
excited either in Northern or Southern Italy. Mazzini tried to 
dissuade them from attempting anything at that time, and even 
sent his friend Ricciotti from London to convince them that the 
project was hopeless. The brothers, however, were suspected by 
the Austrian Government, and, fearing arrest, made their escape, 
and landed in Calabria, where Ricciotti himself, yielding to the 
enthusiasm of the moment, joined them. The event fell out as 
Mazzini had foreseen. The brothers were captured and shot. 

8 Letter to Sir James Graham, Bart., dated October, 1844. 
4 Pius IX. was born in 1792 ; ordained priest, and sent on a 
mission to Chili in 1823 ; became Bishop of Spoletb in 1832 ; 
Cardinal in 1840, and Pope in 1846. 

6 One of the cardinals is reported to have urged in Conclave 
that the election of Ferretti would save the Papacy from ruin for 
another twenty years at least. The speech in which these words 
occur, it must be confessed, has rather an apocryphal look, and 
as I have not the original authority at hand for immediate refer- 
ence, the reader must form his own opinion as to the probability 
or improbability of such words having been used. 
6 History of the Restoration. 

i Garibaldi was at Monte Video when he heard of the national 
war in Italy. He instantly crossed the ocean to Genoa, and 
proceeding to the camp of the King of Sardinia, tendered his 
services, which the king declined to accept, explaining that as a 
constitutional king he had no right to make appointments. He 
was then invited by the Provisional Government of Milan to 
organize a corps of volunteers. 

8 Pepe, whose little army had arrived at Bologna, was ordered 
to send back his troops to Naples, " because they were required 
to put down the communistic-republican intrigues, and for the 
defence of the constitutional system, not only in Naples, but for 
all Italy ;" and he was further ordered, if tliis were contrary to 
his feelings, to resign his command into the hands of General 
Statella. He adopted the latter course, which caused the in- 
habitants of Bologna to rise and insist on the troops being led to 
tlie support of the national cause. Statella then escaped to 
Naples, and Pepe dismissed some of the staff-officers who were 



preparing to obey the king. One of the commanders, Colonel 
Lahalla, shot himself as the only means he could discern of 
escaping from the dilemma. The troops were equally demented j 
some going forward to join the army of Charles Albert ; others re- 
fusing to march. General Pepe reached Venice with 1,500 men, 
among whom was an unusually large proportion of officers. As 
prevfously stated, he assisted heroically in the defence of the city j 
and when all was over, became an exile in London. 

9 The cowardly fanatic who actually struck the blow was dis- 
covered and convicted some years afterwards. His name was 
Constantadini. 

10 It was not until an ecclesiastic had been shot dead in 
an adjoining apartment, and the gates of the Quirinal had been 
blown in by cannon, that the Pope yielded. He was surrounded 
by the diplomatic corps, and while he still hesitated to affix his 
signature to the document which had been presented to him, loud 
cries of " Sign ! Sign ! " came from the assembled crowd 
headed by the civic guard. At the last moment he subscribed 
his name to the list of the new ministry; and when the fact was 
announced, thundering cheers ascended from the streets, between 
the pauses of which one cried exultingly to another, "The Pope 
has given us a Republic ! '' 

11 The Pope made his escape disguised as a servant in livery on 
the box of the Bavarian Minister's carriage. 

12 The ROman Republic was proclaimed on the 9th of February, 
1849, between two and three months after the Pope had fled to 
Gaeta, and not before two deputations had waited upon him in 
the name of the Assembly, and had invited him, in the name of 
the people, to return and resume the reins of government. Both 
deputations had been repulsed. The Pope had appointed a Com- 
mission to govern in his name, but the persons designated had 
refused to act. Rome was absolutely without a Government. 
The Chambers then appointed a Provisional Government, and de- 
clared themselves dissolved. By this body the administration was 
conducted for two months, at the end of which time it convoked 
the people in the primary assemblies, and appealed to the uni- 
versal suffrage of the States for the election of a Constituent 
Assembly. In reply to this appeal 343,000 adult male persons 
out of a total population of 2,800,000 souls returned a Constituent 
Assembly, consisting of 150 members, which met on the 6th of 
February, 1849, and decreed the abolition of the Secular Power, 
and the establishment of the Republic, at one o'clock in the morn- 
ing of the 9th, after an uninterrupted sitting of fifteen hours. It 
cannot therefore be said that any tiling was done in haste. On the 
10th c.f February a Provisional Executive was appointed, consist- 



68 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LX. 



ingof ASmellini, Saliceti, and Montecchi,w1io governed 
the Republic in conjuilction with tile Assembly till the end of 
March, when the triumph' of the Austrians at NoVara caused the 
change mentioned in the text as a preparative to war. It is to he 
noted, however, that Mazzini did not at this time fear any attack 
from the French, nor feven from the Neapolitans, but expected a 
struggle with Austria. The Monarchy had failed in the crusade. 
The Republic was now to take it up, and avenge the " sin and 
shanie of Novara.*' This was what Mazzini meant when lie said 
to the Asseirtbly : " We must act like n\en toho have the enemy 
at their gates, and at the same time like men zvho are working 
for eternity. The attack from France, as stated lower down in 
the text, was iti the nature of a surprise.— (See the Life arid 
Writings of Mazzini, vol. 5, pp. 192—199.) 
13 Life and Writings, vol. v., pp. 200— 20L 
" Ibid, pp. 201, 202. 

16 Garibaldi : his Life and Times, p. 122. 
16 In the early part of April every effort had been made to bring 
the Lombard division of 6,000 or 7,000 men to Rome, but the en- 
deavour was frustrated.. These troops had already shown signs of 
a disposition ito betake themselves to Genoa to assist in the defence 
of that city, which had risen in insurrection, refusing to recognize 
the peace concluded with Austria by Piedmont. The Republican 
Government had in the meantime forwarded proposals, and sent 
means for their coming to Rome. The Piedmontese Government 
alarmed} agreed to these proposals — only stipulating that the 
division should in no way interfere in the Genoese matter, but 
pass by way of Bobbio and Chiavari. General Fanti, however, by 
a secret Understanding with the Government, conducted the 
troops across difficult mountain passes, nearly impassable by the 
cavalry, and completely so by the artillery ; nevertheless, the 
division succeeded at last in reaching Chiavari, though much dis- 
organized. The government, which had meanwhile bombarded 
and vanquished Genoa, and was relieved from its alarm, then for- 
bade them td embark. The riflemen only, under Manara, con- 
trived to reach Rome towards the end of April. 

w The want bf impartiality, nay, of perfect candour, if not of 
strict truthfulness; in this part bf Mazzini's confessions must be 
apparent to any one acquainted with the facts. Prince Louis 
Napoleon did not take his seat as deputy in the French Chamber 
until the 26th of September, 1848. Rossi was murdered at Rome 
on the 15th of November, and the Pope fled to Gaeta on the 
24th. Three days afterwards (Nov. 27thj M. de Corcelles left 
Paris for Rome, preceded by an armed expedition to Civita 
Veochia for the prdtectwn of the Pope. At this time Ca- 
vaignac was President, and Louis Napoleon a simple deputy, his 
election to the Presidency dating the 20th of December following. 
While it is true, therefore, that the march of the French troops 
under Oudinot against Rome at the end of April, 1849, was com- 
manded by the Prince President, the idea of interfering on 
behalf of the Pope did not originate with him, as Mazzini would 
evidently have his readers to infer (Life and Works, Vol. v, pp. 
202, 203), though there can be no doubt he would have done pre- 
cisely as Cavaignac did under the same circumstances. If he went 
further, it was because the circumstances had changed, and he 
was not the man to leave Italy in any doubt of his earnestness. 

18 Life and Writings of Mazzini, vol. v., p. 202. 

19 Garibaldi's wife, Anita, whose condition demanded rest and 
shelter, lay on the bare ground like her husband and his soldiers; 
with no other protection than that afforded by a cloak ora blanket. 
■' She was constantly addressing the soldiers with the ardour and 
spirit of a soldier, encouraging those who showed a di-position to 
fall out of the ranks and faint by the way to make fresh efforts to 
bear up to the end, increasing the enthusiasm of the brave- 
hearted by her example, and refusing to take any other food than 
that which was available for the use of the whole band; and 

; whenever the Garibaldini exchanged blows with the enemy, she 
was to be seen in the thickest of the fray, mounted on a charger, 
and exposing herself without the slightest fear of death or wounds, 
to the sword-thrusts and bullets of the relentless foe.'' How the 
Austrians hunted her to death is told in a separate chapter of the 
same volume from which this passage is quoted. The last scene 
of her painful wanderings was the old pine forest, which stretches 
along the shores of the Adriatic for twenty-five miles. It is the 



famous " Pinds Pittea *' of the ancient Romans. It has been 
alluded to (says Count Arrivabcne in his Italy under Victor 
Emmanuel) by Dante, Boccaccio, Dryden, Byron, and LeigU 
Hunt ; and one of its more shady alleys still retains the name of 
the " Vicolo del Poeta," from a tradition that it is the spot where 
Dante, when a guest of Guido de Polenta, Lord of Ravenna, 
loved to meditate on the 'conceptions of the DMna XJomftietliu . 
Here poor Anita sank into a low fever from exhaustion and 
anxiety, and near here, in a field close by a farmhouse, she was 
buried by the brothers Ravaglia, while Uaribaldi, after passion- 
ately embracing the cold body, went out into the night, he knew 
not and cared not whither. The mortal remains of Anita have 
since been disinterred, and buried in consecrated ground. — Gari- 
baldi : his Life and Times, ch. lvii. 

20 An interesting account of the vicissitudes of Count di Tergo- 
lina was published in the Leisure Hour, January and February, 
1864, as in Turin in the year I860, under the title of " Fbur 
Years in the Prisons of the Holy Father;'' also in Paris in the 
year 1861, by J. B. Charles Paya, under the title " Les Prisons 
Papales :" in Germany, by Herr Neiigebauer, in 1862 i and again 
in Philadelphia, by the Rev. C. M. Butler, professor of ecclesias- 
tical history, in the year 1866, under the title, " Inner Rome." 
Tergolina had his first taste of the blessings of the Austrian and 
Papal rule in November, 1847, when he addressed a letter to the 
Emperor of Austria, in which he said " it wis absolutely 
necessary that something should be dbne for Italy, and that it 
should be done speedily, and done well." For this he was im- 
prisoned in the Pont.-des-Soupirs, where also immediately 
afterwards the celebrated litterateur, Tommasseo, was also con- 
ducted for a similar offence. The business oh which Tergolina 
had gone to Florence, bn behalf of the Venetian Republic, was 
financial. The new State wished to float its paper money. He 
was at Todi when Garibaldi arrived there in his immoi'tal retreat 
from Rome, and headed a prbcession of the inhabitants to bid him 
welcome. The next day Todi was occupied by the Austrians, 
and Tergolina made his way to SJpoleto. While he was shifting 
from place to place to avoid the Austrians, intelligence of the fall 
of Venice reached him, and he went to Rome, where he was 
arrested by the jackals of the Pope, as stated iU the text, and kept 
in a cruel imprisonment for four years. 

21 Mazzini, says Gallenga in his History of Piedmont has related 
this incident, "concealing the fact thttt he ivas himself the 
person concerned, and making it appear that I had inspired 
the act." (Life and Works, vol. i. , p. 347, Note.) He further 
says that Mazzini worked Upon his feelings through the tears ot 
Madame Ruffini ; while Mazzini positively affirms that he did 
not even allow Madame Ruffini to know anything of Gallenga's 
intention. 

22 Turning to Baron Hubner, the Emperor said, " I regret 
that bur relations with your Government are not so ^uod as 
formerly, but I request you to let the Emperor know that my 
personal feelings towards him will remain unchanged." 

23 This proclamation must be deemed of special importance in 
defining the relations that existed between French and Italian, 
policy at this time. The complete text is therefore subjoined : — 
" Soldats ! Les bases de la paix sont arrestees avec l'Empereur 
d'Autriche, le but principal de la guerre est atteint ; l'ltalie va 
devenit pour la premiere fdis Une nation. Une conie eration de 
tous les Etats d'ltalie, sous la prfoidence honoraire du Saint-Pere, 
reunira en un faisceau les membres d'un mime famille. La 
Venetie reste, il est vrai, sous le sceptre d'Autriche : elle sera 
neanmoins une province italienne faisant partie de la con- 
federation. 

" La reunion de la Lombardie au Piemont nous cr6e de ce 
cote des Alpes un allie puissant, qui nous devra son independance. 
Les gouvernements restes en dehors du mouvement ou rappeles 
dans leurs possessions comprendront la necessite des reformes 
salutaires. Une amnestie generate fera disparaitre les traces des 
discordes civiles. L'ltalie, desormais maitresse de ses des- 
tinies, n'aura plus qu'a s'enprendre elle-meme si elle ne progresse 
pas regulierement dans l'ordre et la liberty. 

" Vous allez bientbt retourner en France. La patrie recon- 
naissante accueillera avec transport ces soldats qui ont porte si 
haut la gloire de nos armes a Montebdlo, a Palestro, a Turbigo, 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LX. 



69 



a Magenta, a Marignan, et a Solferino, qui en deux mots ont 
aflrunchi le Piemont et la Lombardie, et ne se sont arreles que 
parceque la lutte allait prendre des proportions quin' etaient 
plus en rapport avec les interets que la France avait dans 
cette guerre fo. rnidable. 

" Soyez done fiers de vos succes, fiers des resultats obtenus, 
fiers surtout d'etre les enfants bien aimes de cette France qui 
sera toujours la grande nation, tant qu'elle aura un cceur pour 
comprendre les nobles causes et des homraes comme vous pour 
les defendre. 

" Au quartier imperial de Valeggio, le 12 juillet, 1859. 

"(Signed) Napoleon." 

24 The Italian Government did not immediately "remove to 
Rome. The revolution was completed by their instalment in the 
capital on the 1st of July, 1871. On the 20th of September 
fo'lowing, the anniversary of the day on which the Italian troops 
entered Rome in 1870, was celebrated with processions and other 
festive proceedings ; the King however was at this time in 
Northern Italy, where preparations were in progress for celebrat- 
ing the completion of the railway tunnel through the Alps. At 
Milan there was also a " blaze of light and storm of sound " on 
the 20th ; a huge orchestra was erected in honour of the conquest 
of the Capital, and among the patriotic songs and choruses, the 
concluding one by Emilio Praga recalled all the glories of 
ancient and medieval Rome (Times, Sept. 26th, 1871). In London 
the day was not forgotten by those Italian patriots whom un- 
propitious Fortune still compelled to abide in " cold lands not 
theirs." The old companion of Manin, Count Vincenza di 
Tergolina, could least of all forget the triumph of a cause for 
which he had laboured with that illustrious patriot. The follow- 
ing classical sonnet from his pen appeared in a patriotic journal 
L'Affondatore, published at Bologna, to which he occasionally 
contributes a denunciation of priestly rule and superstition in his 
fine prose style, or a few lines of such ringing verseas this : — 

II 20 Settembre, 1871. 

Italia, Italia, a' miei pensier regina, 
Non piii divi-a per livor, perl' ira, 
Oggi del tuo bel genio ognun s' ispira, 
Che tua ricorda la Citta Latina ! . . . 

Cara patria d' eroi, terra divina 
Con fausti voti lo stranier ti mira ; 
Anzi nel merto e nel valor t' ammira, 
Sorpreso or piii pdla grand' opra Alpina ! 

Giace il nemico qual se fosse estinto, 
E invano pud tentare una vittoria, 
Che all' uno e all' altro pol si grida " E vinto ! " 

Rinnova, Italia, la tua antica;storia, 
Che sul tuo fuoI di fiori variopinto 
Sta scritto gia : Virtu, Grandezza, e Gloria. 
The musical flow of the Italian is inimitable in English, but the 
follow'ng translation preserves, at least, the measure and the 
peculiar consonance of the rhymes : — 

Italy, Italy, queen of my heart and brain, 
No more divided by envy and anger-mad, 
The world applauds thy-genius, and is glad 
Thou hast the seat of Empire once again ! 

Land of heroic memories, temple and fane, 
The stranger sees thee — eyes that once were sad 
For thy sake— now, in regal garments clad, 
And owns the wonders that renew thy reign ! 

And he, the hated foe, lies stark and dead — 
Dust unto dust — amid thy ruins hoary, 
While realms rejoice that he is vanquished ! 

Renew, my Italy, thy ancient story ! 
For on thy soil, with floral emblems spread, 
Is written Virtue, Greatness, yea, and Glory ! 

Manin was denied the happiness of seeing Italy free and united 
under the sceptre of Piedmont. He died at Piirison the 22nd of 
September, 1857. On the 22nd of March, 1861, a monument 

VOL. II. 



was inaugurated in his honour at 'rurtn, when the wife of his 
old friend, the Countess di Tergolina, laid a garland representing 
the glorious tri-colour at the base of the monument, amid the 
applause of an immense concourse. The incident is thus re- 
corded : — 

" Quando si vide enfrare nel recinto il Conte di Cavour, alti e 
fragorosi applausi scoppiarono da ogni lato, e la gentil donna 
inglese, Anna di Tergolina, depose a' piedi del monumento una 
ghirlanda di camelie fresche che"_ formavano il tricolore italiano. 
Levata la tela che copriva la statua, i battaglioni della guardia 
nazionale fecero il saluto d' onore tra gli evviva del popolo ed i 
concerti dellg musiche." (Discorsi Italiani e Francesi pro- 
nunciati nella inaugurazione del monumento a Daniele 
Manin, sul giardino publico di Torino e raccolti a cura del 
Municipio. Turin, 1861.) 

26 This appears from the following letter which was addressed 
by Garibaldi to one of his English friends :— 

Caprera, Sept. 11th. 

" My dear H , — I shall not go to France, and, like you, 

I am an avowed partisan of peace. Nevertheless, in the interests 
of humanity, I would fain see England, which, more than any 
country in the world, is the classic land of peace, take the initia- 
tive in the formation of a world-wide Areopagus, and thus put 
an end to those savage massacres with which at this moment 
Central Europe is cursed. I have sent the following ideas to 
Berlin and Stockholm, and I now enclose you a copy of them, 
in order that you may give them publicity, should you think it 
advisable to do so. Yours, G. Garibaldi." 

The " ideas" sent to Berlin and Stockholm are such as p ova 
the humanity and, at the same time, the unsophisticated sim- 
plicity of Garibaldi's heart. Let us see :— 

Caprera, Sept. 6th. 

" Mr. A. Schon, Stockholm. — It is superfluous to detail to 
you my humanitarian principles. French, Scandinavian, German, 
they are all my brethren , and if I have desired the triumph of 
the Prussian arms, my only motive has been a longing for the 
overthrow of the most execrable tyrant of modern times. I am 
here a prisoner through the influence of Bonaparte over the 
Florence Government; and if I could get out of this island, and 
effect an entrance into France, I should most certainly be 
arrested there. You know, of course, my idea of a world-wide 
union, and I think that this very circumstance affords a good 
opportunity for once more broaching the subject. The United 
States, England, Scandinavia, France, and Germany, under 
whose protection all the lesser Powers might range themselves, 
would form a magnificent basis for this world-wide union ; and 
the deputies of all the monarchies and republics from all the 
nations in the world should form an Areopagus at Nice, a free 
city, and could there establish as the first articles of an universal 
constitution the following: — 1. War between nations an impos- 
sibility. 2. Any difference arising between any of them to be sub- 
mitted to the Areopagus for pacific adjudication. If my ideas 
seem to you good, spread them abroad. G. Garibaldi." 

26 The following letter from Major Canzio, the son-in-law of 
Garibaldi, was published on the 13th of October : — 

" I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your last letter. 
The General left Caprera on the 6th, and arrived at St. Bonifacio, 
in Corsica, from whence he embarked for Marseilles ; the rest 
you know. For me, I have abandoned all my affairs in Genoa, 
and left my wife and children. I have telegraphed to Menotti 
and informed him of all. The General was detained a prisoner 
at Caprera, the island being surrounded by three ships of war, 
and an active watch established near the General's house ; but 
believing that the General would not go to France, the Italian 
Government removed the surveillance ; then it was that the 
Republican Government sent a special invitation to the General, 
which he accepted." 

27 The wisdom of this indiscriminate arming of the people was 
shown by subsequent events at Paris ! 

28 Only a few days afterwards Flourens marched against the 
Hotel de Ville, and very nearly succeeded in overthrowing the 
Government of National Defence. 

23 Nothing can exceed this in absurdity, Where should the 
arms have been sent but to the troops in tte»~£eld ? 

6 



70 



SUMMARY OF TWO MONTHS' HISTORY. 



CHAPTER LXI. 

lfli ivtxji OF TOUL— THE SITUATION AT PARIS. 

The situation at the end of September, 1870— Summary of 
Military transactions — The new levies —Energy of Gam- 
hetta — New German Corps, commanded by the Grand 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin— Siege and Capture of 
Ton]— The captured garrison en route for Germany — Sois- 
sons and other fortresses attacked— The Corps of Werder— 
Sortie from Paris— Decree of the Tours Government for 
fresh Levies— The Franc-Tireurs brought under dis. ipline — 
Provocations and Reprisals — Destruction of Ablis — The 
siege of Paris in suspense —Circular oi Count Bismarck— 
His view of the situation at Paris confirmed by subsequent 
events. 

What now was the situation of France ? We 
have reached the end of September, or begin- 
ning of October, 1870, just two months since 
the Army of the Rhine left Paris, amidst the 
acclamations of the populace. Only a few 
weeks ago, the Germans were gathering on 
the French frontier, regularly organized in 
several corps oVarmie, so thoroughly dis- 
ciplined, so perfectly equipped, so sublimely 
confident, that they were prepared to move 
forward across fields of carnage more like a 
monster reaping-machine than a host of armed 
men. The foe which had provoked their 
wrath — a foe of whom all Europe had till 
lately stood in awe — presented, on the other 
hand, a complete contrast to this perfection of 
organization. Regiments which had never 
met before were thrown together, as bundles 
of faggots might be piled up, in incoherent 
heaps, to form brigades and divisions, com- 
manded by generals as little known to the 
regiments as the regiments were known to one 
another. While the Germans had quietly and 
resolutely massed their battalions in three 
great armies, each perfect alone, all combined 
in one by their perfect organization, moving at 
first slowly, steadily, insidiously, with the al- 
most imperceptible yet irresistible gravitation 
of a glacier, the French Lad thrown themselves 
upon the frontier with the impetuosity and con- 
fusion of a torrent descending from the moun- 
tains through a score of intricate channels, and 
breaking in foam and noise against obstacles 
continually accumulating, continually rising 
higher, which it was powerless to sweep 
out of its course. So while the telegraphs 
between the capital and the Rhine fron- 
tier were flashing inquiries, and messages, and 
commands, in inextricable confusion, to and 



fro, the lines of railway were choked with 
men and baggage, soldiers and officers alike 
running hither and thither like a routed 
colony of ants, yet all drifting blindly on- 
wards to irretrievable ruin. If a little more 
time would have remedied this state of con- 
fusion, that time was not allowed them. 
" Caught in the act of formation," as the Em- 
peror justly expressed it, the corps of Mac- 
mahon was smitten hip and thigh, and blow 
following blow, the whole French line was sent 
reeling back in disastrous retreat. Thus, while 
one half of the French army was flying 
through the Vosges, the other half, by dint of 
the wonderful marching and desperate fighting 
we have described, was headed back and 
hemmed in at Metz. Still there were armies 
to spare, and pressing forward again with the 
same desperate eagerness, the troops that had 
rallied to Macmahon and the Emperor, were 
literally swept together as in a heap of refuse, 
and crushed and burnt at Sedan. Again the 
Crown Prince and the King had resumed their 
onward march, and now stood in one unbroken 
line of steel round Paris. The corps of Werder 
had been detained at Strasburg, but that 
fortress having surrendered on the 28th, they 
were now pushing forward to encounter the 
irregular levies of the South, or whatever 
forces could be mustered under the command 
of Bourbaki. The " Red Prince " (Frederick 
Charles) kept Bazaine at bay at Metz. Toul, 
Soissons, Chateaudun, Beauvais, and other 
places, held their own bravely ; and the Tours 
Government was working with all the energy 
of despair to form fresh armies of the raw youth 
and undisciplined manhood of France. Poor 
fellows ! they knew too well the fate that 
awaited them ; and as they marched, they 
sang with all the mingled sadness and gaiety 
of their race — 

Nous partons, 

Ton, ton, 
Comme des moutons, 
Comme des moutons, 
Pour la boucherie ! 
Pour la boucherie ! 
Nous aimons 
Pourtant la vie, 
Mais nous partons, 

Ton, ton, 
Pour la boucherie ! 



ENERGY OF GAMBETTA: 



71 



On nous massacrera ! 

Ra, ra, 
Comme des rats, 
All ! que Bismarck rira ! 

The sense of which is, " We are going like 
sheep to the slaughter-house ; we are not yet 
tired of life, yet we are fools enough to go 
where we shall be massacred like rats in a 
battue. How Bismarck will laugh ! " 

The energy of Gambetta recalled vividly 
the fiery impetuosity of the agents of the first 
Revolution, when they hurled armies of Pro- 
le'taires against the oppressors of Europe, and 
began a new era in the world's history. He 
wasted no time in making bombastic speeches ; 
if he addressed the troops at all, it was to com- 
municate some necessary order, or exhort 
them, in a few pithy sentences, to that de- 
votion to duty by which France could alone 
hope to be saved. Compelled by a numerous 
crowd to present himself at the Prefecture at 
Tours, he wound up a short address by ad- 
ding : " I have come here to work ; let us be 
sparing of demonstrations. We must work, 
for we have not a moment to lose." That he 
did work it is impossible to deny, and hereafter 
we shall have to record events which were in 
a great measure the result of the fresh energy 
with which he inspired the authorities. But 
before we follow the fortunes of his new 
levies, one or two occurrences must be ad- 
ded to the eventful annals of the month of 
September. They were, indeed, but as little 
eddies in the great current of the war that we 
have seen sweeping on its irresistible course as 
far as the walls of Paris. Nevertheless they 
are of sufficient importance, as subordinate 
parts of the drama, to demand a place in our 
history. 

We have remarked before that no break was 
permitted in the stream of the invading hosts; 
but constantly as the foremost ranks arrived 
the rear closed up, and the reserve followed, as 
if the whole manhood of Germany was press- 
ing forward to the occupation of France. It 
was about the end of August that the 17th 
North German infantry division (Schimmel- 
mann) and the 17th cavalry brigade (Rauch), 
and the 2nd active Brandenburg Landwehr 
division (Selchow), crossed the frontier, and 



on arriving in France were formed into a new 
army corps (the 13th), which, like that under 
General Werder (the 14th ante p. 16), was to 
be employed in occupying the conquered coun- 
try, capturing the fortresses that still held out, 
and harassing the enemy wherever they might 
attempt to organize fresh forces. This corps 
was placed under the command of the Grand 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and was oc- 
cupied until the 10th of September with the 
army of Prince Frederick Charles in the in- 
vestment of Metz. On that day it was ordered 
to cover the rear of the forces marching on 
Paris, and the performance of this duty neces- 
sitated an attack on the fortress of Toul, the 
key of the railway from Strasburg to Paris- 
Toul had already been summoned by a small 
detachment of Landwehr, and had been can- 
nonaded at intervals since the 14th of August. 
On the 16th an assault had been made at a 
point of the works not defended by cannon 
when the Germans were gallantly repulsed 
with the loss of several hundreds of their 
number. The place in fact was more capable 
of resistance than Moltke had believed, 1 hav- 
ing a double escarpment with full bastions, a 
double ditch, thirty feet wide each, all round 
fully casemated, and defended by seventy-five 
guns, of which twenty-six were heavy rifled ones 
brought from Strasburg, before it was too late to 
think of seriously disputing the road to Paris. 
The garrison consisted of 2,500 men, for the 
most part raw Mobiles. 2 The commandant 
was Colonel Hiick, an old cavalry officer. 

Before investing this little fortress, the Grand 
Duke directed his Landwehr divisions together 
with the 17th dragoon regiment and two light 
batteries upon Rheims; and then marched upon 
Toul with the remaining artillery of his corps, 
the 17th infantry division, the 18th dragoons, 
and the 11th Uhlan regiment. He arrived 
before the fortress on the evening of September 
12th, by which time the possession of the place 
had become a matter of the gravest importance 
to the army that was marching on Paris. The 
artillery of the besiegers consisted at present 
of field guns only, and the old-fashioned siege 
pieces that had been captured at Marsal. 3 Be- 
fore operations commenced, the Grand Duke 
was appointed by the King (September 16th) 

6 A 



72 



SIEGE OF TOUL. 



Governor of Rhcims, and the direction of the 
besieging force devolved on the divisional ge- 
neral, Schimmelmann, who immediately got 
three 6-pounder batteries on Mont St. Michel; 
but attempted nothing very serious, if we 
except a bombardment for two hours on the 
18th with seven German field batteries. 

On the 19th Schimmelmann sent the 33rd 
brigade and the 11th UhlaDS to Chalons. 
When these were gone, the forces before Toul 
consisted of the two Mecklenburg infantry 
regiments (89th and 90th), the Mecklenburg 
rifles (14th), one regiment of cavalry (18th 
dragoons), two pioneer companies, and fourteen 
batteries of field artillery. On the 20th there 
arrived from Cologne sixteen rifled 12-pounders, 
and ten rifled 24-pounders, which had been 
brought up with great difficulty, and not till 
the gallant resistance of old Huck and his 
Moblots was beginning to divide attention 
with the siege of Strasburg. "With the siege 
guns in position, there was no longer any rea- 
son for delay, and there could be little hope 
for the ridiculously small and inexperienced 
garrison. Early on the morning of the 23rd 
the batteries opened fire, and at 9 o'clock Toul 
was on fire. We must allow an eye-witness 4 
to relate the circumstances and tell us how the 
SGene impressed him. 

" Nearly 2,000 paces from the bottom of the 
glacis of Toul, there rises from the green plain 
a hill of about 1,000 feet high, looking like a 
gigantic coffin. From the top of this hill 
(Mont St. Michel) there is a good unobstructed 
view to be had of the whole neighbourhood, 
but more particularly of that part just at the 
foot of the town. With immense difficulty 
our heavy cannon were got up this steep 
mountain path, at the top of which our chief 
batteries had very properly been erected. It 
was a beautiful clear September morning when 
I took my place there, next to an officer whom 
I knew. With the glass we could overlook 
Toul very well, even to distinguishing the 
individual guards on the walls with their red 
hose. Soon the thunder of the cannonading 
resounded from all sides. I had at first been 
much vexed at the small effect our shots took, 
as the French balls we had were sent from 
imooth-bore French cannon, the most of the 



shells bursting too soon in the air without do- 
ing any damage. But now, even in the first 
quarter of an hour, things had begun to take 
quite a different turn. Our own 24-pounders 
took excellent effect, and we could with the 
glass see the great gaps they made in the 
green sods of the walls. The fire was now 
heavy on the town; everywhere the roar of 
cannon and the flashes of the fire, the shells 
whistling through the air till they reached 
their destination with a horrible crack. It has 
a sort of demoniacal effect on one to be in a 
battery in full operation against the enemy ; 
you become an artilleryman with your whole 
heart, whether you will or not; rejoice at 
every good hit, and .straining after every ball, 
feel annoyed if it misses aim or bursts use- 
lessly in the air. I cannot deny that the 
smoke has a great charm for me, and that the 
camions' roar is like sweet music to my ear. 
The guns of the battery where I was were 
manned principally from my own district — the 
shores of the Baltic ; strong Pomeranians, 
Mecklenburgers, and Holsteiners. They worked 
at their guns with untiring zeal, and as each 
ball went off they sent with it some pithy and 
characteristic remark in their Low German 
dialect, which, despite the cannonading and all 
its horrors, made me often laugh right heartily. 
The French answered at first readily enough, 
and their shells rattled over us, without how- 
ever doing much damage. In my battery three 
gunners were killed and six wounded. Of the 
losses on other batteries I knownothing. Almost 
more dangerous than the shells and cannon-balls 
of the French were their long rifles, which had 
a range of from 1,500 to 1,800 paces. As we 
were walking on the ramparts, one of these 
balls kept continually whizzing over us. I 
was there talking to one of the officers, when a 
gunner called out to me in low German, ' Take 
care, sir, the fellows are aiming at you.' He 
had scarcely finished, when one of these balls 
came between me and my friend, and striking 
the thick branch of a tree laid it shattered at 
our feet. That our shot was effectual we 
could see by the pillars of smoke which 
rose from different parts of the town. The 
Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg had expressly 
ordered that the two spires of the Cathedral 



NEW LEVIES IN THE SOUTH. 



73 




GAMBETTA ADDRESSING THE TROOPS. 



H 



SURRENDER OF TOUL. 



of Toul should be spared if it were possible, 
this building being one of the most famous 
buildings of the Gothic style of the fifteenth 
century. We could, however, see with the 
glass that damage had been done both to the 
gallery of the spire and to one of the win- 
dows. The hospital was also spared, distin- 
guishable as it was by its white flag and red 
cross. The French had here erected a heavy 
battery, which did much damage to us, and 
was itself quite protected. Up till four o'clock 
in the afternoon this state of things went on 
and then, quite suddenly, a great white flag 
appeared on the spire of the cathedral. By 
order of the Grand-Duke (he had come from 
Rheims to witness the bombardment) all our 
batteries were instantaneously silenced, and 
a Prussian officer went into the town with 
a flag of truce, and returned immediately 
with the Commandant, Colonel Huck. After 
long negociation the capitulation was agreed 
upon, and the treaty signed by the light 
of a stable lantern, for it had already got 
dark. The entire garrison 5 gave themselves 
up as prisoners of war. The officers, how- 
ever, had the choice either of going out on 
parole, with the promise never again to bear 
arms against us, or of being sent as prisoners 
of war to Prussia. Some eighty French offi- 
cers, all belonging to the Gardes Mobiles 
chose the former alternative, and therefore 
remained in France. Seventeen superior offi- 
cers, among whom was the commander him- 
self, preferred being Prussian prisoners of war 
With him our Duke shook hands, and called 
him a brave officer. As the cause of his capi- 
tulation, the commander alleged that he had 
only three or four days' ammunition, and could 
therefore hold out no longer. In this time j 
too, he thought the city would have been en- 
tirely destroyed. The Gardes Mobiles were 
likewise undisciplined, and not sufficiently 
used to arms to be able to defend the town for 
any length of time, particularly during a 
storm. On the same evening, the garrison 
marched out of Toul and bivouacked in a 
meadow, under guard, in order to be able to 
start for Prussia by rail in the morning. Meck- 
lenburg troops then took possession of the 
town. The next morning the Duke, with a 



brilliant staff, made his entrance at the head 
of his regiment." a 

A correspondent of the Pall-mall Gazette 
was at Remilly, near Metz, on the 26th of 
September, when the prisoners from Toul 
marched through, and he confirms that they 
were chiefly Gardes Mobiles. They had come 
from Pont-a-Mousson on foot, and, though the 
distance was not very considerable for well- 
trained soldiers, it had told severely upon 
these soft, unformed lads. They reached 
Remilly in the dusk of the evening, and it 
was quite dark before they had finished passing 
into the station. Poor fellows ! most of them 
were dead-beat, while the Prussian soldiers 
who came with them carried their bayonets 
erect, and moved with strong, elastic step. 
" My quarters," says the writer, " were in an 
empty room in a deserted house, which had 
once been an hotel, and which now held some 
eighty Prussian officers and men stretched on 
mattresses on the floors. As I stood on the 
steps with a group of Prussian officers and 
two Englishmen, the poor fellows passing close 
to us stopped and crowded round to beg, some 
a glass of water and some a cup of coffee. 
They caught sight of the name Hotel de 
France, and thought to get refreshment. They 
were very earnest and pressing, and it became 
difficult to explain to them that the house was 
absolutely bare to its walls and floors, and 
could bring forth nothing but Prussian swords 
and bayonets. Talking French to prisoners in 
this place, bristling with soldiery and in full 
tide of war, is not a safe or agreeable occu- 
pation ; for the sentries with them are apt to 
add to their urgent cry of " Vorwarts " a 
rough reminder to the French-speaking sym- 
pathizers to get out of the way. I must say, 
however, that the sentries were for the most 
part good-natured enough, and we were 
allowed to get a pail or two of water— no 
small treasure in this now dry and thirsty 
village, where the pumps were almost ex- 
hausted. This we served out in tin cups to 
both sentries and prisoners as they passed, 
with a hundred or two of cheap cigars. Pre- 
sently they halted at the railway station, and 
I walked in among them and chatted with 
them. They were pleased enough to hear 



SORTIE FROM PARIS. 



75 



French conversation, and welcomed me. They 
were but young troops ; most of them " enfants 
de Nancy." They were not so broken or 
dispirited as that weary, motley host which 
marched away as prisoners from Sedan, and 
whose passage for hours in one continuous line, 
a dejected, dirty, weary rabble, no one who 
witnessed it will ever forget. These men were 
not very soldier-like in bearing or physique. 
They complained bitterly of their long march. 
. . . Among them were two or three students 
of medicine who had been shut up in Toul, 
being on their way to Paris to volunteer. One 
of them was ' a journalist,' contributor to the 
Lanterne Comique, and other small comic 
papers. They were very anxious about their 
treatment in Germany, and hopeful of an 
early peace. They seemed to think that now 
they had given in, it ivas of little use for 
any one else to hold out." 

After the capture of Toul, the besieging 
troops, with the heavy siege guns, marched 
against Soissons, where they had strongly 
entrenched themselves on the 26th, and an 
attempt being made to dislodge them led to a 
sharp action and the destruction of some 200 
houses by fire in the faubourg of Rheims (Sept. 
26th and 28th). The fortress surrendered a 
fortnight later, as will be recorded more par- 
ticularly hereafter. 

The principal part of the corps under Wer- 
der's command (the Baden division and Land- 
wehr, estimated at 60,000 strong) will be 
heard of hereafter in connection with the 
movements of Garibaldi near Dijon. The 
other troops liberated by the fall of Strasburg 
were sent to reduce Belfort, Schiestadtt, and 
New Brisach. 7 

Around Paris the investing forces were busily 
occupied with the formation of their camps 
and counterworks, when (Sept. SOth) a great 
sortie was ma.de, in which two divisions, com- 
manded by General Vinoy, took part. The 
people of Paris were woke up by heavy firing 
from the forts, accompanied by the tramp oi 
armed men, and the galloping of messengers to 
and fro in hot haste. The principal attack 
was in the centre from forts Montrouge and 
Bicetre against the 6th German Corps, behind 
Villcjeuf, on the right from Issy it was directed 



against the 5th Corps by Sevres and St. Cloud, 
and on the left from Charenton against the 
11th. 8 The wing attacks were only armed 
demonstrations; but there was hard fight- 
ing in the centre, where the French occu- 
pied in succession Hay and Chevilly, and 
advanced as far as Thiais and Choisy-le-Roi. 
They found these positions strongly occupied 
and entrenched, and the last two mounted 
with guns. After a lively artillery and mus- 
ketry engagement, according to General 
Trochu's report, the French withdrew in good 
order to their positions. The coolness of the 
troops was remarkable, and the Mobiles showed 
great firmness. In short, the day was most 
honourable. The losses, however, were ad- 
mitted to be considerable, and the German 
official report gave the numbers as 1,200 killed 
and wounded, including among the former 
General Guilhem, and 300 un wounded prison- 
ers. General Trochu did not claim to have 
obtained any advantage by this sally against- 
the enemy's entrenchments, but he ascertained 
that they were at the cost of 1,500 men, and 
perhaps tried the mettle of his troops. If 
however, they were cool, and retired in good 
order, it is difficult to account for the capture 
of 300 unwounded men, which is better ex- 
plained by the report issued from the Crown 
Prince's head-quarters on the evening of the 
engagement, in which it is stated that the 
French "retreated in wild confusion." 9 

On the same day the Tours Government de- 
creed that all men from twenty-one to forty 
years of age were to join the Mobile Guards. 
Those from twenty-one to thirty-five were to 
remain until discharged by the Minister of 
War. In order to arm these new levies, the 
prefects were authorized to disarm the Garde 
Nationale Sedentaire, and also to seize all 
hunting and other weapons. The Franc- 
tireurs were to be subjected to the same dis- 
cipline as the Mobile Guards, and to be at the 
disposal of the Minister of War, a measure ren- 
dered absolutely necessary by the wild warfare 
that was beginning to overspread the country, 
and demoralize the peasantry, provoking re- 
prisals by which the innocent were certain to 
be the greatest sufferers. Such an event oc- 
I curred at Ablis, souih uf Paris, where, on the 7th 



7G 



CIRCULAR OF COUNT BISMARCK. 



of October a squadron of the lGth regiment 
of Hussars was surprised by Franc-Tireurs 
hidden in the houses, in expiation of which the 
village was deliberately set on fire and de- 
stroyed by the Germans, who returned in force. 
There were no signs as yet of the threatened 
bombardment of the capital, though siege guns 
were arriving. A communication addressed to 
foreign powers on the 12th of October seemed 
indeed to indicate that it had been determined 
to reduce the city by famine, or to await the 
issue of the internal dissensions that were con- 
fidently predicted. This document excited 
some warmth of feeling in England at the 
time, on account of the coolness with which 
Count Bismarck seemed to anticipate the fear- 
ful sufferings which the people of Paris would 
in all probability have to endure. It is histo- 
rically valuable as an official summary of the 
situation at the beginning of October, from the 
German point of view, and is therefore sub- 
joined : — 

" The conditions of an armistice, proposed to M. 
Jules Favre, as a means of preparing a return to 
the normal state of things in France, have been 
rejected by him and his colleagues. 

" The continuation of a struggle which, judging 
by the course it has hitherto taken, is a hopeless 
one for the French people, has been therefore 
decreed. 

"Since this decision has been pronounced, the 
chances of ultimate success for France have still 
further diminished. Toul and Strasburg have 
fallen, Paris is closely invested, and tbe German 
troops scour the country as far as the Loire. The 
considerable forces occupied in besieging the two 
fortresses here mentioned can now be employed 
elsewhere. 

"France will have to suffer the consequences of 
the resolution taken by the Paris government to 
wage a war d outrance ; her unavailing sacrifices 
will be multiplied, and her social dissolution, 
already begun, will continually assume more alarm- 
ing dimensions. 

" Against this evil the supreme command of the 
German armies is unhappily powerless, though 
fully conscious how pernicious the policy of pro- 
tracted resistance must be to the whole country. 
One point merits particular consideration — it con- 
cerns the special circumstances in which Paris is 
placed. 

" The not unimportant combats of the 19thio and 
30th September before that city, in which the elite 
fo the forces assembled for its defence were not ! 



even able to drive back the first line of the investing 
troops, furnish a convincing proof that the capital 
sooner or later must fall. 

"If the eventual capitulation of Paris be deferred 
by the Provisional Government of the National De- 
fence till the pressing want of food has left no other 
choice than surrender, the consequences cannot fail 
to be frightful. 

" The promiscuous and insensate destruction by 
the French of the railways, bridges, and canals all 
around Paris, has not impeded, in an appreciable 
degree, the advance of our troops ; as the commu- 
nications we found requisite, by land and by water, 
were re-established by us with ease and rapidity. 

"These communications of ours are of a purely 
military character, and intended merely for military 
purposes ; but the railroads and other ordinary 
means of intercourse between Paris and the pro- 
vinces will not be available again for long after the 
capitulation of the capital. 

"When the time for the latter event has arrived, 
the German military authorities will find themselves 
totally unable to furnish a population of two millions 
of souls with the necessary food for even a single 
day. The neighbourhood of Paris, for many miles 
around, will have been stripped to supply the wants 
of our own troops, so that the famishing inhabi- 
tants will seek provisions in vain along the country 
roads. 

" The unavoidable result will be that hundreds of 
thousands will perish of hunger. 

" The present rulers of France cannot but foresee 
these direful consequences of their policy as plainly 
as ourselves, who have at present no other alter- 
native than to prosecute the conflict to the end. 

" If the Provisional Government are determined 
to push matters to this extremity, wo lay the 
responsibility at their door." 

Were the Germans mistaken in calculating 
on the political dissensions of the Parisians for 
an easy conquest ? To judge from the daily 
reports circulated by the French Press, and 
from the letters conveyed by the balloon service 
which had been established in the few days 
that had elapsed since the investment, it would 
seem there was little chance of their anticipa- 
tions being realized. The steadiness and good 
conduct of the Gardes Mobiles were highly 
praised, and Rochefort and Flourens were said 
to be zealously working at the construction of 
barricades, so that if the walls of Paris were 
successfully breached and stormed, the fight 
might be continued " Street by street, and 
foot by foot." A despatch of the 29th of Sep- 
tember spoke enthusiastically of the prepare- 



CAPTURE OF ORLEANS BY VON DER TANN. 



1 1 







73 



COMMUNISTS AT PARIS. 



tions making for a great effort, and added, 
"Bismarck's conversation with Jules Favre 
clearly shows that he calculated on there being 
a revolution in Paris. The conduct of all is on 
the contrary, calm and dignified." Neverthe- 
less, within a week afterwards, Oct. 5th, a 
party of Communists headed by M. Flourens 
made a demonstration against the Government, 



I which they repeated on the 9th in a still more 
I threatening manner. These events were omin- 
] ous of the sanguinary struggle which took place 
| for the possession of the capital after the con- 
' elusion of the war, and it is fair to infer from 
j the facts that Count Bismarck was perfectly 
i sincere in the view he took of the situation at 
i Paris in the beginning of October. 



Notes to Chapter LXI. 



1 The Bavarian railroad direction, who worked the line from 
Weissenburg and Nancy to Paris, had offered, in the middle of 
August, to build a branch around Toul in a fortnight, but Moltke 
said, " No, we shall have Toul long- before that." It held on 
till September 24th. 

2 The following is the enumeration of officers, men, arms, and 
munitions of war captured at Toul : — 109 officers, 2,240 men, 120 
horses, 1 eagle of the Garde Mobile, 197 bronze guns, including 48 
pieces of rifled ordnance, 3,000 rifles, 3,000 sabres, 500 cuirasses, 
and a considerable quantity of munitions and articles of equipment. 
Soldiers' pay for 143,0:25 days, and rations for 51,949 days also 
fell into the hands of the Prussians. The discrepancy between 
the number of guns here enumerated, and the number given in 
the last, is accounted tor by reckoning all the guns captured, 
however useless. Rustow says the armament was " 197 guns, of 
which 48 were rifled.'' (Part hi., p. 134.) 

3 Marsal, in the Department of the Meurthe, is about seven 
miles from Chateau-Salins, and seventeen miles east of Nancy. 

4 Herr von Wickede, in the Cologne Gazette. 

6 Herr Wickede enumerates them incorrectly, as consisting of 
4,500 men, including 500 artillerymen. The tact is there was not 
one artdleryman ; but 500 Moblots had learned to work the guns 
since they marched in, and, as stated above (note 2) the total 
number surrendered was less than 2,500. 

6 The conclusion of Hen- Wickede's letter is not of great im- 
portance, historically speaking, but it contains some interesting 
facts in the form of gossip. On the morning of the 25th he was 
able to walk through the town, and has thus recorded his impres- 
sions: '' In the suburbs I saw six or seven houses quite burned 
down, and several almost so. The bridges over the Marne Canal 
had been blown up by the French, and the only way of crossing 
was by stepping on pieces of wood where they were to be found, 
and when not, by wading. In the streets of Toul, which num- 
bers about 8,000 inhabitants, the traces of shells and balls were 
everywhere visible. Window beams were torn out, great gaps 
were made in the roofs and walls, doors lay shattered in all direc- 
tions, but only two or three houses inside the town were totally 
destroyed. Ihe Cathedral, one of the most magnificent buildings 
I have ever seen, has fortunately not suffered much inside, but 
its outer walls have been considerably injured. The Mairie, too, 
has suffered a good deal in its walls, windows, nnd ornamental 
work. Of the Cathedral the principal parts spoiled are —A win- 
dow quite riddled, a door knocked to pieces, and a part of the 
spire destroyed. Our fire had taken most effect on the walls. 
Here stood the large c:mnons and mortars with which Toul was 
armed, belaud the high gabions or batteries, covered by large 
planks; still our shot had here wrought great devastation, and 
many gunners had been killed beside their guns. All kinds of 
shot and shell were lying scattered about, some of which had not 
even burst. The walls were still in pretty good preservation, 
and the ditches full of water, so that the storming, which would 
have taken place in two or three days, would doubtless have cost 
many lives. Toul itself has been well and regularly fortified 
after Vauban's system; it had excellent walls, fiom five to six 
bastions, and good deep ditches. Formerly it was reckoned a 
very strong fortress ; as it, however, possesses neither outworks 
nor detached forte, it could not long have resisted the new cannon 



with their long range, and would have been completely destroy* 
by the 24-pounders on St. Michel. During the siege we heard 
that about eight people had been killed and about sixteen 
wounded. For the last few days the inhabitants had lived mostly 
in cellars, the trap-doors of which were covered with dungheaps. 
They now came creeping out into the sunshine, bringing their 
beds, which had got damp and musty in their confined quarters 
to be aired and dried again. We saw many pale frightened faces 
and heard loud complaints. Still, we could not but recognize 
the inborn French elasticity, for they soon got all quite brisk and 
cheerful, rejoicing over the capitulation, that the siege was over, 
and their life and health no longer endangered. Everywhere I 
heard remarks in praise of the kindness of the Grand Duke, and 
the moderation and good behaviour of the troops." 

7 The fortresses of Eastern France captured up to the beginning 
of October, 1870, were — Strasburg, Toul, Marsal, Vitry. Sedan, 
Laon, Liitzelstein, Lichteuberg, and Weissenburg. The forts 
beleaguered at thatdate were — Phalsburg, Bitsche, Soissons ; and 
those watched or invested — Paris, Metz, Thionville, Meziere ; , 
Montmedy, Verdun, Longwy, Schlestadt, and New Brsach, 
Thus nine places were in German hands, and twelve untaken. 

8 The position of the 11th Corps was at that time to the left of 
the Wurtemburgers, by the bend of the Marne. 

9 General Trochu's official report of the sortie was as follows : 
" Our troops to-day effected a very vigorous offensive reconnaiss- 
ance, and occupied successively Cuevilly and Hay, and advanced 
as far as Thiais and Choissy-le-Roi. All those positions were 
strongly occupied and entrenched, the last two being mounted 
with guns. After a lively artillery and musketry engagement, 
our troops withdrew in g >od order to their positions. The cool- 
ness of the troops was remarkable, and the Mobiles showed great 
firmness. In short, the day was most honourable. We have 
suffered sensible losses, but their number is not estimated. We 
believe the enemy had considerable losses." 

The despatch from the Head-Quarters of the King at Ferrieres 
was to the following effect ; " Early this morning (30tn) strong 
masses of French troops of the line broke out of Paris against the 
Sixth army corp*. At the same tims the advanced troops of 
our Fifth army corps were attacked by three liattalions, while a 
brigade made a demonstration against our Eleventh corps. After 
two hours' fighting, during which the enemy suffered very con- 
siderable losses, without our reserves having to engage, the 
enemy withdrew in the greatest haste to the protection of the 
forts. Our losses are not yet known, but they are not heavy ; in 
the Eleventh corps, for instance, only eight men. Many hundred 
prisoners in our hands. The Crown Prince was present during 
the whole engagement." 

Another statement, dated from the Head-Quarters or the 
Crown Prince, October 2nd, gives the figures cited in the text : 

The loss of the French in the engagement of the 30th ult. 
amounted to 1,200 killed and wounded, among whom was 
General Giulhen. 300 unwounded prisoners were taken." It 
added that the German loss was 80 killed, and about 120 
wounded ; and that among the former were eight officers. Only 
occasional shots were fired from the forts ou the 1st and 2nd. 

i° '1 he affair on the 19th of September was the frjfhlatClamart 
[ante, vol. i. p. 4txjj. 



THE LOIRE ARMY. 



79 



CHAPTER LXII. 

ARMY OF THE LOIRE —CAPTURE OF ORLEANS. 

Composition of the Army of the Loire — Partisan Corps enrolled 
by the Republic — General de la Motterouge — German Corps 
under Von der Tann detached from the Crown Prince's Army 
before P.iris — Advance of both forces towards Orleans — 
Success of the French at Toury, Oct. 5lh — Enthusiasm of 
the Populace — Position at Artenay — Return of the Germans 
m strength — Defeat of the French at Artenay on the 10th 
— Retrt at to the Forest of Orleans — Advance of the Ger- 
mans and Battle near Orleans on the 11th — Defeat of 
the Fr. nch and Occupation of Orleans by Von der Tann — 
The Tours Government supplied with arms by Engiana and 
America — Question of Neutrality raised — Communistic 
Movement in Paris — The Red Flag at Lyons — Gambetta 
and Garibaldi — Operations in the Vosges. 

While Garibaldi was on his way from Tours 
to Besancon, a miscellaneous assortment of 
troops was being collected to form the " army 
of the Loire/' and pushed northwards even 
beyond Orleans. The most extravagant reports 
of its strength were in circulation. The most 
reliable statement at the time was that it con- 
sisted of 10,000 regular infantry, 20,000 Mobile 
guards, 4,000 African troops, 4,000 volunteers, 
3,000 good cavalry, 2,000 artillery and engi- 
neers, and 1,000 train and administration > 
making a total of 44,000 combatants and non- 
combatants. It will be safe to adopt the 
moderate computation of 30,000 infantry and 
cavalry as sufficiently near the mark. Of these 
many were " Partisan Troops," raised by the 
Tours government, and consisting of men and 
lads, over forty-five and under sixteen years of 
age. They were not volunteers like the Franc- 
tireurs, but compelled to serve by the new 
decree, and carried service books in which they 
were specified as soldiers of the Republican 
Government. Their uniform was a short 
black coat, with a red scarf round the body, 
and a wide-brimmed hat, labelled " Partisans," 
to which was added the name or number of the 
Department from which they came. They were 
armed with Minie rifles, and were most pro- 
bably, like the Moblots and Volunteers, mixed 
with the African troops and Regulars, (among 
whom were Papal Zouaves, and such scattered 
bands as had escaped from Sedan), in such 
proportions as to lessen the risk of a panic from 
their necessary deficiency in drill, and military 
knowledge. From the composition of the whole 
force, which took the name of the 15th Corps 
d'armee, it would be natural to infer either 



that the classes liable to military service were 
being exhausted, or that they were shirking 
their duty, and sacrificing mere boys and old 
men to the cause of their country, as the war- 
riors of the pre-historic ages sacrificed women 
and boys in honour of their dead chiefs. 1 

The commander of this, the first, or part of 
the first, Loire army, was General Joseph 
Edward de la Motterouge, who had been 
returned to the Legislative Chamber, in the 
elections of 1869, by a majority of 18,343 
votes over 12,490 obtained by M. Glais-Bizoin. 
He was a pupil of St. Cyr, and had served 
with distinction in the Crimea and in Italy; 
but he was now in the 70th year of his age, 
and, though it would be rash to infer from this 
fact that he was physically unequal to the 
command in such trying circumstances, it is 
only fair that it should be registered on the 
same page as the singular composition of his 
forces. 

While the French General and the 15th 
Corps were creeping up northwards, a force 
detached from the army of the Crown Prince, 
before Paris, was creeping down southwards 
and feeling for the enemy. This force was 
under the command of General Von der Tann. 
It was composed of his own hardy and deter- 
mined battalions, the 1st Bavarian Army 
Corps, the 22nd division of the 11th North- 
German Army Corps (Gersdorf), and the 2nd 
and 4th Cavalry Divisions, detached from the 
6th Army Corps under Stolberg. 

By referring to the map of the theatre of the 
war on the Loire, it will be seen that the seat 
of the Delegate Government, Tours, is con- 
nected with Paris by a railway which passes 
by Etampes, Malesherbes, Pithiviers, Orleans, 
and Blois, the most important of these places 
being the last mentioned city, seated on the 
Loire, and famous for the exploits of Jeanne 
d'Arc. North of Orleans and westward from 
this line of railway are Artenay and Toury. 
Still further westward is Chateaudun, and east- 
ward is Chateauneuf. Having ascertained the 
relative position of all these places, the move- 
ments which took place as the two armies 
approached each other, will be easily compre- 
hended. 

Simultaneously with the investment of Paris, 



so 



SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH AT TOURY. 



the cavalry above-mentioned detached by the 
Crown Prince, began their reconnaissances 
(southward, and on the 23rd of September, it 
was known that detachments were marching 
upon Orleans by way of Malesherbes and Pithi- 
viers. There had been rumours of the most 
contradictory character previously. Uhlans 
had been reported at Dourdon, in the neigh- 
bourhood of the Blois, in half-a-dozen other 
"daces, and, perhaps, with good reason. The 
force in possession of France had not only long 
legs, and strong arms, but singularly tentative 
fingers, which could be stretched out like 
feelers in any desirable direction, and instantly 
drawn back, if necessary. The effect of such 
rumours, whether true or false, was to increase 
the determination of the Delegate Government 
to defend the Loire, and the troops which, as 
above stated were led to Orleans and beyond 
by General de la Motterouge, were rapidly 
gathered together for this purpose. Notwith- 
standing the incoherent elements of which they 
consisted, they were hammered together into 
a more consistent mass than might have been 
expected. The departments caught the en- 
thusiasm of patriotism as one fire is kindled 
by another. The Council of the Department 
of Loire and Cher voted an appropriation of 
four millions of francs for the defence. The 
Prefect of the Department of the Somme issued 
an address to the inhabitants, stating that, all 
hopes of peace having disappeared, there re- 
mained but one duty for Frenchmen — namely, 
war to the knife. All men must arise and 
chase the enemy who polluted the soil of 
France, and wished to dismember her. A 
general rising and valour equal to that dis- 
played in 1792, could alone save the country. 
" Arise, citizens, enrol under the flags of the 
Republic, and show Prussia that she will find 
a tomb where she hoped to complete the abase- 
ment and ruin of France." 

In the first days of October, the Loire army 
beyond Orleans was represented by a single 
division, consisting of three brigades of cavalry 
and infantry, and three and a half batteries 
of artillery, under the command of General 
Reyau. The Germans were known to be in 
Tours and the neighbouring villages, their 
strength, as afterwards reported, consisting of 



from 400 to 500 cavalry, supported by 2,000 
infantry and ten 12-pounder cannons. Early 
in the morning of October 5th, Reyau set out 
on a reconnaissance in the direction of the 
enemy, and at 7 a.m. arrived before Chassis, 
when at once a squadron of Hussars sur- 
rounded the village, and carried off five of 
Von der Tann's Bavarians. This was a very 
trivial success to begin with, but it was some- 
thing different from what the Germans had 
been accustomed to. They returned the com- 
pliment by opening an artillery fire on the 
French from a field battery of ten 12-pounders, 
which dismounted some of the French guns. 
But Reyau was not to be denied, and pressing 
forward succeeded in turning the village of 
Toury on the right, and compelled the Germans 
to beat a hasty retreat towards Paris, leaving 
behind them a herd of 147 cows and 52 sheep, 
which they had got together at Manchecourt, 
by requisitioning. The French continued the 
pursuit beyond Toury for three or four hours, 
and pushed forward as far as Daury and 
Pithiviers. This unexpected success had an 
encouraging result for the moment. The 
feelers that had been thrown out by the 
Germans in all directions were suddenly drawn 
back, and all that part of the country was 
reported to be clear of the enemy. The 
enthusiasm it excited was an advantage not 
to be despised ; the journals were filled with 
the praise of Reyau's troops, who were declared 
to have " behaved magnificently," and every 
one was willing to see in this first success of 
an improvised and heterogeneous force a sign 
of greater triumphs to come. 2 

It was the day after this successful de"but of 
the Loire army that Gambetta escaped from 
Paris in a balloon, and reached Tours about 
the same time as Garibaldi (ante p. 65). 
The Loire army was therefore actually in the 
field before its numbers were swelled by his 
vigorous measures as the Minister of War at 
Tours. Neither the momentary success of 
Reyau on the 5th, nor the defeat by which it 
was followed on the 11th, the particulars of 
which we are about to relate, ax'e to ba 
attributed to his administration. 

After the defeat of the Germans at Toury 
the French had fallen back on a strong position 



RETURN OF VON DER TANN IN FORCE. 



81 



at Artenay, about nine miles south of Toury ; 
while the enemy lost no time in facing round 
and preparing for a fresh advance. On the 
7th, part of Von der Tann's force was at 
Arpajon, and on the 8th, he sent his advanced 
guard over Etrechu upon Etampes, with the 
determination to recover his lost ground, and 
resume his movement on Orleans. Besides 



9.30, the Germans advanced in considerable 
force (their numbers were reported at 10,000) 
and having outflanked the troops in possession 
of the town, compelled them to beat a hasty 
retreat, many throwing away their baggage 
and guns on surrendering. Thus deserted, the 
artillery also had to decamp in haste, abandon- 
ing three of their guns, and as the French fell 




HARBOUR OF BORDEAUX 



Artenay, the French occupied Patay, about 
nine or ten miles westward of the former 
place. Their strength at Artenay consisted 
of the Cavalry Brigade under General Galand 
de Longuerue, and a few companies of Chas- 
seurs; besides which they had two batteries 
posted on hills in an almost impregnable 
situation. On the morning of the 10th, at 



back, a part of Von der Tann's force occupied 
Artenay. Intelligence of the event having 
reached General Reyau, he hastened up with 
five regiments, four battalions, and a battery 
of eight-pounders to the support of Longuerue's 
brigade, and disputed the ground till 2.30 in 
the afternoon, when he must have been driven 
back as far as Chevilly, as he occupied the 



82 



THE BATTLE NEAR ORLEANS. 



forest of Orleans on the night after the battle. 
As the French fell back along the Orleans 
road, a thousand prisoners were captured by 
the pursuing cavalry. Reyau declared in his 
report 3 that he meant to hold his position in 
the wood at any cost. Reinforcements of 
artillery and infantry were immediately 
hurried up from Tours and Bourges, which 
probably raised his force to 35,000 men. The 
reinforcements with which Reyau had hastened 
to the assistance of Longuerue may have 
numbered about 12,000 or 12,500 men. 

At 6 o'clock on the following morning 
(Oct. 11th), Von der Tann put his troops in 



motion for Orleans. On his extreme l'ight, 
nearest to Patay, marched the 4th Cavalry 
Division towards the Loire ; on the left of it 
the 22nd Division over Souzy, Huetre, Bricy, 
Boulay, and Ormes ; in the centre, the 1st 
Bavarian Corps ; and on the left wing the 2nd 
Cavalry Division, having the forest of Orleans 
under observation. The battalions in the 
centre which marched directly on Orleans 
over Chevilly, were those of the 4th Brigade 
(1st Bavarian Corps), and on their left, march- 
over St. Lye", were the columns of the 3rd 
Brigade. Behind the 4th, the 1st Brigade fol- 
lowed as a reserve. 



ARTENAY 
o 



Patay o 

Bricy o 
Boulay o 



Souzy o 
Huetre o 



Chevilly 
o 



Gidy 
o 



St. Lye* 



FOREST OF ORLEANS 



Ormes o 



ORLEANS., 



Loire 



Loire 



The fighting commenced at Chevilly, where 
a stubborn resistance was made to the further 
advance of the 4th Brigade, and nearly at the 
same time the advanced guard of the 22nd 
Division was brought up at Boulay, by the 
fire of the French artillery, posed between 
that place and Ormes. The fight was 
so well-sustained here, that the whole Ba- 
varian Divisions came into action. The 
French, however, were again outflanked right 
and left, and after a struggle which lasted 
from 10 o'clock in the morning till 5 in the 
afternoon, they gave way at every point, and 
very soon the retreat became a rout, men 
throwing away their arms and uniforms as 
they rushed panic-stricken through the streets 
of Orleans. Indeed it is said that Chassepots 
were strewn on the road all the way from 
Chevilly. It is admitted that some of the 



regiments had fought splendidly ; but what 
possible chance of success could these in- 
coherent battalions have had against the dis- 
ciplined troops of Von der Tann ? It was 
madness in fact to advance so far on this line, 
and the folly can only be accounted for by 
making due allowance for the overpowering 
sentiment that the Loire army was advancing 
to the relief of Paris. But even so, it cannot 
be said the troops were well-handled, for they 
were literally delivered into the enemy's 
hands by detachments. Why Longuerue was 
left unsupported at Artenay, while there were 
ample forces at Orleans, and sufficient reserves 
at Tours and Bourges to swell the number of 
the 15th Corps to some 70,000 men, is still a 
mystery. 

It was known to the Tours Government on 
the 8th, that the Prussians were in force at 



DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH. 



8a 



Arpagon, •with their advance at Estrechy 
and Estampes, yet a handful of raw French 
troops were left to be driven before them on 
the 10th, and then pulled together again, and 
reinforced for the purpose of making another 
stand on the 11th. It will be remembered 
that the battle on the 10th commenced at 
9.30 a.m, and yet, with Tours only three 
hours distant by rail it was 8.30 p.m., before 
intelligence reached the Delegate Government 
of the peril in which General de la Motterouge 
was placed. It is stated that he went in 
person to Tours after his defeat at Artenay, 
leaving his small force in the forest of Orleans^ 
and that his representations, seconded by 
the energy of Gambetta, who had arrived the 
day before, caused 40,000 men and large trains 
of artillery to be despatched during the night. 
These troops must have been coming into line 
during the next day's battle, and though all 
told, the army of the Loire may thus have 
been raised to 70,000 men, they could not all 
have been in action, nor, if they were, could 
it be supposed they were a match for half 
that number of Germans, inured to war, and 
handled like a perfect machine. It is doubtful 
if more than 25,000 were engaged, and when 
they gave way it is certain that the troops 
which were even then advancing to their 
support, shared in the panic and fled likewise. 5 
The pursuit continued until seven o'clock, 
partly because the Germans felt it needful to 
move forward with great circumspection as the 
dusk of evening closed round them. They 
then found themselves before the city, and 
commenced throwing shells into the streets. 
Orleans was at once surrendered, and the 
Bavarians marching in took possession of the 
city, which was fully lighted by their com- 
mand. The French were driven across the 
Loire, and in their haste they forgot to blow 
up the bridges which, as well as the railway 
depot, are said to have been previously mined. 
The Germans were therefore able to pursue 
them across the river to the south side, 
after which, having been recalled into the city, 
they exhibited that prudential foresight in 
which, on this and so many similar occasions 
during the w r ar, the French had shown them- 
selves deficient. 7 Commenting on the stra- 



tegical importance of Orleans in their official 
report, they say: "By blowing up a single 
arch of the two magnificent bridges over the 
Loire, each of which has cost 2,000,000 francs, 
we render it difficult for a southern enemy 
to penetrate north, the next two bridges, at 
Jargean and Beaugency, not being strong 
enough for artillery to pass over. Gien 
higher up the river, is already ours, and the 
Sologne, which is the name of the country 
lower down beyond Blois, is so barren and 
destitute of roads that it serves as a natural 
safeguard from that side." As for the country 
north of Orleans, its acquisition was deemed 
of immense importance. As a wheat and oat 
producing country, to say nothing of its 
orchards and vineyards, it would sensibly 
diminish the number of provision trains from 
Germany. Then Orleans itself had plentiful 
accommodation in the form of barracks and 
other public buildings, and the inhabitants 
were peacefully inclined and wealthy. Plainly 
the possession of Orleans had been worth the 
fighting for. 

The defeat of the Loire army was estimated 
at its full importance by the more sober- 
minded part of the French people, and their 
disappointment was all the bitterer for the 
hopes that had been raised by the first success 
of La Motterouge. 8 The next thought was, 
as it invariably is under similar circumstances 
in revolutionary times, to replace him in the 
command by one whose laurels had not yet 
been dimmed by defeat, and the man selected 
by Gambetta was General D'Aurelle de 
Paladines, whose romantic name gave rise to 
the wildest surmises. It was for a long time 
thought that he was one of the Orleanist 
princes, serving the republic under a nom de 
guerre. He found the defeated troops, whom 
it was henceforth his arduous task to prepare 
for a victorious struggle with the foe, in 
retreat behind the Beuvron, on the left bank 
of the Loire, while the Germans who held the 
right bank were detaching troops to take 
possession of Chateaudun, and occupy the 
country generally. General D'Aurelle de 
Paladines soon found himself at the head of 
50,000 men, holding a good position, well 
disciplined, and provided with all that was 



St 



PURCHASE OF ARMS IN ENGLAND. 



necessary in artillery and material of war. 
We shall see hereafter what he did with them. 
The ability of the Tours Government to 
put these fresh forces into the field, thoroughly 
equipped for a campaign, would be surprising, 
if it were not known they were indebted for 
their success to the extensive purchases of 
arms in America and England. These ship- 
ments were made in the regular way of trade 
to Bordeaux, from which port the communi- 
cation with Tours by railway was of course in 
the undisturbed possession of the Delegate 
Government. Vast numbers of Remington 
rifles, and even cannon with all the neces- 
sary ammunition, were thus forwarded from 
America, the vessels first clearing for England, 
and then making a rapid run across the 
Channel. Everything in the shape of a 
musket that ready money would purchase 
in England, was also bought by the agents 
of the Government, and contracts were taken 
by manufacturers for the supply of large quan- 
tities in addition, which were invariably paid 
for on the bill of lading. These transactions 
being in the regular process of trade could 
not be interfered with ; yet they gave rise 
to serious remonstrances from the Prussian 
Government, who were at the same time pur- 
chasing blankets for their troops in the 
field, and it is even said Armstrong guns, 
in the same universal mart of business. The 
question was argued with some asperity in the 
diplomatic representations made by the North 
German Ambassador. On the 8th of October 
His Excellency addressed a despatch of con- 
siderable length on the subject to Earl Gran- 
ville, stating that he had been almost daily in 
a position to draw attention to various in- 
stances of consignments of arms; and after 
recapitulating the substance of previous corre- 
spondence with the Foreign Office, asserted 
that the neutrality of England, notwithstand- 
ing that it was intended to be impartial, really 
in its practical effect, had assumed the form 
of a neutrality which was benevolent and 
partial towards France. He denied that it 
was compatible with strict neutrality that 
French agents should be permitted to buy up 
in this country, under the eyes and with the 
cognizance of Her Britannic Majesty's Govern- 



ment, many thousands of breech-loaders, re- 
volvers, and pistols, with the requisite ammu- 
nition, in order to arm therewith the French 
people, and make the formation of fresh army 
corps possible after the regular armies of 
France had been defeated and surrounded. He 
affirmed that according to his information, 
which eould be partly tested upon oath, if 
thought desirable, the number of fire-arms 
shipped from England to France since his 
memorandum of Sept. SOth, had been three or 
fourfold the number of 40,000 announced by 
Count Palikao, and that a number of manu- 
factories, especially in Birmingham and Lon- 
don, were working day and night for French 
agents and their men of straw. He was in 
possession of authenticated copies of con- 
tracts, concluded between the French Govern- 
ment and English contractors. The events of 
the war had quite recently delivered into his 
hands an official letter of the present French 
Minister of War [M. Gambetta's predecessor,] 
dated the 18th of September, to a French 
officer at the French Embassy in London, and 
in which the then expected despatch of 25,000 
Snider rifles was mentioned, and reference 
made for the payment to the funds at the dis- 
posal of the French Charge d 'Affaires for the 
purchase of arms in general. In like manner, 
he could produce authentic proofs that the 
export of fire-arms and ammunition to 
France has been thoroughly organized in some 
British ports. Proceeding then to discuss 
the arguments in Earl Granville's note of the 
15th of September as to the validity of the 
German complaints of the facts from a judicial 
and political point of view, he referred to 
English statutes and precedents, and expressed 
his opinion that the right of a belligerent 
Power to complain about the attitude of a 
neutral State does not so much originate in 
its accidental municipal law, as in the inter- 
national law with which it is the duty of 
every Government to bring its own laws into 
harmony. This, he said, was the stand point 
of Germany, and he repudiated the justice of 
the argument, that because France has suffei-ed 
only defeats, while Germany, on the othei 
hand, enjoyed \ininterrupted successes, it woulc 
be contrary to the feelings of Her Britannic 



INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 



85 




8G 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY RAISED, 



Majesty's Government to change a line of 
policy, entered upon at a time when they could 
not know which side would be favoured by 
the fortune of war. Germany, he went on to 
say, could not get ships which she needed 
most urgently, while on the other hand the 
Executive now refused to apply the old laws 
for the prevention of the export of arms and 
ammunition to France, whereby the United 
Kingdom had become a great arsenal for the 
enemy; consequently the new law had as- 
sumed a character as regarded Germany which, 
if not hostile, was practically malevolent. 
Besides, he said, the complaints of the Govern- 
ment as to the manner in which the English 
neutrality laws were being administered dated 
from a time when Prussia had not yet gained 
any victories, and were not first raised by his 
memorandum of the 30th of August. More- 
over, at the time the memorandum was penned, 
France still possessed two poweriui armies, 
while her fleets commanded the Baltic and 
North Sea, so that it could not poisibly be a 
matter of indifference to Germany, whether 
England, by the exercise of her neutrality, ma- 
terially increased the advantages which France 
derived from her superiority at sea. Even 
under present circumstances the German peo- 
ple would not easily be persuaded that they 
were wanting in chivalry, because they com- 
plained that by an unrestricted export of arms, 
the enemy, who had been overcome only by 
great sacrifices on their part, was furnished with 
the means of prolonging a struggle which, 
even if its final result should not thereby be ma- 
terially affected, still in any case must lead to 
more bloodshed and more sacrifices for both 
belligerents. Even the most eloquent defender 
of the position taken by Her Britannic Ma- 
jesty's Government, he concluded, would not 
succeed in the eyes of Germany in bringing 
such a neutrality policy into harmony with 
the considerations of humanity, and the wishes 
for peace so frequently advocated by England- 
The representations of Count Bernstorff were 
ably answered by Earl Granville, but we con- 
fine ourselves for the present to the Line of 
argument by which the Berlin Government 
supported its remonstrances at a period when 
the Delegate Government at Tours was equip- 



ping fresh armies for the prosecution of the war. 
Hereafter the question raised by Count Bern- 
storff, will call for more particular attention. 

We have alluded to the fact of a Commu- 
nistic movement having taken place in Paris 
at the very time when the Republican general, 
La Motterouge, was fighting for the road to 
the capital. The occurrence is important, on 
account of its relation to subsequent events. 
On Saturday, Oct. 8th, there was such agitation 
in Paris as that excitable population are ac- 
customed to show when events are in pre- 
paration of which no one understands the 
exact meaning, or the probable consequences. 
There was much talk of an imposing mani- 
festation in arms in favour of the Commune. 
M. Gustave Flourens, of whom the reader has 
heard before in connection with the story of 
Rochefort, and the Lanterne (ante vol. i. p. 
163) had made himself prominent since the 
calamit}^ of Sedan and the investment of Paris, 
as a leading spirit among the worst class of 
Paris demagogues, and who had recently 
assumed the style and dignity of Major- 
General, represented a party who demanded 
the levy en masse, the appeal to republican 

Europe, THE IMMEDIATE ELECTION OF A MUNI- 
CIPAL Commune, the discharge of all "suspects" 
from positions of trust, and a general distribu- 
tion of daily rations to all citizens from the 
stores of provisions existing in the capital. 
Felix Pyat and Blanqui, with many others, 
who became notorious in the events that were 
soon to follow, were confederate with him in 
these demands, which the Government of Na- 
tional defence had refused to entertain. M. 
Flourens then resigned his military rank ; but 
finding that the world still continued to re- 
volve on its axis, and that his resignation was 
cheerfully accepted by the Commander-in- 
Chief, he withdrew it, and, at the same time 
resolved to present his demands at the head of 
his friends from Belleville, — the Whitechapel, it 
has been called, — but rather the Bethnal Green 
of Paris Demagogy. 9 The re-establishment 
of the Commune of 1789 had been preached 
by Ledru Rollin, both as the only means of 
saving the country, and as an acte expiatoire 
in memory of those who had perished on the 
scaffold for its sake. It was not proposed, 



COMMUNISTIC MOVEMENT AT PARIS. 



87 



however, to abolish the Government of Na- 
tional Defence, but to convert it into the 
executive department of the State, while the 
Commune assumed the real power as the 
Legislature. (Compare the constitution of the 
old Commune, ante, vol. i., p. 480.) It is 
doubtful if Felix Pyat agreed on this point 
with his fellow conspirators, for he denounced 
the Government of M. Jules Favre, as being 
a " servile, rotten, imbecile, and deadly " one, 
which therefore could not afford very pro- 
mising materials for constituting the executive 
branch of the proposed new order of things. 
However, the Commune was to " vivify it " — 
meaning, we presume, that Jules Favre and 
his coadjutors were to be subject to the orders 
of M. Flourens and his party, and on that 
condition were to remain in office. On the 
other hand, the Commune itself was to be 
responsible to its "constituents," that is to 
say, the Red Republican Clubs. 10 

The dissensions among the Communists 
themselves precluded all hope of immediate 
success. The lead of M. Flourens, on the 8th 
of October, was disavowed at a meeting on the 
previous day, by three-fourths of the chefs de 
bataillon, whose objections did not prevent 
M. Flourens from assuming responsibilities 
which his political comrades denied, per- 
haps begrudged him, and who was a man of 
courage, and even honest in his way, though 
mad with vanity and self-confidence. The 
announcement of the Government, that the 
elections to the municipality would be post- 
poned until after the siege was at an end, ap- 
peared as was expected, upon which M. 
Flourens ordered the drummers of the Belle- 
ville National Guard to beat to muster. 
Groups formed in various parts of the town 
when it was ascertained that it was contem- 
plated to renew the attempt which had once 
before proved abortive. Some were in favour 
of persevering with the manifestation, others 
were for desisting. The Government, having 
been informed of what was going on, although 
feeling every confidence in the disposition of 
the Parisian population, caused the rappel to 
be beaten. The movement had commenced 
about noon, and at three o'clock General 
Trochu rode between the crowd and the 



faithful battalions who had taken up their 
position in front of the Hotel de Ville, greeted 
by shouts for the Commune and shouts of 
Vive la Re'publique ! General Tamissier, the 
newly appointed Commander of the National 
Guard acted with great prudence, riding from 
group to group among the disaffected, and 
pacifying them with such paternal remarks as, 
" No, my children, not at present ; Vive la Re"- 
publique ! " And then, when a rumbling 
sound was heard, and there was silence for a 
moment, he added, " Hark ! that is the can- 
non; is this a time for dissension, think you?" 
In the meantime a deputation from the Cen- 
tral Committee was bowed out of the Hotel 
de Ville by M, Jules Favre, and still battalion 
after battalion of the National Guard continued 
to arrive with drums beating and colours flying. 
Each battalion, each company, formed itself 
in square, when it debouched on tte Place, 
and each square necessarily displaced some 
portion of the crowd. At five o'clock there 
were 10,000 National Guards in position, re- 
solved on protecting the Government at any 
cost, while Flourens had only collected a few 
incomplete batoalions, who were mingled with 
the excited crowd. At the hour just named,, 
there was no longer any doubt about the 
superiority of the force at the service of the 
Government. Then the word was given. 
The squares unfolded, formed into line, and 
in another instant the immense Place was 
cleared of the tumultuous thousands who had 
talked of following Flourens to the death. 
The drummers now placed themselves in the 
centre and beat the salute, the trumpets 
sounded, the doors of the Hotel de Ville were 
thrown open, and the .members of the Govern- 
ment of National Defence sallied forth, greeted 
every step of their way with loud acclama- 
tions, which they acknowledged by cries of 
Vive la Republique ! and by waving their hats 
above their heads. Thus they made the tour 
of the Place until they arrived again opposite 
the entrance of the Hotel de Ville, where the 
officers of the National Guard gathered round 
M. Jules Favre, who congratulated them on 
the result, and urged them in conclusion, not 
to let the day stir up in them any feeling of 
anger or animosity. " In this great and 

7A 



ss 



THE PARTY OF FLOURENS DEFEATED. 



generous population," he said, "we have no 
enemies. I do not think we can call those 
who have been the cause of my coming among 
you even adversaries. They have been led 
astray; let us bring them back by our 
patriotism." 11 

On Sunday and Monday (October 9th and 
10th), there was still much agitation, and ap- 
prehensions of a fresh descent upon Belleville. 
The Reds, who were represented by three 
journals, of which the Eappel was the most 
notorious, avowed their determination to con- 
tinue the agitation for the Commune both in 
the press and in their clubs. Blanqui's organ, 
La Patrie en Danger, appeared with an 
article headed in large type, " Fresh Provoca- 
tions to Civil War." The Government was 
accused of desiring only an opportunity to 
slaughter the people, and hide its faults in 
blood. It was accused of continuing the regime 
of personal power with twelve heads instead 
of one, " with the same dodges, the same ruses, 
drawn from the depths of the same laboratory." 
In their disgust and indignation "the people 
had demanded the Commune, and the Govern- 
ment had received them with bayonets." 12 The 
train! was laid, but the powder was not yet 
dry enough to explode. The arguments of 
Blanqui, the ravings of Pyat, and the mad 
gallantry of Flourens, all alike failed to excite 
sufficiently the bad blood of La Villette and 
Belleville. That striking Oowpde Theatre, the 
" Corps of Amazons," was so much lost labour 
and sacrifice of " properties." 13 On Saturday 
night various loyal battalions of the National 
Guard met in the rain to protest against the 
movement. On Sunday night, after another 
day of feverish agitation, Belleville was oc- 
cupied by the 55th Battalion of National 
Guards, and the Hotel de Ville was protected 
by three battalions of Mobiles, who performed 
this service of their own accord. When all 
danger had subsided, the officers of these troops 
were invited into the interior by MM. Ferry, 
Arago, and Rochefort, and departed with loud 
Vivas for the Government. 

While these events were occurring at Paris, 
the revolutionary fire was kindling into dan- 
gerous activity at Lyons also. In addition to 
the old elements of disaffection in its large 



ouvrier population, but too familiar with the 
theory of the barricade, the city and the 
villages around for miles were swarming with 
new levies, of whom the Gardes Mobiles were 
by no means the worst .specimens. These 
Moblots and Franc-tireurs, however, were 
only dangerous in the same sense that loosely- 
organized and ill-commanded armed bands 
always are to external order. The element 
to be feared in Lyons, as in Paris, was the 
political and social one. The International 
had established there its very citadel, and 
there were dangerous movements even so long 
ago as the affair of Pierre Buonaparte and 
Victor Noir. In January, 1870, six months 
before the commencement of the war with 
Germany, the women connected with the 
L3"ons section of the International, published 
a manifesto, exhorting those who fell by con- 
scription under the new army law to brave 
imprisonment or even civil war rather than 
serve. 14 This address was followed after a few 
days by an appeal to insurrection in the 
Marseillaise, in the form of a manifesto from 
the Administrative Commission of the Society 
at Brussels, and by a similar appeal from the 
General Council of the Belgian Associates. 
A third important document, issued in the 
same month, and signed by representatives 
acting in the name of France, Italy, Spain, 
England, and Germany, assured the members 
of the International of their adhesion to the 
revolutionary programme, and of their secret 
co-operation. 15 The activity of the Association 
was again shown in the month of April, pre- 
vious to the plebiscite, when also the large 
number of negative votes given by the army 
proved that the boast of the women of Lyons 
in the address referred to above, was not alto- 
gether without reason. 16 

It was not a simple formula of political or 
social dogmatism, however, that had converted 
the manufacturing capital of France after the 
fall of the empire, into a vast powder magazine 
or a loaded bombshell. The chiefs of all pro- 
scribed and elsewhure forgotten sects had thera 
found an asylum, disciples and resources. 
Specimens of all schools were to be found 
there ; Icariens, Fourierists, Egalitaires, Com- 
munists, all had their professors and adepts. 17 



THE RED FLAG AT LYONS. 



The ashes of former revolutionary fires were 
all aglow with these elements, when suddenly 
there came the news of the disastrous capitu- 
, lation of Sedan. The city was stirred with 
excitement. The Lyonnese Socialists sprang 
to their feet, and once more inspired by the 
stirring strains of the Marseillaise, and the 
hope of at last realizing their wild dreams, in- 
stalled themselves at the Hotel de Ville under 
the Red Flag. Their strength was sufficient 
while affecting to preserve appearances, to 
brave in reality the Tours Government until, 
on the 22nd of September their delegates had 
an interview with M. Cremieux, when it was 
agreed to waive all differences for the present, 
and allow the red flag to remain flying at 
Lyons till the national colours should be deci- 
ded upon by a regularly chosen constituent 
assembly. It was not so easy, however, to 
control the rank and file composed of such ele- 
ments as we have indicated above, and on the 
28th of September a hostile demonstration was 
got up under the leadership of Cluseret, who 
forced his way into the Hotel de Ville and 
addressed the people. 18 The Prefect was at 
this critical moment a close prisoner in his 
cabinet. In. the opinion of those who knew 
Lyons it wanted but one step to the guillo- 
tine; but, as at Paris, the National Guard 
stemmed the flood. " They fought," says the 
correspondent of the Standard, " as men fight 
who have something to lose, and see only in 
fighting the means of saving it. The Hotel 
de Ville was recaptured, and Cluseret having 
been arrested, was first locked up, but after- 
wards summarily dismissed. The Prefect then 
resumed the functions of his office ; but he ex- 
ercised them for some days longer under 
pressure of a close surveillance by the Socialist 
majority, who still virtually ruled in Lyons. 
Not a letter could pass the ante-chamber with- 
out being subjected to the scrutiny of the 
agents of this power, and almost all were 
opened and read before being permitted to 
reach the hands of the magistrate " with full 
power," to whom they were addressed. 19 The 
painted image emblematizing the Red Republic 
still looked simperingly down from the balcony 
of the Hotel de Ville ; 2 <> and the red spectre 
himself only slunk away in the darkness 



89 



when the result of the Municipal Elections, 
added to the defeat of Cluseret, left no doubt 
that the authorities would be supported in the 
suppression of any further attempt to establish 
a government of Socialists. The Central Com- 
mittee then retired into ambush, under the 
pretence of a patriotic resignation of their 
powers. 21 

In the meantime the Germans had spread 
their forces over the country of the Loire, and 
the army of General La Motterouge having 
been defeated before Orleans, the fear of a 
march upon Lyons dictated such measures 
for defence as could be hastily taken by a 
people so divided in their councils. An order, 
compelling all the priests to serve in the 
National Guard under the penalty of imprison- 
ment, spread dismay in the clerical body. The 
Prefect invested with supreme military au- 
thority a member of the Municipal Council 
who was a weaver by trade, with a strong 
military turn, though ho had never served in 
any military capacity. 2 * Whether a siege of 
Lyons was seriously anticipated or not by the 
authorities may be doubted, 2 -? but they seized 
the opportunity afforded them by the general 
excitement to employ the disaffected on what 
the latter at least regarded as serious work. 
Thousands of men were occupied at a rate of 
wages varying from three to five francs a day 
in throwing up entrenchments, and making 
earthworks for the defence of the city, against 
the propriety of which nothing could be said, 
except that they were completely dominated 
by the surrounding heights, and that a lofty 
railway embankment running the greater part 
of their ler gth, would effectually prevent the 
retreat of their defenders if the said heights 
should ever be mounted by the German 
guns. The enrolment of Franc-tireurs and 
other volunteers, was at the same time actively 
carried on, and the municipality voted a loan 
of ten millions of francs for the expenses of 
the defence. The principal of the Volunteer 
corps was a Franco-Polish Legion, the organi- 
zers of which were two men who had gained 
much experience in partisan warfare in Poland, 
Colonel Dombrowsky and Captain Wolosky. 
Besides the stir caused by these preparations, 
there was a great and long-continued excite- 



90 



GAMBETTA AND GARIBALDI. 



rnent about certain documents found at the 
Prefecture. Many found a sort of pleasure in 
believing that proofs were discovered of an in- 
tended coup d'etat which General Palikao had 
planned for the 8th of May. It was remarked 
that the papers found related more to the Libe- 
rals and moderate Republicans than to the So- 
cialists., the theory of Louis Napoleon's enemies 
being that there was always a certain degree of 
affinity between the latter and the Empire. 
The contents of these and all similar docu- 
ments containing alleged revelations of Im- 
perial perfidy, will demand our special atten- 
tion hereafter. 

People in England at this time watched the 
movements of Gambetta and Garibaldi with 
intense interest. The latter arrived at Besan- 
con on the 14th of October, and left im- 
mediately to reconnoitre the neighbourhood. 
He was placed in command of the irregular 
forces in the Vosges, to which were added 
a brigade of Mobiles; 24 he was to act in 
concert with General Cambriel, who com- 
manded the Eastern districts and had his head 
quarters at Belfort. Gambetta likewise, who 
was now universally recognized as a worthy 
representative of the men of '92, left Tours on 
the 17th to inspect the army of the Vosges, 
which had been ordered to arrest the march of 
the Germans on Lyons. He had first sent 
General Bourbaki, with whom he had conferred 
at Tours, 25 to take temporary command of 
the Army of the North, which had its ren- 
dezvous at Lille ; and had also issued a stirring- 
proclamation announcing good news from 
Paris. He did not positively say this good 
news included the destruction of St. Cloud by 
French shells, nor was it fair to the defender:; 
of their country to accuse them of barbaric in- 
difference for their own monuments and works 
of art, because they did not shrink from sacri- 
ficing them when military reasons made it im- 
possible to avoid doing so. 

On the 22nd of October, Gambetta issued a 
decree establishing four military regions. 1. 
The northern, to be commanded by Bourbaki, 
at Lille. 2. The western, with General Fiereck 
for its commander, and Le Mans for its head- 
quarters. 3. The central, commanded by 
General Polhes, at Bourges. 4. The eastern, 



commanded by General Cambriel, at Besancon. 
He also appointed General D'Aurelle de Pala- 
dines to command the army of the Loire in 
place of General La Motterouge, as previously 
mentioned (ante p. 83); distinct commissions 
being also held by General Esterhazy at Lyons, 
Count Ke'ratry in the west (- and Garibaldi in 
the east. Very soon afterwards he removed 
Cambriel from his command, that general 
having the misfortune to be both unsuccessful 
and incapable of an entente cordiale with 
Garibaldi. 

During the siege of Sfcrasburg a French force 
had been organized at Langres, consisting for 
the most part of Gardes Mobiles and Franc- 
tireurs, the recruits being drawn from the Haute 
Marne, Saone and Yonne, Cote d'Or, and the 
country near Dijon. This force numbered at 
the beginning of October, about 12,000 men, 
and although it had been unable to attempt 
the relief of Strasburg, it had done considerable 
service in hindering the communications of the 
Gei-mans in Alsace, with the armies moving on 
or investing Paris. Immediately after the fall 
of Strasburg, therefore, General Werder de- 
tached a column under Major-GeneralFreiheer 
von Degenfeld, with instructions to reconnoitre, 
and if possible, disperse the enemy, and overawe 
the inhabitants of the Vosges who gave them 
shelter and assistance. The detached force 
consisted altogether of six battalions, two and a 
quarter squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, 
which General Degenfeld divided into three 
columns, each consisting of two battalions ac- 
companied by a proportion of cavalry and 
cannon. These columns advancing by different 
routes, were ordered to meet in the Valley of 
the Meurthe at Raon l'Etape and Etival. 
Starting from Strasburg on the 1st of October, 
the column found its passage through the 
Vosges delayed by trenches dug across the 
road, and various other obstructions, which the 
French occasionally defended. The only in- 
cident, however, that could be dignified with 
the name of a combat, occurred after passing 
the Vosges, on the 5th of October, at Raon 
l'Etape. It was immediately after this that 
the 14th Army Corps was organized by General 
Werder, as previously stated (ante p. 16), 
by an order dated Ferrieres, September 30th 






OPERATION IN THE VOSGES. 



01 



and as Werder was now ordered (October 4th) 
to move his entire force through the Vosges in 
order to disperse the battalions gathering under 
the flag of Cambriel, he directed General De- 
genfeld to consider his division as the advanced 
guard of that part of the 14th Army Corps 
which was directed against Epinal. 

The main body, led by Werder, left Stras- 
burg on the 5th and 6th. It consisted of the 
Baden Division (von Beyer), and the 30th 
Prussian Infantry regiment. The other troops 
of Werder's corps (Landwehr, etc.) being em- 
ployed partly as garrisons, and partly in be- 
sieging the small fortresses east of Strasburg, 
as already stated. It was expected that 
Werder's corps, when it had succeeded in 
clearing the country in its front, would effect 
a junction with that of Von der Tann, who 
would turn eastward for the purpose, after 
possessing himself of Bourges, to guard which 
was his first object. In the meantime, as 
Garibaldi had gone to Besancon, the field of 
operations for the corps of Werder (in the 
quadrangle formed by Dijon, Besancon, Vesoul, 
and Belfort) was one in which the great 
revolutionary chieftain was expected to strike 
a blow that would prove the metal both of 
himself and his foe. 

T*he first brunt of the attack by the ad- 
vancing columns of Werder had, however, 
to be bome by the loosely-formed army of 
the Vosges described above. By some columns 
of these, coming from Remberviller and 
Bruyeres, General Von Degenfeld was at- 
tacked on the 6th at Etival, on his way to 
occupy St. Die. A thick fog prevailed in the 
morning, in consequence of which, on the 
skirmirshers encountering a warm fire afc day- 
break, a halt was made on the heights of 
Etival. At 9.15 it was sufficiently clear for 
the advance to be continued. Rompatelize, 
which the French had occupied, and where 
they had erected two batteries, was soon 
taken, but in the wood beyond it there was 
a warm engagement. By 1 p.m. the French 
appeared dispirited, and their fire slackened, 
the Germans, however, were also nearly ex- 
hausted. Many infantry detachments had 
scarcely any cartridges left, and two guns, 
which had been firing incessantly since 10.30, 



had hardly any ammunition remaining. About 
1.30 the French were reinforced, their artillery 
resuming fire and the infantry renewing the 
attack on all sides. They were, however, 
received with equal determination ; the German 
artillery displaying its superiority. The re- 
serves were called up, and at 3.30 a general 
advance was ordered. Drums and trumpets 
sounding, the steep slopes of the wood were 
stormed. The French awaited the attack, 
but were pushed back step by step up to the 
crest of the heights, and then driven, in wild 
flight down the mountains towards La Bour- 
gonce. Here the French attempted another 
stand, but were driven back, and fled in con- 
fusion to Bruyeres and Remberviller. The 
battle-field, the wood, and the line of retreat 
were strewn for a long distance with knap- 
sacks, muskets, and equipments. The Badeners 
bivouacked at night on the field, the burning 
village of Rompatelize serving as their watch- 
fire. The force engaged was estimated at 
3,600 or 3,800 men, who after seven hours 
warm fighting defeated a foe double their 
strength if mere numbers are considered, took 
600 unwounded prisoners, and put a large 
number hors de combat. According to the 
prisoners, the French were commanded by 
General Petevin, and the reader does not 
require to be told of what materials they con- 
sisted. In addition to the Mobiles of the 
Vosges and the Meurthe, there were a few 
marching regiments which had arrived in 
haste the previous nigho from Bordeaux, Mar- 
seilles, and some garrisons of the south. The 
strength of the French was probably under 
10,000, and they had eight or nine guns, but 
no cavalry. The loss on the German side was 
22 officers and 382 men. For a scratch force 
like that of the French Vosges Army, the 
fighting was by no means discreditable. 

The next day Degenfeld halted his columns 
south of Etival, to cover the march of Werder 
from the mountain passes, and at the same 
time sent detachments to St. Die and Raon, 
which places they occupied without meeting 
with any opposition. On the 8th, the Baden 
main force began to debouch in the Valley of 
the Meurthe. On the 9th, Werder having 
concentrated his leading columns, made his 



92 



GENERAL VON WERDER8 HEAD-QUARTERS. 




GENERAL VON WERDER. COMMANDER OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



head-quarters at Raon l'Etape, and the same 
day sent forward his advanced guard, which 
was followed on the 10th and 11th hy the 
remaining divisions, against the Moselle, at 
Epinal. On these two days the monotony of 
the march was broken by slight engagements 
at Rcmberviller, and other places, which, 
however, were scarcely skirmishes in im- 
portance. On the 12th, Epinal became the 
head-quarters of Werder, who reported, that 
the enemy in his front had withdrawn hastily 
to Belfort and Dijon. 

On the 15th, Werder broke cover again, 
and marched for Vesoul, which place he 
occupied on the 18th. The opposition here 
was very slight, but the Germans showed 
themselves more merciless than elsewhere 
on the line of march. Werder had now 
learned that Besancon (where Garibaldi had 
arrived shortly before) was the centre of 
resistance in this part of the country, and 



though he did not consider he was sufficiently 
strong to capture this place, he could, at any 
rate, prepare for that event, by sweeping the 
country clean of the inexperienced youth who 
had been drawn together to form the army, 
so called, of the Vosges. 

On the 20th, Vesoul became Werder's head- 
quarters, and from thence, on the 22nd, he 
directed his army, in three columns, upon the 
Ognon. At Cussey, the French again made a 
stand, and disputed his passage over the river; 
but he was again victorious over greater 
numbers, and continuing his advance — ficrhtinor 
and taking prisoners at almost every step — he 
found himself on the 29th, within one day's 
march of Dijon. But Prince Frederick Charles 
was now on his march southwards, owinsf to 
the capitulation of Metz, and Werder received 
orders, which we must leave him to consider, 
while we endeavour to realize how that im- 
portant event was brought to pass. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXII. 



93 



Notes to Chapter LXII. 



1 Alluding to the researches 01 Dr. Thurnam in the long 
barrows of Yorkshire, Canon Greenwell says:— "If Ihey were 
the bodies of persons slain in battle, we might certainly find the 
cleft skulls and broken bones ; but the accidents of war will not 
account for the scattered state in which the bones are (bund, or 
even for the bodies being-, in many cases, thoso of women and 
children." 

s The following telegrams relate to this event : — " Montargis, 
Oct. 5, Evening. The enemy left Pithivier.s precipitately yester- 
day evening for Toury, and abandoned a herd of 180 cows at 
Manchecourt. Thirty Germans have been killed at Bonderoy by 
tha Turcos. Only one man escaped, and it is believed that there 
are none of the enemy's troops now in the Loiret.'' 

" Veudomc, Oetobor G, Evening. The Prussians have been 
driven out of Janville, Toury, and the neighbouring villages. 
The Frencli made twenty prisoners, one of whom is a courier of 
Prince Albert. The enthusiasm is increasing, and the road to 
Toury is crowded with National Guards, some of whom have 
como a distance of forty kilometres.'' 

How the example spread, and stirred up the spirit of resistance, 
is shown by the following despatch : — " Vendome, October 5. A 
telegram from Chateaudun says the Prussians have been repulsed 
from Ymouville and the neighbourhood by Franc-tireuis and 
National Guard*, who have risen en masse this evening. They 
have set fire to Fancrainville. The inhabitants of the communes 
aie demanding to be allowed to march to Janville.'' 

The report of General Reyau to the Minister of War was as 
follows:— 

"Chevillt, 5th Oct, G.50 evening. 
"To-day, October 5, I left Chevilly with three cavalry bri- 
gades and some infantry, taking the direction of Toury. Each 
brigade had a half-battery attached. Towards seven o'clock we 
arrived near Chaussy, a village lying 3-4 kilometres from Toury. 
The squadron of the Sixth regiment Hussars, which formed the 
advanced guard, surrounded this place, and threw itself upon the 
fore posts of the enemy, taking at once five prisoners belonging 
to the King of Bavaria's regiment. The Iu|istil9 artillery, which 
numbered ten twelve-pounders, had taken position near Toury. 
It fired with great accuracy upon our artillery, which consisted 
of nine four-pounders. The guns of the half-battery ofLongue- 
rue's brigade were immediately dismounted. Two officers of the 
Sixth regiment Hussars were killed. Chief of Squadron Loylet 
and Sub-Lieutenant dc Bourgoing were dangerously wounded. 
Several shells fell among Ressayre's brigade, which was formed 
in mass. Three men and three horses were killed. In spite of 
the very well directed fire of the enemy, the advance was con- 
tinued. The hostile cavalry, which was 400 to 500 strong, and 
supported by 2,000 infantry, was forced to begin a retreat towards 
Paris. We followed them to three or four kilometres beyond 
Toury. Several shots were exchanged with the enemy, who 
withdrew in haste. I then ordered the movement to cease, as 
the troops were very much fatigued. Michel's brigade had 
marched since midnight, and the other brigades since three 
o'clock in the morning. Neither soldiers nor horses had eaten or 
drunk in this time. I withdrew to Toury, where I learned that 
Prince Albert and the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Alten- 
burg, had been there for eight days, and had left Toury at the 
time of our first attack at eight o'clock. I took possession here 
of a drove of cattle, 14',' cows and 52 sheep, which had been col- 
lected by the enemy and sent it to Artenay. As soon as possible 
I will send you a detailed report upon this affair, in which each 
one has done his duty.'' 

3 General Reyau's report to the Minister of War at Tours was 
as follows : — " Orleans, Oct. 10th, 8.50 p.m. This morning, at 
about half- past nine o'clock, Artenay, where the Brigade Lon- 
guerue and several companies of Chasseurs were encamped, was 
attacked by considerable forces and occupied by the enemy. 
General Reyau went immeliately to the support of the brigade 
with five regiments, four battalions, and an 8-pounder battery. 
After a resistance, which lasted till 2.30 p.m. , our troops were 



driven back to the forest, which I still occupy, and will defend at 
any price. In this engagement the enemy's forces were superior 
to ours in infantry, cavalry, and specially in artillery." This 
was probably the first official despatch received by Gambetta as 
Minister of War. 

The following official despatches from the German Head- 
Quarters at Versailles also relate to the event: — " Royal Head- 
Quarters, Versailles, Oct. 11. A mixed body of troops, belonging 
to the army of the Crown Prince, and under the command of 
General Von der Tann, defeated a portion of the army of the 
Loire near Orleans yesterday. 1,000 prisoners and three guns 
were captured. The enemy fled in disorder.'' 

" Versailles, Oct. 11. Yesterday an important engagement 
took plac; between General Von der Tann's force and a French 
corps in the neighbourhood of Artenay. The French lost three 
guns, and up to the moment this news was despatched, above 
1,000 prisoners. They are flying towards Orleans, and are being 
pursued by large bodies of cavalry." 

4 The combatants of a French regiment number 2,336 men, 
and tho e of a battalion 778. 

5 The despatches announcing the battle were as follows. The 
special correspondent of the Times telegraphed from Versailles 
on tiie 12th : — " Yesterday, after nine hours fighting, Orleans 
was taken by General Von der Tann. He took more than 2,000 
prisoners and several guns. The German loss amounted to 
1,200 ; that of the French was heavy." 

The King telegraphed to Queen Augusta :—" Yesterday, 
victorious battle by General Von der Tann, Twenty-second 
divkion. The Loire army completely beaten. Some thousands 
prisoners. Battle lasted from half-past nine o'clock until seven 
o'clock evening, in very difficult ground. At dark Orleans 
taken. Enemy retreated behind the Loire, hasgreat losses; ours 
proportionately small. Details not yet known." 

The French report was as follows :— " La Ferte St. Aubin, 
OcN 12. Yesterday the enemy continued his march upon 
Orleans. Our troops, which were on the road to Paris, were 
overlapped by the enemy, who had very numerous artillery, and 
withdrew upon Orleans, disputing the ground step by step. In 
order to stop the inarch of the enemy, I threw against him three 
reserve battalions of the Second division, who withstood him 
three hours. Our troops were again overlapped, and I therefore 
took the determination to abandon Orleans, and withdraw to the 
left bank of the Loire. The retreat was accomplished in good 
order, and was not disturbed." 

G The following telegram contains one or two items of informa- 
tion not included in the preceding despatches (note 5) :— " Belle- 
garde, Oct. 12, 4 p.m. Orleans has been occupied by the enemy 
since six o'clock yesterday. Our troops retreated to the left 
bank of the Loire before the continuous fire of the Prussian 
artillery. Twenty-four-pound shells were thrown into the 
town, setting fire to the railway station and houses in the fau- 
bourg. It is said that the Mayor and the Bishop went with a 
flag of truce to ask for the discontinuance of the bombardment.'' 

7 As the road from Paris leads directly through Orleans over 
the principal bridge which connects the Nortii with the South 
bank of the river, the French may be sad to have retreated 
fighting round the statue of Jeanne Dare. So long as the Ger- 
mans were on the South side, there were rumours of another 
rally and an expected battle at Ferte St. Aubin, which of course 
died out when they were recalled, and had blown up the bridges." 

8 The Liberte of Oct. 14th, for example, published the follow- 
ing letter, dated from Tours, Oct. 12th :— " Beaten ! Yes we 
have been beaten ; for our troops have not been able to keep 
their ground at Artenay or in the forest, which the General said 
he was resolved to defend at any cost; nor yet in the neighbour- 
hood of Orleans or in Orleans itself. The official despatches, 
since the beginning of the war until now, alike under the Ollivier 
Empire, the David Empire, and the Cremieux Republic-the official 
despatches for three months have all succeeded each other with- 
out improvement. They are all alike. They will announce, 
perhaps, to-morrow to France that our troops have fallen back 



94 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXII. 



on some hill or other in some unknown valley, or to the banks of 
some river. But, heartrending as the facts are, we should have 
tho honesty not to disguise the truth. Our troops falling hack 
on the left bank of the Loire, as they have fallen back, means 
simply that they have abandoned to the enemy the whole of the 
first line of the military operations of the army of the Loire. We 
desire most ardently to find that wo are deceiving ourselves. 
How can one help being deceived ? The system of secrecy, or 
of half avowals of the truth, is, in short, still maintained. It 
controls us, such as we are, and by preventing us from seeing 
things as they are, it makes it the duty of men of sense to enter- 
tain all sorts of fears, as much as it encourages fools to foster 
every illusion.'' 

9 Abbey Street, Bethnal Green, was the Head Quarters of 
Chartism in 1848, and for some years previously. I was acci- 
dentally present at a meeting there on the evening when the 
Tower was prepared for defence by the Duke or Wellington. 
The proceedings commenced by singing the Marseillaise, which 
was led off by an old shoemaker, whose scan., grey Iocks and 
fiery eyes, lighted up by enthusiasm, gave liim the weird ap- 
pearance almost of a maniac. This inspiring song was followed 
by a speech from a journeyman taker, almost worn to a skeleton 
by his long hours of unhealthy task work. Having worked himself 
up to a frenzy of declamation, he was in the act of screaming out — 
literally screaming, with his arms extended, and hi3 eyes flashing 
— that he was prepared to "take the torch in one hand and the 
dagger in the other,'' when there was a sudden crash, and the 
police entered, armed with swords and pistols. A single shot was 
fired from the neighhourhool of the platform, which, however, 
did no harm, and for a few seconds a scene of wild confusion 
ensued, some attempting to arm themselves by breaking the 
forms and benches, others escaping through the windows. The 
next day it was rumoured that the Abbey Street demagogues 
had intended to march from their place of meeting that evening 
and commence the carnival of revolution by firing the Tower. 

10 This appears from the conditions which Felix Pyat proposed 
to enforce on all candidates for election to the Commune, as speci- 
fied in his journal, La P atria en Danger (see letter from " an 
occasional correspondent" of the Times, Oct. 17th, 1870). The 
facts, however, will be fully developed in the further history of the 
Commune, when the elections actually took place, and the new 
reign of terror commenced in Paris. 

11 Details in the letter referred to above (note 10). 

12 The following is the extract, summarized in the text, from 
La Patrie en Danger : — 

" Experience has proved it. All know to-day what many only 
suspected yesterday — the arrogant pretensions of power and its 
obstinacy, determined not to retreat even in view of crime. 

" This power, pretended to have sprang from the people, 
desires only to slaughter the people. Like its predecessors, it 
seeks to hide its faults in blood, and to stifle Republican clam- 
ours and demands beneath bayonets. 

"This personal power, with twelve heads instead of one, with 
the same dodges, the same ruses, drawn from the depths of the 
same laboratory. . . . 

" The inexplicable faults of the Government, its equivocal re- 
lations with the enemy, its subterfuges and lies, had made all 
hearts indignant, and had plainly shown the necessity for an 
authority to control and overlook it. 

"The Commune then became the cry ot the people, its 
resource and its supreme hope against all attempts at treachery 
and surrender. . . . 

" Proletaires, you ask or the Commune. The Government 
receives you with bayonets. Against you it appeals to the 
selfish instincts of trade and fear. The fratricidal drum calls to- 
gether the battalions of the Centre against the battalions of the 
Faubourgs. 

" Had it not been for the patriotism of the Republican com- 
manders, blood would have flowed in Paris. It is no longer 
government or dictation, it is simply folly." 

18 The "Amazons of France," first known as " the Committee 

Women of the Rue d' Arras,'' began to appear in public in the 
early days of October, when they went in procession to the H6tel 



de Ville to the number of 200, preceded by drummers of the 
National Guard, and carrying in their midst the white flag with 
the red cross of the Geneva Convention. They held their public 
meetings at the Gymnase Triat, Avenue Montaigne, in the 
quarter of the Champs Elyseos. 

11 The following paragraph contains the exhortation referred 
to in the text from the address of the women of the International 
section of Lyons, to tho young men of the class of 1870, urg- 
ing them to refuse military service: "It is by a revolutionary 
act, that of absolutely refusing obedience to the law of conscrip- 
tion, that it is necessary to protest, and not by useless reclama- 
tions. ... It is a fact obvious to all the world that the 
Government of Bonaparte (sic) is at this moment lost in public 
opinion, and that all France is hostile to him, not excepting the 
army itself, which awaits but the opportunity of an appeal 
to tlw people to give a startling proof of the fact. . . . What, 
is it you fear ? Imprisonment ? We, your mothers, your sisters, 
your sweethearts, will watch over you, will fight with you. . . . 
Put us to the proof, young citizens, and it will be seen that the 
women of France have not degenerated, that they are as capable 
of energy and patriotism (civisme) as their ancestors of 179w . ." 
This proves how the army had been undermined by the secret 
societies before the Plebiscite of 1870. 

15 The societies of workmen were not generally so audacious as 
the " Parisian Circle of Proletarian Positivists." They feared 
the consequences of a public adhesion at this period, and it was 
in consida-ation of their scruples that the General Council in 
London passed the following resolution : — 

" General Council of the International Working Men's 
" Association, 256, High Holborn. 

"Sitting of the 25th of January, 1870. — Considering that 
the political situation of France does not permit of the actual 
establishment there of a Central Committee, and that several 
societies of working men only' postpone their adhesion to the 
International Association from the fear that such public adhesion, 
in certain circumstances, would he prejudicial to their 
interests — 

" To be recognized as affiliated members of the International 
Association of Working Men, it will suffice for societies of work- 
men to nominate a correspondent, who shall have direct com- 
munication with the General Councd actually sitting in London. 
This resolution to be communicated to all the societies of work- 
ing men in France. By order of the General Council, the 
corresponding secretary for France, Eugene Dupont." 

16 See note 14 above. 

17 Letter in the Independance Beige, dated September 23rd. 

18 "General" Cluseret, as he styled himsalf, has been men- 
tioned before, and will be heard of again before this history is 
closed. He was a man of ungovernable ambilion, dangerous 
alike to his friends and his enemies. He was master of the situa- 
tion for a short period at Lyons, on the occasion mentioned in 
the text. The Times telegram announcing the event is 
subjoined: — 

" Lyons, Sept. 29, 8.50 a.m.— A demonstration hostile to the 
Government was attempted here yesterday. General Cluseret 
forced his way into the Hotel de Ville, and addressed the people. 
The National Guard were called out, and restored order. General 
Cluseret and the leaders of the movement have been arrested. 
The National Guard remained loyal. No blood was shed." 

19 Correspondence of the Sta,ndard : letter dated from Lyons, 
" under the Red Flag," Oct. 13th, 1870. 

20 The red £sg flew from the summit of the cupola of the 
Hotel de Ville at Lyons, but a hundred feet below the same idea 
had found expression in a singular work of art, which is described 
in the letter referred to above. The thing is worth noting as an 
illustration of tho childishness of these madcap Frenchmen, even in 
their ferocious n « ?ds : — " \long the first floor of the principal 
front of the Hole, ae Ville," said the correspondent of the Stand- 
ard, "runs a handsome stone balcony, and in the centre of this, 
just over the principal entrance, stands the Republic herself, 
supported on either side by two more red flags, one of which, 
broken from its insufficient fastenings, hung head downwards on 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXII. 



95 



the pavement of the balcony, Where that unlucky work of art 
can have come from, or what may have been its original destina- 
tion, I cannot say, and have not yet been able to ascertain, but 
anytliing more perfectly laughable the most loyal of Imperialists 
could neither desire nor devise. Had Lyons been a seaport town, 
I should have imagined it had been the figure-head of some 
small coasting collier. Had the thing itself been a little smaller, 
I should have known it at once as a discharged dummy from the 
window of some neighbouriug village dressmaker, though in 
either case the original owner would have been sorely unlucky in 
his choice of an artist. A flat and perfectly expressionless face, 
round blue eyes wide open, not so much from astonishment as 
from an inability on the part of the artist to realize the idea of an 
eyelid; beautiful pink cheeks, with the pink well defined in a 
circular outline of admirable regularity, and a pair of the fiercest 
possible black eyebrows, charmingly contrasted with a simper of 
perfect inanity upon the lips. She had a red night-cap, of course 
— this goddess of the 19th century liberty — and a tricolour tunic, 
the colours of which, however, somewhat worn and knocked 
about, were quite shamed by the glowing tints of cheek and eye ; 
and there she stood between the two blood red flags, simpering in 
amiable inflexibility upon the now quiet place below, just as she 
simpered a month since upon the storming of the Palace in which 
she now reigns; just as she will too probably simper a month 
hence upon far bloodier scenes — an emblem always of the stupidity 
and blunders of the mob, as the terrible ensign above of its ferocity 
and its crimes." 

21 The resignation of the "Red" Committee of Lyons was 
announced in the following address : — 

" Central Committee of Safety of France. 
"To the People. — We have done all we possibly could to 
secure the adoption of the great revolutionary measures which 
alone, in our opinion, can save our unhappy country from dis- 
honour and ruin. We desired that the current month should 
be employed in raising everywhere the masses of the people and 
organizing the revolutionary liberation of all the living forces of 
France against Prussia. We desired that the union of all 
citizens without exception, if it were not for the advantage of 
the traitors to the national cause, should be established by the aid 
of institutions more solid and more democratic than the hierarchy 
and the administrative centralization, the old judicial system, and 
the old military organization, which are so many germs of des- 
potism and guarantees of the actual social inequality. We desired 
that there should only be in France one grand army of brethren 
joining hands and marching to assured victory. 

" Our propositions were rejected, but we desire at any cost 
to avoid troubles and divisions, and we do not wisli to be mis- 
taken for agitators and ambitious persons. Therefore we leave 
the people to judge of the situation, and we proclaim the disso- 
lution of the Central Committee of Safety of France. 
" Lyons, Oct. 9, 1870. 

" For the Committee, 
"Albert Richard, Parraton, Deville, Bis- 
chojfp, Blanc, Charvet, Favke, P. J. Pul- 
liat, Comet Camille, Premillieux.'' 

The letter in the Independence Beige, referred to above 
(Note 17), contained the following remarks: "The leaders of 
this (Socialistic) movement, who believed that from fear or ap- 
proval they would be allowed a free course at the elections, were 
astonished at the result of the polling for the municipal offices, 
which showed a majority in favour of the Moderate Republicans, 
which is not likely to be diminished. Still they do not appear to 
have abandoned all hope of again seizing their prey, and anxiety 
is again felt lest further troubles should ensue. They seek to 
excite distrust in the impressionable minds of these southern 
people. The least act of moderation is stigmatized by them as an 
attempt against the Republic, for which they really care but 
little. They have in that manner denounced the liberation of the 
fcrmer civic and political functionaries who had been imprisoned, 
and who, according to these enthusiasts, ought to ha\e been 
placed upon their trial simply because they had been public 
functionaries. Such, at least, was the reply made by a membei 
of the Commune to questions addressed to him by the Committee 



of Inquiry appointed by the New Municipal Council. At the 
present time, a fresh excitement has arisen at the Croix Rousse. 
M. Andrieux, Procureur of the Republic, who not long ago was 
the idol and oracle of these people, has vainly endeavoured to 
induce them to listen to the voice of reason. He was at one time 
himself actually placed under arrest by a violent mob, and it was 
not without difficulty that he regained his liberty. All these 
facts have irritated the armed bourgeoisie, and the city is divided 
as it were, into two camps." 

22 Correspond ;nce of the Times. 

23 It was previously thought, however, that Lyons might 
become an important centre in the future military operations if 
the investment of Paris was abandoned, an event which the 
Lyonnese thought very possible from the immense difficulties that 
would be encountered there by the enemy. It was a much 
sounder opinion that Lyons could not be seriously menaced until 
the corps of Werder, controlling the Haute Rhine, had made 
sure of the gap of Belfort by co-operating in its march with 
another corps detached from the army besieging Paris. This was 
no doubt the essential object of the movements against the army 
of the Loire. 

21 At first Garibaldi was supposed to have been invested with 
the command of the irregular forces throughout France, as we 
have previously stated ; but this was either an error in point of 
fact, or the command was afterwards limited to the irregular 
forces in the Vosges. The latter, at any rate, was the practical 
shape which his command assumed when he took the field. The 
former represented the grand anticipations that were indulged in 
cf something like an inspirational power in Garibaldi, to create a 
furore of patriotism and enthusiasm wherever he moved. The 
imaginary command was perhaps conferred upon him by the 
Tours Government in the heat of conversation, but when it 
became necessary to express the scope of the appointment in a 
formal commission, it was seen to be impracticable. 

25 Bourbakl had come from Metz, having been passed through 
the Prussian lines by the General's authority. He went direct 
to England, where he had an interview with the Empress Eu- 
genie, lie thou attempted to return to Metz, but being requested 
to present himself at the Head-Quarters of Prince Frederick 
Charles, when he applied f..r the necessary permission, he thought 
it wiser to go to Brussels. From Brussels he went to Tours, 
where he arrived on the 14th of October. This curious episode 
will come under more particular notice in connection with the fall 
of Metz, recorded in the following chapter. 

25 The following is the full text of M. Gambetta's proclamation 
to the inhabitants of Tours, dated Oct. 14tb, 9.45 p.m. : — 

" It is with an unspeakable expression of joy that I hasten to 
make known to you the encouraging news received from Paris by 
a balloon, which left the capital on the 12'Ji inst. 

" At Paris the people, more and more heroic, prepare the sal- 
vation of France by the admirable order which they maintain in 
the city, and by the privations which the inhabitants cheerfully 
impose on themselves. A detail, which is not in the least vulgar 
in the gravity of the situation in which we are placed, is that 
horseflesh is being eaten at the beginning of the siege, the 
living flocks of cattle being reserved for the last days. 

" In their impatience behind the ramparts, the National Guard 
have expressed 1heir wish to be led against the enemy; and here 
is the bulletin of their first victory : — Along the whole belt which 
has been placed round the city, the Prussians have been dis- 
lodged ftom the positions they occupied during the last three 
weeks. On the north, in the direction of Saint Denis, they have 
been driven back beyond Stains, Pierrefitte, and Dugny. On 
the east Dobigny, Joinville le Pont, Cretail, and the Plateau 
d'Avron have been retaken. To the south the Germans have been 
driven out of Bas Meudon and St. Cloud [on which occasion the 
palac? was destroyed by the French fire], being forced to retire 
to Versailles. 

" I told you a few days ago that Paris is impregnable. Behold, 
it now becomes the assailant ! Such admirable examples cannot 
leave the Departments insensible. Let us all redouble our work 
and energies, as we are henceforth sure that Paris will do her 
duty until the end. Let us do ours." 



!)K 



QUESTION OF BAZAINE'S STRATEGY. 




GENERAL COFFINIERES DE NORDECK, COMMANDANT OF METZ. 



CHAPTER LXIII. 

BAZAINE AT METZ. 

Resume— Bazaine's attemj)ts to lead his Army beyond Metz— 
Question of his Strategy— Retrospect to Gravelotte— Ques- 
tion of Bazaine's inactivity previous to the Sortie of August 
31st — His endeavours to concert a movement with Mac- 
mahon— Attempt of August 26th— Opinion of Rustow— 
Opinion of a Prussian General — Attempt of August 31st — 
Subsequent Events in Metz — Bazaine's Reserve —Question 
of his fidelity to the Emperor— Why he held Metz— The 
Political Situation— Romantic Episode— Story of M. Regnier 
— Propositions submitted by him to the Empress — Interview 
with M. Bismarck at Ferrieres — Journey to Metz and inter- 
view with Bazaine — Mission of Bourbaki to Chislehurst — 
The Mystery cleared up — Return of Regnier to Ferrieres, 
and end of the Negotiation — Mission of General Boyer — 
Decision of the Empress — Resumption cf the Sorties. 

We have explained in a previous chapter that 
the situation of Bazaine at Metz was a hopeless 
one after the failure of his attempt to cut 
through the German lines, on the 31st of 
August and the 1st of September, when the 
battle of Sedan was also being fought (ante, 
vol. i., p.p. 370-374). We have also shown 



that he maintained a desperate fight at Grave- 
lotte, before he was beaten back under the 
walls of Metz, on the evening of August 18th 
(Ibid. p.p. 360-368). The newspaper corres- 
pondent who represented a provincial paper at 
Metz, and to whose statements we have before 
alluded, will find history against him on these 
two important points. When the strategy of 
two opposed forces comes to a crisis, as it must 
sooner or later, only one of the two can be 
victor. We have shown that victory hung "in 
the balance between the two armies, when the 
fight wore on to evening on that long summer 
day. Why Pont-a-Mousson was not guarded, 
why the Prussian line, therefore, received such 
reinforcements late in the day that it was able 
to swing round on its right as on a pivot, and 
strike with overwhelming force the extremiiy 
of the French line, is another question altoge- 
ther. The neglect may have been a military 



QUESTION OF BAZAINE'S INACTIVITY. 



97 



necessity, or an error of strategy; but we be- 
lieve the fact was as we have stated. Bazaine 
had no idea that Prince Frederick Charles was 
proceeding by forced marches to Pont-a- 
Mousson, or if any intelligence to that effect 
reached him, he could scarcely have admitted 
the possibility of being counter-marched on 
the Gravelotte and Rezonville Road, by forces 
sweeping round at such a distance (ante, vol.i. 
pp. 351-353). When the crisis became known 
to him as the day waned, ending with the rush 
of Fransetzky's Pomeranians, led by Moltke 
himself, against his right (vol. i. p. 366), he did 
all that a commander of genius and resolution 
could do, by directing his forces against the 
pivotal right of the German army at Gravelotte, 
and eventually the seventh and eighth corps 
began to give way. No amount of vitupera- 
tion can disguise the fact that the moment was 
an anxious one for the enemy. It was a ques- 
tion of moments, when Moltke galloped forward 
to head the newly arrived troops, and led them 
into the thick of the fight ; for with a little 
more pressure on the German right, the French 
would have swept victorious over the field of 
Gravelotte, and their centre and left would 
have been cut off. As at Sadowa, the time had 
been so nicely calculated, that there was scarcely 
the margin of an instant to spare, and for this 
almost superhuman exertions had been made. 

So, on the 31st of August when Bazaine had 
reason to expect the advance of Macmahon to 
his relief, the attempt to break through the lines 
was undoubtedly begun and sustained with 
courage. The battle of Noisseville (ante vol. i- 
pp. 373-374) was not quite child's play. It is 
absurd toargue thatanattemptwasnotseriously 
meant, in which Canrobert, Lebceuf, Frossard, 
L'Admirault, and even the veteran Changarnier, 
(certainly no friend of the Empire or abettor of 
Bazaine's alleged treason), took a leading part, 
and in which half-a-dozen villages were cap- 
tured before the French rested on their arms 
at nightfall. 1 Prince Frederick Charles mdre 
just to the enemy than their own countrymen, 
bore witness in his official despatch to the 
"great bravery " with which the French had 
fought on this occasion. It is not unusual, 
indeed, to hear it objected, in reply to this ar- 
gument, that the victorious aimy was not likely 



to underrate the valour of the foe it had con- 
quered ; but wc must appeal to facts. The 
German despatches frequently mention how 
the French gave way and fled in a panic, and 
if these statements are to be received as the 
simple truth, why should the rule not hold 
when they speak of the valour and resolution 
of the enemy ? 

It is affirmed, however, that Bazaine is at 
least to be condemned for his inactivity in the 
interval between the battle of August 18th and 
the sortie of the 30th. Prima facie an im- 
partial historian would be disposed to say that 
a commander who had acted with promptitude 
and courage on two occasions, separated by an 
interval of only twelve days might be trusted 
to have clone all that was possible during this 
interval, unless on the other hand, he were 
open to the accusation of intermittent imbe- 
cility. To estimate his inaction during this 
period with common fairness, it must be re- 
membered that he had retreated into Metz after 
fighting a succession of battles in a few days, and 
with forces imperfectly organized, of which 
battles that of Gravelotte was only the last and 
most destructive. The battle of Borny, August 
14th, was fought with a broken army caught, not 
in the act of formation, as at Saarbruck, but in 
the doubly hazardous act of rallying and re- 
treating. Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte had 
followed; blow succeeding blow, with only a 
day or two for breathing time. Metz, as we have 
before established, was already encumbered 
with the wounded and suffering from fever, 2 
added to which the 18th of August was fol- 
lowed by a succession of rainy days, which 
converted the country around into a muddy 
swamp. Under these circumstances, and 
pressed all round with a force superior in 
numbers and physique, Bazaine had to reorga- 
nize his dispirited army, and what he is really 
charged with, under the name of inactivity in 
this interval, is with not having done that 
and fought a successful battle besides — for 
surely no better would have been said of him 
had he fought and failed. It is not true, how- 
ever, that he was inactive all the twelve days, 
even in these disheartening circumstances. He 
was actively engaged in concerting secret 
mat, >s of co-operation with Macmahon (ante> 



98 



THE SORTIE OF AUGUST 26mt. 



vol. i. pp. 371-372), and on the 26th, after a 
council of war at which an important resolu- 
tion was unanimously adopted, as will be 
explained in the next chapter, he moved out 
three corps d'arme'e (the 4th, the 6th, and the 
Guards) for the purpose of forcing a passage. 
The clayey soil was saturated with rain, and a 
storm broke out with such violence, as we 
have before stated, that the lightning ran along 
the ground. Nevertheless the troops were 
halted for thirteen hours on the right bank of 
the Moselle, before the project was abandoned. 

As our sole desire is to arrive at the truth, 
it is only fair to state here that the German 
historian of the war, Rustow, unites with the 
enemies of Bazaine in reproaching him for not 
utilizing the time between August 18th and 
October 8th, and more especially the first 
period of this time. He pointedly says : " De- 
fenders of the Marshal have reasoned that he 
really intended by his sortie of 31st August 
and 1st September, to cut his way through to 
Thionville, because they made his ignorance of 
events (vorgangeri) outside, much greater than 
it really was. In any case, if this plan was 
actually propounded on the 31st of August, it 
proves a want of capacity in the Marshal and 
his advisers, such as we should hesitate to at- 
tribute to the most inferior, yet in some degree 
educated and trained officer." 3 The wisdom or 
unwisdom of the plan is not a point that we 
are at present concerned to discuss. 4 That is 
a question which affects Bazaine's military 
reputation, but has very little bearing on the 
problem of his loyalty or his political views. 
Rustow's opinion that he lost valuable time 
immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, is 
the real point of interest, for as we shall 
presently see, there is less difficulty in account- 
ing for his policy during the month of Sep- 
tember. Against that opinion must be set, 
for what they are worth in the reader's im- 
partial judgment, the facts we have stated 
above, and the independent opinion of a 
Prussian general 5 to the following effect : — 

The Marshal has been reproached on all 
sides, says this authority, with having aban- 
doned the project of delivering a great battle 
on the 26th of August. Was not the rains, 
they say, as great an inconvenience for the 



Germans as for the French ? The sufficient 
answer to this is that the French and not the 
Germans were the attacking party. Those 
who employ such an argument seem never to 
have reflected that the defenders had only to 
maintain the positions in which they were 
already strongly entrenched, whilst the attack- 
ing force had to advance with difficulty over 
the saturated soil, and to get their cannon 
into positions one by one, which could only be 
done very slowly. This circumstance alone 
must have placed the attacking force at an 
enormous disadvantage. Napoleon the First 
was so sensible of the disadvantage he was 
under in analogous circumstances, that he 
delayed for two hours the commencement of 
the battle of La Belle Alliance, that the fields 
might dry a little. If so great a commander 
as Napoleon attached so much importance to 
the weather on that occasion, we may well 
excuse Marshal Bazaine for having deferred an 
intended attack in much worse weather, and 
when it rested with him to choose the most 
suitable time. In fact, it was only some twenty- 
four hours after his retirement that he renewed 
the sortie, and under circumstances which the 
most calculating strategist must have deemed 
propitious. The 2nd and 3rd Corps had been 
detached from the invading army before Metz 
on the 27th, and had taken the direction of 
Dun and Stenay, to countermarch Macmahon. 
At what precise moment Bazaine had become 
acquainted with this fact we do not know, but 
there are two points to be considered. He 
could not be sure that those corps would not 
countermarch against him outside of Metz, just 
as the Crown Prince had diverged from his line 
of march on Paris and followed up Macmahon; 
nor was he, perhaps, unaware of the fact that 
Macmahon was as yet too distant to effect a 
junction with him on the Thionville Road. 
These considerations sufficiently account for 
the delay between the sorties of August 26th 
and 31st. 

With respect to the latter events and the suc- 
ceeding circumstances, setting aside all politi- 
cal predilection, what reasonable line of action 
could Bazaine have taken after the failure of 
the sortie of August 31st, and the simultaneous 
catastrophe of Sedan, but that which has been 



QUESTION OF BAZAINE'S RESERVE, 



99 



so freely denounced by his enemies ? Let it 
"be granted, if the reader please, that he began 
the sortie too late in the day ; that he left the 
battle when it raged with the most fury for 
the sake of his dinner; and when the fight had 
continued till black darkness set in, that the 
retreat was sounded on the very eve of suc- 
cess; 6 yet all this, if true, proves nothing but 
his unfitness for command. When Marchal 
informs us in addition, that the population of 
Metz was wild with delight (ravie) on re- 
ceiving intelligence that the Republic had been 
proclaimed in Paris ; that a large part of the 
army joined in the acclamations of the people, 
and that in the midst of this excitement 
Bazaine and Coffinieres " held themselves in a 
reserve which looked like a conspiracy, and 
presaged treason," we naturally suspect a 
motive beyond what ought to influence an 
unprejudiced observer of events. When he 
complains, in further evidence of this intended 
treason, that the eagles were allowed to remain 
on the flagstaffs, it is obvious that his spleen 
against the Empire would have been gratified 
if Bazaine had allowed the disaffected portion 
of the troops to unite with the republicans in 
trailing the eagles in the dust, in imitation of 
the gutter-snipes of Paris ; and when he goes 
on to say, that the Metz journals were censured, 
and the National Guard and Mobiles supplied 
with old percussion muskets, and kept without 
cartridges, whilst the arsenal was full of 
chassepots, 7 we see at once that this chaplain 
of the Imperial Guard was angry, because the 
revolutionary scenes which had disgraced the 
capital were not allowed to be rehearsed at 
Metz. In this mood, he, for one, sits down to 
accuse Bazaine of treason ! 

The very facts alleged by Marchal against 
Bazaine, were indeed, to ordinary common 
sense, so many proofs of his fidelity to the Em- 
pire; and this is confirmed, three weeks later, by 
his language in conversation with M. Regnier, 
whose story will be related a little further 
on, and by his observations when a prisoner in 
Cassel. 8 Against his own asseverations and 
the logic of facts, must be set the statements 
to which we have before referred, of Mr. 
Robinson, the Vicomte de Va] court and the 
correspondent of the Cologne Gazette, Herr 



Wickede, who alleges that Bazaine spoke dis- 
respectfully of the Emperor. 9 When Marchal 
makes it a ground of complaint that he was 
faithful to the Empire, and would not allow 
the eagles to be degraded, these accusing 
witnesses destroy one another, the explanation 
of which may be, that Bazaine, being urged to 
follow the example of Napoleon and surrender, 
replied hastily, that it signified nothing to him 
what Napoleon had clone at Sedan, for that he, 
Bazaine, was alone master in Metz; and he 
may even have used the word fanfaron in his 
anger and impatience of such an argument, 
and in his ignorance of the facts which had 
made the surrender inevitable. As for the 
accusation that Bazaine kept himself aloof 
from the army in Metz, and was seldom seen 
either in the streets or camps, may not this be 
accounted for by the unpopularity he had 
incurred by his adhesion to the Empire ? 
This is not mere surmise. Even Marchal 
relates an incident which he witnessed in the 
streets of Metz, that will go far to suggest 
such an explanation. Certain soldiers had 
audaciously neglected to salute Frossard, for 
which the General was reproving them, when 
the chaplain passed by. Turning to the latter, 
he said, "lis ne saluent pas mime leur general; 
quels soldats ! " The swift retort was, — " II 
aime mieux boire que de se battre ; quel 
Rossard ! " When such incidents were pos- 
sible, is it not plain that all was lost, and that 
Bazaine, who had declined to acknowledge the 
Republic, might have good reason to avoid 
certain of the troops as well as the towns- 
people ? Bitter must have been the reflections 
of any man so situated. Changarnier could 
address the troops with effect ; he commanded 
respect by his reputation, his age, and his 
independence of party ; and still more for 
that noble self-denial which had enabled him 
to proffer his sword to Napoleon in the hour 
of disaster. Leboeuf had rushed into the fight 
with the courage of despair, seeking death, to 
escape the ignominy that was visited upon 
hira by public opinion. Decaen had found 
the rest which Leboeuf sought in vain. Why 
should Bazaine court insult ? 

These considerations are advanced to ac- 
count for the Marshal's reserve, which has 



ICO 



A STRANGE STORY. 



been complained of as a part of the mystery 
in' which his conduct was enveloped. The 
future historian, with the advantage of addi- 
tional evidence, may be able to account for 
the month of September, day by day. In 
addition to the above valid reasons, here is 
something, in the meantime, that will account 
for his inaccessibility, in the interval from the 
5th to the 10th, when Marchal says he was 
shut up " like a satrap in his chateau of the 
Ban St. Martin." In that interval it was 
well known that the two corps of the investing 
army previously alluded to had departed for 
Paris with the Crown Prince of Saxony, 
and the army and the city complained that 
Bazaine did not, at any cost, break through 
the weakened line. 10 Why should he have 
done so, had it been possible, and thus have 
placed himself, now that Macmahon's army 
was destroyed, between the armies already 
advancing on Paris and those which would 
have immediately closed up in his rear ? This 
was surely a matter for his consideration as 
the commander-in-chief of the only army left 
intact to France. On the other hand, by 
remaining in Metz, he detained an army which 
would otherwise have been set at liberty, to 
march on Paris. Could he help the capital 
more efficiently by taking the field, if that had 
been possible, than by keeping a force of from 
100,000 to 200,000 men at a distance from it, 
and paralyzing their efforts ? The question, 
as a purely military one, might be debated by 
strategists to the end of time ; but the charge 
against Bazaine is, that he exceeded his duty 
as the commander of an army, by allowing 
political reasons to influence his conduct, and 
that during that week of seclusion, the man 
who had dreamed of the crown of Mexico, was 
dreaming of something greater in France itself. 
To us, there appears to be sufficient reason for 
his seclusion, in the fact that the people and 
part of the army would have mobbed him in 
the streets to make him yield to their wishes. 
Bazaine is accused of treason for his inac- 
tivity; but against whom or what was his 
treason directed ? Against the Emperor ? Ac- 
cording to the theory of his accusers, the Em- 
pire had ceased to exist. Against the Repub- 
lic? He, the sworn soldier of the Empire, 



owed no allegiance to the Republic. Had the 
Republic been the deliberate choic3 of France, 
the argument against him would have been 
more plausible; but this usurpation of the 
Government in the hour of national peril by a 
conspiracy of lawyers and journalists ; what 
allegiance could it claim from him, with the 
Imperial Guard under his orders ? had he been - 
a republican himself, what confidence could 
he have placed in it ? For him the war was 
ended by the surrender of the Emperor, and 
the destruction or capture of Macmahon's army. 
The only policy lie could conceive of was one 
of peace. Instead of resting inactive, it is said 
he might have harassed the investing army by 
incessant sorties. But to what purpose ? In 
so doing: he would have harassed and decimated 
his own troops, and have embittered the 
enemy with whom, in the interests of France, 
it was necessary to make terms before in- 
creased sacrifices provoked increased demands. 
After Sedan there was no hope for France in 
the continuance of the war, but an absolute 
certainty of deepening the tragedy by con- 
tinued resistance. Sound policy dictated in- 
action within the intrenched camp of Metz, 
until the situation declared itself. But the 
mob, armed and unarmed, were clamorous for 
action, and it was only natural that he who 
could not control them should keep out of the 
way, and avoid their importunity. This ex- 
planation is quite consistent with the circum- 
stances we have now to relate of a- - 

Romantic Episode in the Story of Metz. 

During the month of September mysterious 
paragraphs appeared in the daily papers, 
headed " A Strange Story." As the facts 
have since become known, we will not repeat 
the various shapes which the reports assumed 
at the time, and how one series of events was 
entangled with another, but will simply follow 
the narrative of M. Regnier, 11 which bears with 
it internal evidence of truthfulness. The gen- 
tleman of this name is a landed proprietor in 
France, and has in addition some commercial 
interests in England. When the Prussian ar- 
mies were within a few leagues of his resi- 
dence, he sent his family, consisting of his 
young wife (an Englishwoman) and three 



M. REGNIERS PROPOSITIONS. 



101 



daughters, to this country, where they arrived 
on the 31st of August. The catastrophe of 
Sedan on the day following, and the flight of 
the Empress on the 4th, impressed him with 
the idea of becoming an agent in the imme- 
diate settlement of peace and the restoration 
of the Empire. For the means he took to 
accomplish his purpose, he has been accused of 
overweening vanity and officiousness. We 
shall see, however this may be, that the action 
he took tended to a critical and important 
result. The ship was drifting and he seized the 
helm. Learning from the papers that the 
Empress had arrived at Hastings on tKe 12th, 
he wrote to Madame Lebreton, a sister of 
General Bourbaki in confidential attendance 
on the Empress, and enclosed a document 
for communication to Her Majesty, contain- 
ing the following propositions : — , 

" The Ambassador in London of the North German 
Confederation, who will soon be the Ambassador of a 
German Empire extending from the Baltic to Trieste, 
with fifty-five million inhabitants, may possibly say : — 

" ' I think the Bang of Prussia would prefer treat- 
ing for peace with the Imperial Government rather 
than the Republic' 

" If so, I shall start to-morrow for Wilhelmshohe, 
after having paid a visit to the Empress, and had my 
passport vise by the Prussian Ambassador. 

" The following are the propositions I intend to 
submit to the Emperor : — 

" 1. That the Regent ought not to quit French 
territory. 

" 2. That the Imperial fleet is French territory.* 

"3. That the Fleet, which received the Empress 
Regent with so much enthusiasm on its departure for 
the Baltic, or at least a portion of the fleet, howsoever 
small it prove, be taken by the Regent for her Govern- 
ment seat ; thus enabling her to go from one to another 
of the French ports where she can count upon the 
largest number of adherents, and so prove that her 
government exists de jure and de facto. That the Em- 
press Regent issue from the fleet four proclamations, 
viz. : To Foreign Governments, to the fleet, to the 
army, and to the French people. That each of these 
proclamations contain, besides what specially apper- 
tains to them, a portion of the general considerations 
which will appear further on. 

"To the fleet ! — That just as the Emperor remained 
to the last in the midst of his army, sharing with it the 
chances of war, so also does the Regent, the only exe- 
cutive power legally existing, come with gladness to 
trust her political fortune to the Imperial fleet, that 
second and loyal half of the French army. 

' ' To the army ! — That while the Emperor was with 

* Probably suggested by tbe success of the Spanish Revolution, 
owing to the co-operation of the fleet (ante, vol. i., p. 177). 

VOL. II. 



his son in the midst of you, sharing your dangers of 
every kind, a few lawyers, breaking their oath as de- 
puties, have associated themselves with a set of those 
perpetual conspirators who are the leaders of all the 
dregs of society throughout the different States of 
Europe. They have dared to breathe a ciy of treason 
— they who did not hesitate to give birth to a civil war 
in Paris with the enemy at its gates. Twenty years 
ago they had, as now, seized the reins of government, 
for a short time, by violence and cunning. Their first 
act was to disarm and scatter the army whose loyalty 
and patriotism they always mistrusted ; and this time, 
again, the papers representing their opinions have also 
said that one of the conditions of peace which they 
would offer in exchange for the evacuation of our ter- 
ritory would be the abolition of a standing army. One 
of the Emperor's greatest cares has been, for the last 
twenty years, that of ameliorating the state of the 
army ; and no other Government has, up to the pre- 
sent time, done so much to lessen its onerous duties. 
The Emperor, who had always been upheld by the 
army during its most brilliant period, would not aban- 
don it during its transitory reverse, being fully per- 
suaded that better times will still find them united and 
able to depend entirely upon one another. 

" To the French people ! — (A portion of the general 
considerations contained below.) 

"To Foreign Governments ! — To firmly insist upon 
the fact, or rather not to admit the possibility of a 
doubt, that the Imperial Government is still the actual 
Government, as it is the Government by right. To add 
certain of the general considerations. 

" General considerations. That while the army was 
fighting by land and sea to defend its native soil, a 
small band of agitators took advantage of the misfor- 
tunes of their country to seize on power by violence, 
and to drive away a Government which only a short 
time before had obtained for the third time the suffrage 
of an immense majority of the nation. That the Re- 
gent herself only yielded to force, and that she left the 
Tuileries at the very moment that the threshold was 
being violated. That at such a time, when each man's 
existence was so necessary for the defence of Paris, she 
would not allow one drop of blood to be shed. That 
the most important thing of all was the defence of the 
country, and that she believed her presence more useful 
to France out of Paris than in. That for a moment — 
and what mother will blame her for it ? — she wished to 
see her child again before resuming her post. That 
those who had violently assumed power found fresh 
resources already collected, since our first defeats, by 
the Imperial Government. That the formation, the 
mobilization, and the universal arming of the Garde 
Nationale Mobile; the recall of former soldiers to 
arms ; the anticipated "levee" of next year's conscrip- 
tion ; the arming of the Franc-tirenrs ; the purchases 
made abroad of arms, ammunition, and provisions of 
every description ; the loan of nearly 40 millions 
sterling, which the great confidence reposed in the 
Imperial Government, as the maintainer of stability 
and order, enabled them to realize in less than two 
days, to the astonishment of Europe, the complete 
arming of Paris, the commencement of the formation 
of two corps d'armee in the centre of France ; that all 

8 



102 



REPLY OF THE EMPRESS. 



these tilings are due to the incessant labour of the 
Government of the Regent by day and night, assisted 
by the Defence Committee. After having thus taken 
all the necessary steps, the Regent thought it might 
perhaps be better to allow her work to be continued 
by those persons who, up to the present time, had only 
spoken while she was acting, and whose continual and 
systematic interpellations had often hindered the work 
of the. defence. That the Imperial family had been de- 
ceived in common with the rest of the French people. 
That at the time when war was declared, there was not 
one of those who now wish to be in power who then 
doubted for a moment that France would be victorious. 
That a few deputies of the Left, it is true, made some 
opposition to the war, but without explaining their 
motives for so doing, and simply because it was their 
usual habit to oppose every measure proposed by the 
Imperial Government. 

"That the Imperial Government, at this time re- 
presentative, believed itself to be granting the wish of 
the nation, expressed by the almost unanimous accla- 
mations of the representatives named by the people, 
and the general enthusiasm of the nation lent weight 
to the supposition. That it was not as to their own 
strength that they were deceived, since the French 
army had never been on so good a footing during the 
last fifty years, but in having failed to anticipate the 
enthusiasm (so unexpected by all, even the Prussian 
Government itself) with which the Germans in one 
entire body had joined the Prussian forces, which per- 
mitted the latter Government to attack our armies 
with forces double and treble in number to our own. 

" That if one may blame the Emperor for not having 
sufficiently appreciated the rapidity of action and faci- 
lity in filling up the ranks of the Prussian army, the 
blame must be shared by all our publicists, statesmen, 
generals, diplomatists, and even those members of the 
Left who so keenly reproach him with it now. That 
the mistakes which may have been committed by cer- 
tain generals, or by the Army Administration, ought 
not to recoil upon the Emperor, who only went in the 
midst of the army as a simple volunteer to share its 
dangers. That the Empress, while preparing the means 
of defence, and at the same time providing attendance 
for the wounded, as well as attending to all affairs con- 
cerning the State, had refused to keep her son near 
her, free from all danger, while so many mothers were 
forcibly separated from theirs. 

" Le'. people also bear in mind that the Emperor is 
the onl y one who had the foresight and the courage to 
say ' that the war upon which we are now about to 
enter may be a long and a difficult one.' Lastly, that 
the Regent has not deserted her post ; that she re- 
mains on French territory, refusing to hinder by in- 
ternal dissensions the defence of Paris, which she took 
such pains to prepare ; but that, the war once at an 
end, the immense majority of the French will acknow- 
ledge that the family of Napoleon III., which it has 
upheld so long with its votes, has done its duty, and 
that even in going on board the fleet, the Regent has 
acted from the purest and most noble feelings of 
patriotism. 

It is true the feasibility of this scheme de- 



pended on the character of one or two import- 
ant individuals. The premises were true. The 
government, de jure, was that of the Empress 
Regent, and the reins of government had been 
seized at the moment of the Emperor's disas- 
ter by violence and cunning in pursuance of a 
conspiracy of long standing. It was true also 
that the King of Prussia was willing to treat 
for peace with the Imperial Government in 
preference to the Republic, if only its flag 
could be upheld and its representatives found. 
The question to be tried was whether the Em- 
press Regent would dare to take the proposed 
step either in the interest of the dynasty or of 
France. That it would cause some bloodshed 
was certain ; but was further bloodshed avoid- 
able ? At any rate M. Regnier was not the 
man to shrink from his self-imposed task, and 
having followed his letter, he arrived at Hast- 
ings on the 14th, where he saw Madame 
Lebreton, who told him that Her Majesty had 
read his letter twice over with great care ; that 
she would do nothing rather than incur the 
suspicion of having acted from an undue re- 
gard for dynastic interests, and that she had 
the greatest horror of any step likely to bring 
about a civil war. M. Regnier persevered, and 
submitted a riswmi of his propositions, in 
which care was taken to recognize the National 
Defence Committee at Paris, while upholding 
the relationship of the representatives of the 
Empire to foreign governments. To this the 
Empress replied, that it was not certain the 
fleet could be depended upon, and M. Regnier 
affirms that the officers of the household, who 
communicated this answer to him, did so with 
the air of people who seemed to say, " Who are 
you, sir, who allow yourself to interfere in 
these matters, not being of our set ?" On the 
15th he again addressed a letter to Madame 
i Lebreton, in which he declared strongly against 
j the " expectant policy " of Her Majesty's ad- 
, visers, and predicted that it would fail. He 
j or some one else should before now have been 
placed, not officially, but secretly and confi- 
dentially, in communication with M. Bismarck. 
In the evening he again presented himself at 
the Royal Marine Hotel, and saw the same 
officers of the household, to whom he communi- 
cated his intention of going to Wilhelmshbhe, 



INTERVIEW WITH COUNT BISMARCK. 



103 



where he hoped to be better understood. 
Finally, he left Hastings without having seen 
the Empress ; but with a memorandum, written 
under a large photographic view of Hastings, 
by the Prince Imperial, and two stereoscopic 
views, all bearing the autograph of Louis 
Napoleon. With these souvenirs as the os- 
tensible object of his journey, he was sanguine 
that he should be admitted to the Emperor's 
presence. 

It was of course impossible to reach Wil- 
helmshohe at that time without the permission 
of the authorities at the head-quarters of the 
German army, and besides this it was neces- 
sary to see M. Bismarck with a view to the 
business in hand. After a troublesome journey, 
Regnier arrived at Ferrieres on the 20th of 
September, the day after the complete invest- 
ment of Paris. He considered it his good 
fortune that M. Jules Favre had not yet ar- 
rived there on the mission of which we have 
before spoken (ante, vol. 1, p. 504) ; but he 
was expected at eleven o'clock that morning 
and there was no time to lose. Through the 
courtesy of the Count de Hastfeld, his desire 
for an immediate interview with the Chancellor 
was communicated to Count Bismarck, who 
entered the room five minutes afterwards, and 
after the customary exchange of compliments 
conducted him to his study, where he invited 
him to be seated. The remaining details of 
the interview we must give verbatim : — 

"I opened my portfolio and drew from it the photo- 
graphic view of Hastings on which the Prince Imperial 
had written : — ' My dear Papa, I send you these Views 
of Hastings, hoping they will please you. Loiiis Napo- 
leon ; ' and presented it to him. After he had delibe- 
rated upon it for some time I looked fixedly at him and 
said : ' I come, Count, to ask you to grant me a pass 
which will permit me to go Wilhelmshohe and give 
this photograph into his Majesty's hands.' He also 
looked fixedly at me, there were a few moments of 
silence, and he then addressed me thus, as I felt 
firmly convinced he would do : — 

' ' Sir, our position is before you ; what can you offer 
us ? With whom can we treat ? Our determination 
to profit by our present position, to avoid in the future, 
for a long time to come at least, any fresh war with 
France, is fixed. To obtain this, an alteration of the 
frontiers of France is indispensable to us. 

" On the other hand, we find ourselves in the presence 
of two Governments, the one de facto and the other de 
jure : we cannot alter their position, and it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for us to treat with either the one 



or the other. The Neutral Powers will be glad to see 
the situation cleared up. The Empress Regent has 
quitted French territory, and since then she has given 
no signs, of life. After the taking of Sedan, a treaty 
ought to have been signed ; and a few words that I 
dropped then in an interview at which were present 
Messieurs de Castelnau and Pietri, might have, if they 
had been willing, given rise to more serious pourpar- 
lers, but they appeared unwilling to understand them. 
The provisionary Government for the Defence either 
will not or cannot accept this condition of a diminution 
of territory, but proposes an armistice in order to 
consult the French people on the question, and we can 
afford to wait. We have here four hundred thousand 
men who live on occupied and conquered soil. When 
Metz and the other towns surrender, we shall have 
from five to six hundred thousand who can remain 
here for the winter. When we find ourselves face to 
face with a Government de facto and de jure able to 
treat on the basis we propose, then we will treat. For 
the present we need not make known our requirements 
as to a cession of territory, seeing that it is declined 
in toto." 

" I answered his Excellency by telling him that, in 
my humble opinion, her Majesty the Empress, after 
having embraced her son, ought to have returned, and 
perhaps might still be able to return, on board a vessel 
of the fleet, or on French territory, and by sending out 
her proclamation, thereby give signs of actual exist- 
ence' ; that what had prevented her so doing was the 
fear of its being supposed that for the sake of establish, 
ingher dynastyshe had hindered the National Defence. 
His Excellency interrupted me, saying, 'That is true ; 
but bygones are bygones : let us think of the present.' 
As to the present, we could only consider ourselves 
very fortunate in accepting conditions less hard than 
those which might be publicly accepted by the Defence 
Committee of Paris. Bazaine and Uhrich could, if 
they capitulated, do so in the name of the Imperial 
Government. His Excellency tells me that Jules Favre 
believes he may count upon the garrisons. I offer 
to go at once to Metz. "If you had come a week 
earlier, or even four days ago, it was yet time, now I fear 
that it is too late." He looks at his watch, and, finding 
that the time for his interview with Jules Favre has 
gone by long ago, he rises from his seat, ' Be so good 
as to present my respectful homage to his Imperial 
Majesty when you arrive at Wilhelmshohe.' My 
Parthian arrow is shot ; I leave my papers on his desk, 
with the first number of a paper, ' la Situation,' 
which had come out in London the night before my 
departure, and bowing to him, I tell him that I will 
take my papers in the evening after the pass has been 
added, and at the same time I shall have the honour 
of bidding him good bye." 

At eight o'clock in the evening, the inter- 
view between M. Bismarck and M. Jules Favre 
having taken place in the interim, and the 
situation having become so much the more 
hopeless for the interests of France, Regnier 
i was admitted to another interview with tha 

8A 



104 



THE GERMANS WILLING TO TREAT. 



Chancellor, to whom he read the following 
propositions : — 

"lstly. I will go at once to Metz and Strasburg, 
and sco the Commander-in-Chief of each place ; and I 
will make an agreement that those two towns shall 
only be surrendered in the Emperor's name. 

" 2ndly. By virtue of a Proclamation, the members 
of the Senate, of the Corps Legislatif and the State 

Council shall reassemble in the town of on 

the ... . 

"3rdly. Another Proclamation to the People, in 
which must be stated, that the Left, by the violent 
manner in which they seized on the Government, com- 
pels us now to make a less advantageous treaty of 
peace than we need otherwise have done. That the 
Provisionary Government of National Defence, not- 
withstanding its formal pledge never to give up an 
inch of territory, gives proof, by its appeal to the 
French people to ratify this fact, that itself considers it 
indispensable. That to obtain this result ft was not 
necessary to risk a civil war, a thing which must inevit- 
ably have happened had not the patriotism of the 
Regent prompted her to go away momentarily. That 
they ought not, after devastating a portion of France 
in so terrible a manner, that it will long be remembered 
by the generations to come, to give way so readily ; for 
the enemy, we must own, putting aside his victories, 
which he owes to his numerical superiority, has caused 
less ruin in France than the Government of Defence, 
which has in reality defended nothing, but has been 
busying itself with the nomination of fresh function- 
aries." [Here, Regnier says, Count Bismarck interrupted 
him to express his agreement with his last remark, and 
spoke of the useless Vandalism which caused the min- 
ing of bridges, etc., which never hindered the Prus- 
sians' march for one moment]. "Tbat in presence of a 
determination so publicly manifested by the National 
Defence Committee, the end for which it was 
estabUshed has ceased to exist, and that consequently 
its mission is over. That all Imperial functionaries 
shall, after Saturday, October 1st, resume their func- 
tions. That the Empress Regent (who has given no 
signs of existence for the last fortnight, in order to 
avoid calumny, and accusations of having hindered the 
Defence from dynastic motives), will resume the reins 
of Government on the date before mentioned. That 
after that date no acts will be valid besides those made 
in her name, in the ordinary form, and by the ap- 
pointed functionaries, or those whose resignation has 
not been accepted by the Imperial Government. That 
after a short delay, the duration of which will be 
ultimately fixed by her Majesty, the choice of Govern- 
ment will be submitted to the French people in every 
commune, but that this act cannot be decided under 
the pressure of a foreign army, when the electors 
could not vote with sufficient calmness for so solemn 
an act. That, herself from the present moment re- 
nouncing the privileges which the Constitution gives 
her, the Chamber, when she proposes to it to call a 
Convocation of the People, will prepare the Plebisci- 
tarian formula according to their view of it, in order 
to present it for the general voting of all the citizens. 



" At that period wo shall no longer be in the power 
of the enemy. Men's passions will be appeased, and, 
whatever be the result, the vote will have been taken 
deliberately, with a perfect knowledge of circumstances, 
and we formally pledge ourselves to see it religiously 
observed. A general amnesty and abrogation of the 
exile laws will precede the re-assembly for the vote of 
the Plebiscite." 

When M. Regnier had ended, Count Bis- 
marck replied : " Sir, Fate has already decided : 
to blind yourselves to that fact is not the 
action of an indomitable nature, but of an un- 
decided one. Nothing can prevent what is, 
from being as it is. Do ivhat you can to bring 
before us some one with 'power to treat with us, 
and you will have rendered a great service to 
your country. I will give orders for a ' general 
safe-conduct ' to be given you, which will 
allow of your travelling in all German posses- 
sions, and everywhere in the places occupied 
by our troops. A telegram shall precede you to 
Metz, which will facilitate your entrance there. 
Very likely an armistice may be signed to- 
morrow at twelve o'clock, but if so it is simply 
a war question, which leaves us perfectly free, 
and acknowledges no right whatever; you 
should have come sooner." About midnight 
the promised pass was sent to M. Regnier 's 
chamber. At this point the most romantic 
part of the story commences, which will be 
better understood after reading M. Regnier's 
letter of acknowledgment for the safe conduct 
to Metz— 

" Night of the 20th to 21st. 
"To His Excellency Count Bismakck — 

" I might have written this letter in figurative 
terms which none but your Excellency could have un- 
derstood, but, after the goodwill to our cause of which 
I have such ample proof, I should reproach myself 
for so doing : I prefer trusting to your honour to burn 
this when read. I shall leave your advanced posts 
near Metz, giving orders for the carriage to await my 
return. I shall wrap myself in a shawl, which will hide 
a portion of my face, and I will announce my return 
for six o'clock in the evening. They need not pay atten- 
tion to me when I come out. In the event of Marshal 
Bazaine acceding to all my conditions, either Marshal 
Canrobert or General Bourbaki (to whom I shall give 
an exact account of all that will be requisit" for the 
success of my plan), must consent to enforce it with 
all his influence on the army. He might go out with 
my papers, dressed in my clothes, wrapped in my 
shawl, after giving me his word of honour that he was 
to be, for every one except her Majesty the Empress, 
simply Monsieur Regnier. He would reside with vag 



INTERVIEW WITH BAZAINE. 



10c 



family at Hastings, and only go out after dusk on the 
Esplanade. A letter from me to her Majesty, of 
which he would be the bearer, would acquaint her 
with everything under the seal of secrecy, and she 
would come unattended to my house to speak to the 
Marshal or the General. Only, in case it should be the 
latter, I could not be sure that Madame Lebreton, his 
sister, would bo unaware of his presence. If every 
thing were to succeed as I have seen anticipated, then, 
but only then, he might establish his identity, and 
might make known that he left Metz in the night in a 
balloon; but only in the event of his placing himself 
at the head of the army, with orders to defend the 
Chamber, reassembled if possible at a sea-port town, 
where a portion of the fleet on which they could de- 
pend might also be present. The treaty would be 
signed the same day, I myself not being present. If 
nothing could be done, the Marshal or the General 
would return under my name and resume his post." 

Leaving Ferrieres on Wednesday, September 
21st, M. Regnier was in Metz conferring with 
Marshal Bazaine at eight o'clock in the evening 
of the 23rd. He read the notes of his two in- 
terviews with M. Bismarck, and said that the 
Chancellor had spoken with regret of the con- 
ditions upon which it was necessary to insist, 
partly in consequence of the complete self- 
abnegation of the Imperial Government. 
Marshal Bazaine hailed with delight the pros- 
pect of being allowed to march out of Metz 
through the enemy's lines, and said " it would 
be as much as he could do to hold out till the 
18th of October, and that only by living on 
the flesh of the officers' horses." M. Regnier 
said it was to be an understood thing " that 
both himself and his army would put them- 
selves at the disposition of the Chamber and of 
the Imperial Government, the only legal one, 
which would then be de facto, to which 
Bazaine not only assented, but said further, 
" that when a generous foe is beaten he ought 
to know how to own it ; that France, who be- 
lieved she would be victorious, had been de- 
feated, but she was not obliged on that account 
to remain at the mercy of a handful of ad- 
venturers — men without faith, who were 
making a ladder for their ambition out of the 
misfortunes of their country. That the army, 
the symbol of fidelity, had never ceased to be 
faithful, and that he looked upon the army of 
Metz as the only existing French army." The 
Marshal, however, would not answer for 
General Coffiniei'es, whose command of the 



city and garrison was an independent one. 
So far as regarded the army under his own 
orders, he did not hesitate a moment, but 
attested what he had said by signing his name 
under that of the Prince Imperial on one of 
the stereoscopic views of Hastings. This was 
meant to serve as evidence to Count Bismarck 
that Regnier had seen him and was authorized 
to speak with authority. 12 

In accordance with the scheme foreshadowed 
in Regnier's letter to M. Bismarck on leaving 
Ferrieres, it was arranged that General Bour- 
baki should go out of Metz with Regnier's 
pass and make his way to England, where he 
was to represent the facts to the Empress and 
induce her, if possible, to grant the necessary 
legal authority for continuing the negotiations. 
Bourbaki accepted the mission, and with Reg- 
nier's safe-conduct was allowed to pass through 
the German lines. For all the world, except 
the Empress, he was to be M. Regnier, and it 
was this mystification which gave rise to the 
report on his arrival at Chislehurst, where the 
Empress had now gone, that the mysterious 
"N." or " M." was a French general, who had 
left Metz by leave of the German authorities on 
some mysterious mission. Regnier complains 
that he explained nothing at all. According 
to the statement of his sister, Madame Lebre- 
ton, " he had quite lost his head," and said 
nothing after his arrival at Chislehurst but 
" You sent for me, and here I am." 13 He had 
also previously disclosed himself in order to 
save his honour. This part of the ax*rangement, 
in short, fell through, and we have only to 
follow M. Regnier through the negotiations 
with M. Bismarck on his return to Ferrieres. 

On leaving Metz he first presented himself 
at the head-quarters of Prince Frederick 
Charles, and told him that Marshal Bazaine 
had placed himself and his army at his dis- 
posal, but that he had found it useless to 
attempt to see General Coffinieres He then 
learned from telegrams that had been received 
at head-quarters from Ferrieres that the ex- 
pected armistice had not been arranged with 
M. Jules Favre. On his arrival at Ferrieres, 
this fact was confirmed by M. Bismarck, who 
added : " I find in M. Jules Favre nothing but 
a lawyer, and I am surprised and sorry that 



106 



FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. 



you, who appear to be a practical man, after 
having been permitted to enter Metz with the 
certainty of being able to leave it, and without 
being troubled about your papers, a favour 
never before accorded, should have left it with- 
out some more formal recognition of your right 
to treat than a photograph with the Marshal's 
signature, and a letter to his wife, where, it is 
true, I see it is understood that you should act 
for him. But I, sir, am a diplomatist of more 
than twelve years' standing, and this is not 
enough for me. I regret it, but I find myself 
compelled to relinquish all further communica- 
tion till your powers are better defined. . . . 
I would certainly have treated with you as to 
the conditions of peace, had you been able to 
treat in the name of a Marshal at the head of 
80,000 men ; but do not be uneasy ; I will send 
this telegram to the Marshal : ' Does Marshal 
Bazaine authorize M. Regnier to treat for the 
surrender of the army of Metz [it should have 
been " the army under the walls of Metz,"] ad- 
hering to the conditions agreed upon with the 
last named V This being done, nothing re- 
mained but to wait for the reply. Regnier, we 
may here remark, is convinced that Bismarck 
was anxious to see before him some one with 
whom he could treat ; but, unfortunately, while 
the Chancellor seemed to regard him as an un- 
accredited agent of the Empress, the partisans 
of the latter were equally mistaken in suppos- 
ing him to be an emissary of M. Bismarck. The 
mystification was inevitable under circum- 
stances so irregular and unprecedented. All 
depended, therefore, on the directness of the 
answer from Bazaine. 

It was communicated to Regnier the follow- 
ing evening : " / cannot reply in the affirmative 
to these questions. I have told M. Regnier that 
I cannot arrange for the capitulation of the 
city of Metz." This virtually ended the matter. 
Regnier made other overtures for re-opening 
communications with Bazaine, to which M. 
Bismarck simply replied through Count de 
Hastfeld, that " he could listen to nothing more 
until full powers, without evasion, were granted 
to him (Regnier) ; that it was imperative that 
the matter shoxild be conducted openly and 
above board, and that for himself (Regnier) he 
hoped he would be able to get clear of it with 



honour, and that soon." Hereupon M. Reg- 
nier came over to England, and, as we have 
mentioned above, found on arriving at Chisle- 
hurst that Bourbaki had done literally nothing 
in fulfilment of his part of the mission. 14 
Bourbaki did not return to Metz, but as we 
have related, made his way to Tours and after- 
wards commanded the army operating against 
Werder. 

The narrative we have given — omitting 
numerous details not strictly necessary to the 
elucidation — clears up the mystery so far as 
regards the two M.M. Regnier, and the con- 
fused identity of General Bourbaki with one 
of them. But the name of General Boyer was 
also confused with that of Bourbaki in the 
identification of the mysterious " N." or " M." 
Boyer was Marshal Bazaine's aide-de-camp, 
and it has been thought that he was actually 
sent by him on a mission connected with the 
proposed surrender of the army of the Rhine 
and the conclusion of a peace with the Re- 
gent on conditions which implied the restora- 
tion of the Empire. M. Regnier mentions in 
the account of his first interview with Bazaine, 
that the Marshal read to him the draft of a 
projected letter addressed to Prince Frederick 
Charles, in which he asked permission to send 
his aide-de-camp, Boyer, to the King's head- 
quarters to learn the actual state of things ; 15 
but he adds, " the letter was never sent." 
It is reasonable to conclude that Bazaine at 
that time abandoned the project until the re- 
sult of M. Regnier's negotiations became 
known ; but the idea was revived subsequently 
on the occasion of a Council of War which will 
hereafter have to be mentioned under the date 
of October 7th. General Boyer accordingly 
presented himself at the Prussian head- 
quarters, and he afterwards thought it his 
duty to pay his respects to the Empress at 
Chislehurst. The first letter of his name and 
the fact of his having come from Metz caused 
reports to be circulated which increased the 
mystification occasioned by the movements of 
Regnier. The two B.'s, like the two N.'s, were 
alike spoken of as " Marshal Bazaine's envoy." 
The report given by Boyer on his return to 
Metz of his interview with Bismarck, will 
come under our notice in the following chapter. 



MISSION OF GENERAL BOYER. 



107 



How he fared in his mission to the Empress, 
we learn from certain communications which 
appeared in the London press. If, as there is 
reason to believe, the letter from which the 
following is extracted bore the postmark of 
Chislehurst, it establishes that the Empress 
was proof against every overture that bore the 
semblance of intrigue. 

"General Boyer, the envoy of Marshal Bazaine, 
may have approached the Empress with a view to pro- 
positions of peace or war to be submitted to Prussia ; 
but he was received with no more favour than were 
emissaries of M. de Bismarck on a previous occasion. 
When a former envoy of the Chancellor of the North 
German Confederation came to propose peace, de- 
claring that King William was disposed to content 
himself with 250,000 French inhabitants, Strasburg 
included, the Empress replied with great energy that 
so long as an enemy was in France, and so long as 
there was any question of the smallest cession of 
territory, she would hold aloof from every negotiation. 
The events of the last month have made no change in 
her resolution ; and so far as the efforts of General 
Boyer have been directed to this point, they have com- 
pletely failed. 

" Nor could the mission of General Boyer have had 
for its object to consult the Empress as to the pro- 
priety of surrendering Metz at this moment. That is 
only one way of concealing the real object of his 
journey. Marshal Bazaine, confident in the strength 
of his position as a general who has suffered no defeat, 
and at the head of the only French army which still 



exists, thinks himself entitled to exercise not a little 
influence on the question whether peace shall be made 
or hostilities continue. He would gladly make him- 
self indispensable : would gladly be the dictator with 
whom the enemy should have to treat, taking the 
lead both of the Government which sits at Tours, and 
of that which is shut up in Paris. He would rejoice 
that France should owe peace or victory to him, and 
to him only. That is a respectable ambition, exagge- 
rated as it perhaps may be, but it must not be inferred 
that Marshal Bazaine would rather conclude a peace 
favourable to the Napoleonic dynasty than in accord- 
ance with the true interests of his country." 

To complete this narrative of a curious 
episode in the story of the capitulation of Metz, 
we have extended it a few days beyond the 
date reached in our remarks on the situation in 
which Bazaine found himself after the disaster 
of Sedan. It assists us in some measure to un- 
derstand how the Marshal was occupied, and of 
what he was thinking during the month of Sep- 
tember. He was not in other respects, however, 
so inactive as we sometimes hear it stated. On 
and after the 22nd of the month, the investing 
army was almost incessantly harassed by sor- 
ties and skirmishes, of which it is now neces- 
sary to give some account before recording the 
capitulation of the Virgin Fortress of Lorraine 
and the army of the Rhine. 



Notes to Chapter LXIII. 



1 Mr. Robinson, however, the correspondent to whom we have 
alluded in the text, declares that this movement was shamefully 
mismanaged; and, "Never again," he says, "had we any con- 
fidence in the military qualities of the Commander-in-Chief. We 
saw a movement, commenced at daybreak, suspended until 
evening- in view of the enemy. We saw an army sent out with 
divided councils. We saw the movement arrested when a night's 
march could have carried the posilion. We saw a force, weakened 
by a fair day's work and a long night's watch, left unsuccoured. 
We saw our victory snatched from us when, in spite of these dis- 
advantages, we had almost grasped it; and the shock was too 
rude. Confidence refused to grow again, and when we found 
political trickery added to military incapacity, we ceased to con- 
sider our Commander-in-Chief either wise or honest " (Fall of 
Metz, ch. viii.). If Mr. Robinson had written less obviously 
for rhetorical effect, and had stated the facts which in his opinion 
told against the honesty as well as the capacity of the French 
commanders, with the simplicity which always commands respect, 
it would have been more possible to accept on trust statements 
of his which cannot yet be tested by that accumulative evidence 
which must be the ultimate appeal of every impartial historian. 

2 In addition to what has been stated in the text (ante, vol. i., 
p. 370. and note 9, p. 375), I may cite in support of this state- 
ment the following letter, sent to a German paper by a correspon- 
dent in Prince Frederick Charles's army : — " The situation of the 
French in Metz is beginning to be serious. They have already, 
apparently out of anxiety for their supplies of food, unconditionally 
released six of our»fficers and 730 of our men. One inducement 



to this act was the humanity of two of our military chaplains, 
Gerlach and Prince Radziwill, who gave up the body of a French 
general lying on the field of battle. According to the description 
of our released soldiers, the wounded in the battles which have 
occurred are packed together in Metz to the number of 20,000 or 
30,000. The number of the troops in the town is 100,000 or 
120,000, including 20,000 Gardes Mobiles. Reckoning the 
customary population of 60,000, there are altogether about 
200,000 persons in the place. It is scarcely conceivable that such 
a multitude can for any length of time have sufficient food. 
Moreover, the drinking water, conveyed by pipes from a neigh- 
bouring hill, has been cut off by our troops. The uncleanliness 
which prevails will also be destructive. The bodies of fallen 
horses lie about, exhaling miasma; and in the hospitals sufficient 
attendants are lacking.'' This letter was written at the be- 
ginning of September, and as the series of battles which terminated 
with Gravelotte on the 18th of August, was the sole cause of this 
state of things, the state of the town could not have been very 
much better at any time in the intervening period of twelve 
days. 

8 Der Krieg um die JRheingrenze, 1870-71 politisch und 
militdrhsch dargestesst, vierte Abtheilung, p. 31. 

4 A few words may, however, be said on this point. The 
account given by Bazaine of what occurred on the night of the 
31st, is at any rate as much entitled to consideration as the answer 
of the Vicomte de Valcourt (lecture delivered in London, April 
17th) that if Marshal Bazaine had been actively engaged in the 
field instead of sleeping in the village of St. Julien, the result 



108 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXIII. 



might have been altogether different. "Might have been" is 
in some measure answered by "might not have been," for there 
■was at least a risk ol being surrounded by the enemy, had the ad- 
vance been continued, Jt was not till nightfall that the French 
obtaiued possession of the villages, and as the darkness increased 
Prussian reinforcements were rapidly pouring in. Between ten 
and eleven o'elock they were sufficiently strong to move up 
against the positions that had been captured. In the morning 
the fight was recommenced in a thick fog. What if the French 
had advanced instead of resting on then- arms ? Instead of a re- 
treat into Metz, might they not, have been routed ? One " might 
have been," is, at least, as fair as another, where all is speculation 
or surmise. 

'- La Guerre autour de Metz par un general Prussian 
trod a it de VAllemand, pp. 25—27. 

6 This is what Marchal affirms : — " . . . On ne comprit rien, 
ni a son plan, ni a sa conduite. On le vit rentrer en ville pro- 
bablement pour diner au plus fort de la bataille. Nos pre- 
mieres lignes ne fureut point suffisament soutenues, et la retraite 
sonna au moment oul'on allait atteindre le hut." {Le Drame de 
Metz, p. 15.) 

7 Ibid. p. 1C. 

8 Bazaine declared to M. Regnier that he considered his army 
the Palladium of the Empire, and that it had never ceased to be 
faithful. In Cassel, he said, "I have sworn loyalty to the Emperor 
and the constitution. The Emperor is a prisoner, but the con- 
stitution is in force; and neither I nor any of my comrades will ever 
acknowledge any other Government until we shall have previously 
obtained a discharge from our oath at the hands of the Emperor 
himself. I proposed to march out with the army, and to pledge 
our honour that we would not fight again in this war, but that 
we should be permitted to convene and protect the French 
Chambers against the mob, or, as Bismarck called them, the 
street idlers. I detest politics. We only wanted to do what 
Gambetta asserts that he wishes us to do — that is, to re-establish 
legality, by calling together the representative body. Even had 
we not been forced by hunger, I should have opened negotiations 
on the day when I learned that it was not the Republicans, but 
the mob, who governed at Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles— on the 
day when I learned that the army was insulted, that the memory 
of men whom I venerate was reviled. But, as the case really 
stood, it was hunger, and nothing but hunger, that compelled 
my surrender." 

9 Herr Wickede wrote: "Bazaine will not surrender until 
compelled by the direst hunger, for he is a rough, passionate, 
ambitious man, quite the opposite of the unselfish and noble 
Macmahon, who belongs to the few real chivalrous characters, 
and is a true gentleman as well as a courageous and able soldier. 
Bazaine began his military career as a common drummer, and 
owes all that he has become to his resolution and talents. He is 
anxious to play a part in France — perhaps that of a Dictator, or 
even Emperor ; and he knows that he can only succeed in so 
doing by defending Mete to the last. When informed of 
Napoleon's surrender he replied, ' What the deuce does that fan- 
far on Napoleon concern me '! I alone am Master in Metz, and 
will not dream of surrendering the place.' Famine, however, 
must ultimately bring him to it." Here it is to be noted that a 
German is quoting the words ofa Frenchman, and quoting them 
from hearsay. 
w> Marchal, pp. 1G— 17. 

n What is your Name? N. or M.f A " Strange Story" 
revealed- Ridgway, Piccadilly. 

i 2 M. Regnier confesses to a mistake in not having obtained in 
addition to Marshal Bazaine's signature a statement that he was 
authorized to treat in Bazaiue's name for the capitulation of the 
army before Metz, which he says the Marshal would have gladly 
given him. 
i3 What is your Name"! p. 54. 

14 It was on the 20th of September that Bourhaki left Metz, 
and on the 4th of October that Regnier saw him again at Chisle- 
hu-.st. " In a minute M. N — (Regnier) r.nderstood that M. 
Bourhaki, admirable soldier as he is, and one of the bravest of 
French generals, but unhappily little skilled in diplomacy, had, 
diplomatically speaking, quite lost his head ; that he had met 



with some comrade in Belgium, that the words treason and dis- 
honour had produced their usual effect, that he had then exhibited 
the authorization of his superior, and by this unpardonable indis- 
cretion, which can only be explained by his exaggerated suscepti- 
bility on the point of military honour,had broken probably one link 

of the chain which maintained the scaffolding reared by N amid 

such trouble and danger; had destroyed the last hope of those 
persons who looked for the maintenance of order in France during 
the yeaFS that are coming." This, said M. Regnier in the com- 
munication to the press from which this is quoted, " is the chiei 
thing to which the present generation has to look ; it has been 
bound up of late with the fortunes of the Imperial cause, which 
has the best chance of securing the triumph of a principle whicli 
bu'. for it will be whelmed in a gulf, from whicli no one of the 
Republican chiefs, able and well-intentioned as they are, can 
hope to extricate it, and which will prove, I fear, when viewed in 
its inevitable consequences, one of the most disastrous in our 
history since the epoch of Charles VI. Oh, why do we French- 
men, the noblest of whom, after all, are so small in the eyes 01 
Him who looks down upon the evidence of facts and interests — 
why do we suffer ourselves to be guided by what any one may 
think or say of us, preferring our miserable personality to the 
general good ? We witness in the enemy, from the corporal to 
the generalissimo, a patient and persevering individuality whicli 
has no end but the interest of all, in whose eyes that which has 
happened was ordained to happen, and on every side men reap 
but what they have sown." It was remarked in the newspapers 
at the time that the Empress was surprised when General 
Bourbaki presented himself at Chislehursl, and no wonder, if he 
failed to explain himself. All the parties to the transaction were 
like children playing at a game of " touch " in the d.rk. 

16 This was on the 23rd of September. Marshal Bazaine there - 
fore was not so well informed of the events which had occurred 
outside Metz as Rustow would imply (nnte, p. 08). 

1 6 It is necessary to explain here that the name of Prince 
Napoleon also became mixed up with this Regnier-Bourbaki- 
Boyer mystery. The Prince had been to Chislehurst about this 
time, and was alluded to in the document quoted in the text as 
having ' taken sides with those who would, perhaps, have wished 
the Empress to commit an indiscretion." The Prince wrote in 
reply : " I have come to England on private business. I have 
not seen General Bourbaki, who left before my arrival; 1 
have not seen General Boyer, whose mission I heard of through 
the newspapers. As to my relations with Chislehurst, the facts 
are these : — On my arrival I went to pay my respects to my 
cousin and her son; I returned there, summoned by a telegraphic 
despatch. As to what passed with the Empress, permit me to 
say nothing to the public. Those who know me know that my 
opinions have always been as loyal as they are liberal. I have 
the highest esteem for Marshal Bazaine, for his glorious army so 
devoted to France, as well as to its oath, and for the preservation 
of which, it seemed to me, everything ought to be attempted." 
The reticence of the Prince as to what passed in his interview 
with the Empress was not, however, imitated in the semi-official 
communication to the press from Chislehurst : " During this last 
visit," we are told, " Prince Napoleon, with his usual impulsive- 
ness, allowed himself to express somewhat harshly his opinions 
touching the different, Ministries of the last month of the 
Empire, and he went so far as to call one of them a Ministry of 
idiots (cretins). Now, the sentiment of gratitude is very strong 
with the Empress, and she made a reply to her illustrious cousin, 
of which the following sentences convey the substance, if not 
the precise words: ' I know not, Monseigneur, ' said the Empress, 
' what you mean by a Ministry of idiots ; but what I do know is 
that down to the last moment the Emperor was served by devoted 
and faithful friends. For the last eighteen years you have 
opposed the Empire. You and those about, you have never 
ceased to undermine It; and to-day, when the Emperor is 
fallen, you pursue him still. Had you been atParis on the 4th 01 
September, you might have been able to give us good advice ; 
but you were absent, as you have so often happened to be at the 
moment of danger — of course, to your great regret, as I do not 
doubt.' Upon this, Prince Napoleon tarried no longer; he took 
sp his hat and left the room," 



THE GERMAN ARMY AT METZ. 



109 




MAJOR-GENERAL VON STIEHLE, CHIEF OF THE STAFF (SECOND ARMY). 



CHAPTER LXIV. 

THE CAPITULATION OP METZ. 

Strength and position of the forces investing Metz — The Army of 
Bazaine outside the walls -Uncertainty in the early days of 
September — The ignorance of the population and the arniy 
concerning external events — Bazaine's silence — Question of 
allegiance — Political dissensions — Bazaine continues to hold 
Metz for the Emperor — Decision of a Council of War— Gene- 
ral Coffinieres de Nordeck — Breach in the Entente Cordiuh: 
— Laxity of moral a natural consequence of unsettled politi- 
cal conditions — General Coffinieres de Nordeck adheres to the 
Revolutionary Government — Stormy meeting of the Generals 
—Proclamation by Coffinieres— Continued hesitation of Bazaine 
— General order to the Army of the Rhine — Division of opinion 
in Metz— Testimony of Mr. Robinson to the confusion that 
existed — Sorties resumed — Movement of September 22nd — 
Renewal of the engagement on the 23rd — Capture of prison- 
ers and provisions by the French on the 27th — Fight at Mercy 
le Haut— Destruction of villages by the investing force — 
Sortie of October 7th — Condition of the besieged — Increase 
of the sick and wounded — Approaching famine — The question 
of surrender — Distinction between the Army of Bazaine and 
the garrison of Metz — Council of War on the 10th of October 
— Questions discussed— Impossible conditions demanded — 
Negotiations of General Boyer with Count Bismarck — Com- 
plication of the political with the military situation — Council 
of War on the 25th of October — Mission of General Clian- 
garnier— The Capitulation — What immediately followed. 



The force that invested Metz was composed 
as follows : — 

First Army (Steinmetz), consisting of the 
1st Army Corps, commanded by Manteuffel; 
the 7th under the orders of Von Zastrow ; and 
the 8th under Von Goben. The Guards Corps 
had been detached to serve with the new army 
under the Crown Prince of Saxony, as pre- 
viously recorded (ante, p. 17). 

Second Army (Prince Frederick Charles), 
consisting of the 2nd Army Corps, commanded 
by Fransecky; the 3rd, by Alvensleben II.; 
the 9th byManstein; and the 10th by Voigts- 
Rhetz. The seven Corps, including the 
Cavalry Division, were estimated to number 
about 200,000 men. The estimate was some- 
times greater, sometimes less : it is certain, 
however, that the strength of the investing: 
force, when Metz capitulated, was about 180,000 
infantry and cavalry, with 630 field guns, «& 



110 



ARMY OF BAZAINE. 



The line of investment, commencing on the 
northern side, may be approximately drawn 
from Feves and Se'me'court, across the Thioti- 
ville Road and the Moselle to Argaticy ; 
thence, in a south-easterly direction, through 
Olgy, Malroy, Failly, Servigny, Noisseville> 
Montoy, Coincy, Ars-Laquenexy, and Mercy- 
le-Haut, to Peltre, by the Saarbruck railway ; 
from this point westward by way of Magny, 
across the Moselle to Ars, and from thence 
northward by way of Jussy, Chatel St. Ger- 
main, and Plesnois, to the point from which 
we started at Feves. There were troops, of 
course, both in the rear and in advance of this 
line, which represents, somewhat roughly, the 
ground on which the above-named forces were 
massed, for the most part near the villages 
mentioned. 

At certain points the line was double. Thus 
on the eastern side, Vremy, St. Barbe Gras, 
Retonfay, Flanville, and Ogy were strongly 
occupied, as well as the villages about a mile 
in front of them, through which we have 
drawn the line. In advance of their first 
line, the German outposts approached very 
near those of Bazaine's army, and besides the 
occasional shots and skirmishes occasioned by 
this proximity, they were also exposed to a 
good deal of annoyance from the Guerilla war- 
fare of irregular French bands, who concealed 
themselves in the woods. 1 They also suffered 
much from dysentery, fever, and other com- 
plaints incident to their out-of-door life. With 
these exceptions, the army of Prince Frederick 
Charles may be said to have enjoyed a long 
holiday at the time when Bazaine was charged 
with inactivity, and the third army, under the 
Crown Prince, was proceeding by forced 
marches to the investment of Paris. 

The army of Bazaine lay around Metz in an 
inner circle. Beginning at Woippy on the 
northern side, its lines extended through St. 
Eloy to the Moselle, (6th corps, Canrobert), 
and then trended southward, by way of St. 
Julien and Valliers, as far as Fort Queleu 
(3rd Corps, Leboeuf). The south side, from 
Queleu to the Moselle was kept by the 2nd 
Corps (Frossard), and the west, sweeping 
round in a wide curve from Longueville to 
Woippy, by the 4th Corps (L'Admirault), and 



the Garde Iinpenale (Bourbaki; afterwards 
Desvaux). Their effective strength was 
estimated on the 15th of September at 138,000: 
but the number of men really able to carry 
arms when Metz capitulated does not appear 
to have exceeded 65,000. They were well 
protected ill their lines by earthworks and 
redoubts, and behind them was the inner 
circle of fortifications, forming the circum- 
vallation of the city. 2 In addition to the 
earthworks and redoubts held by Bazaine as 
an entrenched cainp, and the bastioned wall, 
whose guns in many places covered his 
positions there were the outlying forts. The 
fortress-crowned Mamelon of St. Julien, for 
example, commanded with its guns the first 
line of investment where it passed through the 
villages of Failly, Servigny, Noisseville, and 
Montoy ; 3 while Fort Queleu was equally 
within range of Ars-Laquenexy, and the 
villages all round to Magny. 

The German entrenchments were continuous 
all round Metz, so that they were able with 
ease to concentrate sufficient force on any 
given point. The roads were everywhere 
guarded by rifle pits. The villages were 
barricaded,, and the houses loopholed. The 
advanced posts were either posted behind 
earthworks, or in fortified residences. The 
field watches occupied woods and gardens, 
and were ready for instant action at any time, 
A surprise was impossible. Of these facts, 
and even of the streogth of the enemy, the 
people of Metz were in blissful ignorance, and 
consequently they knew better than Bazaine 
what he ought to accomplish or attempt. 
With the facts before us we conclude that the 
service he performed by holding an army of 
200,000 men in the environs of Metz, was 
much greater than he could have accomplished 
for France, had he succeeded in cutting his 
way out. Mr. Robinson, indeed, affirms that 
he could have done so, and that no such force 
was opposed to him. He says : " I myself saw 
on the 15th of September, the returns of our 
available force. On that day we had 138,000 
men, fit in every respect to take the field. 
Six thousand cavalry were then able to be 
mounted, besides having horses available for a 
large body of artillery ; and I firmly believe 



POSITIONS AROUND METZ. 



Ill 





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" Things were going on in this sleepy fashion, when 
I was startled, on the morning of the 7th, by a small 
note brought to my bedroom door : ' Macmahon has 
been defeated at Sedan ; the Emperor has been taken 
prisoner ; the army surrendered at discretion ; ' that 
was all it said. In a quarter of an hour I was at the 
' Division ; ' nothing was known there. In half an 
hour I was at the Quartier-General, and there no news 
existed. It was thought impossible ; in fact, it was 
known not to be true, and I was deemed a ' bkujueur.' 
To give my authority for my news was not possible 
without placing that authority in an awkward position, 
but I still held my opinion, yet at the same time my 
peace. On the night of the 9th, in the midst of an 
almost tropical storm of rain, all at once burst out a 
most furious cannonade all round us. In spite of the 
wet the population turned out. Every piece the Prus- 
sians had mounted fired at us ; our forts replied. The 
heavens seemed to hail fire as the shells burst on the 
hillsides. Some fell on the He Symphorien, sent from 



112 IGNORANCE CONCERNING 

'J 

that at this time the Prussian forces which 
beleaguered us could not have brought anything 
like that number into the field." His "firm 
belief" can avail nothing- against the facts 
stated above from the best German authority, 
as to the stiength of the two armies under 
Prince Frederick Charles. Seven Army Corps 
in their full strength would have made 
a much larger force than the figures we have 
quoted. It is, prima facie, just as reasonable 
to suppose that Mr. Robinson, a civilian, was 
deceived by appearances which led him to un- 
dervalue the strength of the enemy, as that 
the marshal was misled by appearances to the 
contrary. 

It will be remembered that Bazaine was 
driven back under the guns of Metz on the 
same day that the army of Macmahon was 
crushed at Sedan, and that the Emperor sur- 
rendered himself a prisoner. The news of 
this disaster did not immediately follow the 
beaten troops into their entrenchments, and 
for days afterwards people wondered why 
Macmahon came not. The anny, weary of 
waiting-, and of the wet, were settling down in 
despair, or mutinously accusing the officers of 
incapacity, and of having led them out to be 
slaughtered. 4 So the first days of Septem- 
ber wore away ; the Prussians erecting fresh 
batteries, often within range, and the forts 
trying to dislodge them, sometimes with 
success. We must here quote Mr. Robinson 
textually for some particulars in which his 
evidence may be relied upon. 



EVENTS OUTSIDE. 



the Prussian batteries at Ars ; some fell in the camp at 
Plappeville, from the enemy's works at Rozerieulles ; 
at Montigny some few did a bittle damage, but twelve 
or fourteen killed and wounded were all the results we 
knew of from an hour and a half of the heaviest firing 
we ever had against Metz. ' It is Macmahon who ap- 
proaches,' said half the town. ' Let us make a sortie,' 
they said ; and they rushed to the gates in order to 
' interview ' the Marshal on the subject ; but the gates 
were closed, and without the watchword none could 
pass. The other half of the town had received some 
faint echo of the truth, and knew that Macmahon 
came not ; for on the 8th came in 600 prisoners, in ex- 
change for those we had sent out before, and some of 
these knew that Macmahon had met with a check on 
his road from Chalons to Metz. Nevertheless, as they 
had believed the good news brought by the chasseur 
before, and found it false, they now disbelieved the 
bad news, or only believed it partially. 

" Next morning explanations of this heavy firing 
were sought, but none could be found ; the very ab- 
sence of an explanation was suspicious. The only 
probable one of the many alleged causes for all the 
expenditure of powder was, that an enormous body of 
French prisoners from Sedan was passing Metz, and 
that this was to impress them with an idea how vigor- 
ously we were being bombarded ; but the Prussians 
were not much given to waste their ammunition for 
nothing, and we never had a definite solution of the 
mystery accorded to us. The 11th brought us more 
news ; it brought us a German newspaper, the Threust, 
and there we read the news of those disastrous days of 
Sedan, the fall of the Empire, and the establishment 
of a new form of government. This was scorned as a 
lie, a base fabrication. The journal itself was a Bis- 
marckian organ ; indeed, it was not the journal itself, 
but a special copy made on purpose to send into Metz. 
No one would take a calm view of the situation ; few 
believed the news, and those who did dared not say so. 
You must recollect, however, that for very nearly a 
month we had had no news of the outer world ; we 
had seen no gathering of the storm ; it fell upon the 
people all at once ; and human credulity has bounds, 
especially when suddenly called upon to believe the 
truth." 



Even so late as the 15th of Septembei-, Mr. 
Robinson adds : " The unbelieving and stony- 
hearted portion of Metz refused to credit any- 
thing coming from so suspicious a quarter as 
the German Gross." As for Bazaine, " he said 
nothing, not a single word. The army knew 
not what to think, and was greatly agitated ; 
at first it was overwhelmed with the magnitude 
of the disaster to the service, and the personal 
loss each individual in it might have suffered 
in such a wholesale carnage as that which 
must have preceded so huge a catastrophe. 
Then came the question, What are we ? To 
whom do we owe allegiance ? And personal 



BREACH BETWEEN BAZAINE AND COFFINIERES. 



113 



politics began to obtrude themselves into 
everything." 7 Too much heed cannot be given 
to these words of Bazaine's enemy, in esti- 
mating his conduct. If the first thought of 
the officers of the army, when their Emperor 
went into captivity, and their country was 
overwhelmed with sudden ruin, was to doubt 
where their allegiance was due — if " personal 
politics " instantly obtruded themselves into 
everything, why was Bazaine aloue to have 
no politics, and own to no allegiance, even 
in favour of the Sovereign to whom he was 
pledged by his oath ? If, again, these things 
really occurred — and who can doubt it on such 
testimony ? — and if Bazaine knew, as he cer- 
tainly must have known, as much of the 
temper of the troops and the populace as Mr. 
Robinson, why should he alone have been in 
haste to proclaim the disaster, and anticipate 
even by a day or an hour, the evil conse- 
quences ? Why should he not wait — as he did 
wait — for further information from Paris as to 
the progress of events ? Why should he 
above all men, who was responsible for the 
loyalty of the last army left to the Empire, 
and for the safety of the beleaguered fortress, 
have been the first to proclaim that everything 
was in peril ? He may have been mistaken in 
his policy — we do not profess in these pages 
to pass judgment on facts which are yet in- 
sufficiently known. What we mean to affirm 
is only this — that at every step in this inves- 
tigation we find there are two sides to the 
question, and that the cry against Bazaine for 
continuing to hold Metz in the name of the 
Emperor, and for doing nothing which could 
compromise him with the agents of revolution 
it Paris is a one-sided accusation. 

It is now time to state that Marshal Bazaine 
was not solely responsible for the resolution to 
hold Metz, although the question is generally 
argued as if this were the case, which line of 
argument we have humoured in our treatment 
of it. General Coffinieres de Nordeck states 
that there were two opinions on the subject, 
both in the army and the city, in consequence 
of which Marshal Bazaine, on the 26th of 
August, had called a Council of War in the 
chateau of Grimont, o-ver against Fort St. ! 
Julien. At this council it was resolved ; 



unanimously that the wisest course was to 
hold the eminently strategic position of Metz' 
to which resolution was appended the condi- 
tion that the army should " manoeuvre vigor- 
ously round the place." 8 In the face of this 
resolve, it is a question whether Bazaine was 
really trying to cut his way out of Metz, in 
the sense generally understood, on the 31st of 
August and 1st of September. He would have 
acted in strict conformity with the above reso- 
lution, had his object been to open a vjcuy out' 
but not so as to bar his own return. If this 
be so, a considerable amount of ingenuity has 
been uselessly expended in trying to prove 
that Bazaine failed in an earnest determination 
to do what he never meant to do, and what he 
could not have done without acting contrary 
to the policy he had himself suggested. 

Although De Nordeck had agreed with 
Bazaine as to the course that it was desirable 
to pursue at the end of August, there seems to 
have been a break in the entente cordiale be- 
tween them after the disaster of Sedan at the 
beginning of September. If the looseness of 
the political fabric in France, and the total 
eclipse of the old sentiment of loyalty were 
evinced by the Babel of tongues heard in Metz 
after the captivity of the Emperor had become 
known to the soldiers and the populace, how 
much more strikingly apparent was this ren- 
dered by the division between the commander- 
in-chief of the army and the commandant of 
the city ! De Nordeck recognized in the events 
of the 4th of September a " new manifestation 
of the national will." He affirmed that if the 
empire had preserved its adherents, it would 
certainly have been acclaimed anew.; that it 
was impossible to ignore the captivity of the 
Emperor and the flight of the Empress, and 
that he could not understand why the King of 
Prussia declined to treat with any authority 
but the regency, considering that in his first 
proclamation he had declared he was at war 
only with the empire. A man in the high 
military position of De Nordeck ought cer- 
tainly to have known that the King of Prussia 
had never used any such words in his procla- 
mation, as we have stated more than once be- 
fore (ante vol. i. p. 339). But even had it been 
otherwise, this singular readiness of a French 



114 



PROCLAMATION BY COFFINIERES. 



officer to second the purpose of a foreign con- 
queror, and set his foot on the neck of his own 
Sovereign, is somewhat phenomenal. We miss 
the fine sense of chivalric honour for which 
Frenchmen were once remarkable, and which 
caused Henry IV. to observe on one occasion : 
" They who find old examples of virtue before 
them, must imitate and repeat them for such 
as come after." The decline of this sentiment 
is not, however, to be fairly regarded as the 
vice of individuals. It is the natural conse- 
quence of almost a century of revolutionary 
changes that the substitution of one govern- 
ment by another should fail to excite any very 
deep emotion ; and, all things considered, it is 
more surprising that Bazaine should have run 
the risk of incurring odium by adhesion to the 
empire, than that Coffinieres should have ac- 
cepted, as a matter of course, the new order of 
things. 

To express the policy of these two men in a 
word, Bazaine, when intelligence of the event 
of Sedan and the revolution at Paris reached 
Metz in some indirect manner on the 7th of 
September, refused to compromise himself 
either by proclaiming the extent of the dis- 
aster, or by acting on the aggressive. His 
policy was to wait. Coffinieres, on the con- 
trary, desired to be frank with the army and 
the people, tell them the whole truth, and act 
in the name of the Provisional Government. 
Bazaine was able to keep silence so long as the 
rumours of disaster were disbelieved in conse- 
quence of no official statement being made, 
and this was the case even so late as the 11th 
of September, when a French newspaper was 
brought into the town which confirmed the 
flying rumours that had previously been in 
circulation. On the 12th a meeting of generals 
took place at the Ban St. Martin, where it is 
said Bazaine maintained that silence was the 
best policy, while Coffinieres declared himself 
of the contrary opinion. The meeting, says 
Mr. Robinson, was a stormy one, and the next 
day Coffinieres, acting upon his own discretion, 
issued the following proclamation : — 

" Inhabitants of Metz, — We have read in a Ger- 
man journal — the Gazette de la Croix — the very sad 
news of the fate of a French army crushed by the 
numbers of its enemies after a three days' struggle 



under the walls of Sedan. This journal also an- 
nounces the establishment of a new Government by 
the representatives of the country. We have no other 
evidence of these events ; but we are not able to con- 
tradict this. 

" In these very grave circumstances our only 
thoughts should be for France. The duty of each 
one of us, whether as simple citizens or as officers, is 
to remain at our posts, and to vie with each other in 
defending Metz. In this solemn moment, France, our 
country, is summed up for each one of us in the word 
Metz ! that city which has so many times before suc- 
cessfully resisted our country's foe. 

" Tour patriotism, of which you have already given 
such proofs by your care for our wounded soldiers, 
will never fail. By your resistance you will make 
yourselves honoured and respected, even by your 
enemies. The memory of the deeds of your ancestors 
will sustain you in the coming struggle. 

" The army which is about our walls, and which 
has already shown its valour and its heroism in the 
combats of Borny, Gravelotte, and Servigny, will not 
leave you. 9 With you it will resist the enemy which 
surrounds us, and this resistance will give the Govern- 
ment time to create the means of saving France — of 
saving our country. 

"Metz, September 13th, 1870. 

"L. Coffinieres, ■ 

' ' General of Division, Commandant of Metz. 

" Paul Odent, 

" Prefect of the Moselle. 

"Felix Maeechal, 

"Mayor of Metz." 

After this, nothing was to be gained by the 
continued silence of the Marshal. The rumours 
that had so long disquieted Metz had now re- 
ceived the stamp of official confirmation. Still 
Bazaine allowed two or three days to pass by 
before he made any anouncement — he still 
hoped, perhaps, that the Empress-regent would 
show some signs of life, or that something 
decisive would transpire by which to shape 
his policy. It might be that peace .would be 
concluded, in which case, as the commander 
of the only coherent army in France, he would 
be in a position to throw the weight of his 
sword into the scale of public opinion. Whether 
he was moved by the personal ambition of 
which he has been accused, or was influenced 
by the pure sentiment of loyalty, the following 
order of the day, dated three days later than 
the proclamation by General Coffinieres, is 
equally intelligible. 

" To the Army of the Rhine, — According to two 
French journals of the 7th and 10th of September, 
brought to Head Quart* rs by a French prisoner who 
has been able to effect his escape from the enemy's 



POLITICAL FACTIONS IN METZ. 



115 



he Emperor Napoleon has been 

fa y, after the battle of Sedan, and 

the . .he Prince Imperial, having quitted 

Paris )f September, an executive power, 

under th ie G overnment for National Defence, 

has const tself in Paris, ^he members who 

compose th Jeneral Trochu, President, Governor 

of Paris ; a a Deputies of Paris, 



Jules 1 -B. 
Gambei 

Garnie, ^ages. 
Cremiel I 
Glais-Bizoin. 
E. Arago. 



E. Pelletan. 
Jules Ferry. 
Jules Simon. 

E. PlCARH. 

H. Rochefort. 

De KJ3RATRY, 

(Prefet de Police). 



" Generals, officers, and soldiers of the Army of the 
Rhine, our military obligations towards the country 
in danger rests the same. 

" Let us continue, then, to serve it with devotion, 
and with equal energy defend its territory from the 
stranger, and social order against evil passions. 

"I am convinced that your moral, of which you 
have already given such proof, will rise to the height 
of the circumstances, and that you will add new claims 
to the admiration of France. 

"Ban St. Martin, 16th September, 1870." 

Metz was now more divided in opinion than 
before. There were those who agreed with 
Bazaine, that it was foolish to recognize a self- 
constituted body who had no locus standi, 
who were not even elected by the people, 
who could have no function, — inasmuch as the 
Emperor had never abdicated, though he was 
a prisoner of war, and the Empress was still 
Eegent, though she had been compelled to fly 
for her personal safety. Others regarded the 
omission to acknowledge the Provisional 
Government, and the phrase about defending 
social order against " evil passions " as a 
threat. " Coteries began to be formed ; Im- 
perialist meetings were held here ; Republican 
meetings were held there : Orleanist and 
Legitimist meetings were held wherever two 
or three could be gathered together ; and each 
of these was divided against itself. There 
was the party of the Regency, the party of 
the Restoration; and this latter was divided 
into the old Emperor's and the young one's 
faction. There was the Republic, one and 
indivisible, the Confederated Republic of 
different states ; but how many there were to 
be, or what they were to be called, no one 
could tell. There was the Red, and the Rights 
of Man republican parties, and Orleanists and 
Legitimists had half-a-dozen different candi- 



dates to support, where half-a-dozen could be 
found to support their various claims. The 
outward and visible signs of these inward 
sentiments were many. Republicans punched 
out the head of Napoleon from their decoration 
of the Legion of Honour. Orleanists sported 
silver fleurs-de-lys on their scarf-pins and shirt 
links, and the variety in cravats was a political 
study in itself. 10 Confusion was king, and 
confusion alone reigned." 11 This testimony, it 
must be remembered, is that of Mr. Robinson, 
the only Englishman in Metz at this time. It 
is undoubtedly true to the facts; but is it won- 
derful, under these circumstances, that Marshal 
Bazaine should still prefer to wait and watch, 
and keep his sword bright, ready for action 
when the hour came ? 

Another Aveek had passed away since the 
proclamation of General Coffinieres, and still 
there were no signs of approaching peace, and 
no visible token from the representatives fo 
the Imperial Government- In the meantime, 
the Crown Prince had continued his long 
march on the capital, and on the 20th had 
made his head-quarters at Versailles. With 
Paris invested, Strasburg under a bombard- 
ment, and nearly the whole intervening part 
of France swept by the armies of Werder and 
the Crown Prince of Saxony, the best that 
Bazaine could do was to carry out the policy 
agreed upon in the late Council of War. If 
any advantage was to be gained by detaining 
a large army under the walls of Metz, it was 
equally necessary to keep it on the alert by con- 
tinual alarms. Although, therefore, the French 
guns swept a wide area, and the Germans were 
frequently driven back in order that the extent 
of foraging ground open to Bazaine's army 
might be increased, something more was de- 
manded. In spite of these small successes, the 
threatened exhaustion of the supplies, and the 
increase of disease in the city and the camp 
furnished a sufficient motive to renewed ac- 
tivity. Besides this it was important to keep 
the troops in heart by leading them against 
the enemy ; and the circle of investment was 
so impregnable by the middle of September, 
that communication with the outer world was 
only preserved here, as at Paris, by the em- 
ployment of balloons. 12 



Ill) 



RECOMMENCEMENT OF SORTIES. 




GENERAL VON MANSTEIN, COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS (SECOND ARM?). 



Mr. Robinson states that the discontent in 
Metz at this time was so great that a patriotic 
conspiracy was formed to rush out and capture 
Prince Frederick Charles and Prince Louis of 
Hesse, who were supposed to be at Jouy. At 
length, therefore, Sept. 22nd, Bazaine com- 
menced an important movement. Lebceuf was 
to open the ball. Leading his men down the 
slopes of Julien they drove the Prussians from 
a house in which they had taken shelter near 
the wood of Mey below Vantoux. From this 
point they advanced against the village of 
Noisseville, aided by the guns of St. Julien, 
which made good practice; a feint was also 
made against the village of Mercy-le-Haut on 
the south-east, perhaps to occupy the attention 
of the Germans, who from that elevation could 
see all that was going on. In front of Noisse- 
ville a heavy column of cavalry prepared 
to meet the attack, and a rapid fire burst 
from every crevice of the loopholed houses. 
Then the enemy's cannon opened fire over an 



extent of ground measured by miles from the 
north to the south-east. Yet for four hours 
the fight was continued, at the end of which 
time the retreat was sounded, and Bazaine 
withdrew his men under the guns of St. Julien. 
Another account is given of that part of 
this day's engagement, which occurred at 
Mercy-le-Haut. It seems that the French 
were in the habit of coming out of Metz, and 
digging potatoes in the fields of this suburb. 
On the 22nd they were prevented for the first 
time ; for no sooner did they mai.o their 
Appearance than the Prussian outposts, who 
had been previously strengthened, opened 
fire. The French then withdrew, but only 
for a few moments. After half an hour, much 
to the astonishment of the Prussians, they 
opened a smart fire from the earthwork of St. 
Privat, situated about 3,000 yards from the 
suburb of Montigny, and 3,500 yards from the 
village of Augny, occupied by the Prussians. 
Under cover of this cannonade, the enemy- 



THE IRON CROSS. 



V 






The Order of the Iron Cross was instituted by Frederick William III., King of Prussia, at the period of the War of 
Liberatio;:, March loth, 1813, in which month the Confederation of the Rhine was denounced, and Prussia, after having 
secretly prepared for the event during the last five years, openly joined the allies. The Order was founded in honorable 
remembrance of the then lately deceased SZueen Louisa of Prussia, --who had accompanied the King in the former wars arainst 
Napoleon. It thus combined a chivalric and tender sentiment with that of patriotic devotion to country and fatherland. The 
decree reviving the Order was dated July 19th, 1870, and it was then announced that the Cross was to be bestovued " without 
difference of rank and station as a reward for merit gained either in the actual voar with the enemy or at home in service 
connected -with the honour and independence of our beloved country.'''' 




1. — Blucher's Cross. 



2- — Cross of the Second Class. 3 —Cross for Non- Military Persons. 4.— Cross cf the First Class. 
5.— War-Medal for Combatants. 6. — War-Medal for Non-Combatants. 



The Grand Cross cf this Order (1) is worn round the neck ; the star or mounting of the one given to Blue her was of 
gold, but this was exceptional, and is not provided for in the statutes of the Order. The Grand Cross is only given for a victor; 
in the field, or for the glorious capture or equally glorious defence of a fortress. The Cross of the first class (4) is worn on the 
left breast ; that oj the second class in the button-hole, and when given for distinguished service against the enemy, is suspended 
from a black ribbon with a white border (2), but ordinarily from a white ribbon with a black border (3). The Cross of the first 
class has neither crown, nor initials, nor date, and is only given to those who have previously obtained the cross of the second 
class. To the Order are appended two medals, the one for soldiers (5), the other for civilians (6). The first is made of copper, 
and is suspended from an orange ribbon with a white and black border ; the other it made oj iron, and is suspended j'rom a white 
ribbon wi/h an orange and black border. 



FIGHT ON THE 22nd OF SEPTEMBER. 



117 



evidently determined to have potatoes, made 
an advance, supported by cavalry, in the 
neighbourhood of Mercy-le-Haut, driving in 
the Prussian outposts, and occupying that 
village, and the village of Peltre, both under the 
protection of the guns of Queleu. After some 
sharp skirmishing, they were driven back, 
and, having accomplished their object of 
foraging, retired into Metz by way of Le 
Sablon. 13 

The next day, Friday, Sept. 23rd, the sortie 
was renewed. 14 From the vantage ground of 
the chateau of Mercy the French troops could 
be seen gathering under the walls of Fort St. 
Julien, and presently they poured out along 
the road leading in the direction of the 
Prussian Right. They advanced in solid 
masses, the infantry supported by cavalry and 
artillery. Instantly the telegraph flashed its 
messages, 15 orderlies galloped off hither and 
thither, and troops began concentrating on 
the threatened point. Bazaine repeated his 
strategy of the day before. Soon after two 
o'clock Fort Queleu, apparently to draw at- 
tention from the movement on the Right, 
opened a heavy fire against the chateau of 
Mercy-le-Haut. Hot and fast the shells 
dropped among the woods immediately to the 
left and below the chateau, where the French 
knew that Prussian troops were hidden. The 
guns from Fort les Bottes, the strong earth- 
work constructed immediately in front of the 
chateau, and only completed the day before, 
delivered their maiden fire : the French 
and German outposts in this neighbourhood 
had been alike strengthened, and the inter- 
vening ground was occupied by strong patrols. 
The shells, however, were for the most part 
over-pitched; the majority of them passed 
over the woods and fell into the meadows. It 
was soon evident that the attack in this 
direction was only a feint, yet enough troops 
were retained to resist any sudden onset, 
while the great masses were hurried forward 
to meet the rush towards Thionville. Now 
the Prussian field-pieces answered the heavy 
cannonading of the French, and there was 
a continuous roar of cannon on both the right 
and left flanks, mingled with the growl of 
mitrailleuses, and the rattle of a sharp rifle 



fire, which indicated that a severe and perhaps 
close engagement was in progress. From the 
heights of the chateau of Mercy men could be 
seen falling on both sides, and although the 
main attack was at the distance of six miles, 
the smoke could be seen, and the sound of 
battle heard, which told of heavy fighting in 
the direction of Thionville. Towards evening, 
the guns on the French Right which threatened 
Mercy-le-Haut, were silenced, while the clouds 
of smoke Avhich burst in thick puff's from the 
French positions on the left, seemed to ad- 
vance further and further into the Prussian 
lines. This indicated that the Prussians had 
fallen back, but as the movements of the 
French had been foreseen and provided against, 
it could not be the case. Had Bazaine fallen 
into a trap ? There was too much reason to 
fear it ; for as the evening: grew darker, the 
flashes of light which broke from the now 
grey woods, and the louder roar of cannon, 
seemed to tell that the Prussians had halted 
in force, and were driving back the French 
under shelter of their forts. As it grew still 
darker, Fort Queleu was ablaze with signal 
lights, and Fort St. Julien responded with 
similar fires, the meaning of which was known 
only to the French themselves. 10 It was 
afterwards stated that the French had ad- 
vanced well into the Prussian lines, enticed 
by a defence which was at the first com- 
paratively feeble, that they even captured a 
provision train and made some prisoners, but 
that the Germans then closed in upon them, 
and not only robbed them of their prize, but 
took 700 French prisoners. 17 

We have mentioned (ante, p. 116), that a 
plan was concerted in Metz by some of the 
inhabitants, to effect the capture of Prince 
Frederick Charles, and Prince Louis of Hesse, 
at Jouy. This point was one of the most 
interesting in the German lines, and here an 
outpost tragedy occurred for which revenge 
was taken in the night, between the 23rd and 
24th of September. It is alleged that the 
French were the first to break the species of 
truce that existed between the soldiers ot 
either side on outpost duty, by opening fire 
upon the working parties of the 2Slh Regi- 
ment, for which reaeon a party of skilled 



118 



OUTPOST TRAGEDY. 



marksmen were told off to return the compli- 
ment upon every one who came within range. 
The longer range of the chassepot generally 
the French the advantage in these en- 
counters. One of their victims was a non- 
uussioned officer, named Beuther, who was 
shot through the head, on having, at the head 
of a patrol, approached in open day to within 
120 yards of the enemy's outposts. The 
Germans were allowed to fetch in the corpse 
unmolested, and in the afternoon they buried 
the poor fellow with military honours in the 
churchyard at Jouy. This took place on the 
20th, and having been followed by some other 
unpleasant incidents, the colonel of the regi- 
ment resolved on taking his revenge during 
the night of the 23rd and 24th September, by 
destroying the house in which the enemy's 
outposts had taken up their position. He 
entrusted the affair to Lieutenant Behrend and 
thirty men, who had to traverse a distance of 
about 800 paces between their outposts and 
those of the enemy, over ground which was 
without shelter of any kind. The party seb 
out in the dead of the night, at 12.30, and it 
was 2.30 before the first shots were fired, 
during which interval there was not a sound 
which could in any way betray the stealthy 
advance of the men. Suddenly shot succeed- 
ing shot seemed to pour from the house oc- 
cupied by the enemy, and wild cries were 
heard, whilst Lieutenant Behrend, with bullet 
and baj^onet, broke through the chain of out- 
posts, and made himself master of the building. 
Three unwounded prisoners, with arms and 
ammunition, several blankets and tent utensils, 
were the result of the enterprise. The officer 
in command of the outpost, as also the rest of 
the occupants of the building, with their 
wounded, took to immediate flight; and as 
the larkness resounded with cries of pain and 
I imations of " mon JJieu ! mon U'cat !" 
a number of them must have been wounded. 
The attempt to destroy the house by fire was 
not completely successful, owing to the massive 
construction of its walls. With loud huzzas 
and shouts of exultation, the part}' of Lieu- 
tenant Behrend, not one of whom was wounded, 
returned at the double, through the storm of 
bullets which hailed upon them from the 



numerous French troops who had hastened 
to the support of their outpost. For this act 
of courage Behrend received the Iron Cross, 
and was mentioned in the order of the day. 

Events of this kind were not, however, of 
frequent occurrence, A few were taught every 
day by leaden messengers, that the French 
within Metz were neither inactive nor wanting 
in vigilance ; and there were many places in 
the trenches where, if a hat was put on a 
stick, and left above the breastworks, it would 
in a moment be sufficiently riddled with 
bullets to make it a good circumstantial 
witness in England to the bravery of its 
owner, and the risks which he ran. 18 The 
more the investment of Metz assumed the 
character of a blockade, before the recommence- 
ment of Bazaine's sorties, the more infrequent 
such incidents as we have related above neces- 
sarily became. On the other hand, the losses 
become greater from that other enemy upon 
whom soldiers and generals so often fail to 
count beforehand, but who has rarely failed to 
exact a reckoning from great armies in the 
field, which in the end proves heavier than 
even the price of victory and the penalty of 
defeat. Dysentery had been rapidly followed 
by typhus and cholerine, the three pests of 
military masses in camp. The bearers of the 
Red Cross had therefore abundance of work, 
and the road between Metz and Saarbruck 
literally swarmed with Johannitter-Rittern 
and their assistants, and with a mixed popu- 
lation attached to Belgian and Dutch ambu-" 
lances, and to the British International Society 
for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War. 
Inside Metz, the great enemy of mankind 
assumed among other horrible forms, that of 
Hunger. " Mothers saw their new-born die 
from want of more nutritious food than could 
now be obtained, and with tears in their eyes 
they buckled ihe sword-belt and giberne 
on their husbands and their sons." 19 Forage 
failed for the horses, and hundreds of them 
were sent beyond the outposts in a starving 
condition. Under these circumstances, the 
National Guards were reviewed (Sunday, 
Sept. 25th), on the Place in front of the 
cathedral, with the hope of raising their spirits ; 
and two days later, Tuesday, J--H? 27th, : the" 



SUCCESSFUL FORAGING EXPEDITION. 



119 



gairison made a sortie on their own account 
in search of provisions. 

For this purpose a reconnaissance was ordered 
in three different directions. The first and 
principal, was towards Peltre, on the Saar- 
bruck railway ; the second, in the direction 
of Courcelles ; the third towards Thionville. 
At Peltre, the enemy had accumulated his 
commissariat stores for the use of the troops 
encamped westward, and at Courcelles and 
Re'milly there were similar supplies for the 
camp on the east. These stores might be 
broken up or captured for the use of the 
town. 'Twere strange if the enemy could not 
be surprised some time or other. 

At daybreak, on the 27th, a train was 
formed on the Saarbruck line of railway. The 
front was formed with waggons, on which field- 
pieces were mounted ; behind were carriages 
conveying some of the troops, and in the rear 
of these, on the line of railway, the remainder 
of the battalions marched in the good old 
fashion, conveying with them a battery of 
mitrailleuses. So they moved on towards the 
Chateau of Crepy, near the place on our map 
where the line of investment crosses the rail- 
way a little below and westward of Peltre. 
Here the German pickets opened fire, where- 
upon the French left the carriages in the rear, 
and while some pushed on to sustain the 
combat in front, others stole on rapidly to the 
village, and there took the enemy by surprise. 
After a few rattling discharges of musketry, 
the first in the combat had succeeded in taking 
1 50 German prisoners, but not wishing to take 
the responsibility of so many additional 
mouths, they merely broke their guns and Ret 
the men at liberty again. The fighting in 
the village was more desperate. The routed 
Germans took refuge in a convent, the Avails 
of which had been previously loopholed, ready 
for defence. The French stormed the gates, and 
forced an entrance. Imagination may depict 
the scene of carnage in the sanctuary, from 
which escape was impossible, and in which no 
quarter was given. The bayonet and the 
bullet did their devil's work within the walls 
of the chapel, where the terrified sisterhood 
were accustomed to meet for worship, and its 
pavement was slippery with blood, and strewn 



with the dying and the dead. While this 
was going on at the convent, the railway 
station was also carried, men dropping at every 
step of the advance ; and, playing bass to the 
sharp rattle of musketry, the guns of Fort 
Queleu thundered overhead in support of tlio 
adventurous battalions. That morning's wriflt 
was a brilliant but cruel piece of butchery. 
It was a complete success. Oxen and sheep, 
hay and straw, coffee, sugar, and no one can 
say what other grocery, were the reward of 
the victors' toils, and joyfully they returned 
into Metz with these tokens of their triumph. 20 
Nor was this all. There was gallant fight- 
ing at several other points round Metz, on that 
eventful day. General Montaudan led two 
regiments of the Third Corps (the 90th and 
60th) against Mercy-le-Haut, and unlike the 
garrison troops at Crepy and Peltre, found his 
company had been expected, and that the 
enemy was prepared to give him a warm 
reception. The chateau has had its windows 
boarded up and loopholed, and its enceinte 
defended by a barricade of hewn trees, from 
behind which a rattle of musketry salutes the 
advancing columns. With a shout of " Vive la 
France !" the French rush forward, and in an 
instant the abattis is cleared of its defenders-. 
Then from every window of the chateau pours 
a storm of musketry fire, as the sapeurs, grasping 
firmly their axes, lead the way up to the walls 
of the house, and with loud shouts smash in 
the doors and windows. What need to speak 
of the scene of wild confusion and despair that 
ensued ? With the tramp of hurrying feet 
were mingled the groans of the dying and the 
cries and curses of the living. From room to 
room the work of slaughter went on, and the 
sickening death-blow of the clubbed musket 
finished the horrible work, which the rapid 
shot or the cruel steel had left incomplete. 
As in the convent at Crepy, the Germans 
were hopelessly trapped, and th p hot French 
blood was excited to madness. In a few 
minutes the entire basement has been con- 
verted into a shambles, and yet the garrison 
upstairs refuses submission. They know their 
doom — for it is but a few days since their own 
deed at Bazeilles, and hu' a f&g years since 
the smoke of Data shamed the lya — when the 

9 'A 



120 



FIGHTING AT GRANGE-AUX-BOIS. 



cruel enemy began to collect everything com- 
bustible they can lay their hands upon. Soon 
the smoke spreads like a fog of hell, the flames 
climb the staircases, and pale faces appear 
at the upper windows, which are shot at 
before a word can escape their lips. Let us 
leave this scene of horror, and turn else- 
where. 

Above Mercy-le-Haut on our engraved plan 
is the Grange-aux-Bois, and eastward of it 
among a cluster of villages through which the 
line of investment passes, that of Colombey. 
Near the village there are stores of grain in 
the upper floors of three spacious chateaux, 
the owners of which have taken refuge in 
Metz. In the afternoon of the same day 21 on 
which the above incidents occurred, the French 
advanced in considerable force covered by a 
fire from the guns of St. Julien, and followed 
by numbers of empty waggons, the object of 
which is not doubtful. At Grange-aux-Bois, 
as the German fore-posts are driven back, the 
French begin to fill their waggons with corn, 
and at Colombey and La Planchette they 
occupy the woods, to which the Germans then 
set fire. The waggons have scarcely started 
on their return journey, when the enemy's 
shells begin to fall among them, and the limbs 
of the poor horses are bloAvn in all directions. 
The house at Grange-aux-Bois had been set on 
fire by the Prussians before they removed, 
and the French had to make their way 
through smoke and flame on every side, through 
which volleys of musketry darted their tongues 
of fire as the Germans came up in force. The 
losses at these points were not very heavy on 
either side. Many of the forage waggons were 
left behind, but some with their priceless 
lading of golden grain were brought safe into 
Metz by the smoke-begrimed troops. 22 

On the other side at Woippy, a brigade of 
the 1st corps set out on the same day for Petite 
Maxe and the Chateau Ladonchamps in the 
plain of the Moselle. As the column ad- 
vancing on Maxe came within range of the 
German batteries at Malroy and elsewhere on 
the slopes on the other side of the river, they 
marched in open order, and therefore suffered 
but little from the cannon. Driving out the 
email force that held Maxe, they returned 



with loaded waggons, while the Germans then 
squared the account by shelling the village. 
At Ladonchamps they first captured the de- 
tachment of soldiers and officers, and were then 
compelled to return by the arrival of rein- 
forcements to the succour of the enemy. Thus 
the foraging and burning went on all round. 
The villages of Maxe and Peltre, the house at 
Grange-aux-Bois, the wood and chateau of 
Colombey were on fire at the same time, and 
clouds of smoke and flame rolled over the 
valley of the blue Moselle. 

For two days after the dramatic 27th of 
September there was comparative quiet around 
Metz. It was a still dark night at 4 a.m. on 
the 80th, when the scene was suddenly illu- 
minated by the shells fired from fort St. Julien, 
and the return fire of the Prussian batteries. 
The effect, as seen at a distance of four miles 25 
was magnificent. Between the louder crashes 
of the cannon was heard the sharper rattle of 
a musketry fire, singly and in volleys. As 
daylight appeared the firing grew fainter, and 
the demonstration had ceased altogether by 
seven o'clock. The explanation was that a 
provision train had been captured by the gar- 
rison of Thionville a few days before, and 
that an attempt was to be made to fight the 
train through the Prussian environment of 
Metz during this night. The fire of St. Julien 
was probably meant to cover an expected 
sortie, intended to assist in the movement, but 
which the Germans succeeded in checking. 

The activity of the French in their foraging 
expeditions led to corresponding reprisals on 
the part of the investing force, and scarcely a 
day passed that some farmhouse or village was 
not destroyed. On the night of the 1st of 
October they made a night attack on Lossy ; 
and the next day there was a sharp fight for 
LaJonchamps, a position which had been lost 
and won several times, and which, after all, 
was in the possession of the French on the 
day of the capitulation. On the night of the 
2nd, the Germans resolved to destroy the 
village of Nouilly, which lay directly under 
the fire of Fort St. Julien and the new work 
of Les Bottes, and the task was committed to 
Lieutenant von Hosius, who proceeded to its 
execution with a picked band of fifteen men. 



DESOLATION ROUND METZ. 



121 



Alter a period of suspense long tongues of 
flame shot up in the darkness of the night, 
and in ten minutes afterwards the village was 
wrapped in a sheet of fire, in the midst of 
which could be seen the steeple of the church, 



Presently the whole party returned unhurt 
having accomplished their purpose without, 
firing a shot. 

So time wore on to the 7th of October, when 
Bazaine made another determined sortie in the 




till it disappeared in the general ruin. Here 
and there a human figure in despairing flight 
crossed the flame like a shadow, and on a bluff 
just outside the village an eye-witness saw in 
the strong light a woman wringing her hands 
— one of the innocent victims of the war 24 



direction of Thionville, which resulted in the 
battle of Mezieres, or Semecourt, as it is some- 
times called. The first statement was that 
60,000 men were engaged on the side of the 
French, with a much larger number of the 
enemy. A German estimate made the strength 



122 



EXPECTATION OF A GREAT SORTIE. 



of the French a"bout 30,000 ; while Mr. Robin- 
son affirms that only about 7,000 engaged. It 
would be more- easy to decide bi tweeti these 
conflicting statements, if we were certain of 
Bazaine's object. There arc three hypotheses, 
first that he meant to cut his way through 
the German lines with at least a part of his 
army, and gain neutral territory ; secondly, 
that he meant only to open communications 
■ with Thionville ; and thirdly, that the move- 
\ ment was only a foraging expedition on a large 
scale. That he did not mean to effect an 
escape is sufficiently proved, in. our opinion, 
by the arguments already advanced ; and this 
disposes of the larger estimates of his strength. 
Instead of choosing between the two other 
alternatives, we prefer to combine them, and 
suppose that his object was, in the first place, 
to capture the stores at Grandes and Petites 
Tapes ; and in the second place, to make this 
attempt in such force that, if circumstances 
favoured, the advance might be continued so 
far as to clear the road to Thionville, and so 
facilitate the exit of his whole army, when 
political reasons, added to the exigencies of 
the military situation, should render it possible 
and desirable to make such an attempt. If 
this were so, the occurrences of the fight, such 
as we are about to describe them, would be 
adequately accounted for. 

The discontent of the troops at their forced 
inaction, the prevalence of disease, the famine 
with which they were threatened, and the 
pressure which, for all these reasons, the towns- 
people put on the Marshal had culminated in 
the general expectation of another grand sortie 
as early as the 3rd or 4th of October. Mr. 
Robinson speaks of " some sort of promise " 
from the Marshal that a movement of the kind 
should take place ; and he, himself anxious to 
escape, had his knapsack ready packed and 
his pockets filled for a start on the night of the 
3rd. His horse was eaten, and he would have 
to go afoot; but this did not deter him. 
Before daybreak on the morning of the 4th he 
had groped his way to the Port Chambiere, 
where he thought he should be conveniently 
situated for whatever might occur. The pic- 
ture he draws of the camp of " what once was 
cavalry ; " of the abattoir where the starved 



horses were slaughtered ; of the great ambu- 
lance in the Polygon, whei'e the wounded and 
mutilated men and the fever-stricken lay iu 
heaps of suffering humanity, beneath the chill 
of a " thick, white, fever-feeding fog, from out 
of which loomed every now and then the 
long, red-cloaked cai'bineer, looking like a 
monstrous blood-stained spectre haunting this 
isle of horrors," is one that only a Gustave 
Dore could transfer to the canvas. In the 
midst of this horrid desolation a dropping shot 
was occasionally heard in the direction of 
Woippy, but the guns of St. Julien were 
silent, and it was evident nothing would take 
place that day. A visit to the camp of the 
Chasseurs d'Afrique carried the same con- 
viction. Like their brother cavaliers of the 
carbineers, the chasseurs are now afoot. " As 
the ground lose from the bed of the river," 
says Mr. Robinson, " and the fog became 
thinner, we could see their sentries, with their 
long white great coats, their pointed hoods 
erect in the air, a broad-striped blanket flung 
around them, and their carbines slung across 
their shoulders, looking like Arabs of the 
desert, carrying us in thought far, far away 
from Metz. It was wonderfully picturesque, 
though awfully cold ; but disappointment 
chilled us worse than the weather, for we 
found our hoped-for sortie was postponed. 
• Wait a day or two,' sayS a gallant officer who 
has seen some twenty years of service ; ' Wait 
a day or two ; Prince Frederick Charles has 
sent word to say he is not ready yet.' Such 
was the common feeling as to the relationship 
existing between the two head-quarters at the 
time. 23 The fire at Woippy has ceased ; it was 
only an outpost affair, and that is nothing 
now ; so, weary at heart, we turn back into 
Metz, and, sick with another deferred hope, we 
seek our hotel, to breakfast once more on the 
perpetual horse." 

At last the wished-for hour arrived. On 
the 5th the Germans had opened fire from 
their heavy batteries stationed on the low 
hills of Le Hoiimont some distance in front of 
Marange, where the Third Army Corps had its 
head-quarters. Between Fre'me'court, where 
these batteries were stationed, and Semecourt 
there were also six field batteries, and on the 




&lj? ftmmu Inntuntlii 




. 



3fi 



G~~ -1 [§ 






Al M 



/Pil^t 







^= 






Mil 7tl), 1870. 



MORNING OF OCTOBER 7th. 



123 



6th another was established near Se'me'court 
itself. From all these guns a heavy fire had 
been kept up against the work of St. Eloy 
and the village of Ladonchamps, the latter 
being considered of high importance as a 
strategical position, in the alluvial margin or 
plain of the Moselle. On the 6th nearly a 
thousand shells had been thrown into Ladon- 
chp^ps and the neighbourhood, for the purpose 
of dislodging the French, who held the position 
with the tenacity of the English at Hougou- 
mont. One account indeed states that they 
evacuated it on the evening of the 6 th, and 
that the Prussians at once threw forward 
troops in that direction, establishing their 
replis in its rear, and sending forward ser- 
geants' parties to occupy it, as well as the 
Grandes and Petites Tapes, to which its pos- 
session was the key. Other accounts contradict 
this statement, and, according to Mr. Robinson, 
the French guns at Ladonchamps took a pro- 
minent part in the engagement of the 7th. If 
the former statement is true, it may assist to 
account for the movement of Bazaine on the 
morning of the 7th, and it is certainly very 
difficult to account for the circumstantial 
statements made by a credible eye-witness 
(the correspondent of the Daily Netvs), if the 
battle on the 7th was not commenced by Ba- 
zaine with an attempt to recover the village. 

A dense fog covered the valley on the 
morning: of the 7th, under cover of which 
Bazaine made his dispositions for the attack. 
Mi*. Robinson says : " The timely warning we 
had given the Prussians, and the late hour at 
which our movement was made, ensured a 
warm reception for us." The correspondent 
referred to above tells a different story. He 
was sitting at lunch with two staff-officers in 
General Rummer's garden at Mezieres, when 
the Prussian batteries by Se'me'court began to 
give tongue. ' Only a few Frenchmen loafing 
round Ladonchamps,' observed one of the 
officers. ' There will be nothing serious to- 
day ; there is too much mist in the valley.' 
Certainly it seemed as if he must be right. 
From the heights of Seme'coui't neither the 
villages in the valley, nor the cathedral of 
Metz were visible. But the roar of the guns 
..grew louder and louder, and suddenly an aide- 



de-camp came up at the gallop, spreading the 
alarm everywhere he went, and clashing on to 
the General's quarters for instructions to guide 
the front. In five minutes more the German 
Staff was in the saddle, and looking out on the 
scene of action from the fringe of the wood in 
front of the Chateau of Brieux and Amelange. 
If all this is not pure invention, it is an ab- 
surdity to accuse Bazaine of having deferred 
the movement that he might enjoy his break- 
fast. With as much reason General Kummer 
and his staff might be accused of risking a 
surprise for the sake of their lunch. 

The fact seems to be that Bazaine's move- 
ments were admirably timed. Under cover of 
the fog, some time before noon, the Imperial 
Guard descended from the hills of Plappeville, 
and defiled into the valley. In the same 
security the battalions of General L'Admirault 
pushed their way through the woods in the 
direction of Norroy and Feves, and when the 
fog lifted, a little past one, a rush was made on 
Ladonchamps, under cover of an artillery fire, 
to which the Germans replied by the roar of 
their batteries from all the surrounding bluffs 
as the signal of battle ran along the line. This 
was the cannonade which summoned General 
Kummer and his staff to horse. 

To understand what followed, the reader 
must bear in mind the extraordinary facility 
with which the Germans by means of their 
circular railway and telegraph round Metz, 
could bring any number of men to bear on a 
given point in an incredibly short space of 
time. Besides this, they were in much greater 
strength in Bazaine's immediate front than he 
had divined. At St. Remy lay the 59th regi- 
ment of the Landwehr. Maxe, close to the 
river was occupied by outposts sent forward 
from the Tenth Army Corps on the other side 
of the Moselle. The two divisions of Rummer's 
Landwehr were extended across the valley from 
the bridge at Argancy, where they touched the 
Tenth Army Corps, to near Marange, where they 
met the Fifth. 26 Then, all around the centre of 
the plain occupied by Ladonchamps and the 
Grandes and Petites Tapes, the Prussian bat- 
teries were so placed as to form a semicircle of 
fire converging in the centre of the plain. As 
the French infantry advanced, therefore, shell 



124 



BATTLE OF MEZIERES. 



after shell was, hurled into their ranks by the 
great guns at Fre'me'court ; the batteries of 
Se'me'court were also at work, and soon the 
white puffs of smoke from the bluffs between 
Olgy and Malroy, told how rapidly the alarm 
was conveyed from point to point. Still the 
French Guards move up undaunted. General 
Gibbon falls at the head of his brigade. 27 La- 
doncaamps, garrisoned since last night by a 
detachment of a hundred Landwehr if Forbes 



place as the key of the position or not, the 
struggle for it was a sharp one, and the battle 
was merely extended to the whole front of 
Kummer's position, when suddenly the villages 
of Grandes and Petites Tapes, of St. R£nry 
and Maxe, were overwhelmed by a " cataract 
of Frenchmen." From half-past one to 
three the brave Landwehr disputed every 
inch of the ground gained by the French. 
The 59th in St. Re'my stood up there 



ISCHAILCY 
U« £nnery 




Bazaine's Sortie (Battle of Mezieres) Oct. 7tii, 1870. 

The single line oi investment and the black rectangles represent German troops. The double line and the white rectanslc3 

French troops. The arrows show the direction in which the principal attacks were made. 



is right, " held the place as if they were 10,000," 
and to the roar of the cannon and the explod- 
ing shells was added the hail of bullets which 
met the French in their front. It is doubtful 
if the desperate attack and defence of Ladon- 
champs can properly be called a diversion, 
since on looking at the map it will be seen 
that Bellevue and St. Re'my, which were also 
occupied by Kummer's Landwehr, combined 
with Ladonchamps to guard the roads north- 
ward.- Whether we are to regard the latter 



in the street till the French having played 
upon it with their artillery, and rained on it 
Chassepot and mitrailleuse bullets, finally 
pushed backwards the shattered remnant on 
to the chausste by dint of sheer numbers. The 
fusilier battalion of the 58th at Grandes Tapes 
was literally annihilated where it stood, the 
men with their backs to the wall and their 
faces to the foe. 2s The other battalions of the 
same regiment fought with not less courage, 
and suffered themselves to be decimated ; yet 



HOUSE FIGHTING. 



125 




ATTACK ON A HOUSE NEAR METZ, 



12$ 



THE ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 



still Bazaine with the splendid Garde Impcriale 
won his way foot by foot, reoccupied the chain 
of villages athwart the valley, and even got a 
few latteries of artillery out to their front to 
reply to the Prussian lire. In an artillery duel 
under these circumstances, it was certain the 
French would be overmatched, for not only 
had they to withstand the superiority ol the 
enemy's guns, but the superiority of position 
also. The German batteries were so placed 
that they could concentrate and cross their fire 
on the ground in front, whereas the French fire 
was necessarily divergent, and at the same 
time notoriously weak. For a while, indeed, 
Bazaine met with a delusive success. From 
St. Remy and Grandes and Petites Tapes he 
kept the Prussian fire engrossed, both musketry 
and artillery. He sent forward from Grandes 
Tapes great swarms of tirailleurs, and besides 
this, he massed numbers of troops under cover 
of the houses of Maxe, and from this point ad- 
vanced them against the Prussian environment 
where it was weakest close to the river. The 
Voltigeurs and Chasseurs even push on so far 
as to carry an entrenched battery of twelve 
guns at Amelange, while the 25th and 26th 
regiments of the line force their way through 
the wood of Woippy, and capture the farm of 
Belleville. At the same time, the villages of 
Servigny, Noisseville, Mey, and Nouilly, on 
the right bank of the river were threatened by 
the Third corps under General Aymard, with a 
view to draw off some part of the enemy's fire. 
Bo far, Bazaine had succeeded hi doing all that 
was necessary to ensure success on the suppo- 
sition that the conditions of the artillery fire 
on either side had been reversed ; but in the 
meantime Kummer had developed his plan of 
defence, and was able to use against the 
French the very tactics which it was necessary 
the latter should employ in this second stage 
of the fight to secure their victory. 29 

As the Landwehr, with the exception of one 
brigade that was in reserve, had all been sent 
forward against the villages in the plain, we 
shall have to consider them as occupj'ing the 
centre of the position, the troops that were 
moved up to their support being formed on 
the right and the left respectively. On the 
right Alvensleben had concentred the 9th In- 



fantry brigades and two batteries at Norroy-le- 
Veneur. On the left, r a part of the Tenth Army 
Corps (the 38th brigade, Wedell) had been 
crossing the pontoon bridge, and were massed 
between the river and Amelange, while batte- 
ries of the 20th infantry division (Kraatz- 
Roschlau) had been advanced on the right bank 
of the Moselle, and the reserve artillery of 
the Tenth Corps was got into position by Ar- 
gancy, Olgy, and Malroy. So soon as Kummer 
found himself thus supported, he developed 
his attack, and now, at the critical moment, 
gave the order for several regiments to ad- 
vance, while the Prussian batteries all round, 
in a semicircle of nearly eight miles, thundered 
against the enemy. This concluding phase of 
the battle was admirably sketched by the cor- 
respondent of the Daily News. " First came 
the Fusiliers, extending at a rapid run into 
skirmishing order, and covering the whole 
plain with their long thin lines. Then the 
dense columns of companies of the Grenadiers, 
the bands playing and the coloui's unfurled — 
an unwonted sight. But all the work was not 
left for the infantry to do. The artillery left 
the villages alone, and concentrated their fire 
on the advancing columns of the French by 
the Moselle. Bazaine's weakness in field artil- 
lery was now evident ; the only reply was 
from the sullen sides of St. Julien or from the 
ramparts of St. Eloy. But the mitrailleuse 
venomously sounded its angry whirr, making 
the skirmishers recoil nervously as they crossed 
the line of fire, and tearing chasms in the fronts 
of the solid masses of which they were the 
forerunners. The artillery and the skirmishers 
were enough for the French. The dense 
columns staggered and then broke. Through 
my glass I could see a continuous sauve qui 
pent into the village of Maxe. But when they 
had once got stone and lime between them and 
the Prussians, the French were obstinate and 
would go no further. In vain the Prussian 
artillery fired on the Villages, advancing closer 
and closer in alternate order of batteries with 
a precision and rapidity that could not have 
been exceeded on Woolwich-common. That 
obstinate battery in front of Grandes Tapes 
would not cease, and the French tirailleurs 
still lined the chansse'e in its front. By this 



DESPERATE FIGHT- FOR THE VILLAGES. 



127 



time it was nearly four o'clock: As we stood 
in suspense, a staff officer galloped along the 
front line with orders for a general advance to 
take the villages by storm. The advance, he 
told me, was to consist of four brigades of the 
Landwehr, with two brigades of the Tenth 
Army Corps supporting. 30 In a few minutes 
more the command came sounding alono- the 
line, and the men sprang from their cover and 
went forward with that steady quick step so 
characteristic of the Prussian marching. The 
shells from the battery in front of Grandes 
Tapes tore through the line, the mitrailleuse 
and Chassepot bullets poured against it their 
leaden hail, but still the Landwehr silent and 
stern, went steadily to the front. I never knew 
a more furious fire that that to which the centre 
of this line was exposed. General von Bran- 
denstein, commanding the third brigade of the 
Landwehr, was shot down as he rode close to 
me, and several of his staff were wounded. At 
length the entrenchments were reached, behind 
which were lying the shattered remnants of 
the 59th and 58th Landwehr. The fraterni- 
zation consisted in the cry, " Hurrah Preus- 
sen ! " and then " Vorwarts — immer vor warts ! " 
and the line threw itself to its front in a run. 
The gunners from the battery, brave men and 
stubborn, had barely time to run round the 
corner before the Landwehr were upon them. 
The guns they left perforce. In the villages 
the French made a last stand, but it had been 
better for them that they had run away at 
hist. The Landwehr, with less of the conven- 
tional warrior in them than the line, are not 
so much inclined to give quarter as are the 
professional soldiers. With many a French- 
man this afternoon the shrift consisted of a 
bayonet thrust. They fought like devils in 
the narrow ways of the villages, and used the 
mitrailleuses with rare judgment and effect. 
But then there came the steady inexorable 
stride forward of the Landwehr, the bayonet 
lent force with that huge thigh and back 
power which is the leading characteristic in 
an athletic sense of the Prussian physiq tie, and 
ihe villages were cleared of all save victors, 
dead, and wounded." 

If Bazaine had really entertained the idea 
" of cutting his -way through to Thionviile, or 



even of effecting a permanent breach in the 
line of investment, the credit of defeating his 
purpose is due to the admirable stubbornness 
of the Landwehr ; but on the other hand so 
far as its object was to revictual the troops, 
and ascertain the positions and the strength of 
of the enemy, it is to be deemed successful, 
though the results were comparatively small. 
Beyond this, little was lost or gained; for if 
the Germans held Les Grandes Tapes, the 
French held the position at Ladonchamps, and 
the two armies still frowned upon each other 
from behind their entrenchments. Perhaps it 
was necessary to convince the mutinous sob 
diery by a desperate fight that it was hopeless 
to attempt breaking through the German lines, 
but the insinuation that a hopeless sortie was 
made in order to get rid of the disaffected is 
too monstrous to be entertained. Bazaine him- 
self was in the front of battle around the 
villages in the plain, and the Garde Imperiale 
under his immediate orders fought splendidly. 31 
When he returned to his quarters that night, 
it was with the conviction that nothing more 
could be attempted with any rational hope of 
success. He was neither strong enough to 
break through the Prussian line, nor, if he 
had succeeded in doing so by some extraor- 
dinary effort of despair made at a propitious 
moment, could he have hoped to reach an} 7 
point where he could halt his troops. If it 
were not desirable to lead his men like sheep 
to the slaughter, nothing henceforth remained 
for consideration but the time and the condi- 
tions of the inevitable capitulation. 

The next day, October 8th, Bazaine ordered 
the commanders of the several Army Corps 
to assemble their Generals of Division, and 
explain the situation to them. It was in- 
deed desperate. The soldiers could not be 
relied upon to make another sortie, even had 
it been desirable. The men were suffering 
fearfully from skin diseases, chiefly of a scor- 
butic character, caused by insufficiency of food 
and exposure, especially the want of vegetables 
and salt, and their almost exclusive diet of 
horseflesh. Even fodder for the horses hail 
failed, the scanty bit of meadow land whk-h 
the French commanded round Metz having long 
since been exhausted. The • starving- animals 



128 



CONDITION OF BAZAINE'S ARMY. 



frequently galloped over from the meadows 
and entered the German lines. After the battle 
of the 7th had been fought, there were in the 
hospitals and private houses, the accommoda- 
tion in the former being inadequate, 19,000 
sick and wounded. For these unfortunates 
there was neither camp-equipage, bedding, nor 
medical attendance. The small-pox, which 
had been raging in France since the autumn 
of 1869, broke out violently in Metz; and to 
this was added, as a consequence of bad nour- 
ishment, typhus, diarrhoea, and dysentery, 
which spread further and further every day, 
as the necessary care for the sick grew more 
and more impossible. The horses that had 
survived their starvation diet, and were not 
slaughtered, lost all strength, in consequence 
of which the splendid artillery and cavalry of 
Bazaine's army were almost annihilated. On 
the 8th of October the Marshal's effective 
strength did not exceed, at the very most, 
70,000 men. The time that he could hold 
out had been nicely calculated, though Mr. 
Robinson leads his readers to suppose there 
was abundance in the camp on the day of the 
surrender. It was estimated that if negotia- 
tions were at once commenced with the 
German commanders, and followed to a suc- 
cessful issue, yet these negotiations would 
necessarily occupj^ several days, and several 
days moi*e would be taken up by the with- 
drawal of Bazaine's army. Viewing every- 
thing in the most favourable light, these 
operations could not be concluded until the 
16th of October. But it had previously been 
calculated that the provisions for the whole 
army and garrison would last only to the 20th 
of October, so that the garrison of Metz, after 
the departure of Bazaine, could at the very 
most expect the remaining provisions to last 
them from five to eight days beyond that 
time, especially as all the sick remained be- 
hind, and but little change would be made in 
the number of inhabitants. 

Nevertheless, the generals of division were 
for the most part opposed to the project of 
capitulation, and when, logically, if not 
morally, convinced, they sought a compromise, 
to save their honour, in the suggestion that the 
army should be permitted to pass to the 



South of France with their arms and baggage, 
provided it were agreed that they should not 
serve against Germany during the rest of the 
war. This proposition, we may now say, was 
certain not to be accepted. Its practical 
effect was to separate the fall of the army of 
Bazaine from that of the fortress, and to in- 
crease the capacity of the latter for resistance 
by an enormous reduction in the amount of 
provisions consumed. It has, however, been 
imputed as a fault to Bazaine, that he did not 
himself consult the generals of division, and 
discuss their opinions, in which case he could 
either have combated the feeling which pre- 
vailed amongst them against himself per- 
sonally, or at least have brought them to 
recognize the hopelessness of the fresh attempt 
they unanimously desired to make. Doubtless 
he had his own reasons for avoiding any such 
conflict of opinions, which we must leave the 
reader to appreciate according to his lights. 

The military position having been explained 
to the Council of War which met on the 10th 
of October, 3 - three questions were formally 
submitted to them — First, Shall the army of 
Metz hold out till all means of living are 
consumed ? This was answered in the affirma- 
tive, on the ground that by its remaining in 
Metz the army of Bazaine held, as in a locked 
embrace, that of Prince Frederick Charles, 
and afforded longer time for the development 
of the new military organization in the interior 
of France. Secondly, Should sorties still be 
made in the neighbourhood for foraging pur- 
poses? Thisqucstion wasdecidedin the negative, 
because of the apparent improbability that such 
undertakings would be followed by any result 
proportionate to the undoubted loss with 
which they would be accompanied Thirdly, 
Should negotiations be commenced with the 
enemy in order to conclude an acceptable 
military convention ? This was answered in 
the affirmative, but accompanied with this 
condition, that the negotiations should be 
commenced within the next forty-eight hours, 
and not delayed until the moment when the 
last of the pi-ovisions were consumed, because 
if no acceptable and honourable conditions 
were accepted, an attempt must be made to 
force a passage through the enemy's lines 



MISSION OF GENERAL BOYER, 



129 



sword in hand. RustOw observes that there is 
much that is remarkable in these negotiations, 
and it is especially to be noted, that the ex- 
pression "capitulation" was not employed, but 
instead the term " Military Convention ;" from 
which it appears that claim was made for an 
especial role for the army of Metz. Further, 
it will be found that after the state of the 
provisions had been ascertained, had they been 
in earnest to break through sword in hand, 
they had already waited too long for the 
• commencement of the negotiations. No man 
in the French camp could possibly imagine, 
after what had already occurred, that the 
Germans would grant, in the space of a feiv 
hours, the extraordinary conditions demanded, 
conditions which would certainly never be 
entertained in favour of an army in the 
position of Bazaine's. 

The required permission having been granted 
by Prince Frederick Charles, Bazaine sent his 
First Adjutant, General Boyer, to Versailles to 
the head-quarters-m-chief of the German armies, 
in order that he might receive intelligence of 
the real state of France, and learn what terms 
would be granted to the army of Metz, and for 
the settlement of a general peace. 33 It is ob- 
vious from this, Rustow observes, that the mis- 
sion of General Boyer was not a purely mili- 
tary one, but in the highest sense political. He 
makes this remark in answer to the statements 
of Bazaine's apologists, that the political situa- 
tion was not allowed to influence his councils. 
We prefer our own view, that he was perfectly 
justified in considering the political situation. 

After Boyer's departure on his mission, 
General Coffinieres informed the people of 
Metz (October 13) that from that time only 
one sort of bread would be baked — namely, of 
bran. That of this bread every grown inhabi- 
tant would receive daily 400 grammes, every 
child from four to twelve years 200 grammes, 
every child under four years 100 grammes, 
and that it must be paid for at the rate of 45 
centimes per kilogramme. This intelligence, 
coupled with the mysterious whispers that 
were circulating as to the departure of General 
Boyer, was the cause of much excitement in 
the town. '« The citizens complained not so 
much about the deprivations they had to 



endure, as the ignorance in which they had 
hitherto been left, and of their dependence on 
"secret powers," by whom it was quite possible 
they might be betrayed to Prussia. In all 
this it is easy to see the working of the revo- 
lutionary leaven. It was more manifest still, 
here as at Paris, in the excited language of 
the press. Coffinieres himself, notwithstanding 
his leaning to the Republican idea, was 
obliged to adopt repressive measures. The 
editors of the various papers had to 
submit their proofs to him before going to 
press. This was a hardship, no doubt, but 
was it not a necessity of the case ; and could 
such powers be exercised without incurring 
odium ? 34 Then there were popular demon- 
strations against the Imperial Government or 
any government whatever. On the 12th there 
was a gathering before the Hotel de Yille 
while the Municipal Council was sitting, who, 
in obedience to the demand of the mob, broke 
the Eagle from the colours and threw it down 
to them. On the night of the 13th they as- 
sembled again, and the Mayor read to them an 
address which had been prepared for presen- 
tation to the Commandant, in which the 
popular feeling against capitulation was en- 
thusiastically expressed. 35 The reply of Gene- 
ral Coffinieres, who waited on the Town 
Council the next day, throws a little welcome 
light on the situation, for it hints in a round- 
about way that the distress of the town was 
occasioned by the addition of Bazaine's army ; 
at the same time it advised the Municipal 
Council to let politics alone, because political 
discussions would only have a damaging and 
disuniting influence : their one common rally- 
ing cry must be " Vive la France ! " 36 

Boyer, who started from Metz on the 12th, 
reached Versailles on the 14th, and commenced 
negotiations there with Bismarck and Moltke. 
His proposals were that the army of Bazaine 
— of the fortress of Metz nothing was said — 
with all its weapons, baggage, and war mate- 
rial should be allowed free passage to the 
South of France, on condition of not again 
fighting against Germany during the con- 
tinuance of the war. The question naturally 
arose on the side of M Bismarck, who would 
guarantee the observance of this condition? 



ISO 



BAZAINE AND THE EMPRESS EUGENIE. 



Marshal Bazaine was simply a General ! To 
which Government did he acknowledge alle- 
giance? Since the capture of the Emperor 
the only Government that Germany could 
legally recognize was the Regency of the 
Empress Eugenie. The united German Govern- 
ments could not possibly negotiate with the 
Government of National Defence, unless at 
least a Constituent Assembly were called. 
According to the statement made by Boyer on 
his return to Metz (Oct. 17th), M. Bismarck 
treated the military question as subordinate 
to the political one. He was willing to nego- 
tiate with the Empress, and even permit the 
army of Metz to go free on the conditions that 
it, the army, proclaimed the regency, and then 
as the Army of Order, with Bazaine at its 
head, proceeded to combat the revolution. 
Rustow, who wishes to disclaim for his 
country any interference with the domestic 
politics of France, scarcely thinks it probable 
that Bismarck should have placed such un- 
limited trust in the power of Bazaine over Iris 
troops, as soon as they were freed from the 
enclosures of Metz, as these conditions imply, 
or that he should recognize a security of suffi- 
cient strength in the fact of the Empress 
Eugenie being declared. He could not but 
have seen that the army of Bazaine, however 
loyal the Marshal himself might be in keeping 
his word, would no sooner have regained its 
liberty than it would release itself from obe- 
dience, and place itself bag and baggage at 
the command of the Provisional Government. 
Whatever force there may be in this argument, 
we do not admit in the first place that M. 
Bismarck would have done wrong to consider 
seriously the political situation of France, and 
prefer to treat with the Regency of the Em- 
press Eugenie. Setting aside all prejudice and 
political prudery, it was the most natural 
solution of the difficulty. In the second place, 
the story told of Bo} 7 er's interview is 
thoroughly consistent with the story of M. 
Regnier; and thirdly, it accounts for M. 
Boyer's subsequent visits to Chislehurst. 

After hearing from General Boyer the result 
of his mission, the Council of War decided, by 
a majority of 5 (7 against 2), that he should 
return to Versailles and from there should go 



to Chislehurst in order to obtain, if possible, 
through the intervention of the Empress with 
the King of Prussia, conditions more favour- 
able to the army of Metz. It was unani- 
mously concluded that Bazaine should sign no 
agreement which was not wholly and solely 
connected with the army, as this last must be 
kept free from all contact with political ques- 
tions. 37 Commenting on these resolutions, 
Rustow sa}^s : — " It will be at once seen that 
they dfrectly contradict each other ; either the 
second was not earnestly meant, or only in- 
tended to silence the masses, if the decision of 
the Council of War should be imparted to 
them ; or there ruled in the heads of the 
members of the Council the most extraordinary 
confusion of ideas. He adds an opinion by 
no means complimentary to the majority of 
the Council ; but he makes no allowance for 
the difficulty of the situation, and the peculi- 
arities of French character with which the 
members of the Council were painfully con- 
scious they had to deal. Bazaine declares that 
his object in the negotiations was to deliver 
the Army of the Rhine from the painful situa- 
tion in which it was placed, and preserve it for 
Fra nee. This might be done consistently with 
the restoration or non-restoration of the Im- 
perial authority. We have therefore no right 
to infer any insincerity either on his part or 
that of the other members of the Council, 
because of conflicting conversations and reso- 
lutions. We know the result of his envoy's 
second visit to Versailles, and his journey 
thence to Chislehurst. The Empress Eugenie 
declared, after long hesitation, that she would 
not engage in any negotiations whatever'. 
Virtually, perhaps, she mistrusted Bazaine, 
and would not place herself or the future 
of her son, in his hands. Practically she 
refused to make herself a party to a peace 
which would appear disgraceful to the mass of 
the French people, and which, after all, sup- 
posing that Bazaine's army proved faithful, 
would have opened the gulf of civil war at 
her feet. In this decision, it maybe admitted, 
that she proved herself a shrewd politician, 
but it does not follow that Bazaine as a soldier 
was to be blamed for taking a different view 
The case, as regards him, is fairly enough 



MISSION OF GENERAL CHANGARNIER. 



131 



summed up in the semi-official document 
which is said to have emanated from Chisle- 
hurst (ante, p. 107). 

In the interval between the battle of the 
7th and the surrender of Metz, no serious 
fighting occurred. On the 13th there was a 
move on the German side to beat up the 
enemy's quarters about Borny and Grigy; but 
it came to very little. Two batteries were 
got into position between Colombey and Mon- 
toy, and threw shells into the French camp ; in 
reply to which St. Julien thundered a little, 
and a French battalion came in a straggling 
sort of way out of Mey, only to retire again 
before a sharp rattle of musketry. On the 
16th the French made a sortie in small num- 
bers, and were driven back, as a matter of. 
course. On the 18th the Council of War was 
held which received Beyer's report of his 
journey to Versailles, as related above, and at 
which it is said the idea of making Bazaine 
regent was really entertained. 35 On the 21st 
Bazaine sent by six different messengers to 
Paris and Tours a secret despatch, in which he 
stated that his situation was growing more 
and more critical, and that in a few days more 
(sous peu) famine would compel him to act on 
his own responsibility (me forcera de prendre 
un par ti, etc.) He also repeated his former 
complaint that he had received no communi- 
cation whatever either from Paris or Tours, 
and begged to be informed of what had taken 
place in the interior and in the capital. 30 M. 
de Valcour was one of those who succeeded in 
passing safely through the German lines with 
this concealed document. In the meantime, 
M. Boyer was on his way to Chislehurst, and 
on the 23rd King William received intelligence 
from him that the negotiations had led to no 
result. By this time it was well known at 
German head-quarters that the provisions for 
the French army in and around Metz must be 
< o! i sinned almost to the last fraction, and con- 
sequently Prince Frederick Charles was com- 
manded to inform Marshal Bazaine that His 
Majesty had given up all hope of arriving at 
any result through political negotiations. 
This communication was made to Bazaine 
by Prince Fredeiick Charles on the 24th, 
and on the morning of the 25th Bazaine 



called a Council of War to deliberate 
upon it. 

We may here observe that Rustow takes a 
decided part against Bazaine, apparently to 
deliver M. Bismarck and his Sovereign from 
the imputation of meddling with French 
politics, as we have remarked before. He 
says : " It is interesting to observe how the 
expression, political negotiations, appears in 
the justificatory pamphlet of Bazaine, whilst 
he tortures himself to prove that the mission 
of Boyer had no political motive whatever. 
During the journey of Boyer to England, 
arrangements were made as if the departure of 
Bazaine's army, with its weapons and all its 
war material, were quite certain ; the higher 
officers were even informed that this army had 
the task of proclaiming and supporting the 
Regency in France — intelligence which was 
received by the majority with the secret deter- 
mination to act as they pleased when they 
were once at liberty.'' We can only say, if 
this were true, so much the worse for them 
and for poor France, which had not hitherto 
had to suffer from military pronunciamentos 
like those of Spain. 

At the Council of War on the 25th, it was 
resolved that General Changarnier, to whose 
loyal and wise council at all these deliberations 
Bazaine testifies, should go to the head- 
quarters of Prince Frederick Charles for the 
purpose of obtaining, not a capitulation, but 
an armistice, with permission to revictual and 
retire to Algeria. Should this be granted, it 
was hoped the Legislative Assembly, which had 
been turned out of doors by the mob of Paris 
on the 4th of September, would be called 
together, and that it would at once recognize 
the army of Bazaine as the army of order, 
and proceed to reconstitute a regular govern- 
ment. The mission of Changarnier was com- 
municated by the commanders of corps to the 
generals of division, to whom some are of 
opinion it could only appear ridiculous. 
General Bisson is said to have told Marshal 
Canrobert that Bazaine and the corps com- 
manders, no matter what they might say, 
thought of nothing else than how to avoid 
being made prisoners with the army ; and 
knowing right well they dared not show them- 



132 



THE CAPITULATION. 



selves again in France, they wished at least to 
make such a pact with the enemy as to get off 
with their booty. It is difficult for the 
historian, who desires nothing but the truth 
to keep his temper in the presence of state- 
ments which would be in place in a history 
of Greek or Italian brigandage. We, for our 
part, are happy to believe that the soldiers of 
France, with all their faults, were not sunk so 
low in debasement. 

Prince Frederick Charles had his instruc- 
tions. A fortnight had passed since the 10th 
of October, and he knew well the army of 
Metz was no longer in a position to insist on 
conditions. Indeed, if great sorties were still 
spoken of, as was actually the case, the only 
object was to occupy people's minds, and give 
the madmen of Metz something to talk about. 
What could not be accomplished with Ba- 
zaine's army at the end of August, when its 
condition was comparatively good, certainly 
could not be ventured upon with the remnant 
of it struck down with hunger and disease. 
The Prince, therefore, took his ground on an 
unconditional surrender of the army and 
fortress, and Changarnier returned with this 
decision. It is reported that the brave old 
general was quite heart-broken, and when he 
took leave, said with deep emotion, " Eh bien, 
messieurs ! We shall fall, but with honour. 
I wish that neither you nor any brave soldier 
may ever experience this." 

In the evening of the 25th there was an 
interview at Frescaty, a chateau within the 
German lines, on the south of Metz, between 
General Stiehle, chief of Prince Frederick 
Charles's Staff, and General Cissey, of L'Ad- 
mirault's corps, who was selected for the pur- 
pose that it might not be said the divisional 
generals were not consulted. This interview 
had been provisionally arranged by Changar- 
nier as a means of ascertaining definitively 
what terms could be arrived at between the 
two generals, whese sole business it was to 
consider the military situation. Nothing was 
materially altered by this consultation, and on 
ihe morning of the 26th, when the Council of 
war again met, and was advised of the fact, it 
inly remained to make the sacrifice demanded 
sf them. ' It was therefore unanimously 



agreed that Jarras, a general of division, and 
chief of the general staff, should be sent to 
the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles 
with full powers to sign a military convention, 
by which the French army, "vanquished by 
famine," constituted itself a prisoner of war. 

On the evening of the 26th October, the 
negotiations were concluded between Generals 
Stiehle and Jarras, in the chateau of Frescaty. 
One single difficulty still remained undecided, 
namely, whether the officers should be admitted 
to parole, it being alleged that French officers 
who had given their word not to serve against 
Germany during this war, had nevertheless 
taken commands in the new levies. Prince 
Frederick Charles wished to omit this con- 
dition ; but on the question being telegraphed 
to the King of Prussia, he answered it in 
favour of the French demands. The conven- 
tion was signed by the chiefs of the staffs of 
the two armies, on the evening of October 
27th, at the chateau of Frescaty. It was to 
be put in execution at midday on the 29th, and 
was accepted by the Council of War at a 
sitting on the morning of the 28th, under the 
presidency of Marshal Bazaine. It was based 
on the same principles as the capitulation of 
Sedan. Special clauses stipulated for the 
protection of the inhabitants of Metz, and 
determined the manner in which the troops 
should march out. Bazaine states that on the 
26th of October, before anything was decided, 
he had ordered the commander of the artillery 
to have all the regimental Eagles collected in 
the arsenal and destroyed ; but that this order 
had not been executed in all the corps when 
the convention was signed. After that it 
would have been a breach of military honour 
had these trophies been destroyed. It thus 
happened that fifty-three Eagles were given 
up to the Germans on the evening of the 28th, 
the Marshal consoling himself with the re- 
flection that as they had not been captured 
on the field of battle, they were morally of no 
value. 

Besides the Eagles and the small arms of 
every kind, 3,000 guns, including 100 mitrail- 
leuses, and treasure to the amount of at least 
80,000,000 of francs, became the prize of the 
victors. The prisoners were — three marshals 



PROCLAMATIONS TO BOTH ARMIES. 



133 



of the empire (Bazaine, Leboeuf, and Can- 
robert) ; more than G,000 officers ; and 173,000 
subalterns and privates. 40 This raised the 
number of prisoners roughly estimated to four 
marshals, 140 generals, 10,000 other officers, 
and 323,000 rank and file, in a campaign which 
had not yet lasted three months. The Prus- 
sians might well be excused if they felt excited 
and exultant, yet it must be admitted by their 
worst enemies that they celebrated their 
triumph soberly. Even before the terms of 
capitulation were agreed upon, the 2nd corps 
received marching orders for Paris — so much 
like a matter of mere business was the war 
conducted. Prince Frederick Charles, for his 
success in this important event of the war, 
and the Crown Prince, for the battles he had 
fought, were raised to the rank of Field-mar- 
shals, while General von Moltke received the 
title of Count. The occasion was further 
celebrated by the following address to the 
forces : 

'HSoLDIERS OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMIES, — When 

we took the field three months ago, I expressed my 
confidence that God would be with our just cause. 
This confidence has been realized. I recall to you 
Worth, Saarbriick, and the bloody battles before Metz, 
Sedan, Beaumont, and Strasburg : each engagement 
was a victory for us. You are worthy of glory ; you 
have maintained all the virtues which specially distin- 
guish soldiers. By the capitulation of Metz the last 
army of the enemy is destroyed. I take advantage of 
this moment to express my thanks to all of you, from 
the general to the soldier. Whatever the future may 
still bring to us, I look forward to it with calmness, 
because I know that with such soldiers victory cannot 

fail. 

(Signed) "Wilhelm." 

Prince Frederick Charles also issued an 
address to his army, in the following terms : 

"Soldiers of the First and Second Armies, — 
You have fought and invested in Metz an enemy 
whom you had vanquished, for seventy days — seventy 
long days — which have made most of your regiments 
the richer in fame and honour, and have made none 
poorer. You allowed no egress to that brave enemy 
until he would lay down his arms. This has been 
done. To-day, at last, this army, still 173,000 men 
strong, the best in France, consisting of more than five 
entire army corps, including the Imperial Guard, with 
three Marshals of France, with more than fifty Gene- 
rals, and above 6,000 officers, has capitulated, and 
with it Metz, never before taken. With this bulwark, 



which we restore to Germany, innumerable stores of 
cannons, arms, and war materiel have fallen to the 
conqueror. Besides these bloody laurels, you have 
defeated him by your bravery in the two days' battle 
at Noisseville, and in the engagements round Metz, 
which are more numerous than the surrounding vil- 
lages after which you name these combats. I acknow- 
ledge your bravery gladly and gratefully, but not it 
alone ; I estimate almost higher your obedience, your 
composure, cheerfulness, and resignation in enduring 
difficulties of many kinds ; all this distinguishes the 
good soldier. To-day's great and memorable success 
was prepared by the battles which we fought befora 
we invested Metz, and, — as we should remember in 
gratitude to him — by the King himself, by the corps 
then marching with him, and by all those dear com- 
rades who died on the battle-field, or through maladies 
originating here. All this previously rendered possible 
the great work which, by God's blessing, you to-day 
see completed, viz., the collapse of the power of 
France. The importance of to-day's event is incalcu- 
lable. You, soldiers, who were assembled under my 
orders for this object, are about to proceed to various 
destinations. I bid farewell, therefore, to the gene- 
rals, officers, and soldiers of the First Army and 
Kummer's Division, and with a God-speed to further 
successes." 

Marshal Bazaine addressed his troops as 
follows : 

" Soldiers of the Army of the Rhine, — Van- 
quished by famine, we are compelled to submit to the 
laws of war by constituting ourselves prisoners. At 
various epochs in our military history, brave troops, 
commanded by Massena, Kleber, and Gouvion Saint- 
Cyr, have experienced the same fate, which does not 
in any way tarnish military honour, when, like you, 
their duty has been so gloriously accomplished, to the 
extremity of human limits. All that was loyally pos- 
sible to be done in order to avoid this end has been 
attempted, and could not succeed. 

" As to renewing a supreme attempt to break through 
the fortified lines of the enemy,— in spite of your gal- 
lantry and the sacrifice of thousands of lives, which 
may still be useful to the country, it would have been 
unavailing. On account of the armament and of the 
overwhelming forces which guard and support those 
lines, a disaster would have been the consequence. 

"Let us be dignified in adversity ; let us respect 
the honourable conventions which have been stipu- 
lated, if we wish to be respected as we deserve to be. 
Let us, above all, for the reputation of our army, shun 
acts of undiscipline, such as the destruction of arms 
and maUriel; since, according to military usages, 
places and armament will be restored to France when 
peace is signed. 

" In leaving the command, I make it a aaty to ex- 
press to generals, officers, and soldiers, all my grati- 

10 



134 



EXCITEMENT IN METZ. 



fcude i i In iir loyal co-operation, their brilliant valour 

in the battle field, their resignation in privations; 

and it is with a broken heart that I separate from 

you. 

(Signed) "Bazaine." 

The commandant, General Coffin ion-., also 
published an address, the terms of which, 
completely justifying the surrender, should be 
the more convincing, when we recall the 
political differences between him and Marshal 
Bazainc : — 

"Inhabitants of Metz, — It is my duty to faith- 
fully state to you our situation, well persuaded that 
your manly and courageous souls will rise to the 
height of this grave occasion. 

' ' Round us is an army which has never been 
conquered, and which has stood firm before the 
fire of the foe, and withstood the rudest rdiocks. 
This army, interposed between our city and her be- 
siegers, has given us time to put our forts in a com- 
plete state of defence, to mount upon our walls more 
than 600 pieces of cannon, and has held in check 
an army of more than 200,000 men. 

" Within our walls we have a population full of 
energy and patriotism, firmly determined to defend 
itself to the last extremity. 

"I have already informed the Municipal Council 
that, notwithstanding the reduction of rations, not- 
withstanding the perquisitions made by the civil and 
military authorities, we have no more food than will 
serve till to-morrow. 

" More than this, our brave army, tried already 
by the fire of the enemy, has lost 42,000 men, after 
horrible sufferings, from the inclemency of the sea- 
son and privations of every kind. The Council of 
War has proof of these facts, and the Marshal Com- 
manding-in-Chief has given formal orders, as he 
had the right, to direct a portion of our provisions 
for the purposes of the army. 

" With all this, thanks to our economy, we can 
still resist up to the 30 th instant, but then our 
situation will not be sensibly modified. 

"Never in the annals of military history has a 
place resisted until its resources have been so com- 
pletely exhausted as this has, and none has ever 
been so encumbered with sick and wounded. 

"We are, then, condemned to succumb; but it 
will be with honour, and when we find ourselves 
conquered by famine. 

' ' The enemy, who has so closely invested us for 
more than seventy days, knows that he has almost 
attained the end of his efforts. He demands the 
town and the army, and will not permit the sever- 
ance of the interests of the one from that of the 
other. Four or five days' desperate resistance 
would only j L&e the inhabitants in a worse posi- 



tion, llest assured that your private interests 
will bo defended with tho most lively solicitude. 
Seek to support stoically this great misfortune, and 
cherish the firm hope that Metz, this grand and 
patriotic city, will remain to France. 

" F. CoFFINIERES, 

" Commandant-in-Chief of the Fortress of Metz, 

" The General of Division. 
"Metz, 21th October, 1870." 

The people of Metz, when they heard of 
the surrender, were furious. That evening the 
Independant came out with a deep black 
border, and with an article in which the 
heroic editor exclaimed : " It is not we "who 
capitulate ; before the enemy should have 
entered within our walls — before he should 
have sung his song of victory in our streets — 
he should have had to w T ade, knee-deep, 
through a rampart of our dead bodies." The 
statue of Fabert was covered with crape. The 
most desperate resolves were taken. All dis- 
cipline was at an end. Officers met and pro- 
tested. More than a thousand escaped by 
such devious ways as they could, before the 
articles of capitulation were actually signed; 
while others, to the number of 8,000 officers 
and men, hid themselves in various parts of 
the town, with the idea of coming forth from 
their concealment and doing something des- 
perate — it is not very clear what. The 
National Guard, who had at first allowed their 
arms to be taken from them, went mad, and 
broke open the door of the Hotel de Ville to 
recover them. A captain of dragoons placed 
himself at the head of a body of troops, and 
all swore they would die rather than yield- 
The editor of the Journal de Metz (Albert 
Callignon), rode about the town on a white 
horse, firing a pistol, and exhorting the people 
to sally out and seek death or victory, to 
escape the impending shame. Following him 
was a young lady riding a horse in the fashion 
of Jeanne Dare, with a pistol in her hand and 
a pocket handkerchief fastened to it for a 
banner, singing the Marseillaise. The doors 
of the cathedral were burst open, and the 
alarum bell rang all night. Respectable 
women rushed through the streets, tearing 
their hair, and flinging their bonnets and laces 
under their feet, and crying aloud, " What 
will become of our children ? " Soldiers, drunk 



THE ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION. 



and sober, tumbled hither and thither in irre- 
gular groups, with their caps off and their 
sabres broken, many crying, nay sobbing 
like children, and declaring they had been 

sold. The civil functionaries were demented 

> 

and went through the streets" asking each 
other, " Who will be our master ? " " Who will 
govern us ? " " Where shall we go ? " The 
more sober-minded moved about as at a fune- 
ral, and clasped each other's hands in silence. 
At length the violence that had been threatened 
by the more excited part of the population 
was put an end to by inarching in a few 
battalions of the Imperial Guard and the Line, 
— an incident which affords Mr. Robinson the 
opportunit}' to observe, that the last act of 
the Army of the Rhine was to suppress 
liberty. 11 

To complete the historical documents imme- 
diately connected with the capitulation, we 
subjoin the Articles of the Convention agreed 
upon at the Chateau of Frescaty, on the 27th 
of October. 

" Abticle I. — The French army, placed under 
the orders of Marshal Bazaine, is prisoner of war. 

" Article II. — The fortress and the town of Metz, 
with all foils, materiel of war, munitionsx»f all kinds, 
and everything which is the property of the state, 
shall be given up to the Prussian army in the same 
state as they exist at the signing of this convention. 

" On Saturday, the 29th of October, at noon, the 
forts St. Quentin, Plappevillc, St. Julien, Queleu, 
and St. Privat, together with the Porte Mozelle 
(Strasburg road), shall be given up to the Prus- 
sians at ten o'clock in the morning of the same day ; 
officers of the artillery and engineers, with certain 
non-commissioned officers, shall be admitted into 
the said forts to draw the mines, and to guard the 
magazines. 

"Article III. — The arms, together with all the 
materiel of the army, consisting of flags, eagles, 
cannons, mitrailleuses, horses, fourgons, baggage- 
waggons, munitions, etc., shall be left at Metz, and 
in the forts, under the care of military commissioners 
appointed by Marshal Bazaine, to be handed over 
immediately to the Prussian commissioners. The 
troops, without arms, shall be conducted according 
to their different regiments or corps, and in military 
order, to the several places appointed for each corps. 
The officers may then return to Metz, on condition 
of their engaging themselves on their honour not to 
quit the place without the orders of the Prussian 
commandant. The troops will then be conducted 
by their non-commissioned officers to the place of 



bivouac, the soldiers retaining their kn per- 

sonal effects, and camp equipment (tents, rugs, cook- 
ing utensils, etc). 

"Article IV.- — All generals and officers, as well 
as military employes having the rank of officers, who 
will engage on then written parole d' honneur, nei- 
ther to bear arms against Germany, nor in any 
other manner to agitate against her interests until 
the end of the present Avar, will not be made pri- 
soners of war. Officers and employes who accept 
this condition will be allowed to retain their arms 
and personal property. In recognition of the cou- 
rage shown in this campaign by the army and the 
garrison, it is further permitted to those officers who 
elect to go into captivity, to wear their swords or 
sabres, and to retain their personal effects. 

" Article V. — Army surgeons, without exception, 
will remain behind to take care of the Avounded , and 
will be treated according to the articles of the Ge- 
neva Convention ; the same rule applies to the other 
hospital officers or servants. 

"Article VI. — Questions of detail, principally 
concerning the interests of the town, will be treated 
in an appendix to be annexed hereto, and which will 
have the same authority as this present protocol. 

" Article VII. — All cases of doubt arising on the 
above articles shall be translated in favour of the 
French army. 

' ' Done at the Chateau of Frescaty, the 27th of 
October, 1870. 

(Signed) " L. Jarras, Stiehle." 

On the appointed morning (October 29th) 
the Germans took possession of the detached 
forts and the gates, after having sent a pioneer 
detachment to examine the place for mines. 
At mid-day the French troops commenced 
marching; out in the following order : — 

The Sixth Corps and the Cavalry Division 
(Forton) on the road to Thionville, by way of 
Ladonchamps ; 

The Fourth Corps (L'Admirault) between the 
forts Plappeville and St. Quentin," on the road 
from Amanvillevs as far as the Prussian lines. 

The Guard (Desvaux), the great Artillery 
Reserve, and the equipage, etc., of the head- 
citia iter.-,, on the right bank of the Moselle, on 
the road to Nancy, as far as Tournebride, near 
Frescaty. Here the Imperial Guard laid down 
their arms ; they alone, according to Bazaine'^ 
own wish, having been accorded the honour 
of marching out with their weapons. The 
rest of the troops had deposited their arms at 
the appointed places before leaving. 



136 



MARCH OUT OF THE PRISONERS. 



The Second Corps (Frossard), with the 
division Laveaucoupet, and the brigade La- 
passet, on the road to Nomeny, over Magny 
and Seille, as far as St. Thiebault. 

The Third Corps (Leboeuf ) on the Saarbruck 
road, as far as Bellecroix. 

The Mobile Guard and all other troops com- 
posing the garrison of the fortress, on the 
Strasburg road as far as Grigy. 

The march out of the Imperial Guard was 
witnessed by the correspondent of the Daily 
Telegraph, who says : " As we entered the road 
whence we could see the battery of St. Quen- 
tin, every eye was turned in that direction ; 
for there, on the highest point, waved the 
black and white flag of Prussia. Here, too, 
some four or five soldiers of the Imperial Guard 
passed us. They were immediately arrested 
for having broken out of the town without 
waiting for their regiments. As we approached 
we found the Brigade of General Hartmann — 
drawn up on the left of the road, and compris- 
ing the 54th and 21st Regiments, with the 
3rd Dragoons. At a signal from the General, 
8,000 good, strong Pomeranian pairs of lungs 
shouted a welcome to the victorious Prince, 
who, with his staff, galloped up the front of 
the line, and down the rear. His Royal High- 
ness Prince Frederick Charles then took up a 
position to the right of the first regiment, and, 
surrounded by his staff, awaited the arrival of 
the French troops. It was half-past one o'clock, 
but yet there were no signs of the beaten 
enemy. 

" Eagerly every eye was strained in the 
direction of the bridge, which with a single 
arch spans the railway, to catch the first 
glimpse of the red trousers ; but nothing was 
to be seen, and the rain descended in torrents 
— the heavier showers wetting all to the skin. 
Presently the scream of a railway engine, 
pushing before it a single first-class carriage 
along that line of railway that had so often 
proved the scene of outpost fights, came into 
view. The carriage contained Marshal Bazaine 
and staff, going to the residence of his Royal 
Highness, also to surrender themselves* Slowly 

* Bazaine says he surrendered himself at Corvy at 
fiye o'clock on the evening of the 25th (Rapport 
Officid, p. '62) ; but 25th is evidently a misprint for 
29th. — 



the moments dragged on, and still no appear- 
ance of the French advanced Guard. It was 
now whispered that the officers had lost all 
control over their men ; that there was no disci- 
pline ; and that this was the reason they had 
been compelled to give up their arms before 
marching out of Metz. But a greater libel 
against the discipline of the French Guard was 
never circulated. The Prussian troops piled 
arms, and stood at ease, some waited and spe- 
culated, and watched the inhabitants of Metz 
as they straggled along the road in detached 
parties. At three p.m., an aide-de-camp 
came galloping up to say that the troops were 
coming; the soldiers stood to their arms, and 
presently, over the railway bridge, appeared 
the long-expected prisoners. Riding at the 
head of the first detachment was the Town 
Major, a Colonel in the French army, attended 
by a mounted orderly in full uniform, wearing 
his sword. Approaching General Framsecky, 
he took off his cap, and reported the arrival of 
the Guard to surrender themselves prisoners of 
war ; so much affected that he could scarcely 
give utterance to a word. General Fransecky 
replied courteously — his Royal Highness being 
some forty yards off, to the right. The first 
regiment then marched by ; they were the 
Hussars of the Guard. The Colonel of the 
regiment, riding up to General Fransecky and 
saluting, handed to him the effective strength 
of his regiment ; then he rode off, followed by 
his officers, all still wearing their swords. The 
Empress's Dragoons came next; then a regi- 
ment of Chasseurs of the Garde ; then the ar- 
tillery. As each regiment approached, the 
commanding officers went through the same 
formula, presenting " the states " of their regi- 
ments. Never was seen more perfect order, 
or a more quiet, soldier-like demeanour, than 
that exhibited by this splendid body of men, 
as they marched past in perfect silence. Not 
a word was spoken. All that could be heard 
was the measured tread of thousands of feet 
as they splashed along the muddy road. The 
officers, some of them with tears in their 
eyes, some with haughty and bold counte- 
nances, silently shook hands with their sol- 
diers; for the order was, that so soon as the 
officers had marched their regiments to the 



POPULAR FEELING AGAINST BAZAINE. 



137 



quarters assigned for their bivouac, they were 
to ride back to Metz, and there await further 
orders. 

" Immediately following the above-men- 
tioned regiments came the Guards Grenadier 
Regiment, so well-known to Englishmen — so 
familiar at the gates of the Louvre, at the 
Palace of the Tuilleries, and before the prin- 
cipal buildings of Paris. Poor fellows — it 
was impossible not to pity them- as, with 
a steady, solclier-like demeanour, they strode 
past, as if they were going to a field-day, and 
not to prison ! The Prussian officers gazed 
with wonder and surprise upon this fine body 
of men, most of them between 19 and 23 years 
of age ; and as regiment after regiment, to 
the number of at least 30,000, filed past, our 
soldiers whispered to one another how fortu- 
nate it was that they had no longer to fight 
against such men. The Horse Artillery and 
the 4th Voltigeurs of the Guard particularly 
attracted attention, the last regiment that 
marched past being the Zouaves of the Guard, 
and a truly splendid regiment they are. It 
was quite dark when the last troops had filed 
before us. As each regiment marched by, it 
took up the place allotted for bivouacking ; 
the men pitched their little tents, lit their fires 
and commenced cooking their provisions. 
During the whole time that the melancholy 
procession went by, not a man opened his lips, 
either in the French or the Prussian ranks, 
except to speak in a whisper. The last occa- 
sion on which the Prussian troops came as 
near the Imperial Guard was on the field of 
Vionville, on the 16th of August." 

While the officers returned into Metz, as 
stated above, the sous-ojficiers remained in 
command of their men, the places of their 
superiors being filled by German officers. On 
the following day the unfortunate prisoners 
of war were pushed forward on the roads 
over Saarbruck and Saarlouis by General von 
Zastrow, whose corps (the 7th) was to remain 
behind in the neighbourhood of Metz. General 
von Kummer was appointed commander of 
Metz. Some part of his division accompanied 
the prisoners ; the remainder joined to the 7th 
corps. 

A press correspondent states that on pass- 



ing through Ars, on his way to Willie! mshoe, 
(where he was ordered on parole), the women 
of the village heaped every insult upon Ba- 
zaine, calling him " traitor," " coward," " sneak," 
" thief," etc. "Where are our husbands whom 
you have betrayed ?" they cried ; " Give us 
back our children whom you have sold ! " 
They even attacked the carriage, and broke 
the windows with their fists, and would have 
murdered him but for the intervention of the 
Prussiang endarmes. The furore of the popu- 
lation was the same throughout France, 
wherever the intelligence spread. It might 
have been supposed, as Rustow observes, that 
a fortress had never before capitulated, though 
defended by an army; and yet but fifteen 
years had elapsed since Sebastapol fell, al- 
though the Russian army was never environed 
like Bazaine's, or had to depend on the help of 
the fortress for its subsistence. The Delegate 
Government at Tours, of which, as we have 
seen, M. Gambetta was now the informing 
spirit, shared in the general madness. It 
declared Bazaine a traitor, and ordered the 
prefects and mayors to arrest him and his 
officers wheresoever they might be found, and 
deliver them up to justice. 42 The charge of 
treason was repeated at a much later date in 
the Chamber at Versailles, on which occasion 
Bazaine was defended, as we half anticipated, 
(end of note 7, p. 375, vol. i.) by Gen. Changar- 
nier. The question, therefore, will come under 
our notice in a future chapter. For the pre- 
sent, it must suffice to quote the letter ad- 
dressed by Marshal Bazaine to the Novd, of 
the 2nd of November, two days after the 
appearance of Gambetta's proclamation :— 

" I have read," the Marshal says, "your political 
bulletin of the 1st of October, in which you refer to 
M. Gambetta's proclamation. You are right ; the 
Army of the Rhine would not have obeyed a traitor. 
The only answer I shall make to this lying lucubra- 
tion is to send you the order of the day which was 
addressed to the army after the councils of war held 
on the 26th and 29th of October. 

" M. Gambetta does not seem to be aware of 
what he is saying, or of the position in which the 
army at Metz was placed, when he stigmatizes as 
he does its chief, who struggled for three months 
against forces double tbose at bis disposal, and 
whose effective strength was always kept up. 



138 



BAZAINE AND HIS OFFICERS. 



" I received no communications from the Grovcrn- 
aent at Tours, notwithstanding the efforts made to 
place ourselves in relation. 

"The Arm}' of Metz had one Marshal, 24 gene- 
nils, 2,140 officers, and 42,350 men struck by the 
5 's fire, and it made itself respected in every 
fight in which it engaged, finch an army could not 
■miposed of traitors and cowards. Famine and 
disorganization alone caused the arms to fall from 
the hands of the 65,000 real combatants who re- 
mained. The artillery and cavalry were without 
horses, it having* been necessary to kill them to 
alleviate the privations of the army. Had the latter 
not displayed such energy and patriotism it would 
have had to succumb in the first fortnight in Octo- 
ber, when the rations were already reduced to 300 
grammes, and later on to 250 grammes of bad 
bread. Add to this dark picture the fact of there 
being 20,000 sick and wounded, with their medi- 
cines on the point of failing, and themselves Buffer- 
ing from the effects of the continued heavy rains. 

' ' France has always been deceived as to our 
position. I know not why ; but the truth will one 
day prevail. We are conscious of having done our 
duty." 

After all, it will naturally be thought a 
strange thing;, if our view of Bazaine's conduct 
at Metz is correct, that so many of his officers 
should have been dissatisfied and mutin- 
ous. It must be remembered in the first place 
that these officers were individually brave 
men in action, and that the curse under which 
the}? had fallen was that of deteriorated disci- 
pline and the worship of military glory. 
What they felt most keenly in anticipation 
)f the inevitable surrender at Metz was their 
individual humiliation, and with the desperate 



courage of men, frenzied with vanity and de- 
spair, many of them would sincerely have pre- 
ferred death to what, in their shallow self-con- 
ceit, they regarded as irremediable dishonour. 
Let the reader look again at the exclamation 
of M. Regnier (note 14, p. 108, ante) against 
the prevailing vice of French officers, to con- 
sider, above all things, their own " miserable 
personality." To an Englishman who re- 
marked that this capitulation must surely 
bring the French to their senses, and cnsui'e 
an early peace, one of their countrymen, who 
had been a Colonel at Waterloo, mournfully 
replied : " I don't know. Logically, you are 
right, no doubt ; but severe as the lesson has 
been, I question of its effect. It is the officers 
of the French army who chiefly are the 
clamourers — senseless and frothy clamourera 
after la gloire. They shrieked for war, ener- 
vated with lust and absinthe as they were, 
ignorant of their duties, their minds unculti- 
vated, and debilitated with luxury. I fear 
they are too far gone, too 1 utterly vitiated and 
emasculated mentally to be able to draw the 
conclusion from the premises ; and I should 
not be surprised if a year hence you heard the 
parole loafers who are swinging about the 
streets to-day 3 r elling. for war again, as un- 
prepared to pursue it to success as they were 
when this one was entered into, and as reck- 
less and regardless of consequences as they 
were then and are now." Such were the men 
who accused Bazaine of incapacity, and even of 
treason ! 



Notes to Chapter LXI V. 



J The incidents alluded to In the text are natural to all warfare, 
»nt especially a war of invasion. There were other occurrences 
hiring this period of comparative inaction which belong to the 
catalogue of ruffianism common to all nations. One such is 
illudcd to at the end of the following letter, written from before 
Metz, under date of September 18th : — " To-day a flag of truce 
borne, by an officer of rank, came to Frederick Charles's quarters 
1 1 Corny, from Metz. His purpose was to ascertain if it was really 
true that Napoleon was no longer at the head of affairs, and, if 
•o, what was the state of Paris and the Ministry. His Highness 
furnished the officer with all the information he required, and also 
save him a list of the gentlemen who are at present at the head 
>f affaiis in France. Bazaine is as well acquainted with the 
movements of the Prussian troops around Metz as I am, and for 
this knowledge the Prussians have only to thank their kii;dness 
jnd liberaiity towards the inhabitants of the villages of St. Ruffine, 
rtozerieulles, Vaux, and Jussy on one side, and Augny, Marly, 
md Pouillyon the other. The plan of operation is a simple one. 



A pass is obtained from the commandant of the town or village, 
enabling the holder to go to Ars to purchase bread and subsistence. 
The vineyards are thick, and the undulating grounds are specially 
adapted to concealment. The French and Prussian sentries are 
but COO or 700 yards from one another, and arc spread somewhat 
broadcast. What, then, is there to prevent a peasant who knows 
the ground from stealing through the sentries and getting to the 
French outposts ? A severe example has just been made of three 
Prussians who came fiom the town of Daren. These three 
ruffians had disguised themselves; two as Johanniter and the third 
as a clergyman. On the field of the 18th they were observed by 
a Prussian wounded officer to lean over the bodies of the dead, 
and to take an unnecessarily long time over places where no 
assistance was required. He watched them carefully, until a 
sharp cry of pain left him in no doubt as to their horrible errand. 
They leant over a man, who evidently refused to permit them to 
take from him the things so dear to the dying soldier. The 
wounded officer drew his revolver and hit one of the wretches • 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXIV. 



130 



tlio report drew the attention of some army policemen, who, 
hastening to the spot, secured the three inhuman brutes. Their 
knives were red with the blood of their victims. The shrift was 
short and summary. At present affairs remain in the same state. 
Nor is it the intention of the Prussian generals to do anything 
beyond keeping the cordon tied tightly round Metz. Everything 
now depends upon the Crown Prince and his movements." 

2 "The inner [fortifications surround the town continuously, 
with the exception of one gap to the southward, which is covered 
efficiently by the branch of the Moselle which divides the islands 
of Sauleyand Siinphorien. On the north of the lie de Cham- 
bierc a e two important forts on the inner line, one at the north 
western angle of the enceinte, the other detached in the plain of 
the island, but connected with the enceinte by a covered way. 
On the south of the inner line are the Redoubt du Pate to the 
east, and the Lunette d'Arcon to the west, both connected with 
the enceinte hy a covered way. The western side of the inner 
line is covered by the great Fort Moselle, on the further side of 
the main stream of the Moselle — a double-crown work of im- 
mense strength and magnitude, inclosing great magazines and 
arsenals. To the south of it the bastion of He Sauley sends out 
a long spur of fortifications, which crosses the Moselle, and ter- 
minates in a redoubt on the further side. Nor is the eastern 
if the inner line less strongly protected. In front of the 
enceintelooms the great double-crown work of Belle Croix, Cor- 
monfaigne's masterpiece, to the full as larg'e as Fort Moselle, and 
more highly favoured by its natural position. To the south of it 
stands Fort Gisors, a minor detached fortification which serves to 
complete the circuit of connection with the Redoubt du Pate on 
the south." (Correspondence of the Daily News.) 

8 As a rroof that this was really the case, on one occasion a shot 
from Fort St. Julien struck the hack wall of a house at Noisso- 
ville, passed through both walls, back and front, and fell in the 
open street, where it made an immense hole. The house was full 
of officers, but, wonderful to relate, none of them were wounded, 
though one was half-buried under the rubbish of the walls. 
Soon afterwards the fire from St. Julien was supported by a 
cannonade also from Les Bottes, so that Noisseville, which had 
previously suffered a good deal, was almost destroyed, while the 
ground in the neighbouring fields was rent into large holes, many 
feet in depth, by the terrible missiles. In like manner other 
villages were nearly ruined, in consequence of which the Prus- 
sians were sometimes obliged to take up fresh quarters. Under 
these circumstances it would hardly be possible to fix the exact 
positions occupied by the whole investing force at any given 
moment. 

4 Robinson, p. 179. 

6 There had been a heavy fire previously in retaliation for the 
explosion at Laon, (or which it was at first believed the Com- 
mandant of that, fortress was responsible (ante, vol. i., p. 492). 

6 This incident shows what good judges the townspeople were 
of military opportunities ! 

7 Robinson, p. 185. 

* Capitulation de Metz : Reponse du General Cofflnieres 
de Nordech a ses Detracteurs, pp. 49 — 50. 

'■> This expression is a proof that Coffinieres considered the 
resolution that had been unanimously voted by the Council of 
War on the 2Gth of August was still in force, and so far justifies 
the argument I have founded upon it in the text. 

10 This is an old device. When Napoleon I. was General 
Buonaparte, he had his eye on certain gentlemen in green 
cravats. 

ii G. T. Robinson : Fail of Metz, pp. 190-191. It would 
seem that an attempt was made to employ the troops, as the 
correspondent of the Times wrote on the 20th— " The French 
seem more active and more busy than ever they have been before. 
What they can mean by throwing up the gigantic earthworks 
with which they are actually building in the citadel, it seems 
almost impossible to conjecture." Is it conceivable that Bazaine 
anticipated a collision with the garrison and the town ? The 
proclamation of the Republic had been posted up, and Mr. 
Robinton makes the curious remark that " the sole object of the 
National Guard was to defend Metz from the forces which sur- 
rounded it, and I am sure they really did not know whether 



that one under Marshal Bazaine or that under Prill '< 
Frederick Charles was its greatest enemy." (p. 238.) 

i2 The scheme of making use of balloons for the conveyance o 
letters out of Met/, was first, suggested by Mr. Robins n, who 
has given an interesting account of the matter in chapter x. 
of his book. The first balloon, carrying 8,000 letters, was 
started on its aerial voyage on the loth of September. Further 
particulars concerning the balloons, as well as the carrier pigeons 
employed at Metz and Paris will be given in a later chapter. 

18 There had been some skirmishing and firing on tiie 21st of 
September, not only on the south-east of Metz, but also in the 
direction of Plappeville. It was of no great importance, how- 
ever. The sortie of the 22nd is described in the text with suffi- 
cient minuteness for the purposes of history ; but there are a few 
points in the account given of the same event by the corre- 
spondent of the Times worth transcribing : " Attracted by 
firing,' 1 ho says, " I went down in the direction of La-Grange- 
aux-Bois, and found that the enemy was advancing upon it in 
force. Under cover of a heavy cannonade from Fort Queleu, 
preceded by a shower of shells, some of which struck the 
Grange, and others fell as far behind as Ars-Laqucnexy and did 
considerable damage to the church, a strong division of French 
troops advanced. They comprised artillery, cavalry, and in- 
fantry. They had previously been reconnoitred by the Germans 
from an excellent neighbouring point of observation. They 
knew their composition, strength, and direction, and were there- 
fore at once prepared to meet them, and able to avoid a useless 
sacrifice of lives at their outposts. The French infantry were 
thrown into the woods round LaGrange-aux-Bois in skirmishing 
order and in large force, occupying a line extending for about 
one mile to the Prussian Right. This, of course, rendered the 
position of the Prussian outposts at La Grange-aux-Bois 
untenable. Warned of what was about to occur, I had already 
left the Grange about a quarter of an hour previously, and from 
where we stood we could see the puffs of smoke and hear the 
rattle of small arms— which sounded very like the mimic rattle oi 
a field day at the Curragh or at Aldershot. The Prussians in 
retiring availed themselves skilfully of every tree and knoll, and, 
from behind a series of breastworks which they had thrown up to 
strengthen their position, fired steadily upon the advancing 
enemy, and inflicted some severe losses. In order to reach the 
point at which their main supports were concentrated, they had 
to pass over about half a mile of ground, of which they contested 
every inch skilfully and gallantly. It was now about 3 o'clock. 
The French, in advancing, lost the advantage of the support of 
their artillery and cavalry, for the Germans had so obstructed 
the roads by frequent and strong barricades, constructed of hewn 
trees which lined the military road to Metz, and the nature of 
the ground, covered with dense woods, was so unfavourable that 
mounted forces could not act, and guns could not be brought 
forward. All this time, however, a heavy and continuous rain 
of shell of great weight was poured upon Mercy-le-Haut and 
Ars-Laquenexy from Forts Queleu and St. Julien. At the 
junction of the roads leading from Mercy and Ars — which meet 
nearly at right angles— the Germans met their supports. A 
large body of troops of all arms had been concentrated here, and 
were posted in strong positions. The Germans at once assumed 
the offensive, and springing eagerly to the attack with an irre- 
sistible rush, they fairly drove back the French at a considerably 
more rapid pace than that at which they advanced. All the 
German troops engaged carried their knapsacks, mess-tins 
fastened on the top of them, and their cloaks. The cloak is 
sluug crosswise over the shoulder, round the knapsack and under 
the opposite arm. The cloak so rolled has turned many a bullet 
and saved many a German soldier's life. So equipped they poured 
upon the French infantry so heavy and close a fire that they 
were utterly unable to hold their ground. Already in advancing 
thus far they had found how strong a resistance a small body of 
men could mako, fighting with vigour and handled with skill on 
ground of which the natural strength had been increased by the 
use of every means. The German troops, after having cleared 
the woods, drove the French hack through the open, and here they 
inflicted considerable losses. La Grange-aux-Bois was speedily 
reoccupied, and by 5 o'clock the French had been driven back 



140 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXIV. 



within their lines. The affair lasted altogether about four hours. 
I had been at La Grangn-aux-Bois at about 1 o'clock, and at 
a little before five I re-entered it with the Prussian troops. This 
was the second time it had been taken by the French, but each 
time their occupation had been short-lived. The regiment 
which bore the brunt of the onset on the German side was the 
13th Regiment of the 1st Wcstphalinn infantry division. The 
company principally engaged in the struggles of the outposts 
being company No. 1, under command of First Lieutenant Ritter, 
who was slightly wounded. He was the only officer hurt; 15 
men in all were wounded, and one killed on the Prussian side. 
The French losses were considerable. They left prisoners in our 
hands, but I have not yet heard how many. The prisoners and 
wounded of both sides were at once forwarded to Saarbriick." 

14 The careful reader who compares various accounts may 
possibly remark here some confusion in the dates, and even in 
the facts. It arises from the different degree in which the several 
witnesses were impressed by what passed under their immediate 
observation, and what they derived from hearsay. The corres- 
pondent of the Times quoted above (Note 13), gives for the date 
of the first sortie, Sept. 22nd, and in this our text is in agreement 
with him, and also with Rustow. But there was firing and 
skirmishing on the 21st, as we have remarked, which some have 
treated as the beginning of the sorties. Mr. Robinson, after de- 
scribing the sortie of the 22nd, goes on to say that " next day a 
smaller affair took place," which " smaller affair" is described 
by the correspondent of the Times, on the other hand, as a 
" more serious one," and is dated the 24th. The natural inference 
would be that these events succeeded each other in the following 
order : 21st, Firing, affair at Plappeville ; 22nd, Sortie ; 23rd, 
Mr. Robinson's "smaller affair;" 24th, Sortie, more formidable 
than that of the 22nd. This, however, could not have been, for 
Mr. Robinson, who was at Metz, says nothing about the 24th, 
and Rustow agrees with him in omitting any mention of that 
date. We must conclude therefore that the letter of the Times 
correspondent was incorrectly dated, or that " to-day" was a mis- 
print for " yesterday." At any rate what he records as having 
occurred on the 24th (see Times of Wednesday, Sept. 28, 1870), 
seems to have occurred on the 23rd. The words of Rustow are : 
Am 22, una" 23, September unternahmen die Franzosen 
solche Avsfulle auf Peltre, am 27, auf Mercy-le-Haut, $c. 
(vierte Abthellung, p. 24). Mr. Robin=on calls the affair of 
the 23rd "smaller'' by comparison with that of the 22nd, for a 
sufficiently good reason, for he adds, " I was not at it, unfortu- 
nately ; I was much too stiff from my fall of yesterday to walk, 
and my horse was in no condition to be ridden." These discre- 
pancies show the importance in history of the accurate collation 
of testimony, and consequently how much better history can be 
written in the closet than in the presence of the events. 

16 By this time the Germans had perfected their railway and 
telegraphic communication all round Metz, so that they were 
enabled to collect over 8,000 men in one spot within the space of 
15 minutes. Indeed it is recorded that, within twenty-eight 
minutes after the Assembly was sounded, a force of 22,000 men, 
consisting of every branch of the service, were in full marching 
order, ready to proceed to the front. 

16 Mr. Robinson says : " It was a glorious sight, that evening 
view of Metz ; the valley was filled with deep blue evening mist ; 
the grand hill of St, Quentin rose up into the evening sky, and 
glowed almost amethystyne, in the red rays of the autumn sun- 
set ; the fairy -like fleche of the cathedral cutout, in strong black 
lines, its lace-like architecture against the burning line of light, 
whilst the tall poplars remaining on the hill side, rose up in the 
coming twilight, like old cypress trees. It was Turneresque in 
colour, and would need the pen of a Ruskin to describe, for I 
thought as I came down Mount St.Julien that I could see where 
that glorious knowledge of light had come from, for which Tur- 
ner's great, perhap= greater succe=sor, was renowned, I mean 
Claude Gelee, called Lorraine." {Fall of Metz, p. 255.) It 
was when these colours had faded, and darkness had fallen, that 
the signal fires of Fort Julien, and the occasional flashes of Prus- 
sian field guns replying, picturesquely lit up a landscape in which 
all other features were obscured, and that fighting came to an end. 



" The correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette, who witnessed 
the fight from Mercy Le Haut, says: "Towards dusk, the 
firing slackened somewhat; and presently the commandant rode 
up, scrutinizing the civilian dress narrowly, but saluting the 
strangers with marked courtesy, and we heard that the French 
were driven back with severe loss. One of our party who had 
experience of Sebastopol, Richmond, Solferino, and Sadowa, and 
whose fifth great siege this was, was disposed, on the contrary, 
to believe that the French had broken through, and that the 
attacking party would get into Thionville." If the theory I 
have advanced is correct that Bazaine did not mean to break 
through, his troops were perhaps carried too far in the ardour of 
the fight, and the signals of the forts were meant for their recall. 

18 Correspondence of the Times, Sept. 22nd. About this time 
a Prussian officer held a parley with Marshal Bazaine, with the 
object of putting an end to the practice of firing upon outposts. 
Incidentally he was informed by the Marshal that he sought to 
preserve the fortress and the army under his command for the 
service of the Emperor Napoleon, and that he had nothing to do 
with the Republic established in Paris. 

19 Fall of Metz, p. 258. 

20 Mr. Robinson says : " Back, delighted with~the morning's 
work, we come, bringing with us somewhere about 100 prisoners, 
and having lost comparatively few of our own men. It is a veritable 
triumphal entry into Metz. Men come on laden with the spoil. 
From a cross-bow borne on the shoulders of the stalwart Sapeurs 
hangs a huge pig. Him they have decked with vine leaves, and 
have placed a Prussian helmet on his head, while from his breast 
hangs a placard proclaiming him to be le Roi Guiilaume ! Another 
follows, led in triumph by the leg, and struck, hardly lovingly, 
by the hard-handed soldiers, who, at each blow demand his name, 
translating the squeals he utters in return to Bismarck, Bismarck ! 
Laughing and merry they come up the line and parade the town. 
Children run out in the streets to look at those strange animals, 
the cows ; mothers pat their sleek sides, and beg a drop of sur- 
reptitious milk for baby, and everybody is rejoicing. Have not 
we got forty cows? Is'nt that a matter of glee. Yes, but five- 
times forty men at least were lost in doing it. So no wonder beef 
is so expensive, and milk so dear." (Fall of Metz, p. 262.) 

21 The correspondent of the Daily News, who was outside of 
Metz, dates this incident on the 28th. Robinson, who was in the 
city, mentions it under date of the 27th, and is no doubt correct. 

22 The correspondent of the Daily News relates an incident 
of this encounter which he justly characterizes as " a disgrace to 
civilised warfare.'' A Captain of the 44th (German) regiment 
was severely but not mortally wounded, while his detachment was 
retreating from Colombey. His men placed him in shelter, and 
then left him as they fell back. When they recovered the vil- 
lage, they found the corpse of their captain mangled barbarously. 
His fingers cut off for the sake of the rings he wore, and his 
throat cut from ear to ear. 

23 The incident was witnessed by the correspondent oi the 
Daily News. Mr. Robinson does not mention it. 

24 Correspondent of the Daily^News. 

25 It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Mr. Robinson is 
always bitter against Marshal Bazaine, and that, statements of 
this kind must be taken quantum valeat. No doubt one of the 
French officers made the satirical remark cited in the text, but it 
proves nothing, except that the situation was not understood, and 
that like brave men, the troops were impatient of being cooped 
up for the inevitable slaughter and starvation that stared them in 
the face. The feeling of Mr. Robinson is evinced further on (pp. 
299-300), when he sketches the return to camp on the same day. 
" Amidst a merry group, I saw a rakish-looking infantry man, 
with a Prussian helmet on his head and the tail of a pig in his 
hand. The struggles of the two animals were very amusing. I 
stop with others to look and laugh. " Is that the only pig, " I ask 
of an officer standing by. "By no means, sir," is his reply, 
" there goes another." I turn and see a very large stomach on 
horseback, going by, with a moderately sized man behind it. 
They are the Marshal, and they are going home to dinner. It is 
the last time the combination is exhibited to the troops, for never 
after that day till the one on which he fled from Metz to Wil- 



142 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXIV. 



belmshop did the filarial pass the llurh.ld pf his luxurious 

quarters at the Han St. m-.w t,n." 

■ So t In- Carrespqndent of (he Daily Ai'irx was informed by 
ail ollicri- of Iho stall' on llu 1 nuiruiu^ of tin; light. 

87 Mr. IJoliin .< 11 sneaks of hiui as " tlic- in-ue General Gibbon, 
who carries, to-day (or tlic first lime his gulnu as a general iu tho 
field." Ho adds: "the flowers the ioVing hand, of Ids soldiers 
strewed on liis grave by the side of the little church of Woippy 
hard by, had scarcely withered when. I left Mctz." 

28 The 58th and 59th regiments of Laii Iwelir at Grandes 
Tapes were Poles. Only those were spared who tell on their 
! ae 9 and asked for quarter, Hie rest were bayoiulled. Mr. 
Robinson says : " To raise the butt end of the needle gun in the 
air is no longer regarded as an appeal for mercy, and such as do 
it die. In the outbuildings, in the house, room by room, the 
Trench enter, and death with them. Some eighty or a hundred 
prisoners are made, but as for the rest, they are all dead men. 
The prisoners are led off to the rear, meeting on their way 
my very good friend the aumonier of the Voltig'eurs of the 
Guards, tfbwn again on their knees they fall, not this time to 
ask for life, but for a blessing; they seize and kiss his hand, the 
sacred image ho wears round his neck is seized and passed (rom 
hand to hand, from lip to lip, with a fervour of gratitude, whilst, 
in broken French, they tell the tale of fathers borne from long 
distant homes, of wives and children left behind them, of friends 
who have fallen by their side, and how that they were brought 
here to slay a people that they loved by the will of a king they 
did not care for." {Fall of Metz, p. 296.) 

29 Napoleon the First ofien commenced an action with light 
troops along the whole front and a desultory cannonade from 
various points, his object being to conceal his intentions, cause 
the enemy to compromise his whole force, and thus obtain a 
knowledge of his position. At the decisive moment an over- 
whelming force, preceded by swarms of light troops, and sup- 
ported by a concentrated artillery fire, was brought to bear 
upon some weak point. — Principles and Practice of Modern 
Artillery, By Lieut-Col. C. H. Owen, It. A., p. 352. 

30 In the first line Kummer placed the Landwehr division, 
commanded by General von Senden, and two battalions of his 
brigade of the line (Blankcusee). The supports in the second 
line consisted on the right of two battalions of WedelPs brigade 
(10th corps), and on the left of the rest of Wedcll's and Blankcu- 
see's brigades. 

31 The correspondent of the Times vouches for this ftct on 
information received from a general officer. He also records 
how narrowly the Guards escaped destruction in the increasing 
gloom through which they retreated. The Prussians in the 
brushwood saw two strong columns of infantry march past 
within 400 yards, and the order had just been given to fire, when 
suddenly the Prussian infantry call sounded the recall 
from the dark mass on which the cannon was about to open. The 
ruse was successful. A Prussian officer then called out, " They 
are our own men, "don't fire," and the Guard, continuing its 
march to a sufficient distance, greeted their friends with a parting 
volley. If the Prussians had only been certain of the troops 
before, very few of the Imperial Guard would have returned into 
Metz that night. 

38 The Council was composed of the commanders of the several 
army corps, General Desvaux, Garde Imneriale; General Fros- 
sard, Second Corps; Marshal Leboeuf, Third Corps; General 
L'Admirault, Fourth Corps; and Marshal Caurobert, Sixth 
Corps. And besides these the General of Artillery, Soleille, the 
General of Engineers, Commander of Metz, Coffinieres do Nor- 
deck, and the General-Intendant of the Army, Lebrun. General 
Desvaux at the commencement of the war was commander of 
the cavalry division of Garde Imperiale, but now commanded 
the Gardes in place of Bourbaki, who had left Metz, as related in 
the previous chapter. 

33 It will be remembered that General Boyer went to Chisel- 
hurst, and saw the Empress, after his visit to the German Head- 
quarters {ante pp. 106-7.) 

34 Bazaine himself succeeded Coffinieres in the supervision of 
the press; in other words, to use Mr. Robinson's phraseology 
the commandant permitted the marshal to take nut of his hands 



| lowers the commandant should have h Id liim elf." It is 
impossible to form a righteous judgment in this matter without 
knowing what the articles wire which Bazaine thought it 
necessary to suppress- To take the single specimen given by Mr. 
Iiobinson {Fall of Metz, p. 314), is like taking a single brick as 
a specimen of the house of which it formed a part. In ike 
manner, the hasty exclamation cited to prove the arbitrary cha- 
racter of Bazaine, " What matters it where the Emperor is ? 1 
am Emperor at Mctz'' {Ibid. p. 313) may have a very different 
interpretation put upon it. Why should the fact of the Era- 
peror being a prisoner at Wilhelmshoe have been supposed to 
absolve his generals from their oath of allegiance. But 1 have 
argued this point before in the text. 

35 The address to General Coffinieres, agreed upon by the 
Town Council on the night of the 23th October, was to the 
following effect : — 

" General, — The step taken by the officers of the National 
Guard has been inspired by their serious resolution to associate 
energetically for the defence of the town. The garrison, to 
whom the defence is entrusted, may count upon the ardent 
rivalry of a population incapable of weakness when the time 
arrives. The united efforts of both will guard, to the last 
extremity, the principal fortress of France and the nationality of 
Metz, both of w Inch we hold most dear. The municipal Council, 
being the interpreter for the whole city, cannot avoid expressing 
its grievous astonishment at the tardy knowledge which you 
have given only to-day of the resources on which you can count 
for the maintenance of the place. The people, in submitting to 
the consequences with courage, will not accept in any form the 
responsibility of a situation oi the approach of which they have 
had no warning, and of which they have had no knowledge. We 
beg you, General, to make known to the Marshal this expression 
of our sentiments, which we sum up in the cry of " Vive la 
France!" 

86 The Commandant's answer is subjoined : — 

" The Municipal Council of Metz have favoured me with an 
address, in which they express their noble and patriotic senti- 
ments. I hasten to thank them for this expression, which has 
not surprised me, for I have never for a moment doubted of the 
active co-operation of the inhabitants of Metz with the troops 
who are now called upon to defend our fortress. They can also 
equally trust that we shall energetically fulfil our duty. All 
that can possibly be compassed by human aid will be done with- 
out hesitation. But I beg you to announce to the inhabitants 
that in order to attain the desired result we must needs be cir- 
cumspect, and maintain all the presence of mind which belongs 
to people firmly determined, come what will, to remain united, 
and to avoid anything which has the appearance of want of 
discipline, tumult, or useless manifestations. More particularly 
we must abstain from any discussion or disagreement as regards 
polities, for politics have a most damaging influence, and can 
only destroy that harmony which is necessary to all of us. 

"There is in existence at the present moment a Government 
de facto in France, which has assumed the title of the Govern- 
ment of the National Defence. We must recognise this Govern- 
ment, and wait the conclusions which will b9 formed by a con- 
stituent Parliament elected by free and open vote throughout 
the whole country. In the meantime we must unite in the one 
common rallying cry, which you yourselves have raised— ' Vive 
la France ! ' 

"You tell me the inhabitants have been much grieved to learn 
that our resources in provisions are very limited. It could, 
however, have been easily surmised that after a civil and 
military population of more than 230,000 souls have drawn their 
means of sustenance from so small a town as Metz during two 
whole, months, only feeble resources would remain of which we 
could avail ourselves. Moreover, I have never made any i 
ot our present position. The reduction of the army rations, the 
steps that have been taken as to the limitation of the r ttions for 
the inhabitants of the town, the different orders which have been 
issued so as to place the bakers under our control, and my dif- 
ferent interviews with the Mayor and other inhabitants, have 
given ample proofs of the continual exhaustion of our stock of 



NOTES TO CHATTER LXIV. 



143 



provisions. Tt is useless to give way to any regrets or reproaches 
or tilings which li ive passed and gone by, or to seek lo hold one 
person or another responsible for what has happened. Let us 
therefore boldly look our present position in the face, and, as 
you most wisely say, let us accept the consequences with energy, 
and with the firm resolve to mnke the best of the situation we 
• possibly can. 

(Signed), 

"General Coffinieres, 

" General of Division, Commandant of the Fortress of Metz.'' 

37 The wnnls in Marshal Bazaine'* Rapport Officiel are : — 
" II fut reWu a l'unanimite que : le mareebal commandant en 
chef ne saurait accepter aucune delegation pour signer les 
buses d'un traite impliquant des questions e'trangeres a l'armee, 
celle-ci decant rester en dehors do toute negotiation jwli- 
tique." 

Ji It is on record that when the state of France was reported 
by Boyer, added to the information that M. Bismarck would 
only treat with a Regent, there were some who cried " Vive 
Bazaine ! " His statements, however, were doubted, and in the 
end it, was resolved that Boyer should continue the effort at 
negotiation by returning to Versailles and going thence to Eng- 
land to see the Empress. 

'■"' Bazaine gives the despatch as follows: — "A plusieurs 
reprises, j'ai envoy£ des homines do bonne volonte pour donner 
des nouvelles de l'armee et do Metz. Depuis, notre situation n'a 
fait qu' empirer, et je n'ai jamais rec.u la moinndre communi- 

ition ni de Paris, ni dc Tours. II est cependant urgent de 
savoir ee qui se passe dans I'interieur du pays et dans la capitale, 
car, sous pen, la famine me forcera de prendre un parti dans 
l'intcret de la France et do cette armee." 

■"' This is the German estimate, and it includes of course the 
20,000 rick in the hospitals, also the sedentary National Guards, the 
Mobile Guard, all sedentary officers, and every person who in the 
slightest degree was attached to the army. Rustow says " the 
number may be reckoned from a statement contained in a letter 
of General Coffinieres, which he addressed to the Municipal 
Council of Metz on the loth October, excusing the then immi- 
nent capitulation. In this letter he naturally gives the number 
of people in and about Metz to be provided for as high as pos- 
sible, viz., 220,000. If the ordinary civil population of 57,000 be 
deducted, there will remain 170,000 military. Coffinieres could 
permit himself a little exaggeration, firstly, because he wished 
it, and secondly because he probably reckoned the number of 
those who were in and about Metz on the 14th of October. It 
is worth naming that owing to the flight of the country people 
from the surrounding country into the town, 'lie civil popula- 
tion had risen to far above 60,00!) men, and that Bazaine at the 
time of the capitulation reckoned the number of his men really 
fit fur service at G5,0( 0, which agrees with intelligence of a later 
date." 

41 It may appear a little ungrateful, perhaps, to look a gift 
horse in the mouth so curiously, for had not Mr. Robinson been 
in Metz, and had he not possessed the faculty of recording his 
experiences in a vigorous and picturesque style, many of the 
circumstances we have related would not have been known, at 
least tor along time to come, to English readers. It is the 
historian's privilege, however, to separate the pure gold from 
the dross; and in these days, when history is made in haste, and 
much of what passes for historical fact is written almost literally 
in the saddle, it is more important than ever to apply the 
critical solvent, whenever possible, to such current narrative. 

42 The following Proclamation was issued at Tours on the 30th 
of October : — 

"Frenchmen! — Exalt your souls and resolutions to the 
height of the terrible perils which are crushing us down.' The 
country depends upon us to weary out bad fortune, and to show 
to the universe that it is a great people who will not perish, and 
whose courage rices in the midst even of catastrophes. Metz 
has capitulated. A general, upon whom France relied even after 
Mexico, has just deprived the country, when in danger, of more 
than 100,000 of its defenders. 

" Marshal Bazaine has committed treason. He has made 



himself the agent of the Man of Sedan, and the accomplice of 
the invader. Disregarding the honour of the army of which he 
had charge, lie surrendered, without even attempting to make a 
supreme effort, 125,000 combatants, 20,000 wounded, riflas, guns, 
flags, and the strongest citadel of France— Metz, until now a 
virgin free from the contamination of the foreigner. Such a 
crime is beyond even the chastisements of justice. 

" And now, Frenchmen, measure the depth of the abyss into 
which you have been hurled by the Empire. For twenty years 
France has submitted to this corrupting power, which exhausted 
all her sources of greatness and life. The army of France, de- 
prived of its national character, and unknowingly become the 
instrument of a reign of servitude, has been engulfed, despite the 
heroism of its soldiers, by the treason of its chiefs, in the disasters 
of the country. In less than two months 225,000 men have been 
delivered up to the enemy. Sinister epilogue of the military 
coup d'etat of December ! The time has come for us, citizens, 
to draw closer together, and, under the aegis of the Republic, 
which we are resolved not to allow to capitulate, whether at 
home or abroad, to derive from the very extremity of our mis- 
fortunes the restoration of our morality and of our political and 
social virility. Yes! Whatever may be the extent of our 
disaster, it has found us struck with neither consternation nor 
hesitation. Wc are prepared to make the last sacrifices, and, in 
face of enemies whom everything favours, let us swear never to 
surrender so long as an inch of our sacred territory shall remain 
under our foot. Let us firmly hold the glorious flag of revolution. 

Frenchmen !— Our cause is that of justice and right. Europe 
sees it and feels it. Witnessing so many undeserved misfortunes, 
without having received from us either invitation or adhesion, 
she is spontaneously moved and agitated. 

" No illusions ! Let us not permit ourselves to languish or 
to become enervated ; but let us prove, by deeds, that wo are 
able, by our own resources, to maintain our honour, indepen- 
dence, and integrity — all that makes a country free and proud. 

"Longlive France! Long live the Republic,One and Indivisible! 

"Cremieux. 
" Gambetta. 
"Glais-Bizon." 



The following telegrams from the Times refer to the battle 
of October 8 :— 

" Saarbruck, October 8, 6.5 p.m. 

" On Friday great sorties were made from Metz. Bazaine was 
apparently trying to cut his way out by Thionville to Luxem- 
bourg. The attack was made from Ladon, Champs Grandes 
and Petites Tapes, and other villages north of Fort St. Eloy. 
The Prussians lost their first line, two Landwehr regiments being 
terribly cut up. The villages were afterwards taken by storm. 
Two feigned attacks were made without effect. Forty thousand 
French were engaged [a ridiculous exaggeration]. The Prus- 
sians lost nearly a thousand men, the French twice that number. 
" Corny, near Metz, October 8. 

"The enemy yesterday afternoon, at two o'clock, attacked the 
Division Rummer, near Woippy. A serious action occurred, 
which was continued till alter nightfall. The enemy were 
repulsed everywhere. On our side the division Rummer, the 
9th Infantry Brigade, and parts of the 10th corps were engaged. 
The French Guards were under fire. Simultaneously the enemy 
on the right bank of the Moselle sent several divisions against 
the 1st and 1 0th corps. There was a heavy cannonade. The 
losses in the Division Rummer and the 10th corps amounted to 
500 men : in the 3rd corps 150. 

" Saarbruck, October 9. 

" The commissariat moped from Courcelles to Ilerny, for fear 
of being cut off by Bazaine. An attempt was made yesterday 
by the Prussians to blow up by n'ght the Chateau de la Grange 
unsuccessfully. Bazaine made a sortie on the division of Von 
Rummer. Tho Prussians were driven back. Rummer re- 
attacked on being supported by the 10th Army Corps, and the 
French were driven into Metz. The losses were heavy on both 
sides. Rummer repulsed so; ties on the, 22nd and 23rd of Sep- 
September near Grimont. Prince Frederick Charles is quite 
well again. 1 ' 



144 



MISSION OF M. THIERS. 



CHAPTER LXV. 

PARIS AFTER THE FALL OF METZ — AFFAIR OF 
LE BOURGET. 

The Mission ol M. Thiers— Re"9uni£— Return from the tour of 
the Courts— Despatch of Earl Granville— An Armistice sug- 
gested—Reply of Count Bismarck— Resumption of Negotia- 
tions after the Full of Metz— M. Thiers at Paris and Ver- 
sailles—the Conditions debated with Count Bismarck— Re- 
victualling of Pari9 refused— Rupture of the Negotiations - 
M. Jules Favre's Circular relating to that Event— Count 
Bismarck's account of the Negotiations— Reception of the 
News of Bazaine's Capitulation in Paris— Le Bourget re- 
captured by the Prussians— Renewed Disturbances— The 
Mob at the Hotel de Ville headed by M. Flourens— General 
Trochu and M. Jules Favre Prisoners— Prompt action of M. 
Picard— Recaptuie of the Ildtel de Ville and triumph of the 
Government— Object of the movement — Appeal to the Vote 
of the People of the Capital — Immense majority for the Go- 
vernment — Resignation of Rochefort — Antagonism bitween 
the " Reds '' and the " Rurals "—Movements in the 
Provinces. 

On the 12th of September, when France was 
drifting like a ship without a helm, the Ger- 
man armies being in full march for Paris, and 
the reins of power in the Capital having just 
been hastily seized by M. Jules Favre and his 
confederates, the veteran statesman, M. Thiers, 
undertook ex pfO'prio motu, a journey to the 
Courts of London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and 
Florence, to prepare the way, if possible, for 
an honourable peace, or at least for a salutary 
pause in the operations of war. During his 
visit to London an attempt was made by M. 
Jules Favre to negotiate an armistice at 
Meaux and Ferrieres, and it was probably 
owing to the friendly intervention of Lord 
Granville, at the instance of M. Thiers, that 
the Chief of the Provisional Government was 
received with the consideration due to the 
important interests he represented (ante, vol. 
i., pp. 504, 508). The endeavour was utterly 
abortive, as the reader is aware. We have 
recorded the results, and exhibited the official 
documents on either side to which these nego- 
tiations gave rise, ending with the declaratory 
manifesto of the Delegate Government of 
Tours, dated October 10th, and signed by 
Count Chandordy (ifcid, pp. 515—518). While 
these documents were being published, M. 
Thiers was pursuing his self-imposed mission, 
and there is no doubt the " old man eloquent " 
was listened to with the same respect by 
Prince Gortschakoff and by Count von Beust 
as he had been by Lord Gnuiville. Still the 



product of all his labours was only good will, 
and still he bore aloft the flag of distress until 
his course ended at Florence. With what 
heart this relentless opponent of Italian unity, 
this strange old man, who had done more than 
any other to sap the foundations of the Im- 
perial Throne for the great part it had played 
in the War of Independence, could make his 
appeal to the Minister of Victor Emmanuel we 
cannot surmise. According to the record his 
reasoning was that of a genuine Frenchman. 
He had only opposed Italian unity because he 
had regarded it as a certain forerunner of 
German unitj T ; but now that the latter had 
been achieved, Italian unity was necessary as 
a counteracting power ! All were civil and 
courteous, but only kind and respectful words 
were vouchsafed to him. The King, naturally 
embarrassed b} T his position, left town as soon 
as he decently could, and the President of the 
Council soon followed him. The ministers, 
however, had previously extended their 
courtesy so far as to invite M. Thiers to be 
present at one of their Councils, but while 
they listened to his arguments they were deaf 
to his appeals, and positivehy declined to 
render France either diplomatic or material 
aid. They inquired of him whether he had 
ever seriously considered what Italy would 
stake if she allowed herself to be dragged into 
the Franco-Prussian contest ? For France the 
risk was comparatively small — two or three 
departments out of eighty-nine ; for Italy 
it would be her whole existence, her na- 
tional dynasty — her all, should France be the 
loser in the gigantic struggle — a most im- 
probable eventuality, of course the polite 
Italians added. 1 The argument was unanswer- 
able. M. Visconti Venosta was not to be 
moved, and on the 18th of October M. Thiers 
left Florence and made his way to Tours. 

By this time the coming capitulation of 
Metz, the recent defeat of the Loire army, 
and the critical situation of Paris, foreboded 
another decisive period or turning point in the 
war, of which it was thought advantage might 
be taken by the neutral powers to suggest 
terms of accommodation. Count Bismarck's 
Circular on the 12th had forewarned the world 
of the probable death from starvation of 



INTERVENTION OF LORD GRANVILLE. 



145 



" hundreds of thousands " of persons, as the 
effect of M. Jules Favre's rejection of the pro- 
posed terms for an armistice, and the prolon- 
gation of the struggle under the Avails of the 
Capital {ante, p. 76). The sensation this 
document produced throughout Europe was 
profound ; in England there were loud de- 
mands for some official action to avert such 
a catastrophe, and in fine (on the 20th) a des- 
patch was addressed by Lord Granville to 
Lord Augustus Loftus, our ambassador at 
Berlin, in which his lordship said the war had 
already exhibited features, and in case of its 
prolongation would probably do so in increas- 
ing measure, which concerned not merely the 
belligerents, but Europe at large. Her Ma- 
jesty's Government, he said, were convinced 
that an explanation of their views would not 
be construed as an unfriendly act. It was 
dictated by the most sincere anxiety for the 
present and future welfare of the two nations 
with which their country has so long been on 
the most friendly terms. Pie was aware of 
the strong grounds which could be urged with 
regard to extreme measures against Paris. He 
would ask, however, whether there were not 
considerations which to lookers-on appear per- 
haps stronger than those which are felt under 
the influence of extraordinary military success, 
and also the consciousness of great exertions 
and immense sacrifices. It could not be 
questioned that such a design as the reduction 
of Paris by famine or bombardment, although 
Avnhout precedent as regards its magnitude, 
was authorized by the usages of war ; but it 
was equally certain that since, according to 
the communication of Count Bismarck, it in- 
volved not merely the ruin but the probable 
death under frightful circumstances of hun- 
dreds of thousands of non-combatants, every 
one must admit that it should not be resorted 
to until all other possible means had been 
exhausted. Assuming the successful issue of 
an attack on Paris at a not distant period, it 
were not unreasonable to weigh with its 
advantages the disadvantages which might 
attend it, and the fact that some of them af- 
fected the feelings of mankind as much as 
dheir reason, should not prevent Her Majesty's 
Government from laying them before the King 



and his Ministers. The bitter memory of the 
last three months might be effaced by time 
and the sense of the brave conduct of the 
enemy in the field. There are degrees of 
bitterness, and the probability of a new and 
irreconcilable war must be greatly increased, 
if a generation of Frenchmen beheld the 
spectacle of the destruction of a capital — a 
spectacle connected with the death of great 
masses of helpless and unarmed persons, and 
with the destruction of treasures of art, science, 
and historical reminiscences, which are of in- 
estimable value, and cannot be replaced. Such 
a catastrophe would be terrible for France, and 
dangerous, as his lordship believed, for the 
future peace of Europe ; while, as Her Ma- 
jesty's Government thought, it would be more 
painful to none than to Germany and its 
rulers. The French Government had declined 
peace negotiations since the meeting of Count 
Bismarck and M. Jules Favre. Her Majesty's 
Government, however, had taken on themselves 
the responsibility of urging the Provisional 
Government to consent to an armistice, which 
might lead to the convocation of a Constituent 
Assembly, and to the restoration of peace. Her 
Majesty's Government had likewise not 
omitted to represent to them the importance of 
making every concession that was compatible 
in the present position of the war, with their 
honour. Her Majesty's Government were not 
authorized to say so, but they could not be- 
lieve that these representations to the French 
Government would remain without effect. 
During this war two moral causes had to an 
incalculable degree backed up the great mate- 
rial power of the Germans. They had fought 
for the purpose of repelling a threatened 
foreign invasion, and of asserting the right 
of a great nation to constitute itself in the 
manner best adapted to the full development 
of its capabilities. The fame of these exertions 
would be increased if it could be truly said in 
history that the King of Prussia exhausted 
every effort for the restoration of peace before 
the order for the attack on Paris was given, 
and that the conditions of peace were just, 
moderate, and in harmony with the policy and 
feelings of the present ago. Her Majesty's 
Government wished it to be clearly understood 



1-16 



REPLY OF COUNT BISMARCK. 



that, as their attitude hitherto had plainly 
shown, they did not desire to offer to the 
belligerents superfluous or unacceptable coun- 
sels. The observations which they had 
now made in the most friendly manner were 
inspired by the consideration uf consecpicnces 
of so frightful character which, in the judg- 
ment of Count Bismarck himself might result 
from a prolonged investment of Paris, that they 
could not remain silent, nor leave anything 
untried which might tend to avert so terrible 
and so unprecedented a catastrophe. 

This act of intervention — for such it may 
be called — was not immediately followed by 
any result ; but on the 28th of October, the 
day after the capitulation of Metz, Count Bis- 
marck addressed the German ambassador in 
reply to Lord Granville, as follows : — 

"Lord Granville has kindly communicated to 
your Excellency the despatch which he addressed 
to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 20th hist. Your 
Excellency is therefore acquainted with the con- 
tents. I may at once assure you that Lord Gran- 
ville's wish for a speedy termination of this destruc- 
tive contest, and the non-application of the extreme 
measures, sanctioned by international usages, is the 
more fully appreciated by His Majesty the King as 
Germany, which, despite her victories, is obliged to 
make so many sacrifices in this war between two 
great nations, has a much inore immediate interest 
in the restoration of peace than a Neutral country, 
in the position of a humane, and as we admit nobly 
sympathetic, looker-on. For this reason His Majesty 
the King has been much pleased to learn, from Lord 
Granville's despatch, that Her Britannic Majesty's 
Government shares our conviction that, as a neces- 
sary preliminary to successful negotiations, the 
French people should be permitted to elect a Na- 
tional Representative Assembly. From the mo- 
ment of learning what had occurred in Paris on the 
4th of September, we expressed the like conviction 
on every opportunity that offered. I may remind 
you that, in consequence of a suggestion of the Eng- 
lish Cabinet, His Majesty the King authorized me at 
Meaux, more than a month ago, to discuss with M. 
Jules Favre the possibility of the convention of a 
Constituent Assembly. His Majesty, wishing to 
contribute to the creation of a legal Representative 
Assembly of France, in the negotiations at Ferrieres 
offered an Armistice on terms, the moderat" 
which was generally acknowledged, and moreover 
conclusively proved by the fall of Toul and Stras- 
burg a few days after. It is well known that these 
e rejected, and in what manner. It is 



equally well known that the King was willing to 
permit the elections fixed for the 2nd of October by 
the Paris Government to be held in all parts of the 
country occupied by the German troops, and to 
give every facility for them, although they had been 
ordered by a Government not yet recognized by us. 
Our transactions with the French local and depart- 
mental authorities, of which those with the Maire 
of Versailles have been mentioned in the public 
press, prove the willingness of the German authori- 
ties to promote free and unrestrained elections in 
France ; but the Paris Government had no intention 
to allow the nation to elect representatives. It first 
adjourned the elections fixed for the 2nd inst., and 
subsequently annulled the decree of the Tours Go- 
vernment, appointing the 16th as the day of polling. 
The decree of annulment has already been published 
in the newspapers. 

" Its original, with the signatures of the members 
of the Government, has by an accident fallen into 
our hands. We have also obtained possession of a 
letter from M. Gambetta, of which, as it character- 
istically illustrates the tone prevailing in the Paris 
Government, I cannot refrain from sending your 
Excellency a copy. All these experiences did not 
prevent us from offering our co-operation in any 
future steps the Paris Government might be inclined 
to take with a view to enable the French people to 
elect Deputies, in order to express its opinion on 
current events and participate in the responsibilities 
of the Government, arbitrarily usurped by private 
persons. ' The friendly mediation of some distin- 
guished personages, citizens of a Neutral State, who 
repaired to Paris for this purpose, afforded us an 
opportunity once more of offering the French ruler.; 
the means of proceeding with the elections, and 
thereby liberating France from the anarchy v 
renders negotiations for peace impossible. We in- 
timated our readiness to accord an armistice for the 
period requisite for the elections, at the same time 
declaring that we would either permit the Dej 
of the nation to enter Paris, or the Paris Deputies 
to repair to any other place in case the Parliament 
were to assemble elsewhere. These proposals, 
which only on the 9th inst. were, with our consent, 
laid before the members of the Paris Government by 
Neutrals, met with such a reception that the mediating 
personages declared that they must give up the hopes 
they had cherished. Immediately afterwards M. 
Gambetta left Paris by balloon, and his first ex- 
clamation on descending to terra fir ma, if we are 
to believe French sources of information, was a 
protest against the election of National Representa- 
tives. Events prove that he succeeded in hindering 
the elections, and the endeavour* in the opposite 
direction of M. Cremieux failed. It appears from 
this statement of facts that the expedient record- 



RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS 



147 



mended by Her British Majesty's Government, as a 
means for the promotion of peace — namely, the 
arrangement of free elections to a Constituent As- 
sembly — is not opposed by us, but by the Paris 
rulers ; that we have been ready to co-operate for 
this purpose" from the very first, and that our oilers 
have been always rejected by the Government of the 
National Defence. We were therefore fully justified 
in declining, in our communication of the 11th inst., 
referred to by the English Minister, all responsi- 
bility for the deplorable consequences to which a 
resistance aoutrance must expose the inhabitants of 
Paris. That this communication did not fail to pro- 
duce an impression upon the English Cabinet is 
only what we expected. How very much we should 
deplore it, were the rulers of Paris to carry resist- 
ance to the utmost degree, we have proved by 
directing the attention of the world, and of the 
Neutral Powers more particularly, to the conse- 
quences likely to result from it. We hoped the 
representations of the Neutral Powers would make 
some impression on the rulers of Paris, who are 
sacrificing the life and property of the inhabitants 
to their own ambition. We looked the more confi- 
dently forward to such a result, as the Government 
of Paris and Tours have assumed the direction of 
the destinies of France on their own responsibility, 
and without any other title than that which arbitrary 
and violent usurpation, coupled with the continued 
refusal to listen to the voice of the nation, can give. 
We can only thank Her British Majesty's Govern- 
ment if it makes the attempt to caution the French 
Government against continuing in their wrong and 
dangerous path, and if it endeavours to render them 
accessible to considerations which are calculated to 
spare France the further progress of her social and 
political disorganization, and to protect her brilliant 
capital from the devastations of a siege. We cannot, 
however, suppress the apprehension that,owing to the 
illusions in which the Paris rulers seem to indulge, 
the well-meaning intervention of the English Cabinet 
will be misinterpreted by them. They are likely to 
regard the humane sympathy which prompted that 
intercession as support rendered them by the 
Neutral Powers, and to derive from it an encourage- 
ment which, perhaps, might bring on results very 
different from those contemplated by Lord Gran- 
ville. That after our experience of the French 
rulers we cannot take the initiative to reopen nego- 
tiations Lord Granville's despatch seems to imply. 
In acquainting him with the whole contents of this 
communication, I request your Excellency to assure 
him that, actuated by a sincere wish for the restora- 
tion of peace, we shall willingly accept and examine 
any proposition that may be made to us by the 
French, with a view to commencing negotiations for 
peac 



On the same day (October 28th), M. Thiers, 
having received a safe conduct at the instance 
of England and Russia, went to the German 
head-quarters at Versailles, 2 and received per- 
mission to enter Paris, that he might make 
himself acquainted with the views of M. Jules 
Favre and the Government of Defence. He 
found them willing to concur in an armistice, 
if initiated by a third party ; and as Lord 
Granville was now in a position to act with 
the concurrence of Russia in suggesting an 
armistice on the terms hinted at in his note 
of the 20th, there was no difficulty in this 
respect. To avoid the least semblance of 
pre -sure, England and Russia presented their 
views separately, and both were strongly sup- 
ported by Austria and Italy. The way having 
been thus carefully prepared, expectation was 
on tiptoe when M. Thiers, on returning from 
Paris, had five successive interviews with M. 
Bismarck at the latter's quarters, the last of 
which was on the afternoon of Sunday, No- 
vember 6th. The questions mooted at the 
first interview were : first, the principle of the 
armistice ; secondly, its duration, and the free- 
dom of election in the occupied provinces ; 
thirdly, the positions to be retained and rela- 
tions to be observed by the belligerent armies; 
and lastly, the re victualling of all besieged 
places, and especially of Paris, during the 
armistice. Count Bismarck, according to the 
statement of M. Thiers, did not appear to 
make any serious objection to his proposals. 
The first two points were agreed upon. The 
duration of the armistice was fixed at twenty- 
five days ; and although no electoral agitation 
would be permitted in Alsace and Lorraine, 
Count Bismarck added that he would not 
object to their being represented by influential 
>ns, without any interference of Germany 
i i the elections. Even the question of revic- 
tualling did not at first give rise to any funda- 
mental objection on the part of the Chancellor, 
who referred it to the military authorities. On 
this point, however, the negotiations broke 
down. When M. Thiers found it necessary to 
declare that the revictualling w T as not a matter 
of detail, but a sine qua non, Count Bismarck, 
speaking for the Prussian generals, said the 
-Hnistice was absolutely against the interests 



148 



FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. 



of Prussia, and that he could only consent to 
the revictuallvng of Paris if the Government 
of the Defence ivere prepared to concede some 
military equivalent, as, for example,a military 
position round Paris. By a " military posi- 
tion," he afterwards explained that he meant 
" a fort, and perhaps more than one." M. Thiers 
instantly interrupted him, and exclaimed that 
to refuse the revictualling of Paris was equi- 
valent to depriving her of her resources for 
resisting during a month, and that to demand 
a fort was nothing less than to demand the 
surrender of the ramparts. Neveitheless, it is 
not impossible that M. Thiers would have 
accepted any conditions that would have 
facilitated the election of a National Assembly, 
had he been left to himself. This, however, 
was not the case. On the fifth day (November 
6th) he received orders from Paris to break off 
the negotiations. 

M. Thiers concluded the report in which he 
related the course of the negotiations, as we 
have described them above, with the following 
peroration : — " The time has now come for the 
neutral powers to judge if sufficient attention 
has been paid to their advice ; but it is not us 
they can reproach with having disregarded it, 
and we make them judges of the conduct of 
both belligerent powers. I have used all my 
efforts to recover for my country the blessings 
of peace, which it has lost by the errors of a 
government whose very existence was a mis- 
take. France having accepted such a govern- 
ment, and having abandoned it without 
retaining any control over her destinies, has 
committed a great and irreparable fault." 
What a curious study, in a few lines, of this 
old man's mind ! 

Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre also 
each appealed to the public opinion of Europe. 
M. Jules Favre addressed a circular to the 
French Ministers abroad, in which he affirmed 
that Prussia, by causing the rejection of the 
armistice, had once more proved that she con- 
tinued the war with a strictly personal object, 
without caring for the real interests of her 
subjects, and especially the interests of the 
Germans whom she was dragging in her wake, 
and then proceeds : — 

: ' Prussia pretends to be forced to prosecute the 



war by our refusal to cede two provinces which we 
neither can nor will abandon. In reality she seeks 
to destroy us, to satisfy the ambition of the men by 
whom she is governed. The sacrifice of the French 
nation is useful to then for the preservation of their 
power, and they coldly profess to be astonished 
that we should refuse to become their accomplices 
by falling into the weakness which their diplomacy 
advises." 

M. Jules Favre then exposes the conduct of 
Prussia, which, after the fall of the Empire, 
refused to agree to a truce, and goes on to say : — 

" The Prussian armies have now been besieging 
Paris for 50 days, but the inhabitants show no 
signs of weakness. Some attempts at sedition which 
have been made have enabled the population of 
Paris to render legitimate, by an imposing vote,* the 
Government of National Defence, which acquires 
thereby a consecration of its right in the eyes of 
Europe. 

" The Government entered into negotiations for 
an Armistice, which should allow of the election of 
Deputies throughout the Republican territory, even 
where invaded. The duration of the Armistice was 
to be twenty-five days, with a proportional re-vic- 
tualling of the capital. Prussia did not dispute the 
two first conditions, making, however, some reser- 
vations with regard to the vote in Alsace and Lor- 
raine, which we did not enter further into because 
her absolute refusal to admit the revictualling of 
Paris rendered all discussion useless." 

Having demonstrated that the re-victualling 
of the capital was a necessary consequence of 
the suspension of hostilities; and that an 
Armistice without that provision would have 
been a capitulation at a given moment without 
honour, without hope ; he goes on — 

" By refusing our demand to provision Paris, 
Prussia rejected the Armistice. It is not only the 
French army, but the French nation, that she seeks 
to annihilate when she proposes to reduce Paris to 
the horrors of a famine. Europe demanded that 
France should assemble Deputies to deliberate upon 
the question of peace. Prussia refused this As- 
sembly, by subjecting it to an iniquitous condition 
contrary to every right. With regard to the Prussian 
accusation that the French Government obliges 
Prussia to starve Paris, Europe will judge of the 
value of such imputations. They are the last 
feature of a policy which commences by pledging 
the word of the Sovereign in favour of the French 
nation, and terminates by a diplomatic rejection of 
every combination which would allow France to 

* M. Favre here alludes to the Plebiscite at Paris on the 2nd 
of November, 1870, after the insurrection, headed by Flourens 
of which the particulars will immediately follow. 



STATEMENT OF M. FAVRE. 



149 




LIEUT-GENERAL VON GLUMER, COMMANDER 

express her wishes. We do not know what the 
Neutral Powers will think of propositions set aside 
with such haughtiness. Perhaps they will perceive 
at last what will be reserved for them by Prussia, 
risen by victory into a position to accomplish her 
designs. As regards ourselves, we obey an imperi- 
ous and simple duty, still maintaining that the pro- 
posal for an Armistice is the only means of obtain- 
ing a solution by a National Assembly upon the 
tremendous questions which the crimes of the Im- 
perial Government have permitted the enemy to 
place before us. Prussia, which perceives the odious 
character of her refusal, seeks to dissimulate it under 
a disguise which can deceive no one. To ask us 
for a month's supply of our provisions is to ask of 
tis our arms — arms which we resolutely hold in our 
hands, and will not lay down without fighting. We 
have done everything that men of honour could do 
to stop this conflict, but the issue from it has been 
closed against us, and we can henceforth take coun- 
sel only of our courage, throwing back the respon- 
sibility upon those who systematically refuse all 
compromise. It is to their personal ambition that 
VOL. H 



OP A DIVISION IN THE 14TH ARMY CORPS. 

thousands of men may perhaps still be immolated, 
and when Europe, moved by the spectacle, wishes 
to arrest the combatants upon the frontier of the 
field of carnage, in order to summon together the 
representatives of the nation, to seek a basis for 
peace, they say ' Yes, but on condition that the 
population of this city who suffer, these women, 
children, and old men, the innocent victims of the 
war, shall receive no succour ; so that the truce hav- 
ing expired, it may be impossible for their defenders 
to fight us without causing them to die of hunger.' 
" This is what the Prussian chiefs do not fear to 
reply to the propositions of four European Powers. 
We call right and justice to witness against them, 
and we are convinced that if their army and their 
nation were able to give a vote, they would con- 
demn this inhuman policy. Let it be well under- 
stood that up to the last moment the Government 
of National Defence, absorbed by the immense in- 
terest confided to it, will do everything in its power 
to render an honourable peace possible. The means 
of consulting France were refused to it, and it there- 
upon interrogated Paris. All Paris, in reply, rises 

11 



150 



STATEMENT OF M. BISMARCK. 



to arms to show tho country and tho world what a 
great people can do when it defends its honour, its 
homes, and the independence of its country." 

The view which Count Bismarck wished to 
impress on the world must, in justice, be set 
against the foregoing. It is contained in tlie 
following official document : — 

"Tho fact that a statesman of position and ex- 
perience, like M. Thiers, had been accepted by the 
Paris Government, led us to hope that proposals 
would be made to which it would be possible for us 
to accede. M. Thiers stated that at the desire of 
the neutral Powers France would be ready to agree 
to an armistice. Notwithstanding the objections 
which stood in the way of a conclusion of an armi- 
stice, the King allowed his wish to prevail, that 
steps favourable to the conclusion of peace might be 
taken. Count Bismarck, therefore, offered a sus- 
pension of hostilities for twenty-five or twenty-eight 
days on the basis of the military status quo. He 
proposed to fix, by a line of demarcation, the posi- 
tion of the two armies in accordance with those 
respectively occupied by them on the day of the 
signing of the truce. He also proposed that hostili- 
ties should be suspended for four weeks, and that 
during that time the elections for a National Assem- 
bly, and its installation, should be held. On the 
French side, the only consequences of the armistice 
would have been the abandonment by them of the 
little and inexplicable course they pursue of wasting 
their artillery munitions by firing from the guns of 
their forts. As regards Alsace, Count Bismarck de- 
clares that he insisted upon no stipulation which 
could be considered calling in question the posses- 
sion of this German department by France before 
the conclusion of peace, and that he should make 
no charge against any inhabitant of Alsace for ap- 
pearing as a deputy in the French National Assem- 
bly. M. Thiers declined these proposals, and de- 
clared that he could only agree to an armistice on 
condition that it should embrace an extensive re- 
victualling of Paris. In reply to the question as to 
what equivalent he could make for such a concession, 
M. Thiers said he could offer none other than the 
readiness of the Paris Government to allow the 
French nation to choose representatives. The King 
was greatly surprised at such extravagant military 
pretensions, and deceived in the expectations which 
he had associated in the prospect of negotiating with 
M. Thiers. The incredible demand that we should 
sacrifice the fruit of all the effort we had made 
during two months, and the advantages which we 
had achieved, and restore the conditions of the 
struggle to the point at which we found them in the 
beginning of our investment of Paris, once more 
proved that pretexts are sought in the French capi- 
tal to deny to the nation the power of recording its 



votes. At Count Bismarck's expressed wish that an 
attempt should bo mado to bring about an under- 
standing upon other bases, M. Thiers, on the 5th 
inst., had an interview with the members of the 
Paris Government, to propose a short truce, or that 
elections should be ordered without a regular Con- 
vention being signed for the suspension of hostilities, 
in which case Count Bismarck promised free inter- 
course, and the granting of all facilities consistent 
with the security of the German armies. In return, 
M. Thiers communicated merely the instruction he 
had received to break off the negotiations. The 
course these negotiations had taken, left Count Bis- 
marck convinced that those now holding the reins of 
power in France were not in earnest from the com- 
mencement in the wish to allow the voice of the 
French nation to be expressed by a Representative 
Assembly, elected by free votes, and that it was 
just as little their intention to bring about an armi- 
stice. They must have been convinced of the 
impossibility of their conditions being accepted, 
and only brought them forward in order not to give 
a negative reply to the Neutral Powers whose assist- 
ance they hoped to obtain." 

While the professional politicians and 
statesmen of Europe were busy with these 
negotiations, the people whom they chiefly 
concerned took very little interest in them. 
We have seen how the news of the capitu- 
lation of Metz, and the greater peril in which 
Paris was placed by that event, was received 
at Tours, the seat of the Delegate Govern- 
ment, and with what a furore of patriotism 
Gambetta sought to inspire the country. At 
Paris the news was received almost at the 
same moment that intelligence arrived of the 
re-capture of Le Bourget on the 30th of 
October, of which, for another important 
reason, as respects the tactics of the war, it 
is necessary to give some account. 

Le Bourget is a long straggling village 
about seven miles beyond the ramparts of 
Paris, and nearly the same distance eastward 
of St. Denis. It is situated on the road to 
Lille, which stretches in a straight line from 
the suburb of La Villette past Fort Auber- 
villiers. It was included within the lines of 
investment ; the slopes beyond, at the distance 
of two or three miles, being occupied by the 
Prussian Guard Corps. 

On the 28th October the French pickets at 
this village were driven in by the enemy, 
who then occupied the place in some force (the 
telegrams at the time gave their number as 



CAPTURE AND RE-CAPTURE OF LE BOURGET. 



151 



30f)0 men). On the day following, we are 
told, General de Bellemare brought up troops 
to the number of 6000, according to the de- 
spatches, from the villages of Aubervilliers 
and La Courneuve, and recovered the position. 
Other accounts state that its capture was a 
mere freak of the Franc-tireurs who went off 
with some of the Mobile Garde for a " lark," 
and having got in among the Prussians drove 
them out in their night shirts at four o'clock 
in the morning, and then amused themselves 
by dressing up in the furs and overcoats, and 
spiked helmets of the enemy. However this 
may be, the trivial success of the French in 
seizing upon a place which it was strategically 
detrimental to hold, was vaunted as a great 
victory, and had some effect in raising the 
spirits of the Parisians. The long straight 
walls which surrounded the gardens of the 
village, and intersected each other at right 
angles, were loopholed and strengthened by 
heaping up earth. The entrance of the village 
was also barricaded and defended with cannon. 3 
On the morning of October 30th the Prus- 
sians moved against the village in three 
columns — from Blanc Mesnil on the left, and 
Dugny on the right, and along the Lille road 
which passes between those two places. The 
force marshalled on the right consisted of two 
battalions of Grenadiers, commanded by Major 
von Degenthal at Dugny, with two Uhlan 
regiments behind at Bonneuil, and part of the 
artillery of the Guards at Arnouville. That 
on the left consisted of two battalions of 
Grenadiers, three companies of Tirailleurs of 
the Guard, and two batteries under Colonel 
von Zeuner at Blanc Mesnil. That in the centre 
of four battalions of the Queen Augusta and 
Queen Elizabeth regiments, one Pioneer 
Company of the Guards, and three batteries 
of Horse Artillery under Colonel Graf Konitz, 
who marched, as before said, along the road. 
Such were the dispositions for an attack 
which the Duke of Wiirtemberg 4 has specially 
mentioned as the' turning point of German 
tactics in the war, after it had been incontest- 
ably proved, more especially at St. Privat, 
that the attack in line of columns on open 
ground was a useless waste of men. The 
attack was made as follows : — 



" The two flanking columns (approaching 
Le Bourget from Blanc Mesnil and Dugny) 
sent to the front clouds of skirmishers which 
gained ground at the double, and then threw 
themselves down. The supports and reserves 
followed these, spread out in extended order 
and also at the double. As these latter 
threw themselves down to rest, the skir- 
mishers again ran forward, and at the same 
time bore off towards the flanks. When they 
arrived within range they again threw them- 
selves down, and opened fire upon the enemy. 
The gaps which occurred from drawing off 
towards the flanks were filled up by extend- 
ing sub-divisions. In like manner the flanks 
were prolonged by single companies advanc- 
ing one after the other, but always in ex- 
tended order, so that the concentric attack 
which had moreover — as they neared the 
enemy — become denser in character, kept 
always assuming a more enclosing form. 
Each of the extended bodies of troops took 
advantage of whatever cover offered, in order 
to rally behind it and collect together. Thus 
in front of the north-east flanks a row of dung 
heaps had been left upon the field, which af- 
forded a rallying place for an entire company, 
which opened from behind these a destructive 
fire upon troops who came forward to attack. 
On the other flank the bed of the little river 
Mollette afforded a slight protection, and was 
at once turned to • account by a few formed 
companies, in order to cover an onset against 
a counter-attack delivered from Drancy." 

On this the Duke of Wiirtemberg observes : 
"The mechanism of the attach consisted princi- 
pally in the rapid change from open to close 
order directly the most trifling cover admitted 
of the rallying of a sub-division or company. 
On the other hand, every advance over open 
ground took place in widely extended skir- 
mishing lines, which moved on like ants!' 
His description of the action proceeds — 

" The right wing was left behind, the centre 
had not sufficiently extended itself, having 
not completely renounced the old forms, and 
its losses were enormous ; but the attacking 
left wing, under Lieut.-Colonel Graf Waldersec 
pressing forward in long thin lines, succeeded 
in making good an attack of skirmishers up 

11 A 



152 



THE NEW PRUSSIAN TACTICS. 



to the garden walls, in silencing the fire from 
them, and in breaking into the long village, 
both from flanks and rear. Its defenders now 
gave way. General Budritzky was able to 
enter from the front, and the right flank 
column to reach the rear entrance without 
very severe loss." The tactical result was 
that " the attack in open order, joined to the 
attach of skirmishers, was from that time 
adopted as the only efficacious one, and it was 
strictly forbidden to lead bodies of troops in 



close order within a nearer distance of the 
enemy's fire than 2,000 paces? It is true the 
principles had been recognized ever since the 
war of 1866, and had been made known in a 
military tract we have once before quoted, en- 
titled "A Tactical Retrospect." It was now 
definitively adopted in the instructions, and 
generally practised in the battles, to be re- 
corded by and bye, with the Loire army. 

It would be inconsistent with the character 
of this work as a popular history to extend 




PRUSSIAN ATTACK ON LE BOURGET, 
October 30th, 1870. 



PARIS 



further our remarks on a technical question. 
In the village itself, where the French obsti- 
nately resisted, there was a bloody hand to 
hand fight. General Budritzky, when the 
battalions of the Queen Elizabeth regiment 
advanced, had ridden to the front, and dis- 
mounting from his horse, had seized the stan- 
dard, which he held aloft as he led the storm- 
ing column. Notwithstanding their heavy 
losses his men pressed forward, and succeeded 
in holding the village. The battalions of the 



Queen Augusta regiment were equally resolute. 
A detachment was about to enter one of the 
houses, from the windows of which white 
handkerchiefs were waving in token of sur- 
render, when the Colonel, Count Waldersec, 
called a halt, and advanced to the house alone ; 
while so advancing, a ball from the house 
struck him and killed 'aim on the spot. An 
officer was hastening to catch the falling leader 
in his arms, when he too was shot. Seeing 
this, the exasperated troops renewed the attack 



RENEWED AGITATION IN PARIS. 



153 



with redoubled ardour, and repulsed the enemy 
at every point. Over 1,200 unwounded 
prisoners were made, among whom were 30 
officers. The loss on the German side was very 
severe. The Augusta and Elizabeth regiments 
lost 400 men and 30 officers in killed and 
wounded. The whole depot, with large quanti- 
ties of bread which had been sent from Paris on 
the previous day, to the advanced troops south of 
Le Bourget, fell into the enemy's hands. 5 
Whether the capture of the place on the 28th 
was intended or not, this seems to show that 
the intention to hold it was, at least, seriously 
meant ; and, indeed, had it not been so, it was 
the obvious duty of General Bellemare to 
recall the troops that had so committed them- 
selves, before he was further compromised. 

The event was insignificant compared with 
the surrender of Bazaine and the fall of Metz ; 
but information of it having reached the city 
almost at the same moment — and following so 
closely upon the exultation caused by the 
capture of the village the day before — the 
excitement was proportionately intensified. 
This affair too, came more directly home to the 
Parisians, as the circumstances were deemed a 
sufficient proof of the gross mismanagement of 
the Government of Defence. The Belleville 
demagogues felt instinctively, that the moment 
was favourable to their designs; the papers, 
the cafe's, the clubs, had kept alive the agita- 
tion, of which we have previously recorded 
some of the more stirring incidents {ante, pp. 
86 — 88), and once more, between two and 
three o'clock on the afternoon of October 31st, 
the leaders of this party, aided by a fraction 
of the National Guard, presented themselves 
before the Hotel de Ville. They even effected 
an entrance by surprise, and proclaimed the 
Commune. The confusion and excitement 
in Paris were so great that no one knew 
exactly what had occurred. It was re- 
ported that the Government of Defence had 
accepted the programme of the Commune ; and 
again, that the Government had been over- 
thrown, and its place usurped by the partisans 
of the Red Republic, Blanqui, Flourens, Ledru 
Rollin, Pyat, Mottu, Greppo, Delescluze, 
Victor Hugo, and Louis Blanc ; two members 
of the former Government however, namely, 



M. Dorian and our old friend Rochefort, of the 
Lanterne being added to their number. An 
active member of the Communal Administra- 
tion established at a later period, a3 we shall 
hereafter have to relate (M. Jules Andrieu), 
characterizes the movement as " a protest 
against the disaster and disgrace of the sur- 
render of Metz;" as that of the 22nd January 
following, was " a prophetic manifestation 
against a peace fatal to the country, which was 
to be signed six days later; and in each case 
the side of those in power was manifestly the 
treasonous, the forsworn, the unpatriotic side." 6 
This is "manifestly" nonsense of the kind 
that has done all the mischief in France since 
the days of the First Revolution. To plain 
common sense the movement of October 31st 
wag simply the result of the popular excite- 
ment caused by the surrender of Metz, of 
which excitement aggravated as it was by the 
lesser failure at Le Bourget, the clever leaders 
of the Communists took instant advantage to 
prosecute their own designs. It would be un- 
just not to add that they expected they should 
be able to accomplish their purpose without 
bloodshed, and that they really succeeded for 
a time in their coup d'etat, and afterwards 
submitted to the contre-coup without coming 
to blows. 

It was about five p.m., when the Hotel de 
Ville was entered by a deputation from the 
Insurgents, who demanded information about 
the recent mission of M. Thiers, the surrender 
of Metz, and the disaster at Le Bourget. M. 
Jules Ferry and General Trochu, who attempted 
to explain, were interrupted by indignant 
exclamations. When the blame for the mis- 
adventure at Le Bourget was laid on General 
Bellemare, the Government was plainly told 
that it lied, and just at this moment a paper 
was handed to General Trochu, who turned 
pale as he read it, and said in a low tone, 
" It is the death-knell of France ! " This paper 
contained the decree which the insurgents 
wished to force upon the Government, and 
which ran thus : " The electors will be oon- 
voked in three days' time to nominate a Com- 
mune in Paris, which will be composed of 80 
citizens among them the members of the future 
Cabinet, who will be responsible to the Com- 



154. 



THE COMMUNISTS AT THE HOTEL DE VILLE. 



raune, as it, in its turn, will be to the French 
people. The powers of the Commune will ex- 
pire when the hostile army shall have evacu- 
ated tin; soil of France,and a regular constituent 
assembly shall have been named." The mem- 
bers of the Government retired into another 
apartment to consult, but the room was soon 
invaded, and some of the more resolute'of the 
insurgents pointed their rifles at them. M. 
Jules Favre was pale, but impassive ; M. Jules 
Simon, with a disdainful smile, pretended to 
occupy himself with making sketches on paper, 
and General Trochu looked quietly on the 
guns pointed at his heart. Some one en- 
treated him to leave, or he would be murdered. 
" I am a soldier, sir, and my duty is to die at 
my post," he replied. All were expecting 
death . In the midst of the increasing turmoil, 7 
a few shots were fired in the air outside, and 
there were cries that the National Guards who 
adhered to the Government were firing on the 
people. The crowd strayed to and fro in 
excitement, and for a moment the Place in 
front of the Hotel de Ville was left vacant ; 
but again the people came back with a rush, 
and forcing the gates, the principal rooms of 
the building were flooded with the returning 
tide of sedition. One individual, afterwards 
said to be M. Flourens, jumped on a table, and 
proclaimed the deposition of the Government 
of Defence, which he followed up by declaring 
that he came there to make known the will of 
the citizens, who had decided upon the 
immediate installation of the Commune by a 
vote which had been taken on the spur of the 
moment in a neighbouring hall. The Com- 
mune was therefore declared to be installed ; 
but of whom it consisted and by what 
ceremony its entrance upon the functions of 
Government was inaugurated were far from 
being clearly made out in the subsequent 
narratives of the day's proceedings. M.M. 
Flourens and Blanqui were, in all proba- 
bility, voted in by acclamation of their turbu- 
lent followers ; while the members of the 
Government, including General Trochu were 
detained in the adjoining apartment, virtually 
though not avowedly, in the character of 
prisoners. Before their detention had been 
resolved upon, M. Ernest Picard, who alone 



must be credited with having perceived the 
danger of the situation before it was too late, 
had made his escape, and hastening to the 
Ministry of Finance took instant measures to 
organize resistance. First he had the National 
Printing Office occupied by troops, and pro- 
hibited the Journal Official from printing 
anything. He despatched orders to the Staff 
of the Governor and the Staff of the National 
Guard, and ordered the call to arms to be 
beaten in every quarter of Paris. Scarcely 
had these precautions been taken, when a 
messenger arrived at the Hotel de Ville with 
an order signed by Blanqui. He was instantly 
arrested, and M. Picard retained the order as 
evidence of Blanqui's guilt. Soon afterwards 
Admiral de la Ronciere and Admiral Chaille 
placed themselves at M. Picard's orders, and 
about eight o'clock General Trochu and M. 
Jules Ferry were set at liberty by a battalion 
of the National Guard, which was the first to 
arrive in the square of the Hotel de Ville. 
The other members of the Government, 
namely, M.M. Jules Favre, Garnier Pages, 
Jules Simon and Magnin remained under 
guard of the battalion commanded by Gustave 
Flourens, while the battalions faithful to 
General Trochu were mustering by tens of 
thousands along the Boulevards, but chiefly 
near the Place Vendome and the Tuileries. 
To account for the escape of General Trochu 
and M. Jules Ferry, the circumstances must be 
viewed in the light of subsequent events, and 
it will be seen that both parties in this 
impromptu rehearsal of a coming struggle 
had felt they stood on the edge of a powder 
magazine which one misguided spark would 
suffice to explode. The troops were not there- 
fore hurried up to the scene of disturbance in 
force by M. Picard and his colleagues, and the 
single battalion that arrived was commanded 
by a resolute and prudent man, M. Iblon, who 
partly by cajolery, partly by a little quiet 
coercion succeeded in getting the General off 
half disguised by the kepi of a National Guard. 
There had already been some talk of shooting 
him among the mob, and when at the last 
moment it was discovered he was escaping an 
attempt was made to seize him, but his friends, 
with the assistance of "a Hercules of the 



COLLAPSE OF THE INSURRECTION. 



155 



106th battalion, conveyed him from the scene 
of disturbance, before the cry for his blood had 
reached the fever heat, when all resistance 
would have been in vain. The measures that 
had been so promptly taken by M. Picard 
had prepared everything for the successful issue 
of the struggle. All the posts of the Government 
except the Hotel de Ville had been preserved ; 
and to avoid all unnecessary risk of provoking 
a conflict, the faithful Mobiles and National 
Guard were kept well in hand at a distance 
from the scene of disturbance, but still showing 
their zeal by cries of " Vive Trochu ! " and 
" A bas la Commune ! " as they demanded to 
be led against the insurgents. At length their 
concentration commenced, and between eleven 
o'clock and midnight the battalions began to 
defile in the direction of the Hotel de Ville. 
By midnight the square was occupied by a 
triple line of guards, and the mob had slunk 
away from the open space ; while their more 
adventurous companions in occupation of the 
Hotel were working havoc in the splendid 
apartments ; " here upsetting the wine, there 
upsetting the ink ; tearing the rich stuffs of 
curtains, sofas and carpets, spitting everywhere, 
breaking the backs of chairs, smashing the 
mirrors, pocketing everything on the tables 
that could be pocketed, and encumbering the 
velvet carpets with a litter of cigar ends, mud, 
and an infinity of torn paper. The chiefs at 
the same time were issuing their orders, and 
all discussed in a wild hullaballoo of voices, one 
shouting against another, and no one able to 
make himself heard in that oppressive atmo- 
sphere." 8 There could be no doubt about the 
fate of a so-called " Government " installed in 
such a scene of riot and drunkenness, with 
30,000 troops mustered in front of their head- 
quarters, and between two and three hundred 
thousand under arms in other parts of the 
city. Whether the event was to be decided by 
actual resort to force, or M. Flourens and his 
party would have the grace to yield to over- 
whelming numbers yet remained to be seen. 

While General Trochu after his escape was 
actively engaged by the side of M. Picard in 
disposing the troops for every emergency, M. 
Jules Ferry, in front of the Hotel de Ville, was 
endeavouring to bring the Communal leaders 



to reason. At eleven o'clock when the more 
important dispositions were completed, he 
communicated the fact to the occupants of 
the hotel, and demanded the release of the 
Members of the Government still in custody. 
He was answered by two shots from the upper 
Avindows, but as no harm was done it is sup- 
posed they were fired in the air as a menace. 
M. Delescluze then came down to parley with 
him, and having been told that the hotel would 
certainly be stormed, he replied that in that 
case M. Favre would instantly be shot. So 
the time wore on in feverish anxiety for two 
mortal hours, during which time several bat- 
talions of Mobiles had concentrated behind the 
hotel, and the Belleville rioters on their part 
had barricaded themselves inside the building 1 . 
At length the patience of M. Jules Ferry was 
exhausted. At one o'clock a company of the 
Mobiles was ordered to enter the hotel by a 
subterranean way or a side door (accounts 
differ), and at the same time M. Jules Ferry at 
the head of three battalions of the National 
Guard entered by one of the large gates. The 
troops did not need even to use their bayonets. 
As they occupied the lower part of the build- 
ing some of the rioters took refuge in the 
cellars, others were driven to the upper stories, 
all were ferreted out, and simply disarmed and 
set at liberty. As an eye-witness expressed it, 
when M. Ferry entered the hotel de Ville, " it 
was like pricking a bladder ; " the bubble 
collapsed. " The Members of the Government 
faint with hunger and weary with talking, 
were free, and Blanqui was glad to escape 
under the protection of General Tamisier, who 
had been his prisoner." 9 Between three and 
four o'clock in the morning the Hotel de Ville 
was free of the rabble which had defiled it. 
At daylight when Paris expected to find itself 
under the rule of the Red Republic, " great was 
the relief to find the insurgents reduced to 
their original insignificance, and the Govern- 
ment of France still in the hands of General 
Trochu and his colleagues." The insurgents 
could no doubt have been routed much sooner 
had it not been for the desire of the Govern- 
ment to avoid bloodshed. 

As we have hinted above, the object of this 
movement is not to be determined from the 



156 



OBJECT OF THE MOVEMENT. 




LIEUT. -GENERAL VON OBEKNITZ, COMMANDER OF THE WURTEMBURG DIVISION. 



accidental conjuncture of circumstances which 
gave rise to it, but from the whole purpose 
and character of the leaders. We must refer 
the reader back to more than one chapter of 
our history, in which we have traced the Com- 
munal theory and seen the conspirators at 
work. The Red Republic is a spectre whose 
history would be written in a series of inter- 
mittent apparitions, and the body in which it 
appears is always that of an excited mob. 
The vital root of the idea is nevertheless what 
Jules Andrieu calls "the passion for social 
justice,/ and whether developed in the intel- 
lectual sphere, by an Auguste Comte or a 
Proudhon, by a St. Simon, or a Fourier, it is 
a protest in the name of our common humanity 
against all caste and pariahship in the consti- 
tution of society. To accomplish this accord- 
ing to the Communal theory a political 
reform is indispensable ; but what are we to 



understand by a political reform ? Certainly 
not such changes as we include under that 
term in England, nor even such revolutions in 
the form of Government as have been accom- 
plished in France, including the Republican 
idea itself. Let us hear M. Jules Andrieu on 
this point, who, as an active member of the 
Communal administration in Paris, in March, 
1871, is entitled to speak with authority: "A 
centralized republican form (he says) like that 
of 1848 and 1870 costs both too much and too 
little, having always to pay the ambitious, 
which do it dis-service, too high, and the de- 
votions, which do it service, too low. Cen- 
tralization in such a form presently demands a 
president, a chief of the executive power, a 
king, an emperor. What matter is it ? Cen- 
tralization cogs the dice in favour of absolu- 
tism, and the reaction brings the throw of the 
sixes." As for universal suffrage M. Andrieu 



THE COMMUNAL THEORY. 



157 



thinks it a device worthy of Bedlam : " The 
knowledge of mankind in general is at present 
confined to its own needs. At the best the 
majority of mankind have no more than 
aspirations which can easily be played upon 
and at times of crisis are always craven, un- 
grateful, and cruel. Nevertheless, universal 
suffrage contains its kernel of truth, in seeming 
to attempt the granting to all their share in 
political power. But this power of the elector 
really only lasts the time of his voting. He 
is inevitably a plaything in the hands of the 
representative whom he sends up, who has 
made him promises that cannot be kept, and 
who gulls or dupes him with all the coarseness 
or cajolery of an unscrupulous steward. In 
short, " What each man knows best is his 
house, his street, his trade, his own locality ; 
and the conclusion of a long chain of consider- 
ations in the physiology of society, will be a law 
which resolves the antinomies of centralization 
and decentralization thus : — Decentralize, that 
is, manage locally everything which answers 
to a direct want ; centralize, that is, group 
according to the nature of your objects, at 
their proper point of convergence, everything 
which belongs to community or reconciliation 
of interests, to unification, to checking and 
control." This theoretical perfection has cer- 
tainly not been attained by any form of 
Government in France, perhaps it has not 
even been recognized as desirable of attain- 
ment by any de facto government. M. 
Andrieu cares nothing for names, and he 
virtually condemns that worship of the capital 
which would treat the provinces as so many 
milch cows for fattening up a political class, 
when he says : " The false centralization 
actually prevalent in France may best be 
conceived under the figure of an immense 
crushing machine, urging all the live forces of 
the nation to the one central power of Paris, 
and straining to redistribute to every extremity 
of the territory the uniform and unfruitful 
administrative product therein elaborated. 
Everything is thus sent a double journey. 
The oentral furnace burns everything which 
comes to it, and when the conflagration 
mounts, then the water engines are turned on ; 
when the explosion comes, then all the govern- 



ment stokers and drivers bolt, and by-and-bye 
come back at the cost of blood and treasure, 
exactly the same as they went, except, per- 
haps for the colour of their cockades, to repair 
the costly and inefficient machine." 10 

It appears from this that Communal Right 
as we have before insisted, is something more 
than the rights of municipalities and vestry- 
men as we recognize them in England. The 
political reform it demands is two-fold : first it 
decentralizes and sets every community or 
township free, and then it begins the work of 
centralization by " grouping " at their " proper 
point of convergence " whatever belongs to 
"the reconciliation of interests." It aims to 
do once more, in fact, and according to theo- 
retical rule what the municipalities did on 
the break-up of the old Roman empire in 
obedience to the natural law of political 
gravitation or necessity. The reader may 
compare what we have before said concerning 
the organization and the aims of the Com- 
mune {ante vol. i. pp. 479-484), our object 
being in all these elucidations not to affirm 
anything dogmatically, but to corroborate from 
time to time by such evidence as comes before 
us in connection with the course of events, the 
views which have been suggested by an im- 
partial examination of the data. It was the 
Commune as here indicated in the sense of 
a complete reconstruction of the political 
and social fabric that installed itself at the 
Hotel de Ville on the 31st of October, in the 
persons of Blanqui and his immediate con- 
federates. But it is not credible that the 
insurgents en masse had formed any opinion on 
the subject. What they felt most keenly was 
the incapacity of the commanders who had 
allowed their men to play the fool at Le 
Bourget, added to the humiliation and ruin of 
Bazaine's surrender, and the close environment 
of the capital by a ruthless enemy. The blind 
passion thus excited against the Government 
made the people of Belleville the ready instru- 
ments of a set of doctrinaires, whose misguided 
fanaticism would have converted France into 
a second Poland. Still, if the people of Paris 
had decided in favour of the Communal Right 
a outrance, it was clearly not possible for the 
usurping Government of M. Jules Favre to 



158 



TRIUMPH OF THE GOVERNMENT. 



deny them the luxury of inaugurating an era 
of dismemberment. Only it must be made 
quite clear that they really did deserve to 
inaugurate this stupendous change in the 
fabric of society ; and to put this to the test 
there was but the one way of appeal to the 
popular vote. The following proclamation 
was therefore issued as a counter-blow to the 
decree placarded by the Communists, and con- 
tained in the note handed to General Trochu, 
which the insurgents had hoped to force upon 
him at the point of the bayonet: — 

" ' The Government of the National Defence, con- 
sidering that it is important for the dignity of the 
Government and for the free fulfilment of its mis- 
sion of defence that it should know whether it re- 
tains the confidence of the Parisian population. 

" ' Considering also, that from a deliberation of 
the Mayors of the 20 municipal arrondissements of 
the city of Paris, lawfully summoned at the Hotel 
de Ville on the morning of the 31st of October, it 
results that it is opportune to constitute regularly 
by election the municipality of the 20 arrondisse- 
ments : 

" ' Decrees, — 

" ' The vote shall be opened on Thursday, the 3rd 
of November, on the following question : — 

" ' Does the population of Paris maintain ("Yes " 
or "No") the powers of the Government of the 
National Defence ? 

" ' All electors of Paris, and of the Communes who 
have taken refuge in Paris, who can show they 
possess their electoral rights, shall participate in the 
vote. 

" ' On Saturday, the 5th of November, the election 
of a Mayor and three Deputy-Mayors for each of 
the municipal arrondissements of the city of Paris 
shall be proceeded with. 

" ' The electors registered on the electoral lists at 
Paris shall alone participate in this vote. 

" ' The vote shall take place by voting a list for 
each arrondissement, and an absolute majority of 
the suffrages shall be required. In case of a second 
balloting being required, the vote shall take place 
on Monday, the 7th of November. 

" ' Done at the Hotel de Ville, the 1st of No- 
vember, 1870. 

(Signed) 

" ' GENEEAL TEOCHD, " ' GAENIER PAGES. 

"'JULES FAVRE. " ' E. PELLETAN. 

" ' EMMANUEL ARAGO. " ' E. PICARD. 
" ' JULES FERRY. 



JULES SIMON. 



The result on the 3rd was a complete 
triumph for the Government of Defence, 
557,990 votes being recorded for them, and 



only G2,638 against their continuance in office. 
M. F. Sarcey says : — The Government thought 
fit to demand a bill of indemnity. Strange 
irony of history ! Every member of that 
Government had argued against the famous 
plebiscitum by which the Emperor had put the 
French people in the necessity of voting for or 
against the existing order of things — either 
" Yes or No." Strange and instructive evidence, 
we might say, of the manner in which passion 
and personal ambition have influenced the 
men who have ever been the loudest in 
accusing others of personal motives. On the 
5th, also the greater number of the elections 
in the municipal arrondissements of Paris were 
favourable to the Government, although a few 
Communists were also voted in. General 
Trochu, therefore, issued a proclamation on 
the 4th, in which he said to the people of 
Paris : " You order us to remain at the post of 
danger assigned to us by the Revolution of the 
4th of September. We will remain with the 
strength derived from your support and with 
the consciousness of the great duties imposed 
upon us by your confidence, the first of which 
is that of defence, which will continue to 
occupy us exclusively. We will prevent 
criminal movements by the severe execution 
of the laws." M. Jules Favre said in his pro- 
clamation : " We have all one heart and one 
thought — the deliverance of our country. 
This deliverance is only possible by obedience 
to the military chiefs, and respect for the 
laws." The same sentiments were repeated in 
the evening of that day, when General Trochu 
received a deputation of the National Guard. 
M. Jules Favre also took the opportunity to 
re-affirm the resolution of the Government. 
"Not to yield one inch of territory" — alas, 
he could no longer add "Nor one stone of 
our fortresses" — that would have been too 
daring in the face of accomplished facts. 

Rochefort of the Lanteme and the Marseil- 
laise now resigned his office in the Government 
of Defence. His position seems to have become 
utterly untenable. By his adherence to the Re- 
publican party since the early days of Septem- 
ber, when, as we have before recorded, M. Jules 
Favre employed him in the congenial task of 
constructing barricades, and adroitly crowned 



THE REDS AND THE RURALS. 



159 



him with an extinguisher, he had forfeited 
the confidence of the " reds." When his name 
was proclaimed as a memher of the Communal 
Government in the Council Chamber of the 
Hotel de Ville on the 31st, it was objected to, 
and excited violent protest. By his nomina- 
tion in the Commune he had at the same time 
forfeited the confidence of his colleagues in the 
Government, and when the question of the 
Municipal Elections arose on the 5th, he took 
the opportunity afforded by some difference of 
opinion to resign his functions. We shall 
probably hear of him again hereafter in a more 
clearly defined position. 

General Tamisier also compromised at the 
Hotel de Ville, resigned his command of the 
National Guard, and was replaced by M. 
Clement Thomas. M.M. Felix Pyat, Maurice, 
Joly, and several chiefs of battalions were 
arrested, and the latter cashiered. The arrest 
of M. Jules Valles 11 who had constituted him- 
self Mayor of Belleville during the insurrection 
was not accomplished without creating some 
excitement, but the Government was now too 
strong to be seriously resisted. The time was 
not yet ripe for that martyrdom of the Com- 
mune which the world has since witnessed 
with astonishment ; nor indeed was it yet 
organized for effective action. 

The vote given by Paris on this occasion in 
favour of the Government constituted their 
claim, for the first time, to legal recognition. 
Once more, in a critical scene of the great 
historical drama, Paris had started to her feet 
and spoken in the name of France. Nor did 
provincial France repudiate the leadership of 
the capital ; but everywhere, in spite of diver- 
gencies of opinion, there were signs of adhesion 
to the government which was now credited 
with the merit of having saved society. The 
universality of this feeling is proved by the 
denomination of " Rurals," afterwards given 
to the adherents of the government in the 
desperate struggle with the Commune for the 
possession of Paris. It was the conviction 
that this feeling existed which induced M. 
Thiers eventually to abandon Paris in the 
certain hope of being able to rally the 
provinces to his aid at Versailles. It cannot 
be doubted that he decided wisely. The 



momentary success of such men as Flourens 
and Felix Pyat at the Hotel de Ville, while 
Lyons and Marseilles were also like seething 
cauldrons, scarcely prevented from boiling 
over, the disorder rampant everywhere, left no 
doubt of the consequences which must ensue 
if a tranquil centre of order and authority 
could not be found. Already in the south a 
league was talked of by the partisans under 
the lead of General Cluseret, for establishing 
an independent Republic. At Marseilles the 
Club of the Alhambra denounced Gambetta as 
a rogue and an impostor. At Perpignan the 
Colonel in command of the town was sabred 
and other individuals obnoxious to the multi- 
tude were stoned or cut down. In Normandy, 
Picardy, Flanders, and Artois, Orleanism was 
agitating public opinion. In Brittany, Maine, 
Anjou, Touraine, Poitou, and Angoumais the 
cry was for legitimacy. 12 In the "' pleasant 
Bourbonnaise," La Marche, Auvergne, aud 
other of the provinces, Imperialism was in the 
ascendant. In the turmoil of these conflicting 
elements the Material Interest, represented 
by the rally to the flag of Jules Favre and 
Trochu, was the only one that offered the least 
foothold to the terrified bourgeoisie of all 
classes and the moderate republicans. That 
this should be so was the cause of surprise, nay, 
of infinite pain and disgust to Garibaldi whom 
we recently left in arms at Besancon, pre- 
paring to withstand Werder, and who honestly 
added his ingredient to the witch's cauldron in 
the following order of the day. 

" Militia of the Army of the Vosges, — The cosmo- 
politan nucleus that the French Republic is rallying 
in her midst, composed of men chosen from the elite 
of nations, represents humanitarian future, and upon 
the banner of this noble group you can read the 
' motto ' of a free people, which will soon be the 
word of order of the human family, ' All for one, one 
for all.' Egotism governs the world, and autocracy 
combats certainly in the French Republic the germs 
of the rights of man, which it abhors. Genius of 
evil, it makes every effort for its preservation. 

" And the people? Modern Republics, like an- 
cient Carthage, swim in gold and sybaritism, whilst 
despots shake hands amidst the darkness they enjoy 
and profit by the misfortune of a brother people. 
Helvetia, believing herself weak, holds down her 
head and covers with the holy flag of William Tell her 
money-chests and her banks. Grant, who by a 



160 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXV. 



( 



mere sign with his finger could have despatched the 
soldiers of Prim home to Madrid, permits peaceably 
an entire population belonging to the grand family 
of Washington to be massacred and destroyed, and 
barely allows the great Republic to utter a word of 
sympathy for the valiant sons of Lafayette. 

"And thou, proud and classic ground, refuge of 
the exile — thou who hast first proclaimed the emanci- 
pation of races, and who to-day enjoyest the triumph 
of thy courageous initiative, wilt thou leave alone 
in its gigantic struggle that sister nation which, like 
thee, marches, and will march, in the van of human 
progress ? 

" In the heroic struggle which France is sustaining 
there can only be found the debris of an army of 
brave men which the most stupid of tyrants con- 
ducted to defeat. But the nation is there ! Risen 
like one man, she will cause the old autocrat soon 
to repent of his determination to continue his 
butchery of men. 

" What a noble mission, therefore, is ours ! Sons 
of liberty, elite of all people. Oh, no ! I would 
not change my title of militiaman of the Republic 
for a crown. 

"Apostles of peace and of the fraternity of 
peoples, we are compelled to fight, and we shall 
fight with the proud consciousness of justice whilst 
consecrating the formula of the illustrious Chenier : 



" ' Republicans are men, and slaves are children.' 
" Your courage I do not doubt. All I ask of you 

is coolness and discipline, indispensable in war.— 

G. Garibaldi." 

Had Switzerland, America, and England 
obeyed the call, the world must have been 
wrapt in flames. But the extravagant man- 
ner in which Garibaldi here alluded to the 
enterprise of General Prim, to which Spain 
owes her present tranquillity under a Consti- 
tutional Government,* is sufficient to show that 
the bravest and most generous of men is not 
necessarily the safest and best of political 
advisers. Pity that the devotion of a heart 
like his to the popular cause should be associ- 
ated with the judicial blindness evinced in this 
Order of the Day. Pity that the logic of 
events was so soon to convince him that these 
same " braves " might be " led to defeat " by 
the most glorious of patriots, no less than by 
"the most stupid of tyipnts." 

* The course which events took in Spain after the 
withdrawal of Prince Leopold's nomination to the 
throne will be sketched hereafter, in continuation of 
the historical elucidation in Chapter xxji. 



Notes to Chapter LXV. 



* Letter from Florence in the Times, Oct. 25th, 1870. 

2 A Tours paper says that M. Thiers, when departing on his 
new mission (Oct. 28th), was seized with overpowering emotion 
and shed tear.}. Well might he be thus moved. He knew of 
the Fall of Metz, and his heart must have been full of anguish 
for his country, as well as of the deepest anxiety, doubt, and ap- 
prehension. Letter from Tours in the Times, Nov. 2nd, 1870. 

8 On leaxing Versailles for Paris (Oct. 30th), he had some con- 
versation with the Prussian outpost commander, the substance of 
which was published by the German papers. The officer's sym. 
pathizing manner apparently led the aged statesman, who likes 
so much to hear himself talk, into a full outpouring of his pent- 
up feeling. He referred to his efforts to avert the war, and de- 
scribed the sitting of the Corps Legislatif in which prophetically, 
as he himself believed, he predicted the defeat of France, though 
the clenched fists of 40 Bonapartists were directed towards him. 
Not without betraying a painful satisfaction at his own foresight, 
he dwelt on the tumultuous scenes which occurred in front of 
his usually quiet house, on the evening of the 16th of July. He 
appeared to forget that he only opposed the war as inopportune, 
and that since 1866 he had by constant speeches against Germany 
fanned the flame and stirred the fire. The Prussian officer ven- 
tured to remind him that in 1840 he advocated war against Ger- 
many. " Ah,'' replied Thiers, " the thing was quite different 
then. At that time we were obviously, incontestably, in the 
right. The quadruple alliance had secretly intrigued against us, 
and wished to makefaits accomplis, which we could not submit 
to. The object then was to prevent Syria falling to Egypt ; we 
were not then unprepared, had excellent generals, and the pros- 
pects of success were altogether in our favour. This time every- 
thing was the reverse. The Emperor desired the war, but at 
bottom he only followed the Empress's impulse. Both were in 
the highest sense incompetent to guide the destinies of the 



country, and my fellow-countrymen must to-day pay a 
heavy pricefor having so long put up with [the "rule joi such a 
charlatan as Napoleon III." M. Thiers knew of the Fall of 
Metz, but was far from condemning Bazaine. He deemed him, 
on the contrary, the ablest French General, and in his enthusiasm 
went so far as to describe his private character and reputation in 
France as thoroughly spotless. He did not, indeed, place 
Bazaine as a man on the same level as Macmahon, whom 
he styled a perfect gentleman, a modern chevalier sans peur et 
sans reproche. He (Thiers) was from the first opposed to the 
hazardous movement which ended with the disaster of Sedan. 
He warned, but in vain. He had been indeed almost a Cassandra, 
but hoped people would now be more disposed to listen to hiin. 
He now sincerely desired peace. To save France from its present 
desperate position, it was necessary above all things to extricate it 
from the provisorium in which it was sticking fast. A Con- 
stituent Assembly, chosen by universal suffrage, was therefore, 
necessary. He did not, however, conceal that it would be very 
difficult to handle such questions with the Paris Government, 
which was not free from illusions, and to convince it of the un- 
avoidableness of making sacrifices. Turning to the German 
troops, he termed Count Moltke indisputably the greatest strate- 
gist of the age, and expressed respect for the Prussian officers. 
He, however, by no means liked the Prussian system, of the 
people in arms. The French army, he thought, became first 
thoroughly disorganized through the half measures of Napoleon 
III., whom he throughout judged very harshly. His ideal is 
still a paid army with five years' service. France had certainly 
taken up arms at an unfavourable time, and when Leboeuf 
declared himself in the Chamber " archipret," he (Thiers) knew 
full well that the War Minister was deceiving himself. The 
officer went with him up to the bridge, and there gave the little 
man his hand, that he might get out of the carriage with less 



7i t 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXV. 



161 



difficulty. On seeing Paris before him his eyes became moist, a 
nervous tremour came over him, and quickly turning away he 
exclaimed, " Oh queje suis navre de revoir ainsi la capitate." 
According to another account lus words were, " Oh, gentlemen, 
I never knew before how much I loved my unfortunate native 
city ! What a terrible position to find it in." When greeted in 
a friendly manner by the Duke of Saxe Coburg at Versailles, he 
said, "How frightful are the circumstances under which I have 
the honour to meet you again," and burst into tears. M. Remusat, 
his companion, who conversed with some other officers, tried to 
convince them that Germany, having shown herself to be stronger 
than France, could not require a cession of territory. 

3 The reports of General de Bellemare, addressed to General 
Trochu, relative to these events, were as follows : 

St Denis, Oct. 28th, 1870. 
"Monsieur le Gouverneur — I have the honour to address to 
you a report on the occupation of Le Bourget, executed to-day 
by a portion of the troops under my command. Wishing to 
utilize the service of the Francs-Tireurs of the Press, who were 
no longer required at La Courneuve, in consequence of the inun- 
dation of the Crould, I ordered the commander of the Francs- 
Tireurs yesterday evening to make a night attack on the advanced 
posts of the enemy established at Bourget. I pointed out to him 
the principal dispositions, and warned the principal guards 
established in advance of Fort Aubervilliers and of Courneuve to 
take up arms at 3 o'clock in the morning to support the move- 
ment. At the hour prescribed, the movement was executed by 
the Francs-Tireurs, under the orders of Commander Kalland, 
with equal vigour and precision, and without firing a shot. They 
approached the Prussian post, who fled in disorder, abandoning 
most of their knapsacks and helmets. They continued their 
advance in the village, driving the enemy from house to house, 
as far as the church, where he was established more solidly. At 
this moment I caused them to be supported by a part of the 34th 
of the Line and the 14th Battalion of the Mobiles of the Seine. I 
also despatched Colonel Lavoignet, Commander of the 1st Bri- 
gade, to take the command, with orders to carry the village and to 
occupy it solidly. I ordered to the support of the infantry a sec- 
tion of two 4-pounders and a mitrailleuse, and I posted two 12- 
pounders in advance of Courneuve to take the enemy in flank. 
At 11 o'clock I proceeded personally to Bourget, and arrived 
there at the moment we were completely masters. I ordered up 
a strong reserve composed of the 16th Battalion of the Mobiles 
of the Seine and a Battalion of the 28th of the Line. Towards 
noon the enemy unmasked two batteries at the Iblon-bridge, and 
sen t forward two batteries of field artillery on the road from D u gny 
to Bourget, which fired almost incessantly until nearly 5 o'clock 
upon the village, and some houses were burnt. I withdrew my 
artillery, as it could not contend with that of the enemy, which 
was superior in numbers. Our troops, however, remained in their 
position, although receiving a formidable fire for the first time, 
and I have only to congratulate myself on their coolness and 
energy. During this time the sappers and engineers opened com- 
munications, crenelated houses, and erected barricades. About 6 
o'clock I relieved by fresh troops those who had been engaged 
since the morning, in order to give them time to rest and to eat 
their soup. Throughout the night the work was carried on to 
render the position as capable of defence as possible ; the capture 
of Bourget, audaciously attacked and vigorously held, notwith- 
standing the numerous artillery of the enemy, is an operation of 
little importance in itself, but it affords proof that without ar- 
tillery our young soldiers can and do remain under the fire, more 
terrific than actually murderous, of the enemy. It enlarges the 
"ircle of our occupation beyond the forts, gives confidence to our 
troops, and increases the supply of vegetables for the Parisian 
population. Our losses, which I do not yet exactly know, are 
small (at most twenty wounded and four or five killed) ; we have 
made some prisoners." 

A later report of General Bellemare, dated October 29th, 7 
p.m., says : 

■' The firing continues intermittently, as yesterday. No in- 
fantry attack. We are in a very good position. We hold, and 
shall retain it The results of the fighting have been very im- 



portant. The ground in front of our skirmishes fe &>/ered with 
Prussian corpses. One of their wounded is a prisoner. During 
the attack the fire of the enemy's batteries ceased, and he fell 
back on Gonesse.'' 

4 The system of attack of the Prussian Infantry in the 
Campaign 0/1870-71.— By Lieut. Field Marshal William, duke 
of Wurtemberg. Translated from the German by C. W. Robin- 
son, Captain, Rifle Brigade, Garrison Instructor, Aldershot 
Mitchell & Co. 

6 The official French report of the recapture of Le Bourget, 
dated October 30th, 5.30 p.m., ran as follows : 

" Le Bourget, a village in advance of our lines, which had been 
occupied by our troops, was unsuccessfully cannonaded by the 
enemy throughout yesterday. Early this morning masses of in- 
fantry, estimated at more than 15,000 men, appeared in front, 
supported by a numerous artillery, while the other columns 
coming from Dugny and Blanc Mesnil turned the village. A 
certain number of men who were north of Bourget were cut oft 
from the main body, and remained in the hands of the enemy. 
The number is not exactly known at the present moment It 
will be ascertained to-morrow. The village of Drancy, occupied 
for 24 hours only, no longer found itself supported on the left, 
and time having failed for placing it in a respectable state of de- 
fence, its evacuation was ordered in order not to compromise tha 
troops posted there. The village of Bourget was not part of our 
general system of defence ; its occupation was of very secondary 
importance, and the rumours which give consequence to the in- 
cidents which have happened are without foundation." 

6 Fortnightly Review : Nov. 1871, p. 582. 

7 Paris during the Siege. By Francisque Sarcey. 

8 Correspondence of the Times, Nov. 8th, 1870. 

9 Ibid. 

10 M. Jules Andrieu, in The Fortnightly Review, cited above, 
pp. 577-78. 

11 Jules Valles was among the members of the Commune who 
got a scorching in a little publication from the pen of W. de Fon- 
veille. He is described as a Diogenes without even a tub. He 
never had a wash but once, — when he fell into a river. His prin- 
cipal taste was for gin and herrings ; but, on the other hand, he 
was tongue-valiant, and at least the Commune should have re- 
warded his services by voting him a small quantity of municipal 
soap. Uufortunately, says Fonveille, soap was the only com- 
modity which the Commune, on principle, never requisitioned ! 

The arrests of the Communist Leaders were, after all, a mere 
farce, as they were soon set at liberty again. There is a little 
mystery, too. M. Sarcey says: A placard signed Dorian and 
Etienne Arago, gave notice to the public that they were called 
upon to appoint by election a Municipal Council; whilst a 
second notice, posted up a few hours later, enjoined them to pay 
no heed to the first. Nevertheless, Dorian retained his position, 
though Arago resigned the Mayoralty of Paris. 

12 The following address was circulated by M. de I'Heberge- 
ment, inciting to a religious crusade against the Germans. The 
covert appeal to their loyalty as descendants of the Vendean 
Royalists scarcely needs to be pointed out. 

" Vendeans ! France has been attacked by the savage hordes 
of Protestant Germany. Within a few dajs, 120 squadrons of 
Uhlans, detached from the enemy's corps d'armee, will pour into 
your departments to deliver them up to pillage, murder, and 
robbery ; to violate women, cut the tliroats of children, shoot old 
men, send all able-bodied men to the convict hulks, to pillage 
houses, burn villages, destroy churches, break the statues of the 
Virgin Maiy, and assassinate prisoners of war. Such is the mode 
of warfare practised by the Prussians. They seek to treat oui 
country as a conquered land. Vendeans ! you will remember 
that you have never paltered with the religion of your fathers not 
with the love of your country. To arms ! and let not one of you 
be wanting at the rendezvous. Let the priests lead the parishion- 
ers to the fight. Let the mothers arm the fathers to avenge theii 
sons slain in the carnage fields of Alsace and Lorraine. Take 
your muskets, take pitchforks, pikes, axes ; cast bullets, make 
gunpowder, and unite yourselves with us to wage with the enemy 
war to the death, without truce, without mercy." 



162 



THE LOIRE ARMY AGAIN. 




3ENERAL D ATJRELLE DE PALADINES. 



CHAPTER LXVI. 

CAPTURE OF DIJON. — BATTLE OF COULMIERS. 

Advance of Werder after the fall of Strasburg continued — Ruth- 
less policy in his line of march and in the country around 
Orleans — Capture of Chateaudun by a detachment of Van 
der Tann's troops — Incidents at Saintillon and other places 
— Tlio advance of Werder disputed by General Cambriels at 
the crossing of the Ognon — The fight at the Bridge of 
Cussey - Advance continued to Dijon — Werder ordered to 
co-operate with the advancing army of Prince Frederick 
Charles — Detachment of two Brigades under General Beyer 
to occupy Dijon — Fight for the Town, and defeat of the 
French — Terms of occupation agreed upon between General 
Werder and the Municipality — Constei nation caused by this 
event — Where was the army of the Loire ? where was Gari- 
baldi? — False position of the latter — Enmity of the French 
Officers and of the Peasantry — Army of the Loire reorgan- 
ized by General D'Aurelle de Paladines — General Chanzy 
in command of the 16th Corps — Its concentration towards 
the Orleans and Chateaudun Road — Reconnaissances and 
occasional conflicts with the Enemy — Action at Valliere— 
Places already occupied by Von der Tann — The Armies 
within sight of each other — Anxiety at Tours — Battle of 
Coulmiers — Victory of the French — Question of D'Aurelle 
de Paladines' strategy — Mistake of General Reyau on the 
French Left — Retreat of Von der Tann from Orleans — 
Consternation of the Invaders — Subsequent movements of 
General D'Aurelle de Paladines — Arrival of Prince Frede- 
rick Charles's Army from Metz — The tables turned— In- 
dignation at Tours — Prophecy of the Nun of Blois. 

We left Werder with the 14-th Army Corps, 
formed after the fall of Strasburg, fighting his way 
southward, with Dijon for his objective point, 
when Prince Frederick Charles inarching from 



Metz upon the Seine, ordered him back towards 
Cray to protect his left flank (ante p. 92). 
The incidents of Werder's march up to this 
date when the time comes to depict them with 
dramatic force and historic accuracy — will 
make a picturesque and tragical episode in the 
war. Those who disputed the invader's pro- 
gress belonged for the most part to the irregular 
levies of France, and their manner of warfare 
too frequently compromised the inhabitants oi 
the villages. Werder shot them without mercy, 
and swept over the country like a scourge. The 
same thing was going on all around Orleans, and 
over much of the intervening country. Some 
idea of the misery caused in this smaller 
theatre of war may be formed from what 
occured at Chateaudun. It will be remembered 
that Von der Tann, operating against the 
army of the Loire, had detached some of his 
troops to move on Chateaudun (ante, p. 83), 
where La Motterouge had left a few volunteer 
companies and Francs-tireurs, when he fell back 
to re-form behind the Beuvron. A few days 
later, October 17th, these inexperienced troops 
made a reconnaissance at such a distance that 
they discovered Von der Tann's battalions 
marching in their direction. Instead of falling 



ADVANCE TO THE OGNON. 



163 



back on the main body, they returned to 
Chateaudun, and employed all the night and 
the morning of the next day in barricading 
the place. The enemy arriving before Cha- 
teaudun about midday on the 18th, found the 
entrances obstructed, and the walls and houses 
loop-holed. Instantly he brought his artillery 
to bear on the unfortunate town, and his pro- 
jectiles soon made a ruin of the feeble defences 
that had been invented by the gallant but ill- 
advised defenders, who, however, protracted 
the defence till the evening, and then left the 
burning town. When the Germans entered, 
shattered masonry, charred timber, fallen-in 
roofs, made the streets almost impassable. 
Even the church was nearly destroyed by 
shells, large blocks of stone were forced out 
from the walls, the tiles were shattered, and a 
grenade had exploded in the clock. Entire 
streets were destroyed by fire, a storm raging 
at the time made any attempt to extinguish 
the flames hopeless. Manjr of the French 
wounded who had been left in the houses were 
burnt, and even on the 20th the fire in the 
ruins made the environs of the town as light 
as day. 1 At Saintillon, near Orleans, a requi- 
sition column was attacked by Francs-tireurs, 
and the inhabitants joined in the assault, 
though, on the previous day they had appeared 
quiet and submissive. All who attempted 
resistance were cut down by the enemy, and 
the village, consisting of about thirty houses, 
was destroyed by fire. The cruel occurrences 
at Ablis some days before 2 reacted against 
the French and Germans alike in these terrible 
scenes. Even so near Paris as Corbeil one of 
these tragedies occurred. Six privates and an 
Uhlan officer having been shot byFranc-tireurs, 
and the villagers refusing to give any clue to 
their assailants, had their houses burnt over 
their heads, in revenge for which (most pro- 
bably) several soldiers were found dead, 
fastened to trees, and with their tongues cut out. 
In twelve days five villages in the country 
south and east of Paris were fired by the 
enemy; and where there was burning there 
was butchery. " Every day " a German corres- 
pondent wrote, " The war becomes more cruel. 
The fanaticism of the French excites the 
rage of the Germans, who too often see their I 



comrades fall by bullets from an ambush." 
It was also stated, however, that the troops 
sometimes imagined that the shots were fired, 
or other outrages attempted when nothing of 
the kind had occurred, and accidents arising 
from their own carelessness were too readily 
ascribed to French malignity and revenge. 

To return from this digression. The inarch 
of Wcrder upon the Ognon was checked at 
the bridge of Cussey, as we have before briefly 
stated {ante p. 92), by the army of the east, 
under the command of General Cambriels. 
This officer had been appointed to the com- 
mand of Belforfc, the key of the Vosges 
Passes, in the middle of September, shortly 
before the fall of Strasburg. The army of th«. 
Vosges, gathered from the whole department, 
as well as at Belfort and Langres, was, as 
we have before described it, an ill disciplined, 
uninstructed, and ill-provided body, or rather 
collection of men, mostly raw recruits, with- 
out coherence or esprit de corps. The arsenal 
of Belfort provided it with a few cannon, and 
Muihouse improvised the necessary harness. 
Such was the army which General Cambriels, 
immediately after the fall of Strasburg, joined 
in the Passes of the Vosges, leaving his place 
as Commandant at Belfort to be supplied by 
General le Changere. How the Vosges army 
was attacked in all its positions, and driven 
over Bourgence between Raon l'Etape and 
Bruyeres, over Remberviller and Epin&J in 
the direction of Besancon has been recorded 
(ante pp. 91-92). It was while he was thus 
retreating before the enemy in the direction of 
the Ognon, a small river which has its source 
in the flanks of the Vosges mountains, and 
becomes a tributary of the Loire, that Cam- 
briels was appointed to the command of one 
of the four military regions decreed by 
Gambetta (Oct. 22nd), of which region, called 
" the Eastern," Besancon was the head quarters. 
Here, therefore, General Cambriels made a 
rally, and turning to face the enemy disputed 
his further progress at the crossing of the little 
river by Cussey and Auxerre. 

The Germans advanced in three columns, 
the right wing commanded by Prince William 
of Baden, the left by General von Keller, and 
the centre by Degenfeld. General Cambriels 



164 



FIGHTING EN ROUTE. 




WERDER S ARMY CROSSING THE VOSGES. 



had his advanced troops at Sisy and Etuz. 
The fight was sustained for some time by 
Degenfeld's advanced brigade ; Keller and 
Prince William of Baden having delayed 
somewhat in their march. On the German 
side three batteries took part in the engage- 
ment. The contest had lasted the whole day 
before the French were driven back. The 
principal fighting was at Cussey, where the 



stone bridge, though neither destroyed nor 
barricaded, was defended by a sharp fire from 
the village beyond, which the French occupied 
in force. General Degenfeld, who led on this 
side, after letting his guns play for some time 
on the houses, suddenly ordered the leading 
battalion, formed in column, to storm at the 
double, and the order was so well carried out 
that the Pi-ussians, crossing the bridge at a 



CAPTURE OF DIJON. 



105 



rush, carried the village beyond with the 
bayonet, taking some 200 of the defenders 
prisoners, and driving the rest into a wood 
beyond. General Werder, who witnessed the 
feat, rode up and personally congratulated the 
troops on their achievement soon afterwards. 
The brigade now ascended a hill which divides 
the valley of the Ognon from that of the 
Doubs, in which Besancon lies, having lost 
only 27 men in all in their successful assault. 
The other columns, having crossed the Ognon at 
Auxerre and various passages, closed in, but soon 
found the enemy posted in a strong position, 
flanked by heavy field guns, from which, how- 
ever, the reserve artillery of the corps, which 
Werder ordered to be brought into action, dis- 
lodged him without further fighting. The 
cavalry followed up the retreat, but were 
presently repulsed by a fire from skirmishers 
in woods on the flank, and on a support of 
infantry being sent to dislodge these, it was 
found that they had fallen back finally on a 
line of earthworks constructed to cover the 
approaches to Besancon on this side. The 
German loss was three officers and one hun- 
dred men, that of the flanking columns in their 
minor affairs, being about sixty killed and 
wounded. The French, if we may judge from 
the incidents of the fight, and the number of 
prisoners, which included two staff officers and 
thirteen subalterns, must have suffered much 
more severely. General "Werder estimated the 
enemy now concentrated before him at about 
12,000 strong; but he had no intention of at- 
tacking them farther, his design having been 
merely to clear his right flank thoroughly 
before turning westward to make the flank 
march on Dijon, which was his real object. 

Having accomplished his change of front 
without interruption from the enemy, Werder 
directed his columns upon Gray, on the Saone, 
where his head quarters were lodged on the 
24th, and from whence detachments, sent west 
and north-west, gained the southern slopes of 
the plateau of Langres. During their advance 
to this point, on the 27th, two petty actions 
were fought where the columns, meeting 
separately, found the roads barricaded and 
preparations made for resistance. In each of 
these affairs the French stood just long enough 

VOL. II. 



to enable the column they encountered to turn 
one flank and take a number of prisoners, 3 
among them several men without uniform, 
called in the German reports "armed peasants," 
who were tried next day by a court-martial 
and shot, in accordance with the severe policy 
to which we have alluded above. On the 
28th Gray was left by the head quarters, and 
the advanced posts were already in sight of 
Dijon, when Werder received orders direct 
from Versailles to co-operate with the advanc- 
ing army of Prince Frederick Charles, now on 
its way from Metz (ante p. 92). But he had 
also received intelligence that Dijon was not 
garrisoned, and before retracing his steps to 
Gray, considered it quite safe to detach a portion 
of his troops, consisting of two brigades only 
(one of Prince William's and one of General von 
Keller's) under the command of General Beyer, 
to push forward and occupy the place. The 
advance upon the town commenced on Satur- 
day the 29th, but the absent garrison had re- 
turned, and was ready to face the enemy. 
The attack began in the suburbs at 9 o'clock 
on the morning of Sunday the 30th, and the 
fight lasted till four or half-past four in the 
afternoon. Five battalions of the brigades of 
Prince William, supported by six batteries of 
artillery, were required to capture the heights 
of St. Apollinaire, which commanded the ap- 
proaches to the town ; and the suburbs were 
taken by the Grenadiers of the Baden Guard 
with the loss of 200 men hors de combat. The 
early accounts gave no estimate of the loss of 
the five battalions, but it has since been stated 
that the total loss of the Germans in killed and 
wounded was 245 men ; that of the French at 
least double. A part of the town was fired by 
the enemy's shells, and was burning after 
nightfall, but the damage was not very great. 
In the morning of the 31st the municipality 
capitulated, the troops having previously with- 
drawn. The convention stipulated that a force 
of 20,000 men should be boarded and lodged in 
the town, and that a sum of 500,000 francs 
was to be paid as " caution" money, to be re- 
turned hereafter if the relations between the 
troops and the inhabitants remained satisfac- 
tory. 

The occupation of Dijon occurring so soon 

12 



166 



JEALOUSY AND HATRED OF GARIBALDI. 



after the capitulation of Metz was another 
Litter ingredient in the cup of sorrow which 
France had to drink. It was not a place of 
very great strategical importance, but it was 
thought to be coverod by the army of the East, 
which, according to a despatch from Basle was 
reported to have held in check the army of 
Werder. Where, too, was the army of the 
Loire ? Where was Garibaldi ? With Prince 
Frederick Charles sweeping southward, every- 
thing presaged ruin. As for Garibaldi we 
know that he was at Dole, 25 miles from 
Besancon, thwarted at every point by jealousy 
and hatred. General Cambriels had even ten- 
ded his resignation of the command of the 
Eastern military region rather than consent 
to take counsel with him, or accept his co- 
operation. 4 According to subsequent informa- 
tion he had barely 8,000 ill-armed and undis- 
ciplined men under his command, of whom 
3,000 were Italians, 1,500 Hungarians, Poles, 
Americans, etc., and some 3,000 Frenchmen. In 
this force he had but 300 cavalry and 12 guns. 
The French Generals of the regular army 
would not serve under him. Herr Wickede 
wrote in the Cologne Gazette, " not only did 
Garibaldi fight against the French army in 
1849 and 1868, but he had too habitually 
abused them to hope for the least sympathy 
from the superior officers, three-fourths of 
whom, from the captains upwards, were in 
their hearts Imperialists, and hoped to see the 
Prince Imperial ascend the throne. All these 
men were therefore radical enemies of Gari- 
baldi and intrigued against him. He had also 
a dangerous enemy in the entire Catholic priest- 
hood, whose influence over the peasantry was 
unlimited, and who hated Garibaldi, and taught 
the peasantry to hate him, as the inveterate 
enemy of the Pope. The French peasant, es- 
pecially in the Vosges and the Jura can seldom 
read, and if he can, scarcely ever sees a news- 
paper. He has no idea that men like Gambetta, 
Rochefort, and Victor Hugo exist, and follows 
blindly in all political matters what his priest 
tells him. As for the Frenchmen who had 
joined Garibaldi's standard, they were chiefly 
youths from Lyons and other large towns, 
enthusiastic but undisciplined, all wanting to 
be officers. In vain the lion-hearted cham- 



pion of the " rights of man " appealed to the 
better instincts of his companions in arms in 
the stirring address cited at the end of the 
previous chapter. At this moment there was 
too much reason to believe that his entire corps 
would be scattered to the winds on its first 
encounter with a Prussian column, and there 
were many in England, lovers of the man and 
admirers of his heroism, who dreaded to hear 
that he had been captured and shot with as 
little ceremony as the leader of a band of 
Francs-tireurs. The Germans were said to be 
infuriated against him as a "foreign adven- 
turer," whose character and motives they were 
totally unable to appreciate, and who had no 
patriotic right to take the field against them. 
But the Army of the Loire, which we left to 
rally under its new General, D'Aurelle de 
Paladines, after his defeat at Artenay and the 
capture of Orleans by Von der Tann (ante,]). 83) 
where was it ? The wildest rumours had been 
afloat concerning its strength, and the most 
romantic statements were made concerning 
its commander, who, after all, was a plain 
old soldier, experienced in African warfare, 
arid reputed to be an inflexible disciplinarian. 
At first placed in command of the 15th Corps 
in succession to La Motterouge, whose misfor- 
tune it was to lose Orleans, he was a little later 
appointed to command all the forces in that 
part of the country. His first care when he 
joined the forces which had retreated into the 
Sologne, was to get his troops well in hand, 
and at the same time organize another corps 
(the 16th) under the direct command of the 
General of division, Pourcet. This new force 
formed at Blois and Bourges, consisted of three 
divisions of infantry, a division of cavalry, and 
eleven batteries of artillery. The object of 
D'Aurelle de Paladines was to concentrate the 
combined corps on the right bank of the Loire, 
in order to recapture Orleans, and make that 
place the base of his operations for raising the 
siege of Paris. There is no doubt the plan 
was divined by the enemy, and that it was 
primarily to prevent its execution that the 
Germans under Von der Tann and Werder 
spread themselves pver this part of the countiy, 
not to occupy Lyons or drive the Delegate 
Government out of Tours as people imagined. 



MOVEMENTS OF THE LOIRE ARMY. 



167 



To cover the movements of concentration, 
ordered in the middle of October, those troops 
of the 16th corps that were not organized were 
sent to Mer and the forest of Marchenoir, north 
of Blois, and were successful at the cost of 
occasional skirmishes with advanced guards, 
in preventing the enemy from extending the 
area of his occupation. It was at first intended 
to make the attempt on Orleans on the 
25th of October, but it was not until the end 
of the month that the army was ready for any 
great enterprise. In the meantime Metz had 
capitulated, and the army of Prince Frederick 
Charles was on its march southward. This ren- 
dered redoubled care necessary, and it is fair 
to state that in General D'Aurelle de Paladines 



the army possessed all that energy and 
experience could contribute to its success. It 
is manifest that he could not allow his atten- 
tion to be distracted by secondary operations, 
such as the protection of Dijon. The truth is, 
however, so little was known of the strength 
or whereabouts of the army of the Loire, much 
less of the strategic purpose of its commander, 
that its very existence was, in England at 
least, seriously doubted. 

It is difficult without much tedious detail to 
describe the distribution of an army in the act 
of formation at the same time that it is ad- 
vancing against the enemy, but the following 
is approximately correct : — 



15th Corps: D'Aurelle de Paladines. 
1st Division (General Martin dcs Pallieres), at Ar- Ordered to march thence on Gien, where it was to 



gent on the 31st of October. 



2nd Division, across the Loire, at Mer, between 
Orleans and Blois, October 31st. 



3rd Division, across the Loire, at Blois, October 
31st. 



take over the troops of the lGth Corps, sent from 
Bourges, and proceed to Orleans by the right 
bank of the Loire. 
Between the 31st of October and the 8th of No- 
vember the 2nd Division had moved up to a 
position between Messas and Cravant; the 3rd 
Division to Killy. 



16th Corps : Pourcet — Chanzy. 

1st Division (General Chanzy). Between the 31st of October and the 6th of No- 

2nd Division (General Barry), near Concriers, be- vember the 1st Division had moved up to St. 

tween Seris and Boches, October 31st. Leonards, and the 2nd Division stood behind it, 

3rd Division, not yet formed. with the artillery. 



While these movements were in progress, 
General Chanzy has succeeded General Pourcet 
in the command of the 16th Corps (Nov. 2). 
In the afternoon of the same day a brigade of 
cavalry, supported by a battalion of infantry, 
and two batteries, were pushed forward to 
Ouzouer-le-Marche, west of Orleans, where 
the presence of the enemy had been signalled. 
The latter (Bavarians) retired from the vil- 
lage on the approach of the French and 
fell back on their cantonments. The object 
of this movement, and of the reconnais- 
sances which followed it from day to day was 
to accustom the young troops of the Loire army 
to real service before the enemy in anticipation 
of the grand movement that was in contem- 



plation. The most important of these small 
affairs occurred on the 7th of November, when 
a strong reconnaissance was made in the 
direction of Verdes, which brought on an 
action at Valliere, in which the 16th corps 
was hurried up to take part. The strength of 
the enemy consisted of two battalions of 
Bavarian infantry, about 2,000 Prussian 
cavahy, and ten pieces of artillery. Before 
the reconnaissance was supported by the 
troops from Marchenois, the Germans had 
opened fire upon St. Laurent-des-Bois, and 
marched upon Valliere. The combat lasted 
five hours, and was well sustained by the 
young troops. An entire company of Bava- 
rians was captured, and the enemy was com- 

12 a 



108 



RECONNAISSANCES IN FACE OF THE ENEMY. 




OV-- * Ss 



PRINCE WILLIAM OF BADEN. 



pelled to leave some of his dead and wounded, 
to the number of a hundred, on the field. On 
the same day a reconnoitring party, consisting 
of Francs-tireurs, Mobiles, and a few Chasseurs, 
under Lieut.-Colonel Lipouski, surprised a 
body of two hundred White Cuirassiers, who 
had seventy-five men killed or wounded, and 
left some of their horses and arms behind them. 
These incidents, trivial in themselves, con- 
tributed to raise the spirits of the troops, and 
inspire them with the necessary confidence in 
the skill and good fortune of their leaders. 
The eyes of all Europe were now turned on 
General D'Aurelle de Paladines, in whom people 
began to recognize a leader worthy of a nation 
in arms. The enemy himself began to be 
seriously impressed by the possible strength 
of the still mysterious army of the Loire, and 



was proportionately anxious to deal it a crush- 
ing blow before it was too late. Besides 
possessing Orleans, he had already established 
his positions at Saint-Pe'ravy, Saint-Sigismond, 
Cheminiers, Coulmiers, Le Grand-Lus, La 
Renardiere, Baccon, and all along the Mauves 
of Huisseau as far as Meung. 5 

On the morning of the 9th of November the 
two armies, commanded respectively by 
DAurelle de Paladines and Von der Tann, 
stood within sight of each other in the vast 
and fertile plains of La Beauce, 6 over which 
Von der Tann had obtained absolute control by 
his possession of Orleans. It was on the 
morning of the 8th that General D'Aurelle de 
Paladines had moved up from the woods of 
Marchenoir, and other defensive positions that 
had been occupied by his corns while engaged 



GLOOMY ANTICIPATIONS AT TOURS. 



169 



in the critical work of reorganization, and 
crossed the fields to give battle to the enemy. 
The direction of his march was the Orleans 
road, and the prize of victory was the city 
itself, which the enemy was prepared to de- 
fend at every point. The day that was 
destined to witness the only real success of the 
French arms during the war was a gloomy 
one at Tours. That morning a Cabinet Council 
had been held to receive from M. Thiers an ac- 
count of his negotiations, the failure of which 
we have recorded in the preceding chapter. The 
very persons who had inveighed against his 
mission, and denounced the idea of an armistice 
under any circumstances, were among the first 
to complain of his ill-success — as if his success 
were the event which they, above all others, 
had desired and worked for. It was but natural, 
however, that his failure should redouble the 
anxiety felt for some decisive intelligence 
of the Loire army. If it too, were unsuccessful, 
the Tours Government felt that their hour was 
come, and that their almost instant removal 
further westward would have to be seriously 
considered. We have before observed that 
designs were attributed to the German com- 
manders, which they in all probability never 
entertained; nor is this to be wondered at, 
when we consider how little could be known 
of their strategical purposes. If D'Aurelle de 
Paladines at the head of the only organized 
army in the field should now be able to break 
the charm which had hitherto bound victory to 
the enemy's chariot wheels, it would open a 
new epoch in the war by encouraging the 
armed forces of all descriptions throughout 
France. The Government at Tours therefore 
urged immediate action, but it was thought 
that General D 'Aurelle still mistrusted the 
fitness of his troops to encounter the enemy in 
the field. The general appearance of the drafts 
that passed through Tours justified these fears 
of the Government, and when General Bour- 
baki was there a few weeks before, he had 
distinctly expressed his opinion that several 
months would be necessary to organize an 
army that could take the field with any pros- 
pect of success. 7 

However, as General D'Aurelle would cer- 
tainly have to fight before long, they who 



thought it urgent he should take the initiative 
before the Prussians had time to bring down 
overpowering forces, were surely in the right. 
On the very day when the armies were en- 
gaged at Coulmiers, as we are about to relate, 
a correspondent wrote from Tours : " All the 
troops that can possibly be mustered are being 
sent up to him (D'Aurelle de Paladines). Bat- 
teries of artillery are moving northwards, also 
cavalry and infantry, and the prevailing belief 
here is that an action on a large scale is immi- 
nent. We have now had several dry days, so 
that the country will be in a better state for 
the movement of troops than it recently was. 
The French are thirsting for a success, but 
far from sanguine of it. Should their army be 
routed, there will be nothing to prevent the 
enemy marching to Tours, and as much farther 
as he pleases. It is certainly not the barricades 
at Amboise, a few leagues to the north-east on 
the road to Blois, that will stay his progress. 
It is said that Tours intends to resist, and it is 
certain that the great bridge is mined, and is 
to be sufficiently blown up, when the enemy 
approaches, to prevent his passing over it. 
In conformity with this, the two suspension 
bridges which connect the eastern and western 
extremities of the city with the northern banl( 
of the Loire must also be more or less de- 
stroyed . . . but when all this is done, the 
Germans will throw over pontoons, and cross 
with very few hours' delay." On the whole, it 
was doubtful whether Tours would be defended 
very seriously, should the army of the Loire be 
defeated, and the march of the Germans con- 
tinued southward. As for Lyons, we have be- 
fore stated that it was actively preparing for 
resistance (ante, p. 89). 

What the country ardently desired, and yet 
scarcely dared believe to be possible, wat 
about to take place. A council of war had 
been held in the Chateau of Dizier on the 6th, 
when the dispositions for the attack on thfc 
enemy's positions around Orleans had beer 
discussed and agreed upon, of which the ad. 
vance of D'Aurelle de Paladines was the im. 
mediate result. On his part, Von der Tanr ; 
had taken every necessary measure to retain 
his hold of a city and a district so important 
to the forces besieging Paris, He entrenched 



170 



THE BATTLE OF COULMIERS. 



himself behind every obstacle, and in every 
village which commanded and defended the 
approaches. He had artillery in position at 
all these points, and had established his obser- 
vatories in the steeples and on the tower of 
Baccon, from which it was easy to watch the 
movements of the French army, when it 
debouched into the plains. The Bavarians 
rested with their left on the village of Bac- 
con, their centre at Coulmiers, on the road to 
Le Mans, and their right extending on the 
road to Chateaudun, over Champs and Saint- 
Sigismond. On consulting a map drawn to 
scale, it will be seen that Orleans (where Von 
der Tann had left his provision and munition 
train, under the protection of two battalions) 
was about twelve miles in the rear of the left 
of their position, and reference to the subjoined 
sketch map of the battle at seven in the even- 
ing will show that the positions indicated 
(with the exception of Saint-Sigismond) were 
then occupied by the victorious French. The 
extent of ground covered by the line of battle 
was about nine miles. 

The line of battle formed by the French as 
they advanced was almost parallel with the 
line occupied by the Bavarians. There had 
been neither rain nor snow for some days, so 
that not only infantry and cavalry, but even 
artillery, could move across the fields without 
difficulty. The 15th and 16th Infantry Corps 
took the right and centre ; the cavalry and 
Francs-tireurs marched on the left. The in- 
fantry were formed in two lines of battalions, 
at half-distance, with intervals for deploying, 
their front covered by skirmishers, and these, 
again, preceded by cavalry scouts. A German 
account states that skirmishers were also 
thrown out on the flanks, the inference from 
which is that German tactics were to some 
extent adopted in this action. 

The advance in front of the enemy had com- 
menced at eight o'clock am. About half-past 
nine cannon was heard on the right. This was 
the artillery of the 15th corps opening upon 
the Bavarians at Baccon. But the 16th corps 
was advancing in line with the 15th, and as 
Chanzy states that the skirmishers of Barry's 
division were directly afterwards exposed to 
the fire of two batteries in this position, it 



seems certain that those skirmishers had been 
thrown out on the right flank. To silence this 
fire, two batteries attached to the 1st brigade 
were sent to the front, supported by two com- 
panies of foot Chasseurs, the first line being 
halted to await the result. In the meantime 
the French left continued its advance, and at 
half-past ten had arrived near Saintry and 
Epieds, when intelligence was brought in by 
the scouts, who had pushed on far in advance, 
that Coulmiers was strongly defended. By 
this time the sound of cannon at Baccon had 
somewhat diminished, but was increasing 
in intensity at La Renardiere and Grand Lus. 
In order to diminish the width of the space 
which the division of Barry would have to 
occupy when it came up, as well as to assist in 
the attack on Renardiere, Chanzy now got a 
battery into position on the road from Saintry 
to Grand Lus, and thus compelled the Bavarian 
artillery to divide the fire which it had pre- 
viously directed against the 15th corps only. 
While the Bavarian left was thus held in 
check, the brigade Deplanque (16th corps) had 
crossed Epieds and debouched into the plain, 
where it also was greeted by a storm of shells. 
Getting his guns into position, and throwing 
out a cloud of skirmishers, Deplanque never- 
theless continued his advance. For a consider- 
able time he had to face alone the fire from 
Saint-Sigismond and Gdmigny, as well as from 
the defences of Coulmiers and Rosieres; but 
about mid-day Barry came up with his division, 
and, forming in line, advanced his artillery in 
front of Saintry, from which point its fire was 
directed upon Coulmiers. The action now 
became general along the whole front. 

On the right La Renardiere and Grand-Lus 
were vigorously cannonaded by the 15th corps, 
with the assistance of the battery of the 16th 
corps, spoken of above, between Saintry and 
Grand-Lus. In the centre Barry and Del- 
planque directed their fire against Coulmiers, 
Rosieres, Saint-Sigismond, and Gemigny; 
while on the extreme left, General Reyau, 
who had two divisions of cavalry and six 
batteries of horse artillery with him, and had 
received orders to turn the right of the 
Bavarians, the effect of which would have been 
to cut them off from their line of retreat at St. 



D'AURELLE'S STRATEGY. 



171 



Peravy, joined in the general scrimmage, and 
opened fire on the villages of Champs and 
Saint-Sigismond in his front, which were 
strongly occupied and defended. That this 
was contrary to the intention of General 



the inatructions of the former we read : " The 
General Commanding-in-Chief the 16th corps 
has received orders to make a turning move- 
ment towards the left, supported by ten 
regiments of cavalry and six batteries of 



BATTLE OF CODLMIEES 

Nov. 9th, 1870. (Position at 7 o'clock.) 




/.O SAINT-PERAVY 



6* LUS 

□ 



IS 



BACCON 
O 

GERMAN FORCES. 
B. Brigade of 1st corps of Bavarians. 
2. Cavalry, '2nd Division. 
4. Cavalry, 4th Division. 



DAurelle is not only obvious to the merest 
tyro in strategy, but is proved by the instruc- 
tions issued on the eve of the battle, both by 
the General Commanding-in-Chief and General 
Chanzy, the Commander of the Division. In 



LA RENARDIERB 
O 



IS 




FRENCH FORCES. 
16. Brigade of Infantry, 16th corps. 
15. Brigade of Infantry, 15th corps. 
C. Cavalry. 
A. T. Artillery and Trains. 

artillery, which, with some battalions of 
free corps, will endeavour to outflank the 
enemy's right. . . The General commanding 
the 16th corps will give to General Reyau, 
commanding the cavalry, the necessary in- 



172 



INCIDENTS IN WERDER'S ADVANCE. 




ill 



MISTAKE OF REYAU. 



173 



structions for his movement" — as indeed lie 
did. 8 

As the battle grew hotter, the Bavarian in- 
fantry could plainly be seen extending their 
long lines in front of the woods of Buisson and 
Rosieres; his cavalry, from this position, ad- 
vanced as far as the farms of Vaurichard and 
Ormeteau, apparently with the object of driving 
in the French skirmishers and turning the left 
of their lines, and his artillery swept the ground 
in front of the French advance. Everywhere 
a most determined resistance was made by in- 
ferior numbers; nevertheless, about two o'clock, 
the defenders of Renardiere and Grand-Lus 
were compelled to give way, and those places 
were occupied by the infantry of the 15th 
Corps. Coulmiers held out two hours longer. 
The skirmishers of the 16th Corps penetrated 
into the gardens, but the defenders occupied 
the houses, and finally it was necessary to use 
artillery. This had the effect, at about half- 
past three o'clock, to slacken the fire of the 
enemy, whereupon General Barry directed four 
battalions to turn Coulmiers on his right, while 
the rest of his troops attacked in front. They 
were received at every point by a sharp fire, 
and were evidently on the point of falling 
back, when Barry jumped off his horse, and, 
placing himself at the head of the principal 
column, dashed forward for the village, to the 
cry of " Vive la France ! " " En avant les 
Mobiles ! " The elan of the French soldier 
made itself felt. At four o'clock Coulmiers 
was wholly in their power, and three batteries 
having been got into position* on the side facing 
Rosieres and Gemigny, which still held out, 
made it impossible for the Bavarians to attack 
from that quarter. 

While these events were taking place on the 
right and centre of the French line, the mis- 
take occurred on the left, to which we have 
before alluded as seriously affecting the results 
of D'Aurelle's strategy. The Bavarians, afraid 
of being turned on their right and cut off from 
their line of retreat at Saint-Peravy, had got a 
powerful battery and several columns of fresh 
infantry into line opposite the village of 
Champs, about the time when Deplanque's 
brigade (commanded by Admiral Jaureguiberry 
at the moment) had taken possession of the 



village. These latter, therefore, were almost 
immediately assailed by a heavy artillery fire, 
and a cloud of skirmishers thrown out by the 
new columns, and at the same moment the 
enemy's batteries behind Champs and Robre- 
chere, and in front of Mouise and Gemigny 
renewed their fire. Admiral Jaureguiberry, 
with all his energy, could not prevent his 
young troops from giving ground before such 
a storm; but, fortunately, before it was too 
late a reserve battery was brought up, which 
at once engaged the enemy, and about five 
o'clock the Admiral, who had also been rein- 
forced on the right by the rest of the brigade, 
made a forward movement again, and captured 
both Champs and Ormeteau. The enemy then 
retreated, pursued by the fire of the French 
artillery, and thus the success of the army 
of the Loire in the centre and on the right 
was equally assured. Had Reyau acted up to 
the letter of his instructions on the left, the 
troops of Von der Tann would have been 
enveloped, and the result of General D'Aurelle 
de Paladines' strategy would have been an 
unqualified success. 

But General Reyau had been for two hours 
subject to a galling fire, and had lost a great 
number of men and horses, while his ammuni- 
tion was exhausted, and his cavalry everywhere 
seriously engaged. All this seems to have 
been the consequence of his having joined the 
battle in front. Instead of turning the enemy's 
line he feared being turned himself, and when 
at five o'clock a column was signalled on his 
left, he concluded the fatal moment had come, 
and falling back, regained the position from 
which he had moved up in the morning. 
This column, however, which he had mistaken 
for the enemy was composed of the Francs- 
tireurs of Lipouski, marching in the direction 
of Tournoisis. The error was a grave draw- 
back from the success of the day. The enemy, 
who had yielded but slowly all along the front, 
and clung tenaciously to their right were 
able to retire in perfect order, if their own 
account is to be believed. In fact, the French 
were scarcely aware of the real measure of 
their success until the next day. Far from 
thinking Von der Tann was in full retreat, 
they occupied the night in defensive prepara- 



174- 



RETREAT OF VON DER TANN. 



tions, expecting an attack on the morrow. 
The villages of Epieds, Champs, Ormeteau, and 
Coulmiers were fortified, ammunition was re- 
newed, rations distributed, the wounded at- 
tended to, and every preparation made for a 
renewal of the fight. The first intelligence of 
the real state of the case was brought to Ad- 
miral Jaureguiberry, under singular circum- 
stances. Having passed the night at Champs, 
he rode forward in the morning to St. Sigis- 
mond, to reconnoitre, and found that village 
evacuated. Still it does not appear that he 
suspected what had occurred until a resident 
of Saint-Pe'ravy, who had come over to the 
village for the purpose, informed him that the 
enemy had been marching all night long on 
the Patay road, in the greatest disorder. The 
Admiral had no other cavalry at hand than 
his escort, consisting of thirty dragoons and 
fifteen hussars ; yet the commander of this 
handful of men did not hesitate to gallop off 
with them in pursuit. His success was ade- 
quate to his courage. Coming up with the 
rear of a convoy beyond Saint-Peravy, the 
column being then at Lignerelles, half-way 
between Saint-Peravy and Patay, he attacked 
the escort, and brought off two pieces of Bava- 
rian artillery, with their teams and drivers, 
twenty-five caissons of ammunition, thirty 
baggage waggons, several of which belonged 
to generals, and 130 prisoners, including five 
officers. Such a capture rather confirms the 
report made by the villager of the state of the 
Bavarians than the German account. 

The battalions and the mate'riel of war left 
by Von der Tann at Orleans had received 
orders, when he retreated, to follow him on 
the road to Paris. But the evacuation of the 
city had only been partly effected when the 
Volunteers, under Cathelineau and a few troops 
of the line, who had marched up by the right 
bank of the Loire, arriving in good time, cap- 
tured 2,000 prisoners, with the remainder of 
the war mate'riel. Meanwhile the army of 
Von der Tann retired upon Etampes (thirty 
miles from Paris) to re-form before joining the 
forces of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg at 
Chartres, leaving a small body of cavalry and 
a few companies of infantry as a corps of ob- 
servation at Toury. Chanzy, whose opinion 



is entitled to respect, hereupon observes that 
if the Government of Tours had been less in- 
tent on the possession of Orleans, which it 
desired to make the base of ulterior operations, 
and if the General-in-chief had believed his 
army to be so completely organized and so 
well equipped as to justify his further advance, 
it would have been possible, perhaps, profiting 
by the enthusiasm excited by the victory of 
the 9th, to crush the army of General Von der 
Tann before it could have received succour from 
that of the Grand Duke, and to have beaten 
the Germans in detail before the arrival of 
Prince Prederick Charles with the army from 
Metz. 9 

It cannot be conceded, however, that the 
escape of Von der Tann from the field of 
Coulmiers is wholly chargeable upon the 
Government of Tours. Had the intended 
flanking movement on the right not failed 
owing to Reyau's mistake, or had the main 
body of the army been directed on Saint- 
Pe'ravy instead of on Baccon, the result must 
have been different, nor is it very clear why 
D'Aurelle did not follow up his success when 
the retreat of Von der Tann was certified, 
unless we decide without further inquiry that 
he was after all wanting in one of the first 
qualifications of a great general, — a conclusion 
which would be amply justified by the sudden- 
ness with which his blaze of reputation ex- 
pired. One day like that of the great 
Napoleon, when he had won his first battle on 
the Italian side of the Alps, would have sufficed 
to deal the Bavarians a crushing blow, and the 
second should have fallen on the Mecklen- 
burghers who hastened from Chartres to the 
succour of their comrades. DAurelle de 
Paladines, so far from emulating this great 
example, was contented to obey orders in the 
most literal vnanner, by settling down in 
cantonments across the Orleans road, as if he 
feared the responsibility of completing his 
day's work. He had proved himself a good 
soldier, but his soldiership was of the kind 
which recalls the saying of Marmont: "Generals 
who win battles are more numerous than those 
who know how to turn the victory to account." 
Like Scherer after the battle of Loano ; like 
Clairfait after Mainz ; like Moreau and Bruno 



MARCH OF THE MECKLENBURGERS. 



175 



who also gained battles and did nothing more, 
D'Aurelle de Paladines failed in the inspira- 
tion, or the self-reliance which would haA^e 
secured for him all the advantages due to his 
first success. A general who deserves his good 
fortune will not hesitate to assume a certain 
amount of responsibility. It is he, and not 
the Government he serves, that sees his diffi- 
culties and his advantages face to face, and he 
knows that everything is forgiven to success. 
He may be excused and pitied, therefore, if he 
allow a great opportunity to escape him on the 
right hand, because he had been ordered to 
keep a look out on the left, but he will never 
rank with the great masters of war. 

The defeat of Von der Tann startled the Ger- 
mans like a clap of thunder in a cloudless sky. 
There had been a mystery about the gathering 
of the French beyond the Loire, of which this 
was the first revelation. No one could predict 
with confidence what might follow — that is to 
say, until a few days had passed by, and no 
second blow did follow. The Grand Duke of 
Mecklenburg's division was in the meantime 
marching through the snow on the 10th (for 
the weather had changed on the night after 
the battle) with no misgiving of what might 
possibly have awaited them, but in a mood 
very different from that which had been in- 
spired by the summer weather and the good 
fare and lodging they had enjoyed in the early 
days of the campaign. Herr Wachenhusen, of 
the Cologne Gazette, saw something of them 
on the 11th, and wrote as follows : — " Our 
soldiers, indeed, are still the same ; they have 
the same invincible spirit, but the sky is grey 
and concealed by a snowy covering, the wind 
shakes the last sere leaves over the white- 
mantled roads, and the moments of rest, after 
a toilsome march, necessarily become moments 
of melancholy reflection, thoughts of home and 
loved ones who are yearning for our return. In 
the evening there is stillness in the villages 
and cantonments ; the streets are deserted, 
snow covers the roofs, the fire casts light 
through the windows, and around it sit quiet, 
serious men, who hum a melancholy tune. 
They are the same who, as long as the sky 
was blue, marched with merry songs through 
France, and planted Germany's banner before 



the gates of Paris. They are the same, and 
yet not the same ; but humour on the march 
is like the flower which peeps out of the 
snow-covered village gardens ; and many a 
good fellow who, a little while ago, sang so 
joyfully the ' Wacht am Rhein,' now draws 
forth his pipe, or buries himself in his woollen 
shawl, through which no more songs pene- 
trate. . . . To-day it was worse than 
yesterday ; to-morrow it may be worse than 
to-day. But what matter? The Francs- 
tireurs and the Army of the Loire will be 
no better off. [This was true enough, for the 
soldiers who fought at Coulmiers slept on the 
battlefield in the snow, which began to fall 
that night.] We sleep in their beds, drink 
their wine as far as there is any left in this 
region, and in the end this peasant war must 
terminate." 

At Patay he saw the first trace of Von der 
Tann's march — some burnt buildings, which 
had punished the blind fanaticism of the 
middle classes, and goes on to say : 

" The good people excuse the excess of their 
patriotism on the ground that the Vandalism 
of our soldiers excited them to attacks on 
hostile individuals. So many, they say, have 
been ruined by the war, and the hot blood 
urges them to revenge. They look at things 
with different eyes from us ; they think, for 
example, the burning of Ablis was a brutality 
unparalleled in history, and that the Mobiles 
were quite justified in massacring the Prussian 
Hussars. That they should be treated as 
enemies in turn, they do not think in order." 

At Chevreuse, he states, the inhabitants had 
not fled, the shops being open, and peasants at 
work in the fields. At Dourdan the troops 
encountered scornful faces, the people having 
learnt, though the Germans had not, of the 
French victory near Orleans. The municipal 
authorities, with suppressed oaths, found quar- 
ters for the officers, secretly expecting that 
they would in the night be turned out of their 
beds by the Army of the Loire [as indeed they 
should have been according to our theory of 
able generalship]. On second thoughts they 
offered a dinner at an hotel to the Grand Duke 
and his officers. " A hangman's meal, of course, 
because they thought we should all be killed 



176 



GERMAN REPORT OF THE BATTLE. 



on the morrow. ' The town will once for all 
poison us, ' was jestingly remarked, ' for 
why is it so gracious ?' The company, how- 
ever, was as distinguished as the fare was 
ordinary. The high dignitaries — the Grand 
Duke, with his winning cheerfulness, the 
Dukes of Altenburg and Meiningen, the Prince 
of Schwarzburg, and the staff officers — were in 
the best of humours. Not a word was dropped 
as to yesterday's events, and only yesterday 
noon, when we reached Angerville, did we 
encounter the Bavarians with bleeding heads 
and the information of the details of Orleans. 
Two hundred wounded had been lying in the 
town since the evening, the streets were filled 
with sanitary and provision waggons, the houses 
crowded up to the roofs." 

Wachenhusen adds to the above informa- 
tion that on the 9th, the day of the battle, the 
French officers had secretly ordered a sump- 
tuous dinner at Orleans, and as the town was 
evacuated by the Germans, they probably sat 
down to it. They knew, he says, the weak- 
ness of the Bavarians opposed to them, and 
also that there were but few troops between 
Versailles and Orleans. When the left wing 
of Von der Tann's little army was no longer 
strong enough to withstand so immensely 
superior a force, the rumour that the Prussians 
were coming gave the exhausted soldiers new 
courage, till at last courage and strength gave 
way, and they retired on the Grand Duke of 
Mecklenburg's division, of whose advance they 
were certain. As for the French, he admits 
that they fought well, and even that their 
artillery fired excellently. " Let us be candid ; 
we have for the first time suffered a little 
reverse. The French have always had hitherto 
to pay the reckoning ; why should we not do 
so at least for once ?" 

The official report of the Bavarian staff con- 
cerning the battle of Coulmiers was to the 
following effect. It contains some particulars 
in addition to those we have given, and is 
further interesting as a summary of the battle 
from the German point of view, of the correct- 
ness of which the reader is in a position to 
form his own opinion : — 

" To Lieutenant-General von Hanenfeldt, Chief 
of the Staff. 



" I have the honour to report on the battle in 
which the 1st Bavarian Corps was engaged, near 
Coulmiers, as follows : — 

" General Von der Tann had received information 
in the beginning of this month that the enemy had 
occupied the district from Mer to Moree, and 
especially the forest of Marchenoir, in force with 
Mobiles and Francs-tireurs, and that a brigade had 
been pushed forward as advanced guard to Mer, on 
both sides of the Loire. The reconnaissances under- 
taken in consequence by the 2nd division of cavalry, 
as well as the intelligence brought by spies up to 
the 8th, proved that the Army of the Loire was 
about to advance via Coulmiers. General von der 
Tann, therefore, on the evening of the 8th, 
marched westwards, leaving an infantry regiment in 
Orleans, and concentrated his troops in a position 
between Coulmiers and Huisseau. The advanced 
guard pushed forward from this position on the 9th, 
fell in with the enemy at seven in the morning 
on the other side of Coulmiers, coming from the 
direction of Vendome and Moree, according to the 
statement of some prisoners. This was the van- 
guard of the Army of the Loire, under General 
Polhes, which was known through the newspapers, 
to have set in motion 60,000 strong in the direction 
of Le Mans, twelve miles north-west of Tours, and 
fourteen miles west of Chateaudun. 

" The enemy attacked the position of the Bavarian 
corps with six battalions of infantry of six companies 
each, all troops of the line, followed by powerful 
and numerous columns in the course of the morning. 
Seven French cavalry regiments protected the at- 
tacking wings, and 120 French guns were gradually 
brought into action against the Bavarian position. 

"Notwithstanding their great numerical superi- 
ority, the advance of the French troops was 
checked by the admirable attitude of the Bavarian 
battalions. Four onslaughts which the enemy 
made against the right wing were successively re- 
pulsed with great bravery, and inflicting considerable 
loss on the French infantry ; so that General Von der 
Tann succeeded in completely holding his position 
up to the evening. It was only at dusk, and when 
the attacking columns of the enemy had retired, 
that General Von der Tann decided to move nearer 
to the reinforcements which were being sent him 
from Chartres and Versailles. The retreat on St. 
Peravy was accomplished in admirable attitude, and 
with the proud conviction that notwithstanding 
great numerical inferiority, the attack of the enemy 
had been completely baulked, and that the retro- 
grade movement had been caused only by the free 
will of the general. [This is a plausible mis-state- 
ment ; for as D'Aurelle de Paladines had checked the 
further advance of Von der Tann, and compelled 
him to evacuate Orleans, his attack had certainly 
not been " completely baulked."] The -aoemy did 



D'AURELLE DE PALADINES RESIGNS THE COMMAND. 



177 



not follow up the 1st Bavarian Corps, but occupied 
Orleans the same night, where about 1000 sick, 
that could not be transported, had unfortunately to 
be left behind in the hospitals. 

" On the 10th the retrograde movement was con- 
tinued to Toury, where the 1st Bavarian Corps was 
reinforced by Prussian troops. His Boyal High- 
ness the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg- Schwerin has 
taken command of this newly-formed division of 
the army. 

" The loss of the 1st Bavarian Corps on the 9th 
amounts to 42 officers and 650 rank and file killed 
and wounded. On the 10th an ammunition train, 
with a warrant officer and eighty men, fell into the 
hands of the enemy. [But see the more detailed 
statement of this incident, given above, p. 174, 
on the authority of General Chanzy.] 

" A French report, which has been intercepted, 
computes the loss of the enemy as 2000 killed and 
wounded. It is conceded that the enemy was un- 
able to force our centre, and has even suffered 
defeat on his right wing. Complaints are likewise 
made about bad rations and deficient care of the 
wounded. The 1000 prisoners alluded to in this 
report must be those left behind in the hospitals of 
Orleans. 

(Signed) " Karnatz, Captain of the General 
Staff." 

As Von der Tann retired upon Artenay and 
Toury, and finally on Etampes, he drew off 
with him Wittich's division of the 11th Corps, 
which had occupied Chateaudun and Chartres, 
and the cavalry division of Prince Albert, so 
that he now mustered 40,000 men, and with 
the Duke of Mecklenburg's division, which had 
been sent from Paris, 70,000. At the same 
time it was known that Prince Frederick 
Charles had directed his march ostensibly on 
Orleans, and there was every reason to believe 
that overwhelming numbers would be hurled 
against the army of the Loire, if the enemy 
were allowed to continue his movements of con- 
centration unmolested. Nevertheless, D'Aurelle 
de Paladines for some days remained impassive, 
organizing his train, and providing for the 
comfort of his troops against the bad weather. 
On the 14th, indeed, he sent out a reconnais- 
sance as far as Viabon, which there surprised a 
regiment of Prussian Uhlans, with Prince Al- 
bert, who fled so precipitately as to leave the 
order of movement, which had been sent to 
him two days before by the Grand Duke of 
Mecklenburg, on the table. Possessed of this 



important document, General D'Aurelle knew 
the dispositions of the enemy, and almost 
every day witnessed some successful affair of 
outposts. He, however, was more anxious to 
perfect his defences, in anticipation of an at- 
tack in force on his lines, which was evidently 
in preparation, than to develop an offensive 
or strategic movement. The commander of 
the 16th Corps, General Chanzy, on the other 
hand, was anxious to prepare for other eventu- 
alities, and was watching with especial atten- 
tion the movements of concentration of the 
enemy's right wing, the command of which 
had been given to the Grand Duke of Meck- 
lenburg, who, on the 20th of November, was 
in strength at Chartres, and only awaited the 
arrival of Prince Frederick Charles to develop 
his plan of attack. Fretting under theinaction 
to which the Loire army was condemned 
by the policy of the commander (whether 
forced on him by the Tours Government or 
not is out of the question), and foreseeing a 
catastrophe, Chanzy memorialized his general, 
recapitulated the situation according to his 
view, and requested permission to advance. 
This letter brought no reply, and the events 
which followed are too important to discuss at 
the end of a chapter. We may, however, so 
far anticipate as to state briefly that Prince 
Frederick Charles arrived in line between Mon- 
targis and the Paris-Orleans road about Toury, 
between the 24th and 28th of the month, on 
which latter date his left wing was attacked 
at Beaume la Rolande by a part of the Loire 
army. It was too late. The French were 
beaten at a second battle at Artenay on the 
2nd of December. The Grand Duke of Meck- 
lenburg and Prince Frederick Charles then 
pushed on for Orleans, and a third battle was 
fought for the possession of the city, which 
once more fell into the hands of the enemy. 
The indignation at Tours was in the inverse 
ratio to the hero-worship of which General 
D'Aurelle de Paladines had a few days before 
been the subject, and, as usual, the popular 
voice demanded a sacrifice. Under these cir- 
cumstances the late favourite, threatened with 
a court-martial by Gambetta, pleaded illness, 
and resigned his command, in which he was 
succeeded by General Chanzy. 



178 



PROPHECY OF THE NUN OF BLOIS. 



These circumstances call for a move particu- 
lar recital, which must be reserved for another 
chapter ; but one incident of the brief period 
during which General D'Aurelle enjoyed the 
honours of hero worship may be properly 
noticed in this place. The success of the 
Loire army at Coulmiers caused the Constitu- 
tionnel to publish a document of a prophetical 
character, well known in certain parts of 
France as "the prophecy of Blois." It was 
made in 1808 by an Ursuline nun of that city, 
and she foretold that troubles would come 
upon both Blois and France in 1848 and in 
1870. The former part of her prediction, it 
was remarked, had come true ; and therefore 
there was a probability that the latter part of 
it also might be realized. While foretelling 
terrible troubles to France in the last mentioned 
year, the nun went on to predict le sauveur 
accords a la France, and added that he should 
be a man whom the country did not expect. 
According to her prophecy, the grands malheurs 
were to begin after the middle of July — it will 
be remembered that the war dates from just 
before that time — and before the vintage. 
The troubles foretold were to affect the capital 
especially, in which there was to be a fearful 
fight and a great massacre. " Both good and 
bad will fall in battle," the prediction ran, 
" for all the men will be called out, and only 
the old men left in the place. The time," adds 



the nun, " will be short ; for the women will 
prepare the vintages, though the men will re- 
turn to complete the work. Meantime no news 
will be obtained, excepting through private 
letters. Presently, three couriers will arrive 
at Blois, of whom the first will bring tidings 
that all is lost, the second will be in too great a 
hurry to stop at all, and the third who will come 
by fire and water" — probably by railway — 
" will be the bearer of good news. A Te Deum 
will then be sung, such as never has been heard 
sung before ; but this Te Deum will not be in 
honour of him who reigned at the first, but 
for the saviour granted (accorde) to France." 
The end of the prophecy is a statement that 
" the Prince will not be there ; they will go 
and seek him elsewhere ; and after the Prince 
has ascended the throne, France will enjoy 
peace and prosperity twenty years. 10 

There were those who thought the "saviour" 
of France had been granted in the person of 
D'Aurelle de Paladines ; others who preferred 
to identify him with Garibaldi. After the 
battle of Coulmiers this singular feeling found, 
expression in the surname given to the former 
of "Jean Dare," or " le Qarcon d'Orleans," in 
allusion to " Jeanne Dare," or the " Maid of 
Orleans." Some of the coincidences are re- 
markable, but even yet it cannot be said that 
the saviour of France has appeared, or that 
France is saved. 



Notes to Chapter LXVI. 



1 The people of Chartres were less unhappy. Invested on the 
morning of October 21st by the Prussian corps which had cap- 
tured Cliateaudun, and detachments from Ranibouillet, Etampes, 
Auberville, and Patay, it yielded to necessity. At eleven o'clock 
the Prefect and the Major were summoned to head -quarters, 
and after a considerable time spent in negotiations they surren- 
dered the town to save it from certain destruction by the can- 
nonade of the enemy. Skirmishing was going on during the whole 
time that the negotiations, were in progress, and the parlem.cn- 
taires had to pass several times through the lines under Are. 

2 A German Hussar, who was an eye-witness of the attack on 
Ablis, gave an account of it in a letter under date of Rambouillct, 
October 9th. He says : " While staying in barracks here, I take 
up my pencil to write you a few words. The events of yesterday 
are too horrible to be passed over by me without writing to you 
about them. As you already know, the 4th squadron of the 
Schleswig-Holstein Regiment of Hussars, No. 10, on the night 
of the 7th and the morning of the 8th of October, were attacked 
whUe in quarters at an advanced post by Gardes Mobiles, and 
were all massacred, with the exception of 48 men and 12 horses. 
The attack was made at half-past three o'clock, and the patrols 
placed in advance of the squadron, to the number of 60 men, were 



driven back. The town was attacked at the same time on tliree 
sides. The three stables which the Hussars had in the interior 
of the town were surrounded while the Hussars were saddling 
their horses. Men and horses were then shot together, the shots 
being discharged at random through apertures and stable doors. 
The Hussars protected themselves with their carbines as well as 
they could, this being the only thing they could do; but at last, 
seeing the uselessness of fighting in self-defence, they took to 
flight, climbing over walls to the neighbouring woods, and in 
this way the 48 men escaped. The officers, who had their horses 
in a stable apart from the others, escaped, the captain only being 
wounded. We were alarmed when tins news was brought to us 
and at onco the brigade, with artillery and a company of Bavarian 
Jiigers, returned to the town, which was two and a half miles 
long. There the order was given to plunder and destroy all 
stores and forage, as well as cows ; and then our Hussars set on 
fire every house, with the outhouses, wood-stacks, and hay and 
straw ricks; and the whole of the town, which had a population 
of about 0,000 inhabitants, was converted into a heap of ashes. 
Women, children, and old men were permitted to leave half an 
hour before the place was set on fire, while there was yet time to 
escape. The men were not spared, but were positively shet or 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXVI. 



179 



cut down, and till late in the night the flames rose high into the 
sky. It was a day such as lias been seldom recorded in the his- 
tory of the world, and, indeed, there will be a universal clamour 
against it. Yet it was a just punishment, for the Hussars who 
survived were compelled to place themselves against the walls, 
and were then shot and put into waggons, by which these bands 
could reckon their reward, which was 50 thalers on the body of 
each Prussian. Only two dead bodies of Hussars were found ; 
the others, with the horses and accoutrements, had been taken 
away in the waggons.'' 

3 The following telegram refers to these events : — 

" Royal Head-quarters, Versailles, Oct. 31. 
"The outposts of General Werder encountered the enemy's 
troops near Gray (Haute Saone) on the 27th of October (two days 
before the occupation of Dijon), and repulsed them everywhere, 
taking 15 officers and 500 men prisoners." 

4 The resignation ot Cambriels was in answer to the following 
letter addressed to him by M. Gambetta, dated Oct. 13th : — 

" General, — I have to appeal to your patriotism. The com- 
mand of the various volunteer corps (compagniesf ranches), and 
of a brigade of Mobiles, in the zone of the Vosges, has been given 
to General Garibaldi, who has generously offered his sword and his 
services to the French Republic. General Garibaldi has already 
left here to see you and Canrobert on the means of action. I 
count upon you to give him a cordial welcome, feeling assured 
that a man with a heart like yours will loyally join hands with the 
illustrious patriot in order to achieve a joint triumph over existing 
difficulties." 

It is M. Vandevelde who records that General Cambriels 
answered this appeal by tendering his resignation, but he men- 
tions, apparently in extenuation of the fact, that Cambriels was 
still suffering from a wound which he had received at Sedan. 
The wound was deeper in his amour propre, and we are once 
more reminded of that "miserable personality " so pathetically 
alluded to by M. Regnier {ante, p. 108, note 14). 

6 Chanzy : La DeuxiemeArm.ee de la Loire, p. 14. 

6 La Beauce is the ancient name of a part of France, formerly 
comprised in the same government as Orleans, and comprising 
the country about Patay, Chartres, Chateaudun, Vendome, 
Cloycs, etc. It is renowned as a wheat country. 

7 A correspondent of the Times at Tours says it was on ac- 
count of the time required, in Bourbaki's opinion, to organize the 
Army of the Loire, and also because he did not choose to serve 
under the then Minister of War at Tours, that he refused to take 
either the general command of the French military forces out of 
Paris, or that of the army at the Loire, but preferred to go north- 
wards, where he would be more independent, and hoped to get 
together some regular troops scattered through that part of 
France. The extract which follows in the text is from the same 
letter in the Times of Nov. 12th, 1870. 

8 On account of the important bearing of all that concerns the 
army of the Loire on the issue of the war, I subjoin a translation 
of all that is to the point in the instructions issued to the 10th 
corps on the eve of the battle (Nov. 8th, 10 p.m.). 

" To morrow, Nov. 9th, the 10th corps, in order to execute the 
operation prescribed by the order of movement of the commander- 
in-chiel, will take the following dispositions : — 

"The troops will breakfast (mange la soupe) at half-past 
seven, and be ready along the whole line to march out at eight 
precisely. 

" The result to attain is the expulsion of the enemy from 
Charsom ille, Epieds, Coulmiers, and Saint-Sigismond, and to 
make a turning movement on his left, in order to occupy in 
strength the route from Chateaudun to Orleans, advancing as 
far as possible in the direction of Barres, and holding all the 
positions necessary to render us masters of the woods in front of 
Ro-4eres. 

" General Reyau, with his two divisions of cavalry, should, 
during this operation, cover the left wing of the army by march- 
ing in the direction of Patay, and is to keep a sharp look out in 
the direction of Paris, without losing sight of the road from 
Chateaudun, in order to avoid all surprise from that quarter. 

" The Francs-Tire urs of Lieut.-Coloncl Lipouski, and of the 



commandant of Fourdras, have received orders to reconnoitre 
Tounioisis and Saint- Peravy ; they will co-operato with the 
cavalry, and will be during the whole movement under the orders 
of General Reyau." 

It is interesting to add that the corps armed with Remington 
guns were ordered to be kept out of action as long as possible. 
They were not yet served with bayonets. 

9 La Deuxieme armee de la Loire, p. 35. 

10 The London Spectator, referring to the stir made by the 
Prophecy of Blois, at the time, confessed that all doubt about its 
genuineness had been removed by reference to a book entitled 
" L'Avenir: Revelations sur VEglise et la Revolution," the 
third edition of which, published at Brussels, bears date in 1800. 
There can be no reason to doubt, therefore, it was first published 
at the date given by the Constitutionnel. Turning to its sub- 
ject matter, the Spectator observed that there were certain local 
events, mentioned in connection with the first part of her pro- 
phecy, which the editor states really took place in Blois in 1848, 
and which convinced the good people of Blois that she was a true 
prophet, and that much greater troubles, the " grands mal- 
heurs" par excellence, which she predicted for some future 
time (apparently not dated), would really take place. 

" The Nun of Blois goes on to assign as the time of year when 
the " great calamities " are to overtake France, an ecclesiastical 
occasion which her editor (writing ten years before the event) 
declares to mean after the first fortnight of July (apres la pre- 
miere quinzaine de Juillet). In point of fact, war was de 
clared on the 15th July. She then goes onto assert that "the 
death of a great personage will be concealed lor three days," a 
prediction which had not been verified. She then foretells that 
"the gieat calamities " will all happen before the end of the 
vintage, and that the pedlars or travelling salesmen who attend 
a certain fair at Blois (which the editor of 1800 fixes as the fair 
of August 23) will be so anxious about the state of things at 
their own houses, that they will make haste to pack up and be 
off from Blois. On August 23 it will be remembered that the 
great battles from Metz had all taken place some three or four 
days, the last battle of Gravelotte having occurred on August 18, 
and Bazaine being already effectually shut up in Metz ; indeed 
Macmahon had on the previous day begun his march from 
Chalons, and the whole attitude of France was one of the deepest 
anxiety. The nun goes on to say how terrible the calamities of 
France will be. ' Nevertheless,' she says, ' they will not extend 
to the whole of France, but only to some great cities, and, most 
of all to the capital, where there will be a terrible conflict, and 
the massacre will be great.' " 

After some details relative to the priests and religious persons 
who would be in constant terror, she goes on : " There will be 
great need of prayer, for the wicked would wish to destroy 
everything, but they will not have time. They will all perish in 
the great fight. Many good will perish also, for they will make 
all the men go out to the fight, and only the old men will remain.'' 
It will be remembered that when this prophecy appeared in the 
newspapers before the middle of November, the call for all the 
male population able to bear arms had already been made, aud 
since then the Communists of Paris have compelled many who 
were not in heart with them to fight for their cause. The nun adds 
that the last [those summoned last] will not go far ; they will 
not go more than three days' march from Blois — say, to the 
Army of the Loire, encamped somewhere between Bourges and 
Blois. " The time will be short. It will be the women who will 
prepare the vintage, and the men will return in time to finish 
it, because all will be over." It must be admitted, says the 
Spectator, " that the good nun seems to have been very wide 
of the mark here, unless, indeed, Paris falls, and the Army ot 
the Loire is again defeated, and peace is made within the next 
week or so, in which case all may be over almost as soon as she 
predicted. During all this time the Jxue news will not be 
known except by private letters. At last three couriers will 
come. The first will announce that all is lost. The second, who 
will arrive in the night, will only meet one man in the streets, 
who, as he leans against his door, will look at him and say, ' You, 
are hot, my friend ; dismount, and take a glass of wine ; ' 



180 



THE OLD CHATEAU AT BLOIS. 




NOTES TO CHAPTER LXVI. 



181 



to which the other will reply, ' I am in too great a hurry,' 
and will explain that another courier ought soon to arrive 
and bring good news. Then he will continue his route to- 
ward the Berry." The Berry is the district of France in which 
Bourges lies; in other words, this courier is supposed to 
be going toward the head-quarters of the Loire army. " You 
will be praying toward six in the morning, when you will hear 
it said that two couriers have passed, and then there will arrive 
the third, fire and water, who will be due at Tours atseven o'clock, 
and who will bring the good news. ' Note,' says the editor of 1860, 
that the courier, fire and water, i.e„ the railway, is thus an- 
nounced long before any one dreamt of it in France' (the pro- 
phecy, as we have said, is ascribed to the year 1808). The curious 
point here is the reference to Tours (where the French Govern- 
ment is now established, Nov., 1870) as the end of this railway- 
courier's, journey— who is to arrive at Blois at six in the morning 
and be due at Tours at seven— the distance being about thirty- 
five miles or an hour's express journey. ' Then a Te Deum will 
be sung— yes, indeed, a Te Deum, but such a Te Deum as has 
never been sung. But it won't be he who is expected who will 
reign, i. e., who wSJ reign at first; it will be the Saviour granted 
to France on whom France did not count. The Prince will not 
be there. They will go and fetch him . Nevertheless, quiet will 
reappear, and from the moment when the Prince remounts the 
throne France will enjoy a perfect peace, and will be more flou- 
rishing and more tranquil than ever for about twenty years.' 

"Another prophecy quoted in the same pamphlet (of date 
1860) prophesies, along with much thatseetns highly improbable, 
the loss of his empire by Napoleon, and the destruction of Paris. 
' The Pope,' it is said, ' shall be at that time driven out of Rome, 
and he shall be restored by Napoleon. The latier will be Em- 
peror, but his empire shall not be long ; for when he shall com- 
mence afflicting the Pope and the children of Judah, then God 
shall send arrows of fire against him and his. But before all 
there will be a war of the French and English against the Turks; 
nevertheless, the Russians will lose the first war, but there will be 
a second war, in which the Russians will take Constantinople and 
the Austrians Jerusalem. Then the Russians will encamp in 
Piedmont, and King Victor Emmanuel will have lost the kingdom 
and will be a Russian general. Some sovereigns {des souverains) 
invade France, which is desolated by civil war, but they will not 
get to Paris till it is already destroyed by fire. Before that there 
will be in Paris famine, pestilence, and civil war. Then Henry V. 
will be King of France, and he will leave the isle of captivity. 
After that England will turn Catholic, and also two sovereigns of 
Germany.' Here is an odd enough medley of fiction, or at least 
of violent improbability and of actual fact, the improbabilities 
seeming to be spoken of as of about the same date as the facts. 1 ' 
The notoriety gained by the prophecy, when it was seen that 
the circumstances of the War of 1870 agreed in some important 
particulars with its predictions, raised a question of its authen- 
ticity in France, no less than in England, and the Abbevillois 
published a letter received from a monk of the Dominican 
Convent at Abbeville, who said he had communicated on the 
subject wit!) the superior of the Ursuline sisters of Blois, and 
had received the reply from which the following extracts are 
taken : — " I do not know by what train of circumstances 
our sisters became convinced that they possessed an authentic 
copy of a prophecy which was never written. The accounts 
given by the newspapers, although they reproduce the chief 
incidents (and that without any information from us), add to and 
misrepresent a number of the details. The fact is that in 1804 
an attendant of the convent who had lived in the obscurity 
and simplicity of a life of abnegation and devotedness to our 
house, which was at the time in extreme poverty, was visited on 
her death-bed by a young postulant, now the Mere Providence. 
The dying woman seemed rapt in the contemplation of realities 
that surrounded her. The future appeared to be unfolded before 
her eyes in a series of animated pictures which she made known 
by exclamations. Most of the events which she communicated 
were connected with the house, and have been strikingly 
fulfilled. Other of her statements announced political revolutions, 
which were verified in 1848. Some, however, seem now to be 
coming to pass ; but no date was stated. The newspapers fixed 
VOL. II. 



these afterwards. Mere Providence, on hearing: all these pre- 
dictions, said to the dying woman that it would be better for her 
to confide matters so serious to a nun than to a postulant about 
to quit her noviciate in consequence of the violent opposition of 
her family. The sister replied, 'When you are of age to take 
your vows, your mother will no longer oppose your duing 
so ; and it is to you alone that I desire to confide these tilings, 
because it is you alone who will see their fulfilment.' In fact, 
six months after the death of the attendant, Mere Providence lost 
her mother, and was at liberty to devote herself to a religious life, 
and she alone survives of all her contemporaries. . . . Notwith- 
standing that she is ninety-two years of age, she enjoys quite 
exceptional gaiety and health." The letter concludes by repeating 
that "no precise date was fixed by Sister Marianne; yet Mere 
Providence never confounded the events of 1848 with those 
of the present time ; and, of late years, when the political horizon 
became overclouded, she gave the following answer to questions 
put to her : — ' No ; it is not the time for 'great events.' Now 
she thinks that the time has come." 

CATHELINEAU'S VOLUNTEERS. 

Page 174. The Volunteers under Cathelineau were mustered 
at Le Mans. Miss Pearson, in her admirable record of " Ad- 
ventures during the War of 1870," mentions having seen them in 
that city, on her way to Orleans, at the beginning of November. 
The day after her arrival at Le Mans was Sunday. The Cathe- 
dral was full of kneeling worshippers, " the Pontifical Zouave 
and the Garibaldian Volunteer, the Breton peasant and the Iong- 
descendeil Franc-tireur captain of La Vendee, prayed side by side 
for their well-beloved and suffering France." On the Boulevard 
outside were the bronzed and bearded soldiers of Alders, sons of 
French colonists, with afaith in the star of France that was quite 
touching : " We have crossed the sea, Madame," said one of their 
sergeants, " We have marched on foot from Marseilles, and we 
arc going to Serial ! " The rest is interesting for its historical 
interest: "Strange and most appropriate," Miss Pearson con- 
tinues, " was the parade ground of the Franc-tireurs of Cathe- 
lineau. It was on the old Place Viauuie. There where Cathe- 
lineau fell in the moment of victory, fighting for the Bourbons ; 
there, where his Vendeans, despairing and dismayed at their leader's 
fall, retreated from the position they had won, the grandson of 
the dead hero, the Genei-al Cathelineau of to-day, mustered 
around him the descendants of the men who had fought and fell 
on that very spot, on that fatal day ; to march again against a 
foe. The Fleur-de-lis, and the white cockade, were replaced by 
the Tricolour; but the euemy now was a foreign invader, and 
royalist and republican could fight side by side in this common 
cause. Their dress was perfect for irregular troops. The men 
wore black cloth tunics and trousers bound with blue, bluescarfs 
around the waist, and black slouching hats, with a raven's plume 
fastened by a small tricolour cockade. I he officers wore their 
scarfs over their shoulders, and had high boots and black gauntlet 
gloves. The rank was marked by a small gold star, embroidered 
on the sleeve, one, two, or three, as depended on the rank. Both 
officers and men were of a very superior class. Tiiey were ac- 
companied by a small, well-organized regimental ambulance, 
under the management of Madame Cathelineau. She had a hus- 
band and two sons in the corps, and many, very many, friends 
and neighbours and, with two other Vendean ladies, she followed 
the regiment in a carriage, accompanied by a couple of light 
store-waggons, to be at hand to nurse the wounded of the corps, 
in case of need. It was quite a model little ambulance, just 
what an ambulance should be — the nucleus of work able to be 
expanded to any extent that occasion may require. One thing 
struck us as peculiar and beautiful — the deeply religious tone 
of the whole corps . English people, not considering the innate 
faith of the Breton nature in ' things unseen,' might have 
considered it superstitious to wear, as they all did, a crimson 
heart, embroidered on black cloth, and attached to the tunic, 
with the words written below it, ' Arrete ! le cceur de Jesus est 
ici ! ' Perhaps it was so ; but the idea that the presence of 
the Saviour in the heart of the soldier would turn aside the balls 
and be his shield in the hour of danger is, after all, a very beauti- 
ful one, and that was but the outward expression of that ideal." 
Page 177. The strength of Wittich's division was 15,000 men. 

13 



182 



POLICY OF RUSSIA. 



CHAPTER LXVII. 

THE RUSSIAN NOTE. 

Tho long-lookcd-for opportunity—Russia never sulks— Antece- 
dents of the Eastern Question— Will of Peter the Great- 
Persistent Policy of Russia— Treaty of Kainardji— The Czar 
acknowledged Protector of the Christian subjects of the Porte 
—Intrigues in the Crimea— The Crimea annexed— Treaty 
of Jassy— Extension of the Empire to the Dniester— The 
Revolution of 1789 and the Question of the East— Napoleon's 
dream of Empire— His ambition in Egypt and Syria baulked 
by the British Government— England and France enemies of 
the Sultan— Treaty of Bucharest— Battle of Navarino— War 
With Russia and Treaty of Adrianople — Position of Austria 
—The Hungarian War— Retrospect to the Treaty of Uukiar- 
Skelessi after the War with Mehemet Ali— Preparations for 
the Conquest of Constantinople — Mission of Prince Ment- 

schikoff The Crimean War— Treaty of Paris (1856)— 

Specific articles which guarantee the independence of the 
Sultan— The attitude of Russia on the eve of the War of 1870 
— The Neutralization of the Black Sea denounced by the 
Russian Press — Alleged infringements of the Treaty pre- 
viously — Relations between Russia and Austria — First 
rumours of the Russian Note— Text of the Note — Reply of 
Earl Granville— Indignation felt in England — Count Bis- 
marck ready with a proposal for a Conference — What people 
thought of the whole business— What Mr. John Stuart Mill 
thought— What Earl Russell thought— Complications which 
retarded the meeting of a Conference — The United States 
said to be invited by Russia — Expectation that M. Jules 
Favre would represent France — Meeting of the Conference 
in January, 1871 — Speech of Her Majesty on the opening of 
Parliament — Observations of Mr. Gladstone in the Debate — 
Conclusion of the Conference, and its results. 

The ink which signed the capitulation of 
Metz was scarcely dry — the telegram which 
announced the fact that the sword of France 
was broken had scarcely been deciphered at 
St. Petersburg — when Prince Gortschakoff, 
the astute minister of the Czar, complacently 
seated in his arm-chair, in the beautiful seat ot 
the emperors, Tzarskoe-Selo, on the Moscow 
road, also affixed his signature to a memorable 
document. It is sufficient to read the despatch 
since known as "the Russian Note," to be con- 
vinced that its contents had been well consi- 
dered beforehand, and that it lay ready in the 
Minister's portfolio awaiting the hour when it 
could be sent, as on the point of an arrow, to 
its destined aim. So long as Bazaine held out 
at Metz, there was a remote chance, at least, 
that France would rise from the contest, which 
had brought her to her knees breathless, but 
en garde. The event of October 28th had 
humbled her in the dust, and not only struck 
the weapon out of her hand, but maimed for a 
long time to come her sword-arm; and the 
alliance of the western powers which had been 
no less faithfully kept between Louis Napoleon 
and Victoria than it was in other times, be- 



tween Henry the Fourth and Elizabeth, was 
no longer to be dreaded. It is well enough 
known that Russia never sulks. 1 She always 
yields, when yielding is inevitable, with good 
grace, and waits sweetly smiling for the next 
favourable opportunity to resume the thread of 
her intent. That opportunity, for the first 
time since the period of the Crimean war, had 
suddenly presented itself. The arrow was 
barbed and feathered — ready for flight. The 
Northern Ulysses had only to snatch up the 
bow, which only he could bend, at the aus- 
picious moment, and his revenge was certain. 

For a connected view of the circumstances of 
which this Note was the latest outcome, it is 
necessary to refer back to the document known 
as "the Will of Peter the Great," 2 who died in 
1725. After premising that the Russian nation 
has been chosen by Providence to govern the 
whole of Europe, the Will proceeds to define the 
policy to be followed by the Czar's successors. 
Perpetual intervention in the affairs of Europe, 
especially those of Germany, is enjoined; family 
alliances with German princesses are to be 
promoted. Poland is to be divided. Den- 
mark and Sweden weakened. The alliance with 
England cultivated. [The United States of 
America did not then exist.] The shores of the 
Baltic and the Black Sea were to be occupied. 
The scattered Greeks drawn into sympathetic 
relationship with Russia. Persia conquered in 
order to extend the empire in that direction to 
the East Indies, and Turkey for the sake of 
Constantinople. The remaining powers, France 
and Austria, were to be courted, Avith the view 
of using the one which firstaccepted theaUiance 
of Russia as a means of destroying the other. 
By this means, it was predicted, all Europe 
would eventually fall under subjection to 
Russia. It is generally admitted that the 
policy thus outlined by Peter the Great has 
been steadily adhered to; whether or not with 
the same object in view, is another matter. Po- 
land has been divided, and Sweden weakened. 
The shores of the Black Sea have been oc- 
cupied, and the empire continually extended 
eastward. India, Persia, and Turkey have 
been menaced; and the preservation of the 
latter power, on account of the vast strategical 
and political importance of Constantinople, 



TREATY OF KAINARDJI. 



183 



has been made one of the chief objects of 
modern diplomacy. 

The first treaty of importance concluded 
between Russia and the Sublime Porte, is that 
of Kutzchouc-Kainardji, dating in 1774. The 
war was one of mere aggression on the part of 
Russia. Catherine had already worked her 
will in Poland with the connivance of Prussia, 
and in a less degree of Austria. According to 
Rabbe, 3 her next thought was the "grand 
idea" of "expelling the Turks from Europe, and 
restoring to the country of Themistocles and 
Philopoenion its ancient liberty." She landed 
troops in the Morea, but only succeeded in 
covering the country with bones. At sea she 
was successful, having English officers to com- 
mand her vessels. The honour of the achieve- 
ment was given by Catherine to Alexis OrlofF, 
but in reality Elphinstone and Dugdale de- 
stroyed the Turkish fleet in the Bay of 
Tchesme, near the island of Chio (1770) ; and 
a little later (1773) the victories of Roumiant- 
zoff compelled the Sultan to submit to the Peace 
of Kainardji, which "opened to Russia the Black 
Sea and all the other ports of the Turkish Em- 
pire, preserved to her Azof and Taganrog, and 
assured the independence of the Crimea ; or 
rather reserved it for the ambition of Ca- 
therine." 4 Of the twenty-eight articles of this 
treaty, those which eventually proved to be 
of most importance were the 7th, 8th, and 
14th by which the Porte undertook to "protect 
constantly the Greek Religion," and to allow 
Russia to build a church in Constantinople, in 
addition to the chapel at the embassy. These 
two articles formed the basis of the claims 
made by Russia, in 1853, to exercise a pro- 
tectorate over the Greek Church throughout 
the whole of Turkey; but there were others — 
the 3rd, 16th, and 23rd — of more immediate po- 
litical importance. By the 3rd article, the Tar- 
tars of the Crimea and Kouban were declared 
independent, and it was agreed that neither 
Russia nor the Porte should, under any pretext 
whatever, interfere in their affairs. The 16th 
article restored Bessarabia, the fortress of Ben- 
der, Wallachia and Moldavia to the Porte ; and 
the 23rd restored Georgia and Mingrelia. The 
country between the Dnieper and the Bug was 
given to Russia. The fiction of a pretended 



interest in the Christians of the Greek Church 
was then plausibly kept in the foreground by 
Catherine, who soon afterwards, having been 
thoroughly successful in conspiring against 
Poland, occupied Crim Tartary and the whole 
country eastward to the Caspian, utterly re- 
gardless of her obligations. There is no doubt 
that if England and France had acted in con- 
cert, to prevent what has been justly stigma- 
tized as "the greatest crime in modern history," 
a barrier would have been preserved against 
Russian aggression, which would have pre- 
vented the expenditure of much blood and 
treasure in later years. Even yet the sin 
of the spoliation of Poland has not been 
atoned, and we may live to see an alliance as 
fatal to Turkey as that of Frederick and 
Catherine to the former country. Now, as 
then, Austria is like the corn between two 
millstones, and seems to have no choice but to 
participate in the political crimes of other 
powers, or to share with the sufferers the 
consequences of them. 5 

Occasion was soon found to set at nought the 
provisions of the treaty of Kainardji. Turkey 
was restless and indignant to see the Russians 
flaunting their colours under the very walls of 
Constantinople, and regarded with haughty 
displeasure then intrigues for ruling in the 
Crimea under the semblance of Tartar inde- 
pendence. Events were brought to a crisis 
when, in 1778, the Khan Sachem Gueray, who 
had been forcibly installed in the government 
of the Crimea by Russia, was again dispos- 
sessed by the protege of the Porte. Catherine 
then marched her troops into the Crimea, 
under Suwarrow, and the Turks prepared for 
war. A peace was patched up in 1779, both 
powers agreeing to withdraw their troops from 
the Peninsula, and the Porte agreeing; never to 
interfere, on religious pretexts, with the civil 
or military power of the Khan. In 1782, the 
same causes produced the same results. The 
Crimea was reoccupied by Russian troops, and 
on the 8th of January 1784, a new treaty was 
signed at Constantinople by which the Porte 
ceded to Russia the Crimea, the island of 
Taman, and all that part of the Kouban which 
lay on the right bank of the river of that name, 
and constituted a sort of frontier between the 

13 a 



184 



TREATY OF JASSY. 



two empires. Such humiliating conditions 
could not however long endure : Austria was 
tempted to join Russia in an attempt to dis- 
member Turkey. The Russians, still con- 
ducted to victory (1787-89) by Suwarrow, 
captured Bucharest, Bender, Akerman, and 
Ismail ; while the Austrians under Loudon 
became masters of Belgrade. 6 The war was 
concluded by the Treaty of Jassy (Jan. 9th, 
1792) which established the Dneister as a per- 
petual frontier between the two empires, and 
confirmed the territorial cessions, which in- 
cluded the Crimea, of the former treaty. It 
was after this settlement, and the extension of 
the commerce of Russia on the Black Sea by 
which it was followed, that Catherine founded 
the town and port of Odessa, between the Bug 
and the Dneister. Belgrade was restored to 
the Sultan, and Russia acquired the fortress of 
Oczakoff. 

The French Revolution then broke out, and 
Russia was otherwise occupied than in troub- 
ling the Turks. But Turkey and her magni- 
ficent seat of empire at Constantinople, troubled 
the dreams of others. A young artillery officer, 
named Napoleon Buonaparte, had gained such 
prestige by his success at Toulon and his ser- 
vices at the War Office, that he naturally 
looked for the preferment which was denied 
to his ambition, and fretted under his forced 
inaction while the affairs of the Republic 
were going to ruin. In the summer of 1795, 
he had reason to believe that his hopes would 
soon be realized. The Moderate Republicans 
were in power, the Jacobins were exasperated, 
the whole south of France, where fresh atro- 
cities had been committed, was in a state 
of feverish anxiety, and the repulse of 
Kellermann had created a military danger, 
which only the local knowledge and military 
skill of Napoleon seemed calculated to avert. 
The Committee of Public Safety had his plans 
before them for prosecuting the war in Italy 
to a successful issue. These circumstances 
combined to favour the idea of a speedy 
change in the fortunes of a man who felt that 
he had the world at his foot if he could once 
secure fair play for his talents and his energy. 
The hope, however reasonable, was suddenly 
crushed when the Committee, with Napoleon's 



plans on the table before them, tendered him a 
command in La Vendee, and appointed Scherer 
to the command of the Army of Italy, vice Kel- 
lerman, who was transferred to the Army of 
the Alps. Anything more unjust it would be 
hard to conceive. This Scherer, too, the son 
of a butcher, was a man of no character, for 
the time came when he incurred dismissal for 
his rapacity and extortion. What end did the 
Committee purpose to gain. Had they uni- 
formly declined to employ Buonaparte after 
his arrest, the inference would be plain that 
he was still suffering under the ban of suspicion 
laid upon him by Salicetti at the time of his 
arrest. This supposition, however, is not tena- 
ble, for he had since been employed in the most 
delicate and confidential of all offices, — that 
which involved the setting of armies in motion, 
and consequently the question of peace or war, 
— of victory or defeat for the Republic. More- 
over, at the very time when they disappointed 
his hopes of a command in Italy, the Committee 
of Public Safety had tendered him a command 
in La Vende'e, and he had long previously, it 
must be remembered, held the appointment of 
Brigadier-General in the Army of the West, 
from which he was only absent on leave. 
Why, then, since it is plain the Committee 
knew not how to dispense with Napoleon's 
services, this coquetting with his hopes ? Why 
this apparent determination to put the right 
man in the wrong place ? Why, on the part 
of Napoleon, an equal determination not to be 
shelved, and to risk all, as the event proves he 
did, on the cast of a die ? 

The truth is that Napoleon, so far from 
being a neglected and unknown man at this 
time — a single unit in the crowd of expectants 
waiting in the antechambers of the great, — 
an unemployed and recently disgraced officer, 
melancholy for lack of preferment, — was in the 
position of one whose vast abilities are recog- 
nized and feared, and who himself knew that 
this was so. In a letter addressed to Joseph 
Buonaparte, this remarkable passage occurs: 
" I have just read the following passage in a 
printed report which Cambon has made upon 
the affairs of the South : ' We shall be in 
imminent danger whensoever the virtuous and 
brave general of artillery, Buonaparte, puts 



THE FIRST NAPOLEON AND THE EAST. 



185 



himself at the head of fifty grenadiers, and 
opens the passage to us,' " — a remark amply 
sufficient to prove what a character for energy 
and ability he had already gained. Yet we 
are told that this man was indebted for the 
command with which he was finally entrusted 
to the friendship of Barras, purchased by an 
act of vice, and that he commenced his career 
b} T the slaughter of his fellow-citizens in Paris 
in the servile performance of his duty as a 
professional soldier ! 

No. It was fear that dictated the offer 
made to Napoleon, and he knew it. Knowing 
it, he declined acceptance ; and now, feeling 
that his time was come, he determined upon a 
course which would either force the hand of 
the Government, or give him a fair field and 
no favour in another part of the world. 

Bourrienne says, in allusion to this time 
(without having at all understood the real 
position of Buonaparte) that " Injustice had 
soured his spirit. He was tormented with the 
desire of action. To remain in the crowd was 
insupportable to him. He resolved to quit 
France, and the favourite idea, which he ever 
afterwards retained, that there was an Empire 
to be won in the East, inspired him with the 
notion of going to Constantinople, and of de- 
voting himself to the service of the Grand 
Seigneur. What dreams he indulged in ! What 
gigantic projects he brought forth in the exal- 
tation of his imagination ! He asked me if I 
would follow him. I replied in the negative. 
I regarded him as a young madman (fou) who 
was pushed on to extravagant enterprises, to 
desperate resolutions, by the irritation of his 
spirit, the injustice he had endured, his irre- 
sistible craving for action, and, in a word, by 
his want of money. He did not blame me. 
He said he would take with him Junot, and 
several young officers whom he had known at 
Toulon, and who had attached themselves to 
his fortune. He also named Marmont." 

This design to go to Turkey was not the 
mere dream of a delirious imagination. The 
idea of Turkey as a field of action had crossed 
Napoleon's mind long before, when he was 
smarting under the accusation of Salicetti, and 
declared to his friends he was henceforth any- 
thing — Chinese, Turk, or Hottentot. China 



as a field of action was doubtless suggested by 
the then recent embassy of Lord Macartney, 
which dates 1793-4, and had, there can be no 
doubt, opened the eyes of many, besides Napo- 
leon, to the conviction that a new world in the 
East invited the energies which had already 
established the British power in India. It was 
still more natural that visions of an indepen- 
dent field of action in Turkey, by which France 
might be served and his own ambition satisfied, 
should attract the gaze of the ardent young 
soldier. The year 1770 had seen the English 
and Russian fleets combined against the Grand 
Seigneur; in 1784 the Crimea had been an- 
nexed by Catherine ; and in 1787-91, the 
combined powers of Austria and Russia had 
waged a disastrous war against the Turks, 
in which the latter had lost 200,000 men, and 
the Semiramis of the North had achieved a 
bloody triumph by the fall of Ismail when 
35,000 Turks fell in the assault, after stretch- 
ing 15,000 Russians dead at the foot of the 
ramparts, and Suwarrow might have swum in 
blood. 7 If, in our day, England and France 
have combined to hold Russia in check at the 
gates of the Black Sea, it is surely nothing but 
honourable that a young soldier, whom the tur- 
bulent factions of the Republic prevented from 
serving his country on her own frontier, should 
have seen so clearly how the enemies of France 
might be met and vanquished on this distant 
field. The wonder is that biographers should 
have been so utterly misled by the maudlin 
speculations of Bourrienne, who saw in Napo- 
leon only "un jeune fou" at this period, and 
who, with all his honesty, had no conception 
of the greatness of the master spirit he served. 
So it was, disgusted with the offer of a 
witherino- command in La Vendee after he had 
redeemed France from shame at Toulon and 
pointed the way to glory from the summits of 
the Alps, that Napoleon at once " declined," 
or sent in his " resignation," as he expressed 
it ; and it was then, while the butcher's son 
was preparing to head the troops who already 
honoured the name of Buonaparte, and whose 
path over mountain and plain he had marked 
out with the inspiration of genius — that the 
thought which had crossed his mind so long 
before, and we know not how often in the in- 



186 



DISMEMBERMENT OF TURKEY" 



terval, and had always been overshadowed by 
a brighter hope, sprang up fresh and vigorous. 
•' These men," we conceive him muttering, 
"will never advance me unless compelled by 
some overwhelming necessity; so long as I 
linger here they will borrow my happiest in- 
spirations, and send their creatures to execute 
my plans ; or, La Vendee is near at hand, and 
there my longing for action may be sated by the 
slaughter of rebellious peasants, and the ma- 
noeuvring of a brigade. Never. If I cannot 
meet these Russians, these Austrians, on the 
slopes of the Alps and the plains of Lombardy, 
I will at least,by your leave, my friends, thun- 
der at his doors on the other side of the house, 
and go my own way to glory. Nous verrons!" 
We have called the resolution which Napo- 
leon was now revolving in his mind a cast of 
the die — a stake — and so it was. He had been 
under arrest — provisionally liberated — erased 
from the list of generals — restored in a suspi- 
cious manner to his rank — and offered a com- 
mand which he had flatly refused to accept. 
Under these circumstances a proposal to leave 
the country was not unlikely to be accepted, 
and that acceptance opened to him a career of 
which it was impossible to foresee the issue, 
and which we now know would have changed 
the history of Europe. On the other hand, if 
this proposal were declined, a more frank ac- 
ceptance of his services on the part of the 
government would be sure to follow. They 
would decline it because they could not spare 
hie services, and with the conviction that he 
was determined no longer to serve them in the 
ambiguous manner he had been compelled to 
do since his re-instatement in the rank of ge- 
neral. This proposal, it would be understood, 
was Napoleon's declaration of independence, or 
at least, his protest against the policy hitherto 
pursued towards him. It would be dealt with 
accordingly. Would he risk the consequences ? 
He did risk them, and the result was that the 
Committee succumbed. 

On the fifth day after the date of the memo- 
rial, Napoleon wrote to Joseph: "The Com- 
mittee has decided that it is impossible for 
me to leave France so long as the war lasts. 
I am to be re-established in tlie artillery, and 
will probably continue with the Committee," 



that is to -say, in the war office, as the adviser 
of the Committee in the Italian campaign. 
Thus Napoleon's coup de main had proved 
entirely successful, and he was now so well 
satisfied with his position that he added in 
the same letter : " If I remain here, it is not 
impossible that I may be foolish enough to get 
married:" as we know, in fact, he did, and 
what great results speedily followed. So far 
as the present history is concerned we may 
dismiss this curious episode by remarking that 
it shows how the Turkish problem at that 
time presented itself to the mind of the greatest 
soldier of the modern world, and that Napoleon 
the Third was only following the traditions of 
his house when he turned his eyes eastward 
soon after his first accession to power, and 
declared himself the "Protector of the Holy 
Places." 

As the storm of the French Revolution 
swept on, and Napoleon bore aloft the banner 
of France, his dream of the East began to 
realise itself in another fashion than that he 
had first designed. The greater part of Egypt 
fell to his arms, and the French flag was planted 
before the walls of Acre. The work of dis- 
memberment was thus assisted by France; 
and, on the other hand, the Russian and 
Turkish fleets acted in combination. But 
England caused Napoleon to "miss his des- 
tiny," as he expressed it. The Syrian Expedi- 
tion, baffled by Sir Sydney Smith, was com- 
pelled to abandon the enterprise, and return 
to Egypt. Napoleon himself hastily returned 
to the new theatre of operations in Paris, and 
Sir Ralph Abercromby liberated Egypt by the 
victory which he paid for with his life at 
Alexandria. 

The next important period in the story of 
the Eastern Question dates from 1807 to 1839. 
During this time the Porte suffered immense 
losses, and this time England herself was 
compelled, in the name of humanity, to become 
one of the aggressors. The independence of 
Greece was established. Egypt threw off the 
yoke of the Sultan ; and in the early part of 
the period, 1812, Russia acquired the country 
between the Dneister and the Pruth by the 
Treaty of Bucharest. It may astonish many 
of the present generation, whose sympathies 



THE CRIMEAN WAR. 



187 



with Turkey date from 1853, to learn that the 
statesmen of the last generation, with the ex- 
ception, perhaps, of William Pitt, detested the 
Turkish Government; that even so great a 
statesman as Burke, notwithstanding his sa- 
gacious jealousy of Russia, and his abhorrence 
of the partition of Poland, hated the Turks as 
much as he hated Warren Hastings and the 
Jacobins ; calling them a race of savages, and 
declaring that any minister who allowed them 
to be of any weight in the European system 
deserved the curses of posterity. 8 This, how- 
ever, was the case. Without discussing in 
detail the views expressed by Sir James Mac- 
kintosh, by Lord Brougham, even by Lord 
Palmerston, against any political action in 
favour of Turkey during this interval, we may 
recall two memorable occurrences by which it 
is distinctly marked. In 1807, when the Sultan 
had joined the French alliance, the Darda- 
nelles were passed and repassed by Sir John 
Duckworth, not without immense damage to 
his fleet, caused by the huge masses of stone 
that were hurled down upon the decks ; and 
in 1827, when England was allied with France 
and Russia against the Sultan, the battle of 
Navarino destroyed for a long time to come 
the naval power of Turkey. This event was 
followed, in April, 1828, by a war with Russia 
alone, which was concluded in 1829 by the 
famous Treaty of Adrianople. Nothing more 
was required to evince the egregious folly of 
the policy pursued by the western allies, who 
had suffered themselves to be made the cat's- 
paw of Russian ambition. 9 By the 4th article 
of this treaty Russia obtained part of Turkey 
in Asia ; while by the 5th article, and by a 
separate Act, a sort of quasi-independence was 
bestowed on the principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, it being agreed that the Hospodars 
should hold their dignity for life. Besides 
these hard stipulations, the Porte was com- 
pelled to pay an indemnity of £5,000,000 
sterling, and formally renounce its sovereignty 
over Greece. 10 

There is no doubt that England was sincere 
in desiring the emancipation of Greece, for 
reasons of humanity no less than for the po- 
litical progress of Europe ; but there is just as 
little doubt that every measure which England I 



took to promote this end, was made use of as 
a fresh stepping-stone to accomplish their own 
sinister ends by the astute statesmen of St. 
Petersburg. ' Prince Metternich saw through 
the Russian game, and, could he have prevailed 
on the other powers, the Turkish Empire would, 
even before the Treaty of Adrianople, have 
been placed under a general European guaran- 
tee. 11 But Austria herself was driven into a 
false position at a later period, through avail- 
ing herself of the intervention of the Emperor 
Nicholas in the war with Hungary, in 1849. 
After crushing the patriot army, the Russians, 
it is true, retired within the limits of their 
own territory ; but Austria had not only placed 
herself under an obligation, but received an 
admonition which it was not likely she would 
disregard. Austria was gagged, as Turkey 
herself had been gagged, and bound hand and 
foot, by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, extorted 
from the Sultan in 1833 when Mehemet Ali 
was threatening the safety of the capital. By 
this insidious treaty, the Bosphorus was 
opened to the Russians, and the passage of the 
Dardanelles closed against other powers. By 
these and like measures the way was stealthily 
prepared for the sudden conquest of an empire 
when the auspicious moment should arrive, 
and the creation of an arsenal and fleet at 
Sebastopol provided the Czar with the neces- 
sary material means. The critical moment 
came in 1853, when the arrogant demands of 
Prince Menschikoff were followed up by the 
advance of the Russian army beyond the 
Pruth, and the destruction of the Turkish fleet 
off Sinope, under circumstances even more 
atrocious than those of Navarino. On the 28th 
of March, 1854, England, with France and 
Italy for her allies, declared war. The Em- 
peror Nicholas was astounded by an alliance 
which he had not foreseen, and the blaze of 
indignation in England left the sophisms of 
the peace party, upon which the Czar had 
counted, mere dust and ashes. After a severe 
struggle in the Crimea, to which France con- 
tributed the larger number of troops, and 
which added the names of the Alma, Inker- 
mann, and Sebastopol to the glorious roll of 
British victories, the war was concluded by the 
treaty signed at Paris in March and April, 



188 



THE TREATY OF PARIS. 



1856. As these treaties were challenged 
by "The Russian Note," of October 31st, 1870, 
it will be convenient to summarize the move 
important articles : — 

By the 7th article, the contracting powers 
" declare the Sublime Porte admitted to par- 
take in the advantages of the public law and 
system {concert) of Europe," and engage to 
" respect the independence and the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire." They 
" guarantee in common the strict observance 
of that agreement, and will in consequence 
consider any act tending to its violation as a 
question of general interest." The 8th and 
most significant article, stipulates that " should 
there arise between the Sublime Porte and 
one or more of the other signing Powers, any 
misunderstanding which might endanger the 
maintenance of then- relations, the Sublime 
Porte and each of such Powers, before having 
recourse to the use of force, shall afford the 
other contracting parties the opportunity of 
preventing such an extremity by means of 
their mediation." The 10th article closed the 
Dardanelles. The 11th and 12th, declared 
the Black Sea neutralized : "Its waters and 
its ports, thrown open to the mercantile 
marine of every nation, are formally and in 
perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war of 
either of the Powers possessing its coasts or 
of any other Powers, with protection for 
Consuls, etc." In the same spirit the 13th 
article stipulates that neither Russia nor the 
Porte shall establish upon the coast of the 
Black Sea any military maritime arsenal. A 
14th article recognised as an integral part of 
the treaty a convention between the Porte and 
Russia that neither should keep in the Black 
Sea more than six steam-vessels of 800 tons, 
and six light steam or sailing vessels of 200 
tons. This convention was neither to be an- 
anulled nor modified without the assent of the 
Powers signing the treaty. A second con- 
vention was added to the treaty stipulating, 
in three articles, that no foreign war vessel 
should be allowed to enter the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, except such 
light vessels, under special firman from the 
Sultan, as should be employed in the. missions 
of foreign powers, and also such other small 



vessels as each of the Powers was authorized 
to station at the mouth of the Danube. 

On the 15th of April a further convention 
was signed between France, Austria, and Eng- 
land, containing only two articles, by the first 
of which the three Powers "jointly and seve- 
rally guarantee the independence and integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire, as recorded" in the 
Paris Treaty ; while by the second it is agreed, 
" that any infraction of the stipulations of the 
said (Paris) treaty will be considered by the 
Powers signing the present treaty as a casus 
belli ; but they will come to an understanding 
with the Sublime Porte as to the measures 
ivhich are necessary, and will without delay 
determine among themselves as to the employ- 
ment of their military and naval forces!' 

The probable attitude of Russia in certain 
eventualities had been the subject of some 
anxiety ever since the commencement of the 
war of 1870. Indeed, there were signs of 
sinister interpretation even before the actual 
outbreak of the war between France and Ger- 
many. The 8 th of July was the centenary of 
the battle in which the Turkish fleet was 
destroyed in the Bay of Tchesme', the begin- 
ning of a series of successes which were com- 
pleted by the victory of Field-Marshal Rou- 
miantzoff over the Turkish army at Kagul, as 
previously referred to (ante, p. 183). The 
Moscow Gazette recalled these early glories, 
and declared that the names of Kao-ul and 

O 

Tchesme " marked that great turning point in 
the history of humanity, to which the fall, 
[rather say decline], of the Mussulman power 
in Europe was to be traced." This retrospect 
was followed by what really amounted to a 
denunciation of the treaty of Paris in antici- 
pation of the result of the impending conflict. 
" Where," said the Moscow Gazette, in an 
excited rhapsody, " is that fleet which flew so 
boldly on the waves of the Archipelago ? Where 
are those famous ships which reminded us at 
Sinope of the immortal struggle of Tchesme' ? 
The very same Europe whose civilization our 
grandfathers defended on its eastern bound- 
aries, united itself against us for the purpose 
of avenging the victories which she applauded 
and of which she enjoyed the fruifs. Sebas- 
topol was the reward for Tchesine" and Kagul ; 



SCENES OF THE WAR. 



189 




190 



THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA. 



but the glory of these victories is the best 
guarantee that Russia will not remain in the 
East in that degrading position which has 
been created for her by the Sebastopol allies of 
Turkey. A time must come when Russia will 
get rid of the fetters imposed upon her, and 
will re-establish her influence so dearly pur- 
chased in the East. It is impossible that she 
should remain for ever in the conditions which 
have been prescribed to her by the Treaty of 
Paris — with empty harbours, with towns un- 
protected from the smallest gunboat of Turkey 
all along the shores of the Black Sea. A great 
Power disarmed in its own waters ; a Power 
victorious at Tchesme*, over the Turks, is now 
undefended against them ! — can any one be- 
lieve in such a thing ? can it be true ? can his- 
tory stop at such a fact ? Russia must re-esta- 
blish her power in the Black Sea, and she will 
re-establish it. Of this no one doubts, not even 
her enemies, who exert their best efforts only 
to postpone the decisive day as far as they 
can." 

The Gazette further suggested that the naval 
power of Russia in the south was necessary to 
that country, though not for the purpose of 
aggrandizement. It alleged that Russia did 
not wish to extend her boundaries, and that 
the Eastern question admitted now less than 
ever of a violent solution. " From the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire would arise a chaos out 
of which we should not be able to extricate 
ourselves, notwithstanding our best efforts." 
The organ of the ultra-Russian party thought 
there was no need to make war on Turkey or 
to keep that country in constant dread, but 
that it was absolutely necessary to make 
Turkey " respect " Russia. It was by pre- 
serving a due share of influence in Eastern 
affairs, and by an unbroken chain of liberal 
efforts for the improvement of the condition of 
the Slavonian population in the East, that 
(according to the Gazette) Russia would do 
most good both to the Slavs and to herself. 12 
It was the critical moment when this denun- 
ciation of the Treaty of 1856 appeared, which 
gave it importance. Unless we were to sup- 
pose the coincidence a purely accidental one, 
we were forced to assume one of two hypo- 
theses — either that M. Katkoffj the best in- 



formed of Russian journalists, had some reason 
to apprehend a warlike disposition on the part 
of his Government, and did not agree with it ; 
or that he thought the Government had not 
sufficiently pronounced itself with reference to 
the new European conflict, and wished to point 
out the direction in which the Government of 
St. Petersburg ought to exert its efforts under 
the favourable circumstances of the times. 13 
The latter was the most reasonable supposition, 
and subsequent events proved that it was 
correct. 

This being the foregone conclusion of Rus- 
sian statesmen, they watched the course of 
events until the fall of Metz announced that 
the hour had struck. Naturally, the date of 
the Note immediately after that event com- 
bined with the rumour of marked civilities 
passing between the Courts of Berlin and St. 
Petersburg, caused much alarm. Then there 
had been reports from time to time during the 
last few years of preparations being made by 
Russia in the rivers of the Black Sea, which 
infringed, in spirit if not in letter, the treaties 
of 1856. The fortress of Kertch had been built 
on the Sea of Azof, and was said to be even 
more formidable than Sebastopol ever was ; 
while the vessels of the Black Sea Navigation 
Company were said to be so constructed that 
they could be converted into men-of-war at 
the shortest notice. For some time also reports 
had been coming in from the diplomatic agents 
of the British Government in Russia detailino; 
the strenuous efforts made by the government 
of that country to push forward its military 
prepai'ations. Large masses of troops were 
said to be collecting in the southern provinces, 
and Austria, too, had been silently arming, as 
if in preparation for an expected emergency. 
On this point a semi-official statement of French 
origin appeared in the London papers. It 
was alleged that when the war broke out the 
Emperor Alexander informed the French am- 
bassador at his court that he would preserve 
the strictest neutrality, so long as Austria 
kept the promise she had made to the same 
effect. A few days afterwards, the Russian 
Charge d' Affaires at Paris received instructions 
to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and call 
his attention to the fact that the neutrality of 



RUMOURED INTENTIONS OF RUSSIA. 



191 



Russia was entirely dependent on the inaction 
of Austria, which power had nevertheless begun 
to increase her armaments. The Russian 
Charge a" Affaires was even instructed to exact 
a promise from the French Government that 
they would take no steps calculated to bring 
Austria into alliance with France. If this was 
intended as a menace it failed of its effect. The 
Minister of Napoleon III. replied that he was 
not informed of the extraordinary armaments 
of Austria, which seemed so to alarm the 
Russian Government ; and, moreover, if Austria 
was really arming, he could hardly be asked 
to remonstrate with the Cabinet of Vienna 
with the view of checking preparations which 
obviously were in no way directed against 
France. Besides, he did not see anything 
objectionable in Russia arming on her part, 
if she thought fit, nor would he be any the 
more disposed to make such a course the 
object of diplomatic representations, for he 
was persuaded that such would in no case, in 
a question of this kind, conduce to any al- 
teration in the resolutions of the Russian 
Government. With respect to the demand 
that he should declare in advance that under 
no circumstances would France seek an 
alliance with Austria, such a declaration at 
the commencement of a war would be at least 
inopportune, and could not justify itself suf- 
ficiently by the prospective neutrality of 
Russia. The Russian CI targe d' Affaires then 
said that France would, nevertheless, find such 
a course her interest, and a certain advantage; 
for the moment that Austria declared against 
Prussia, that same instant would Russia take 
the field against Austria. " Then," rejoined the 
French Minister if we are to believe this story, 
" that must be because you have a secret treaty 
with Prussia!' The matter was thus reasoned 
out in the statement : that the armaments of 
Austria should have provoked similar move- 
ments in Russia as a measure of precaution, 
might . be regarded as a natural consequence ; 
but the moment that Russia declared her 
readiness to attack Austria if the latter sided 
against Prussia, it became evident that, before 
the war, a treaty had been entered into between 
Prussia and Russia. That this, in fact, had 
happened, seemed to be manifest from the 



course of events ; and the important question 
presented itself with fresh force after the fall 
of Metz, where were the clauses of this 
treaty ? " This question," said the statement 
we are citing, " will naturally occur to all ex- 
perienced politicians, and, although the two 
sovereigns have preserved absolute secrecy 
upon the reciprocal conventions, it is not im- 
possible to determine what are their principal 
points. Those who are acquainted with the 
traditional policy of Russia — of the two currents 
of opinion which divide that vast Empire — 
those, in fact, who can form an estimate of the 
various elements which at the same time con- 
stitute its power and its weakness — will find 
no difficulty in foreseeing with what object 
the Emperor Alexander has bound himself by 
treaty to the King of Prussia. As its further 
development proceeds, this question will doubt- 
less receive further attention. For the pre- 
sent, it may suffice to establish clearly by infor- 
mation the accuracy of which is guaranteed, that 
Russia is in the Prussian camp, and that she 
is tli ere by virtue of a treaty of which England 
would do well to seek to ascertain the clauses, 
so as to be able to anticipate their consequences 
before it is too late to avert them." 

This statement, (whether true or false is out 
of the question), was fresh in the public memory 
— for only a few days had passed by — when 
on Saturday the 5th of November rumours 
began to circulate in London that an important 
diplomatic note had been despatched from St. 
Petersburg ; but it was not until the 9th that 
the Russian Ambassador waited upon Earl 
Granville, and handed to him in person the 
subjoined despatch. On the evening of the 
same day the Foreign Minister was at the 
Lord Mayor's banquet, but nothing transpired 
on the subject of this uncomfortable announce- 
ment. The first positive information concern- 
ing it appeared in a leading article of the Times 
on Monday the 14th, and on the 16th all doubt 
was removed by its publication in full as sub- 
joined. 

Prince Gortschakoff to Baron Brunnow. 
" Tzarsko£-S£lo, Oct. 19 (31), 1870. 
"M. le Baron, — The successive changes which, 
during these recent years, the arrangements con- 
sidered as the foundation of the European equili- 



192 



PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF'S NOTE. 



brium have undergone, have placed the Imperial 
Cabinet under the necessity of examining the con- 
sequences which result from those changes for the 
political position of Russia. Among these arrange- 
ments, that which most directly concerns Russia is 
the Treaty of the 18th (30th) March, 1856. The 
Special Convention between the two Powers border- 
ing on the Black Sea, forming the ' annexe ' to that 
Treaty, contains, on the part of Russia, the engage- 
ment to limit her naval forces to the smallest di- 
mensions. In return, that treaty offered to her the 
principle of the neutralization of that sea. In the 
thought of the signatory Powers, that principle was 
to remove far off every possibility of conflict, whe- 
ther between the Powers bordering on the inland 
sea, or between them and the maritime Powers. It 
was also to increase the number of the territories 
called on by the unanimous agreement of Europe to 
enjoy the benefits of neutrality ; and thus to protect 
Russia herself from any danger of aggression. 

" The experience of fifteen years has proved that 
that principle, upon which depends the security of 
the whole extent of the frontiers of the Russian 
Empire in this direction [the southern], rests only 
on a theory. In reality, while Russia was disarm- 
ing in the Black Sea, and was even forbidding her- 
self loyally, by a declaration embodied in the Proto- 
cols of the Conferences, the possibility of taking 
efficacious measures of maritime defence in the ad- 
jacent seas and ports — Turkey preserved the right 
of maintaining unlimited naval forces in the Archi- 
pelago and the Straits, while France and England 
retained the power of concentrating their squadrons 
in the Mediterranean. Besides, under the terms of 
the treaty, entrance into the Black Sea is formally 
and in perpetuity forbidden to the war flag whether 
of the Powers bordering on that sea, or of any other 
Power ; but, in virtue of the Convention called ' of 
the Straits,' the passage through those Straits is 
closed to war flags only in time of peace. It re- 
sults from this contradiction, that the coasts of the 
Russian Empire are exposed to all kinds of aggres- 
sion, even on the part of the weakest States, from 
the moment in which they find themselves in com- 
mand of naval forces to which Russia would only 
have to oppose a few vessels of smaller dimensions. 

"The Treaty of the 18th (30th) March, 1856, 
moreover, has not escaped the slights by which the 
majority of European compacts have been visited, 
and in face of which it would be difficult to affirm 
that the written law, founded upon the respect for 
treaties as the base of public right and the rule of 
the relations between States, has preserved the same 
moral sanction which it may have had in other 
times. We have seen the Principalities of Moldavia 
and Wallachia — whose destiny had been fixed by 
the Treaty of Peace, and by the subsequent Proto- 
cols under the guarantee of the Great Powers — ac- 



complish a series of revolutions as much contrary to 
the spirit as to the letter of these arrangements : 
revolutions which have led them first towards union, 
and afterwards to the calling in of a foreign Prince. 
These acts have been committed with the knowledge 
of the Porte, with the acquiescence of the Great 
Powers — or at least without the latter having judged 
it necessary to cause their resolutions to be re- 
spected. The representative of Russia alone has 
raised his voice to point out to the Cabinets, that 
by this tolerance they would place themselves in 
contradiction with the explicit stipulations of the 
treaty. Assuredly, if these concessions, accorded 
to one of the Christian nationalities of the East, had 
been the result of a general understanding between 
the Cabinets and the Porte, in virtue of a principle 
applicable to the whole of the Christian populations 
of Turkey, the Imperial . Cabinet could only have 
applauded them. But they have been exclusive. 

"The Imperial Cabinet, therefore, could not fail 
to be struck by seeing that, but a few years after 
its conclusion, the Treaty of the 18th (30th) March, 
1856, could have been infringed with impunity in 
one of its essential clauses, in face of the Great 
Powers met in Conference at Paris, and represent- 
ing in its assemblage the high collective authority 
upon which the peace of the East reposed. But 
this has not been the only infraction. On several 
occasions, and under divers pretexts, the approach 
to the Straits has been open to foreign ships of war, 
and that of the Black Sea to whole squadrons, whose 
very presence was an outrage on the character of 
absolute neutrality ascribed to those waters. In 
proportion as the pledges offered by the treaty, and 
especially the guarantees of an effective neutrality 
of the Black Sea, were being thus weakened, the 
introduction of iron-clad ships — unknown and un- 
foreseen when the Treaty of 1856 was concluded— 
enhanced for Russia the dangers of an eventual war, 
by increasing, in considerable proportion, the al- 
ready obvious inequality of the respective naval 
forces. 

" In this state of things, His Majesty the Emperor 
has been obliged to place before himself the question 
of ascertaining what are the rights, and what are 
the duties, which flow for Russia from the modifi- 
cations in the general situation, and from these acts 
of contempt for the engagements to which Russia 
has not ceased to be scrupulously faithful, although 
they were conceived in a spirit of distrust towards 
her. After a mature examination of this question, 
His Imperial Highness has arrived at the following 
conclusions, which you are instructed to bring to 
the knowledge of the Government to which you are 
accredited : — 

"Our august Master cannot admit in right that 
treaties infringed in several of their essential and 
general clauses, remain obligatory in those which 






REPLY OF LORD GRANVILLE. 



193 



concern the direct interests of his empire. The 
Emperor, relying on the sentiments of equity of the 
signatory Powers of the Treaty of 1856, and on 
their sense of their own dignity, orders you to de- 
clare that His Imperial Majesty cannot consider 
himself any longer as bound by the obligations of 
the Treaty of the 18th (30th) March, 1856, in so far 
as they restrict his right of sovereignty in the Black 
Sea. That His Imperial Majesty believes himself 
entitled and bound ($e croit en droit et en devoir) to 
denounce to His Majesty the Sultan the Special and 
Additional Convention attached to the said Treaty, 
which fixes the number and the size of the warships 
that the two bordering Powers reserve to them- 
selves the right of maintaining in the Black Sea. 
That His Majesty, in all good faith, makes com- 
munication of his purpose (en informe loyalement) to 
the Powers who are signatories and guarantors of 
the General Treaty of which this Special Conven- 
tion forms an integral part. That His Majesty in 
this respect restores to His Majesty the Sultan the 
fulness of his rights, as his Majesty equally resumes 
it for himself. 14 

"In acquitting yourself of this duty, you will 
take care to establish, that our august Master has 
only in view the security and the dignity of his 
empire. It nowise enters into the thoughts of his 
Imperial Majesty to raise the Eastern question. 
On that point — as, for that matter, on others — he 
has no wish beyond the preservation and the con- 
firmation of peace. He maintains, in its entirety, 
his adhesion to the general principles of the Treaty 
of 1856, which determined the position of Turkey 
in the European system. He is ready to come to 
an understanding with the Powers Avho were signa- 
tories of that arrangement, either to confirm its 
general stipulations, or to renew them, or to substi- 
tute for them any other equitable arrangement 
which might be judged suitable to secure the tran- 
quillity of the East and the European equilibrium. 

" His Majesty has convinced himself that that 
peace and equilibrium will have one guarantee the 
more, when they shall be established upon bases 
more just and more solid than those which result 
from a position that no great Power could accept as 
a normal condition of existence. You are invited 
to read the present despatch, and give a copy of it 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. — Receive, &c, 

" GOKTSCHAKOFF." 

In a separate despatch, dated October 20th 
(November 1st), for the further instruction of 
Baron Brunnow, Prince Gortschakoff recalled 
the tenor of certain discussions which had 
taken place between him (Baron Brunnow) 
and Earl Russell in 1866, in which the latter 
had admitted the principle insisted on, namely, 



that in case of certain eventualities then oc- 
curring, calculated to modify the status quo 
existing in the East, Russia would have an 
equitable right to demand certain compensa- 
tion and guarantees of security. Although, 
he said, those eventualities had not occurred, 
it could not be denied that the treaty of 1856 
had undergone serious modifications in one of 
its essential provisions — alluding to the crea- 
tion of a small quasi-independent state (Rou- 
melia) on its frontiers. The balance of power 
having thus been disturbed, the sole purpose 
of the Czar was to restore that equilibrium, 
and he especially desired the ambassador to 
impress on the British Government that his 
decision implied "no change in the policy 
which his Majesty had pursued in the East." 
This policy, he explained, was such a " con- 
formity of principles and interests," in the 
face of differences that might arise between 
the Porte and the Christian subjects of the 
Sultan, as would induce the two Governments, 
in the event of any decisive crisis presenting 
itself, " to seek for its solution in the general 
agreement of the great European powers. All 
this was, no doubt, eloquently argued by 
Baron Brunnow, and earnestly pressed on the 
attention of Earl Granville, who, on the next 
day, sent the following despatch in reply : 

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan. 

"Foreign Office, Nov. 10, 1870. 

" Sir, — Baron Brunnow made to me yesterday 
the communication respecting the Convention be- 
tween the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan, limit- 
ing their naval forces in the Black Sea, signed at 
Paris on the 30th March, 1856, to which you allude 
in your telegram of yesterday afternoon. In my 
despatch of yesterday I gave you an account of 
what passed between us, and I now propose to ob- 
serve upon Prince Gortschakoff' s despatches of the 
19th and 20th ultimo, communicated to me by the 
Russian Ambassador on that occasion. 

"Prince Gortschakoff declares, on the part of 
His Imperial Majesty, that the Treaty of 1856 has 
been infringed in various respects to the prejudice 
of Russia, and more especially in the case of the 
Principalities, against the explicit protest of his 
representative ; and that, in consequence of these 
infractions, Russia is entitled to renounce those 
stipulations of the Treaty which directly touch her 
interests. It is then announced that she will no 
longer be bound by the treaties which restrict her 



194 



INDIGNATION OF ENGLAND. 



rights of sovereignty in the Black Sea. We havo 
hero an allegation that certain facts have occurred 
which, in tho judgment of Russia, are at variance 
with certain stipulations of the treaty ; and the 
assumption is mado that Russia, upon the strength 
of her own judgment, as to the character of those 
facts, is entitled to release herself from certain other 
stipulations of that instrument. This assumption 
is limited in its practical application to some of the 
provisions of the treaty ; hut the assumption of a 
right to renounce any one of its terms involves the 
assumption of a right to renounce the whole. 

" This statement is wholly independent of the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness, on its own 
merits, of the desire of Russia to be released from 
the observance of the stipulations of the Treaty of 
1856 respecting the Black Sea. For the question 
is, in whose hands lies the power of releasing one 
or more of the parties from all or any of these stipu- 
lations ? It has always been held that that right 
belongs only to the Governments which have been 
parties to the original instrument. The despatches 
of Prince Gortschakoff appear to assume that any 
one of the Powers who have signed the engagement 
may allege that occurrences have taken place which, 
in its opinion, are at variance with the provisions 
of the Treaty — and, although this view is not shared 
nor admitted by the co-signatory Powers, may 
found upon that allegation, not a request to those 
Governments for the consideration of the case, but 
an announcement to them that it has emancipated 
itself, or holds itself emancipated, from any stipula- 
tions of the treaty which it thinks fit to disapprove. 
Yet it is quite evident that the effect of such 
doctrine, and of any proceedings which, with or 
without avowal, is founded upon it, is to bring the 
entire authority and efficacy of treaties under the 
discretionary control of each one of the Powers who 
may have signed them ; the result of which would 
be the entire destruction of treaties in their essence. 
For, whereas their whole object is to bind Powers 
to one another, and for this purpose each one of the 
parties surrenders a portion of its free agency, by 
the doctrine and proceeding now in question, one of 
the parties in its separate and individual capacity 
brings back the entire subject into its own control, 
and remains bound only to itself. 

" Accordingly Prince Gortschakoff has announced 
in these despatches tho intention of Russia to con- 
tinue to observe certain of the provisions of the 
treaty. However satisfactory this may be in itself, 
it is obviously an expression of the free will of that 
Power which it might at any time alter or with- 
draw ; and it is thus open to. the same objections as 
the other portions of the communication, because 
it implies the right of Russia to annul the treaty on 
the ground of allegations of which she constitutes 
herself the only judge. The question therefore 



arises, not whether any desire expressed by Russia 
ought to bo carefully examined in a friendly spirit 
by the co-signatory Powers, but whether they are to 
accept from her the announcement that, by her own 
act, without any consent from them, she has re- 
leased herself from a solemn covenant. 

" I need scarcely say, that Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment have received this communication with deep 
regret, because it opens a discussion which might 
unsettle the cordial understanding it has been their 
earnest endeavour to maintain with the Russian 
Empire; and for the above-mentioned reasons, it is 
impossible for Her Majesty's Government to give 
any sanction, on their part, to the course announced 
by Prince Gortschakoff. If, instead of such a de- 
claration, the Russian Government had addressed 
Her Majesty's Government and the other Powers 
who are parties to the Treaty of 1856, and had 
proposed for consideration with them whether any- 
thing has occurred that could be held to amount to 
an infraction of the treaty — or whether there is 
anything in the terms which, from altered circum- 
stances, presses with undue severity upon Russia, 
or which, in the course of events, had become un- 
necessary for the due protection of Turkey — Her 
Majesty's Government would not have refused to 
examine the question in concert with the co-signa- 
tories to the Treaty. Whatever might have been 
the result of such communication, a risk of future 
complications, and a very dangerous precedent as to 
the validity of international obligations, would have 
been avoided. — I am, &c, 

(Signed) " Geanville." 

"P.S. — You will read and give a copy of this 
despatch to Prince Gortschakoff." 

The first impression naturally was, that 
Prince Gortschakoff 's note was intended as a 
direct menace to England, and it was generally 
thought that this would not have been ven- 
tured upon by the Czar if a previous under- 
standing had not been come to with Count 
Bismarck, and the power of France had not 
been broken. The indignation provoked by 
this view of the case was intense, and it was 
aggravated by a suspicion that the question of 
" the Alabama claims" had been almost at the 
same moment revived at Washington, in con- 
sequence of a similar good understanding be- 
tween the Governments of St. Petersburg and 
the United States. 15 The paltry character of 
the incidents alluded to in the Russian Note 
as infractions of the treaty of 1856 to the 
detriment of Russia justified the general indig- 
nation. According to the semi-official North 



A CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY COUNT BISMARCK. 



195 



German Gazette, which refrained from ex- 
pressing any opinion on the Note, they were 
the cruise of the Prince of Wales in the Black 
Sea in an English man-of-war ; a similar voy- 
age by the English Ambassador, Sir Henry 
Bulwer ; the appearance of the Austrian squad- 
ron at Varna during the Emperor's Eastern 
trip ; and a voyage by the Sultan in a large 
man-of-war; the writer, however, failing to 
enumerate among his instances the recent ad- 
mission of Admiral Farragut into the Dar- 
danelles on his own demand, which it were 
scarcely uncharitable to construe into an act 
of intentional connivance with the designs of 
Russia. 16 

The first duty of the Government, after 
despatching the reply quoted above, was ob- 
viously to ascertain the sense of the Prussian 
Government on the question, and for this 
purpose Mr. Odo Russell was despatched to 
the German head-quarters at Versailles. He 
there received a positive assurance from Count 
Bismarck that the Cabinet of Berlin had not 
sanctioned the Note ; and the clever Chan- 
cellor at the same time made a proposal for a 
conference of the Powers to be held in London 
for the settlement of the question, which pro- 
posal was eventually accepted both by Russia 
and England, on the condition that it should 
assemble " without foregone conclusions." 17 
This was equivalent to the withdrawal by 
Russia of her pretensions to annul the treaty 
by her own sovereign act, if indeed the an- 
nouncement of her intention to do so was not 
meant from the first as a short cut to a 
Conference ! However this might be, it was 
generally felt that the British Government 
would better have consulted its dignity by 
■ insisting on the unqualified withdrawal of 
the Note as a preliminary to any negotiation 
whatever on the subject. It was feared that 
some evasion might lurk under the assurance 
of the Berlin Government that they had not 
sanctioned the communication made by Prince 
Gortschakoff. If there existed some secret 
understanding between the two powers, as was 
the case before the war of 1866 between 
France and Prussia, might not the Russian 
Government, remembering how Napoleon the 
Third had been deceived after the successful 



issue of that campaign, have resolved to force 
M. Bismarck's hand before the present war 
was concluded by bringing on the question 
prematurally ? The alacrity with which a 
Congress was proposed and accepted, without 
respect for the convenience of France, lent 
some colour to this view of the case. The 
game, however, was a dangerous one to play. 
While the Government were courteously nego- 
tiating, Englishmen were counting their 
troops, and calculating how many could be 
spared, in case their suspicions were realized, 
to make a diversion in favour of beleaguered 
Paris. Austria and Turkey were also said to 
be actively preparing for any eventuality. In 
a few days the idea of war became familiar, 
and people began to say one to another, " How 
strange if the first battle-field in a new war 

o 

with Russia should be in the country around 
Paris!" 

One of the most curious phases of the ex- 
citement produced by the question was the 
controversy in the press between such men as 
Mr. Froude and Mr. Stuart Mill, on the one 
hand, and Earl Russell on the other. Mr. 
Mill naturally assumed that his own Govern- 
ment was in the wrong, and Russia in the 
right. The gist of his argument was that no 
treaty should be held binding if its terms were 
not such as would be insisted on afresh at the 
present time : " Treaties," he said, " are the 
promises of nations ; and in the breach of a 
treaty, as in that of a private promise, there 
are all degrees of guilt, from some of the 
gravest to some of the most venial. The degree 
of Russia's guilt in this particular repudiation 
of a treaty was not to be decided off hand." 
He affirmed, farther, that treaties and other 
engagements were liable to be broken if they 
were imposed without limit as to duration. An 
individual has no power of promising anything 
beyond the duration of his mortal life ; but 
nations have the wild folly to make and exact 
engagements for all time. Mankind, happily, 
are now beginning to find out that anything 
whatever to which a nation attempts either to 
bind itself or others in perpetuity, be it a 
constitution, a dynasty, an irrevocable law, a 
particular disposition of public or private 
property, or whatever else, will assuredly, at 



196 



MR. MILL AND EARL RUSSELL. 



some time or other, require to be, and will 
actually be, shaken off by those to whom it is 
injurious. The present generation has had 
sufficiently convincing experience that to this 
rule treaties are no exception. He maintained 
therefore, that as treaties, practically, can only 
bind for a certain number of years, they 
should be actually made of limited duration. 

All this, if admitted to be sound in prin- 
ciple, could not apply to the case in point. 
What were the facts ? " Russia had, at great 
cost, created in the Black Sea a very powerful 
fleet, manned by at least 30,000 sailors. This 
fleet was harboured and protected by one of 
the strongest maritime fortresses in the world. 
The fleet and the fortress were unassailable, 
except in the event of war breaking out be- 
tween Russia and Turkey, because at all 
other times the passage of the Dardanelles 
was closed. For the same reason the fleet 
could only be used against the Turks. It 
could never pass the Straits unless the Straits 
and Constantinople itself fell into the power 
of Russia. Had that event occurred, Russia 
would instantly have become the greatest 
maritime Power in the Levant — perhaps in 
the Mediterranean. When the Emperor 
Nicholas had completed these preparations he 
despatched Prince Menschikoff to pick a 
quarrel with the Porte ; he soon afterwards 
crossed the Pruth and took possession of 
Moldavia and part of Wallachia as a " material 
guarantee," and he used his fleet with such 
effect that he effectually destroyed the Turkish 
squadron at Sinope. Upon this war was 
declared by the Western Powers, the allies of 
Turkey ; Sebastopol was besieged and taken, 
and the Russian Black Sea fleet was sunk by 
its own officers in that celebrated harbour. 
The Western Powers contented themselves with 
wresi Ing from the hands of Russia the weapon 
she had so recently turned against the peace 
of Europe, and they compelled her to sign an 
engagement that she renounced that weapon 
for the future." ls This was, in short, the 
history of the causes and results of the Cri- 
mean war, which had cost England many 
precious lives and a hundred millions sterling 
of money. It was not by Russia that these 
results were considered worthless and incon- 



siderable. Russia had seized the first oppor- 
tunity to regain what she had lost in that war, 
namely, the power of attacking Eastern 
Europe ? As Earl Russell argued, England 
could do no other than stand as a nation upon 
the ground which Earl Granville and his 
colleagues had taken. " If," said his lordship, 
"the Russian Emperor asked for a conference 
on the Treaty of 1856, at a time when such a 
conference could be assembled, let us meet 
him in a fair spirit, and consider with France 
Prussia, Italy, Austria, and Turkey, in what 
manner we can find a substitute for the 
neutralization of the Black Sea. But, if the 
Czar proposes to set aside the Treaty of 1856 
by force, let us meet him by force ; and the 
sooner the better." There was a manly ring 
in this which responded to the heart of the 
nation. Russia had once more mistaken the 
temper of Englishmen, in supposing that this 
country would not go to war for a principle ; 
and still more so in putting forth the childish 
idea that only a question of form was involved 
in the Russian note. 19 

Some time necessarily elapsed before the 
arrangements for the proposed Conference 
could be satisfactorily settled. The French 
Government hesitated to become a party to it ; 
and Prussia who had not signed the Treaty of 
1856 was anxious to ascertain the feeling of 
her Confederates on the question how far the 
interests of Germany were affected in the case. 
If, on the other hand, France tried to enlarge 
the scope of the proposed Conference, and 
made this a condition of her acceptance, as was 
once reported, this was no more than might 
have been expected in the circumstances ; and 
especially as no attempt was made by Prussia 
to conceal the fact, that she was anxious to 
secure the assembly of the Conference even 
if France were excluded. There was the 
further question, whether France could appear 
with dignity, or even with legality, without a 
properly constituted Government ; and if her 
representative were admitted, whether this 
would not amount to a recognition of a govern- 
ment by foreign powers, which had not yet 
been recognized by France herself. The old 
question of the meeting of a Constituent 
Assembly, was thus, as a necessary preliminary 



A CONFERENCE ASSEMBLED IN LONDON. 



197 



of the Conference, once more raised to import- 
ance, as it had been in the negotiations for 
peace. It was rumoured, also, that Prince 
Charles of Roumelia would expect the inde- 
pendence of his states to be recognized. While, 
owing to these complications, the question was 
still in suspense, a curious communication was 
made to the Times newspaper* by its American 
correspondent. It was stated that the Russian 
Government had expressed through itsminister 
at Washington, a desire to have the United 
States represented, and that the United States 
Government had declined to do so, to the 
manifest chagrin of the Russian Minister. 20 
There were sinister rumours at the same time, 
or soon afterwards, that Russia had persuaded 
the Sultan to determine the questions at issue 
by a new Treaty between themselves alone, 
independent of the other powers, and it is 
probable enough that negotiations were opened 
with this object in view. The Grand 
Seigneur was little likely to stultify himself 
by any such measure. 21 

Towards the end of the year it became 
known that the " Black Sea Conference " 
would certainly meet, with or without a repre- 
sentative of France. It was understood, how- 
ever, that M. Jules Favre would be deputed 
to attend, and the first meeting was fixed for 
the 3rd January, 1871. The Assembly was 
then postponed, to give further time for his 
arrival, to the 17th January, and it finally met 
without him, but with the understanding that 
France would accede in the end. In Her 
Majesty's Speech on the opening of Parliament, 
February 9th, she alluded to " the endeavours 
that had been made to uphold the sanctity of 
treaties, and to remove any misapprehension 
as to the binding characters of their obliga- 
tions." And having stated that she relied with 
confidence on the result of the deliberations 
of the Conference then assembled, she expressed 
her regret that France was not represented ; 
and this not formally but in emphatic terms, 
alluding to France as a power which " must 

* December 15th, 1870. For reasons of obvious con- 
venience, the story of the Conference is completed in 
thi3 chapter, although it extends considerably beyond 
the date reached by the incidents of the War in the 
preceding chapter. 

VOL. il. 



ever be regarded as a principal and inde- 
pendent member of the great commonwealth 
of Europe." The meaning of these expressions 
in the then critical- situation of France, was 
fixed by the words used by Mr. Gladstone in 
the debate which ensued. " We have no right," 
he said, " to wrap ourselves up in an absolute 
and selfish isolation. We have a history, we 
have traditions, we have living, constant, per- 
petual, and multiplied intercourse and contact 
with every people in Europe. We should be 
unworthy of the recollections of our past, un- 
worthy of the hopes of the future, unworthy 
of the greatness of the present, if we disowned 
the obligations which arise out of these rela- 
tions to others more liable to suffer than our- 
selves." It is further noticeable as a confirma- 
tion of the view we have taken of the ch'cum- 
stances throughout this history, that a clause 
was introduced into Her Majesty's Speech 
to the following effect : — " I have forborne x 
from whatever might have been construed as 
gratuitous or unwarranted interference between 
parties, neither of ivhom had shoivn a readi- 
ness to 'propose terms of accommodation such 
as to bear promise of acceptance by the other." 
This statement on the highest official authority 
is a complete answer to those who affirm that 
France alone was impracticable, and that she 
alone scorned every attempt at conciliation. 

The members of the Conference concluded 
their deliberations, and affixed their signatures 
to the Treaty, on the 13th of March. It is im- 
portant to record that the first care of Lord 
Granville when the Conference assembled, was 
to obtain from the representatives of all the 
Powers present, their assent to a Protocol 
declaring the permanence of the obligations 
imposed by Treaties, and thus giving the best 
of all practical refutations to the logic of Mr. 
Mill. This protocol, which was signed at the 
time by the representatives of Austria, Germany, 
and Italy, as well as of Russia and Turkey, 
and subsequently by the Due de Broglie, as 
Plenipotentiary of France, affirms, as an essen- 
tial principle of the Law of Nations, that no 
Power can free itself from the engagements of 
a Treaty, or modify its stipulations, excepting 
with the consent of all the contracting parties. 
Without it, the representative of England 

14 



198 



THE TREATY OF PARIS REVISED. 



could not have entered on the discussion; 
this declaration, therefore, amounted prac- 
tically to a withdrawal by Russia of her 
audacious Note; although a more direct re- 
tractation of it might have been desirable. 
This act of submission having been solemnly 
made by Russia, Count Bernstorff stated that 
the King of Prussia, who had been the 
first to advise the holding of the Conference, 
had instructed him to recommend to the 
favourable consideration of the Plenipoten- 
taries the desire of Russia to abrogate the 
clauses in the Treaty of 1856, which restrict 
the rights of Sovereignty of the riverain powers 
over the Black Sea. It was understood before- 
hand, that England and the other Western 
powers were willing to lend a favourable ear to 
this proposal, providing the representative of 
Turkey were authorized to consider it in a 
friendly spirit. 22 This was fortunately the case, 
and it is impossible to glance at the Protocols 
of the Conference without recognizing the ability 
displayed by Musurus Pasha. He defended 
the principle of the limitations imposed by 
the treaty of 1856 on the sovereign rights of 
Turkey and Russia ; but he consented on the 
part of his government to abolish those limi- 
tations, provided compensating securities were 
substituted. At the same time the equivalents 
he demanded were exceedingly moderate. It 
would have been quite open to the Sultan to 
insist that if the sovereign rights of the Czar 
over the Black Sea were to be unrestricted, 



his own rights over the Dardanelles and the 
Bosphorus must be equally wide. While per- 
mitting the free passage oi merchant ships of 
all nations in time of peace, he might have 
held himself at liberty to permit or prohibit 
the passage of ships of war at his sole discre- 
tion. In effect, however, the Sultan consented 
to affirm anew the rule closing these Straits 
altogether to ships of war in time of peace, and 
the only question the Porte raised was whether 
the liberty of opening them under exceptional 
circumstances, when the security of the Otto- 
man Empire made it, in its judgment, necessary, 
should be a liberty of opening them in favour 
of friendly powers generally, or should be re- 
stricted to non-riverain powers — that is to 
say, Powers other than Russia. The Porte 
contended for the wider plan, so as to avoid 
the invidious appearance of barring the pas- 
sage of the Straits in perpetuity against 
Russia alone, and it is not easy to understand 
why there should have been any difficulty in 
agreeing to the extension. It is possible that 
the Plenipotentiaries having no authority 
on the point, felt themselves prevented from 
accepting any modification, however harmless, 
and, for the time the proposal of the Porte fell 
to the ground. At the last meeting, however, 
it appears that the justice of the suggestion 
was recognized, and the right of the Sultan to 
open the Dardanelles in exceptional cases is 
now extended to the vessels of war of friendly 
and allied powers. 23 



Notes to Chapter LXVII. 



i When Prince Gortschakoff succeeded Nesselrode as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, be concluded his protest against the interven- 
tion of France and England in the affairs of the two Sicilies, with 
a phrase which has since seemed to characterize his policy : " La 
Russia ne 'wudepas, elle se recueiilit." 

2 The document known as "The Will of Peter the 
Great " is subjoined, on account of its historical importance. 

" In the name of the holy indivisible Trinity, we Peter, to all 
our successors greeting, etc. The great God, who always en- 
lightened us by His divine wisdom, allows me now to behold in 
the Russian nation the people chosen by Providence to govern 
the whole of Europe. Most of the European nations have already 
arrived at a state of extreme old age, and they must needs be re- 
generated by a new and youthful people, when the time for the 
latter shall have come," etc. 

Here follow the different maxims or items of the recipe to be 
observed : — 

: ' 1. The Russian nation is constantly to be kept in a state of 
I tl . Like spirit ofl ■■ 

"8. Distin| ig to the most ci 



nations of Europe are to be called to Russia in time of war, and 
the very first artizans and men of letters in time of peace. 

" ;3. Russia is on all possible occasions to intermeddle in Euro- 
pean differences and affaire of all kinds ; in particular, however, 
she is to do so in those which concern Germany, on account of 
the proximity and more direct interest which is to be attached to 
that country. 

"4. Poland is to be divided. This object in view will be 
effected by encouraging in that country party rivalries, and by 
constantly keeping up a state of internal discord. The must in- 
fluential of the nobility are to be won over with gold; their 
influence in the country, and at the elections of the kings, is to 
be maintained : and every opportunity is to be eagerly laid hold 
of which affords a pretext to march Russian troops into the king- 
dom of Poland. T : of the neighbouring powers raising 
difficulties, the coi W be divided ; and whatever I 

cessary then to grant to them may 
I hereafter, whenever a proper opportunity 
offers for the pur; 

■ y as possible from 



iNOTES TO CHAPTER LXVII. 



199 



Swollen ; it must be separated from Denmark ; and a feeling of 
jealousy is constantly to be kept up between those two countries. 

"6. The consorts of the Russian princes are always to be 
chosen from amongst the German princesses, in order to multiply 
the family connections. 

"7. The alliance with England, for commercial reasons, is to 
preferred to all other alliances. England requires our produce 
for its navy; and it might moreover be made subservient to aid 
in the development of the maritime strength of Russia. 

" 8. It is necessary that the Russian empire should be con- 
tinually extended towards the north, along the Baltic; and 
towards the south, along the shores of the Black Sea. 

" 9. It is expedient to draw as near as possible to Constanti- 
nople, and to the East Indies. Whoever rules in these two 
countries is the true sovereign of the world. Wars are in conse- 
quence constantly to be waged, or caused to be waged, against 
Turkey and Persia ; great colonies are to be established along the 
Euxine, in order to get in time the whole Black Sea into the 
Russian power. The same policy is to be followed with regard 
to the shores of the Baltic— two objects indispensable for the suc- 
cess of the above project. 

"10. The Greeks, united and schismatical, who are spread 
over Hungary, Turkey, and Southern Poland, must be gained 
by favours to be bestowed on them, for it is expedient to win 
their sympathies for Russia. They must look up to us as their 
central point and their chief support. A generally preponderating 
influence is to be created by joining the principle of autocracy to 
a sort of spiritual supremacy combined and united in the person 
of the Czar. The Greeks will then be the friends of Russia, and 
our enemies will be theirs.'' 

"11. When Sweden is weakened, Persia vanquished, Poland 
subjugated, Turkey conquered, and the Euxine and the Baltic 
til aided by Russian fleets, then secret proposals are first to be ad- 
dressed to the French court, and hereafter to the court of Vienna, 
offering them to share with Russia the kingdom of the world. If 
one of those two great powers consents, from vanity or from 
flattered ambition, to entertain the proposal, then it must be 
made use of to suppress the other, and to annihilate all other 
powers ; an undertaking that cannot fail of success, for by that 
time Russia will already be in possession of the whole of the East, 
and of the major part of Europe. 

"12. Should, however, the impossible become true, and both 
powers unite in resisting the offer thus made, then it is expedient 
to incite them to strife with one another, and in this manner to 
exhaust then strength. Then Russian armies will first inundate 
Germany, then France, and in this way Europe will and must be 
conquered.'' 

3 " Kabbe's History of Russia was originally published in the 
French Historical Library, edited by Felix Bodin, and was justly 
considered a model of judicious condensation." Duncan, who 
makes this remark, is indebted to Rabbe for the whole of his first 
volume and the first chapter of his second. It is from the former, 
p. 228, that the passage in the text is cited. 

4 Ibid, p. 232. 

6 The principal agents in the first partition of Poland, February 
17th, 1772, were Frederick the Great and Catherine. In the 
second, or public partition treaty, August 5th, 1772, Austria 
coincided, reluctantly perhaps, but all the more perfidiously for 
having done so under the mask of friendship : " What made the 
folly of Austria still more apparent was, that the design of the 
Russians upon Turkey was at that time publicly avowed, and 
the weakness of the Ottoman Empire plainly demonstrated. It 
was during that very year (1772), while Catherine was dictating 
terms to Turkey, grasping at the Crimea and at the absolute con- 
trol of the Black Sea, that Austria submitted to assist her in par- 
titioning Poland. No policy was evermore infatuated." — (Thirty 
years of Foreign Policy, p. 32.) 

c The name of this fortress recalls a tour de force by the late 
AJaric Watts, commencing 

"An Austrian Army ardently arrayed 

Boldly by battery besiege Belgrade — 

the alliteration being continued, line by line for each letter, 

through the whole alphabet. The late Mr. Jevdan, who edited the 

Literary Gazette for over thirty year-, claimed the lines for his 



own in his autobiography ; a mistake like that attributed to 
George IV., who had heard and talked so much about the battle 
of Waterloo that he came to believe he had been present at it. 

7 " Suwarrow, having received from Potemkin orders to cap- 
ture the place (Ismail) in three days, made two successive 
assaults ; twice repulsed, he rushed a third time to the ramparts, 
at the foot of which 15,000 Russians were stretched dead. A 
valour so furious, having at length conquered the resistance of 
the Ottomans, the ill-fated Ismail, given up to all the resent- 
ment, all the ferocity of the soldiers, became the vast tomb of its 
inhabitants and garrison : 35,000 Turks there perished, and 
Suwarrow might have bathed himself in blood. The booty of the 
viclory was immense; and the wreck of the population, the un- 
fortunate remnant of a massacre which the weariness of the 
soldiers had alone spared, was transplanted into Russia.'' Rabbe: 
History of Russia, cited above, vol. 1, pp. 248-49. 

8 Thirty years of Foreign Policy : p. 107. 

9 The enthusiasm of Byron for the Greeks carried the popular 
feeling with him, but the Tory view of the case deserves some 
consideration : " For six years," says the author of the work just 
cited (note 8), " the hostilities between the Turks and the 
Greeks had continued. For six years the Great Powers had pro- 
fessed their neutrality. For six years Russia anxiously watched 
her opportunity, and almost believed that the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire was at hand. She knew well that if the Greeks 
achieved their iudependence without the aid of France or Eng- 
land, as long as the Turks remained in Europe that independ- 
ence would be merely nominal ; that a kingdom of Greece would 
be entirely dependent upon herself, and that a Greek state would 
be a powerful lever by which all the Greek brethren in Turkey 
might be moved at will, and the Turkish Empire demolished at 
any moment. To the surprise of Nicholas, and to the dismay of the 
Whigs in England, Greek patriotism showed itself at length not so 
powerful as they supposed; the energy of the Turkish commanders 
was gradually subduing the insurgents, and the authority of the 
Sultan was once more being recognized throughout the Morea. 
Professions of neutrality were immediately thrown to the winds. 
The Czar determined to interfere, and he would have been glad to 
have interfered alone. This could not be done without hazarding 
a rupture with England. The Duke of Wellington's influence 
prevailed, and a common intervention was agreed upon, especi- 
ally for the purpose of preserving peace. In the name of peace 
the Three Powers made war on a friendly state, destroyed its 
armaments, and insisted upon the withdrawal of its garrisons. 
But this was not all. When the Turkish armies had become 
victorious in all parts of the Morea, after the Greek armies had 
been defeated, Missolonghi and Athens taken, and the Crescent 
was everywhere triumphant, the allied fleets arrived at the scene 
of action, and checked the operations of the Turkish commanders. 
The object for which the Governments professed to interfere was 
not accomplished ; for instead of peace being preserved, as soon 
as Nicholas saw what a loss the Turks had sustained, he hastily 
separated himself from the other mediating powers, and a disas- 
trous war with Russia followed the disastrous battle of Navarino. 
As we now look calmly at that naval conflict, we are shocked at 
the injustice and hypocrisy of the allies. We sympathize fully 
with that sentence in the King's speech which declared it an 
' untoward event.' Neither the Government of France nor ot 
England really approved of the victory which their fleets had 
gained ; and by all sagacious politicians the result was deeply re- 
gretted." 

10 The real character of the treaty of Adrianople was make 
known to the British public by the publication, on June 28th, 
185-1, of a despatch transmitted by the Earl of Aberdeen to Lord 
Hey tesbury on the 81st of October, 1829. Even after this lapse 
of time it was only allowed to see the light as a personal vindica- 
tion of the Earl of Aberdeen. (See Mr. Duncan's note : History 
of Russia, vol. ii., p. 140.) It is an able exposure of the sys- 
tematic aggression of Russia, and a solemn warning against the 
consequences that must inevitably result from continuing the 
same policy. As our ambassador was ordered to read this de- 
spatch to Count Nesselrode, it is one of the most remarkable 
documents ever addressed by one power to another without being 
followed by a declaration of war ; and this makes it all the more 



200 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXVII. 



V 



strange that Russia should Lave made her next aggressive move 
against Turkey when Lord Aberdeen was in office. 

11 History of Russia, vol. ii., p. 126. 

" Quoted in the Pall Mall, Gazette of July Kith, 1870. 

w Ibid. 

M On account of the importance of this part of Prince Gort- 
schakoff's note, as containing the pith and substance of the com- 
munication made by the Russian Government to the European 
Powers, it is subjoined in the original French: — 

" L'Empeieur, se flant aux sentiments d'equite* des Puissances 
signataircs du Traite de 185C, et a la conscience qu'elles ont de 
leur propre dignite, vous ordonne de declarer : Que Sa Majeste 
Imperiale no saurait se considerer plus longtemps comme liee 
aux obligations du Traite du 18 (30) Mars, 1856, en tant qu'elles 
restreigncnt ses droits de souverainete dans la Mer Noire. 

" Que Sa Majeste Imperiale se croit en droit et en devoir de 
denoncer a Sa Majeste le Sultan la Convention speciale tt addi- 
tionelle du dit Traite qui fixe le nombre et la dimension des 
batiments de guerre que les deux Puissances riveraines se re- 
servent d'entretenir dans la Mer Noire. 

" Qu'elle en informe loyalement les Puissances signataires et 
garanties du Traite General, dont cette Convention speciale fait 
partie integrante. 

" Qu'elle rend sous ce rapport a Sa Majeste le Sultan la pleni- 
tude de ses droits, comme elle la reprend egalement pour elle- 
meine." 

16 The London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, 
who was generally well informed, wrote as follows: — 

" It is assumed that without a military ally we shall be afraid 
to stir; and the ominous revival of the Alabama claims seems to 
intimate that the Russian Government has prepared a surprise 
for us which will effectually checkmate our naval power. The 
perfect understanding which for some time has existed between 
Washington and St. Petersburg is as notorious as it is unintel- 
ligible on general grounds, and it is long, long ago since I heard 
an experienced and acute observer remark that the Alabama 
claims would sleep until the Eastern question was revived, and 
vice versa. I have been told on excellent authority that not long 
since Count Bismarck expressed his opinion of the British Go- 
vernment, and particularly of the Edinburgh Reviewer, in 
most contemptuous terms, and added that he knew how to keep 
their neutrality cool if it were necessary." 

18 A little later than the above the St. Petersburg correspondent 
of the Independance Beige wrote : — " The Emperor Alexander 
has received an autograph letter from the President of the United 
States, General Grant, in which the chief of the Washington 
Executive congratulates him warmly on his resolution to have 
done with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris denounced by 
Prince Gortschakoff, and proposes formally the support of the 
entire American fleet in case of conflict with England. The 
letter says (this is almost textual) that at the first word of Russia 
the whole of the navy of the United States will proceed to 
the Mediterranean and aid the Russian vessels in forcing the 
Dardanelles. The existence of President Grant's letter has be- 
come known to the English Government. Since then the 
Cabinet of St. James's begins to show itself more tractable on 
the substance of the question raised by the Cabinet of St. Peters- 
burg." 

w The most studied courtesy marked Prince Gortschakoffs 
rejoinder to Earl Granville's despatch of Nov. 10th, dated 8th 
(20) Nov. It was observed in particular that the abrogation of 
the objectionable clause of the treaty of 1866 was " theoretical," 
and " without immediate application." In the reply to this 
rejoinder, dated Nov. 28th, Earl Granville said: "Her Majesty's 
Government have no objection to accept the invitation which has 
been made by Prussia to a conference, upon the understanding 
that it is assembled without any foregone conclusion as to its 
results. In such case Her Majesty's Government will be glad 
ao consider with perfect fairness, and the respect due to a great 
and friendly power, any proposals which Russia may have to 
make." 

18 This summary of the argument is borrowed from a letter in 
the Times subscribed " Senex." The facts could not be more 
concisely or logically set forth. 



19 In a letter from the St. Petersburg correspondent of the 
Daily Neics, dated the 27th of November, the correspondent 
said that no one at St. Petersburg believed in England going to 
war for a principle. Besides, the Russian journals denied that 
any principle was involved in the proceedings of Prince Gorts- 
chakoff, who simply caused the Czar to say, with perfect candour, 
that he would no longer be bound by his engagements. "Did 
not his Majesty take very much the same course during the last 
Polish difficulty? That was likewise declared to be an internal 
affair, to which the stipulations of the Congress of Vienna did not 
apply. Had not those stipulations been broken again and again ? 
Why should Russia alone keep them ? Lord John Russell in- 
sisted that Russia could not liberate herself from them ; but 
his protest, as we may remember, passed unheeded, and the king- 
dom of Poland is now called the ' Cis- Vistula Begion.' '' 

The Goloss, with reference to the assertion that it was the 
form rather than the substance of the Russian Note that was 
objectionable, said : — 

"England is only angry because Russia demands, does not 
solicit, what even the English papers [viz., such reasonera as Mr. 
Mill] say she has a right to. What does this mean ? Who gives 
the journalists of the West the right to treat Russia with so much 
haughtiness ? Even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris 
Russia did not cease for one moment to be a great Power. It is 
true Western Europe began to forget it, and even in 1863 wished 
to meddle in our home affairs ; but this same Prince Gorts- 
chakoff who at present is accused of so much rudeness courteously 
reminded those whom it coucemed that Russia would not permit 
any interference with her home affairs. Prince Gortschakoff 
now declares, by order of his Imperial Majesty, that for 
several reasons his Majesty does not consider the limitations on 
his sovereign rights in the South as obligatory. Those who are 
discontented with this measure have not the impudence to contest 
its legality, but it is the form — the form — that makes them lose 
their tempers. " If Russia dares, they say, to insult Europe, it 
will be necessary to chastise her." And as it is generally by war 
that States are punished, Russia must hold herself in readiness for 
an invasion. We do not think, however, that there is in Europe 
any single Government capable of declaring war, not for the de- 
mands of Russia, but simply for the manner in which she has 
expressed them. Such a course would be too childish for any 
serious Government to entertain for one single moment." 

20 Subsequent events, especially the recall of M. Catacazy, 
have lent fresh interest to this communication. After stating 
the fact mentioned in the text, the writer continues : ' ' Not- 
withstanding the general popular belief in the great friendship 
between the United States and Russia, these nations do not seem 
of late to have been much in accord. The United States will 
not allow herself to be used by Russia to forward any of the plans 
of the latter for aggrandizement, and this sturdy independence 
has been made plainly evident in recent outgivings from Wash- 
ington. This has naturally disappointed Russia, and the an- 
nouncement made in Washington that the Russian Government 
is deeply offended at the declaration of President Grant that he 
will not at this juncture press the Alabama claims. Russia 
thinks that such a declaration is, at this time, an indirect and 
uncalled-for expression of sympathy for England, by relieving 
her of her fears that the United States might take this oppor- 
tunity of a quarrel with Russia for demanding their early settle- 
ment. A Washington correspondent writes that it has been 
generally remarked that within the past few weeks the Russian 
Minister, M. Catacazy, has called on neither the President nor 
the Secretary of State, and the assertion is made that he is acting 
under instructions from his Governmeut, which before long will 
communicate officially its gTievances. To add to the delicacy 
of the situation, M. Catacazy is said to have received letters 
from prominent Republicans, among whom are named Senator 
Sumner and General Butler, apologizing for the action tf tli2 
President, and indicating that the nation would not support 
him in his refusal to now press the claims. General Butler, the 
correspondent adds, even endi avowed to get the President 
to retract or modify his opinions, but failed. These statements 
now lead a portion of the public to tear sume complication with 
Russia. Whatever may come, the President seems resolute in 



SCENES OF THE WAR. 



201 







209- 



NOTES TO CHAPTER LXVII. 



his determination not to press the claims. lie think- the propo- 
sition for reopening the negotiation ought to come from 
England." Tor additional particulars concerning 1 the case of M. 
Catacazy, the reader may consult Prince Gortschakoff's despatch 
in the Times of January 13, 1872 ; a communication from Berlin, 
Including an article from the Moscow Gazette, in the same 
journal of January 24th, and the beginning of a letter from 
Philadelphia in the impression of tho 31st. It appears from 
these documents that M. Catacazy was of late accused of im- 
pertinently interfering in the negotiations between England and 
America, for the settlement of the Alabama Claims, which 
nccusation is ridiculed by the Moscow Gazette. Since M. Cata- 
cazy has had to leave Washington, the denial cannot be of much 
value. The question is a much wider one, however. Now that 
the treaty for the settlement of the Alabama claims is likely to 
prove abortive, in consequence of the extraordinary " case " set 
up by the American government, it is by no means imper- 
tinent to enquire whether the whole of this Catacazy business is 
not a political ruse; at any rate it is scarcely to be believed that 
the true history of the matter is in the possession of the public. 

21 Within the last few days, however, (February 9th, 1872) the 
rumour of a year ago has been revived. According to the Pall 
Mall Gazette of the above date a correspondent at Constan- 
tinople of the Deutsche Zcitung, of Vienna, gives some in- 
teresting information alout the rapprochement which has lately 
taken place between Turkey and Russia. " Aali Pasha '' (he 
;says) " was wise in his generation and soon perceived that it was 
only the policy of Rescind — the Turkish Canning — which could 
permanently secure the existence of the Turkish State. The 
late Grand Vizier was not, as is generally supposed, a bitter 
enemy of Russia, whom, it was said, he regarded with more hatred 
than fear. His leaning towards a Western alliance and his 
aversion to a Russian one was merely a matter of calculation. 
He knew that Russia would never abandon her designs on the 
Balkan peninsula : if Turkey strengthened herself by internal 
reforms and the friendship of the Western Powers she might, he 
thought, resist these designs, but if she threw herself into the 
arms of Russia, a catastrophe would be inevitable. ... It is not 
true that Aali advised his successors to alter this policy ; the 
document published as his will has been fabricated not far from 
the Russian Embassy. Mahmoud Pasha, on the other hand, 
seems to have entirely abandoned tho traditions of Resehid's 
policy. The Cabinets of Constantinople and St. Petersburg are 
now more intimate than they were even in 1840, when the 
famous Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was ushered into the world.'' 
The correspondent adds that, although the fact will probably be 
contradicted by semi-official organs, there is no doubt that nego- 
tiations are now being actively pursued for an alliance between 
Russia and the Porte, and that this is the cause of the sudden 
departure of the British Ambassador for London, where he wishes 
to confer with the Ministry on the menacing aspect of Eastern 
affairs. 

22 The remainder of this paragraph is quoted almost verba- 
tim from the remarks of the Times on the results of the Con- 
ference ; see that journal of March 15th, 1870. 

^ The text of the Treaty, entitled a "Treaty between Her 
Majesty, the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, the Em- 
peror of Austria, the French Republic, the King of Italy, the 
Emperor of Russia, and the Sultan for the Revision of certain 
Stipulations of the Treaty of March 30, 1856," signed in London, 
March 13th, 1871, is subjoined :— 

" Article I. Articles XI. XIII. and XIV. of the Treaty of Paris 
of March 30, 1856, as well as the special Convention concluded 
between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and annexed to the said 
Article XIV, are abrogated and replaced by the following article. 
" Article II. The principle of the closing of the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been established 
by the separate Convention of March 30, 1856, is maintained, 
with power to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to open the said 
Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and 
allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary 
in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty 
of Paris of March 30, 1856. 



"Article III. The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to 
tho mercantile marine of all nations. 

"Article IV. Tho commission established by Article XVI. of the 
Treaty of Paris, in which the Powers who joined in signing the 
Treaty are each represented by a delegate, and which wai 
charged with the designation and execution of the works neces- 
sary below Isaktcha, to clear the mouths of the Danube, as well 
as the neighbouring parts of the Black Sea, from the sands ami 
other impediments which obstruct them, in order to put that 
part of the river ;.nd the said parts of the sea in the bast state for 
navigation, is maintained in its present composition. Tho dura- 
tion of that Commission is fixed for a further period of twelve 
years, counting from April 24, 1871, that is to say, till April 24, 
1883, being tho term of redemption of the loan contracted by 
that Commission, under the guarantee of Great Britain, Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and Turkey. 

" Article V. The conditions of the re-assembling of the Rive- 
rain Commission, established by Article XVII. of the Treaty of 
Paris of March 30, 1856, shall be fixed by a previous under- 
standing between the Riverain Powers, without, prejudice to the 
clause relative to the three Danubian Principalities ; and in so 
far as any modification of Article XVII. of the said Treaty may 
be involved, this latter shall form the subject of a special Con- 
vention between the co-signatory Powers. 

" Article VI. As the Powers which possess the shores of that 
part of the Danube where the Cataracts and the Iron Gates 
offer impediments to navigation reserve to themselves to come 
to an understanding with the view of removing those impedi- 
ments, the High Contracting Parties recognize from the present 
moment their right to levy a provisional tax on vessels of 
commerce of every flag which may henceforth benefit thereby, 
until the extinction of the debt contracted for the execution 
of the works ; and they declare Article XV. of the Treaty of 
Paris of 1856 to be inapplicable to that part of the river for 
a space of time necessary for the repayment of the debt in 
question. 

"Article VII. All the works and establishments of every 
kind created by the European Commission in execution of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1856, or of the present Treaty, shall continue 
to enjoy the same neutrality which has hitherto protected 
them, and which shall be equally respected for the future, 
under all circumstances, by the High Contracting Parties. 
The benefits of the immunities which result therefrom shall ex- 
tend to tho whole administrative and engineering staff of the 
Commission. It is, however, well understood that the provisions 
of this Article shall in no way affect the right of the Sublime 
Porte to send, as heretofore, its vessels of war into the Danube 
in its character of territorial Power. 

"Article VIII. The High Contracting Parties renew and 
confirm all the stipulations of the Treaty of March 30, 1856, as 
well as of its annexes, which are not annulled or modified by 
the present Treaty." 
Article IX. Provides for the ratification, etc. 

(Signed) Granville, 
Bernstorff, 
Apponyi, 
Broglie, 
Cadorna, 
Brunnow, 

MtJSTJRUS. 

The ratification of this treaty dispersed for the time the " cloud 
in the East;" but it left an uneasy feeling with regard to the 
future, which afterwards found expression in the rumours that 
were revived of a" secret understanding between Turkey and 
Russia. There was also, immediately after the conclusion o 
the Treaty a fresh alarm raised about Luxemburg, caused by a 
sharp rebuke addressed to the Duchy on tho ground of an 
alleged breach of neutrality. An explanatory note from Count 
Bismarck had, however, a reassuring effect. 



TROCHU AT PARIS. 



203 



CHAPTER LXVIII. 

PARIS IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER. 
Recapitulation of incidents in the Capital since the disaster of 
Sedan — General Troclm and the force at his command — 
Question of his capacity for the position he occupied — Mani- 
fest weakness of his own statement of facts — Further shown 
by his inaction on the night of September 3rd — His conduct 
on September 4th — The Revolution in a nutshell — General 
Trochu virtually Dictator — His estimate of the " heroic 
folly " of resistance — Contempt for the National Guard and 
the New Levies — His celebrated "plan'' — Increasing irrita- 
tation — Movements of the Revolutionists — Sortie of October 
13th — Destruction of St. Cloud same day — King William 
and his staff at Versailles — Trochu's lack of artillery — His 
strategic plans thwarted by Gambetta — The trouble given by 
the populace and their illusions— The Food Question: 
estimated supplies and regulations of the Government for the 
distribution of food — Luxuries of the well-to-do-classes: "rats 
and mice, and such small deer" — Irrepressible gaiety of the 
French character — Caricatures of the period — The theatres 
converted to charitable uses — Visit to the Theatre du 
Palais Royal — Victor Hugo at the Porte St. Martin — 
The Sisters of Charity and the Red Cross- -The Clubs— 
Blanqui and the Patrie en danger — Preaching Com- 
munism — Materialism versus Spritualism— General aspect of 
Paris — First sound of the enemy's guns — Balloons and 
carrier pigeons — Communications between Paris and the 
Tours Government — Publication of papers found at the 
Tuileries — Romance of the guns — Augmentation of the 
defences — The investment threatened by the army of the 
Loire — Sortie and fight at Bougival, October 21st — Events 
outside in November — Exchange of compliments with Von 
Moltke. 

Our occasional glimpses of Paris since the 
catastrophe of Sedan, have kept us acquainted 
with the general course of events in the capital. 
We have witnessed the sudden collapse of the 
empire, and the establishment of the " Govern- 
ment of National Defence," (ante, Chapters LI. 
and LII.) We have noted the temper of the 
populace during the advance of the German 
armies (Chap. LIV.), and the buoyancy of 
public feeling as the enemy fell into line 
around the walls (Chap. LVI.) We were there 
for a few moments when the first sortie was 
made on the 30th of September, (Chap. LXI.) ; 
when Flourens led his emeutiers out of Belle- 
ville (Ibid., pp. 78, 86-7), and when the race 
of Amazons, representatives of the historical 
"furies of the guillotine," first formed in pro- 
cession behind the red flag (p. 88). We have 
assisted too, at the crisis after the fall of Metz, 
and the affair of Le Bourget, when General 
Trochu and his colleagues became the prisoners 
of the Commune ; and at the overwhelming- 
vote of confidence in the Government of De- 
fence which followed the discomfiture of the 
Insurgents (Chap. LXV.). These events con- 
stitute so many landmarks in the history of 
" Revolted Paris " during the months of Sep- 



tember and October, 1870. There are some, 
dropped threads, however, to gather up, and 
when that is done the record must be continued 
to the end of November, that we may see and 
know what the Parisians were doing at the 
time when DAurelle de Paladines fought his 
last battle for the road to the Capital, and 
resigned his command into the hands of General 
Chanzy (ante, p. 177). 

The little that we have hitherto had occasion 
to say of General Trochu has not been favour- 
able to a very lofty idea of his capacity for the 
great position he occupied, nor do we think 
that our estimate of his fitness for the role he 
was called upon to play will be in any con- 
siderable degree modified by what is to follow. 
It is not simply as a general that Trochu has 
to be judged at the bar of history. The cir- 
cumstances under which he was appointed 
Governor of Paris by the Emperor, and the 
spirit in which he entered upon his functions, 
have already been commented upon (ante, 
vol. I. p. 395, note 8; Ibid. p. 413). It is 
scarcely necessary, therefore, to state more ex- 
plicitly that his position was virtually that of 
dictator ; it was in fact, an infinitely stronger 
one than that of Napoleon I. on the 18th Bru- 
maire (1799) ; and by no means so perilous as 
that of Napoleon III. on the 2nd of December 
(1851). It combined every element of success 
but one, that of the genius necessary to or- 
ganize the conditions of which he was master, 
into the instrument of a resistless will. He 
was legally, by his appointment, master of the 
situation; and at the same time was able to 
stand at the head of the Revolution as the 
representative of the enlightened opposition to 
the military system of the Empire. He thus 
occupied a pivotal position in the midst of 
conflicting parties, and had the whole material 
strength of the capital gathered up in his 
hands. Let us pass in review the battalions 
which were ready to obey his orders. The 
Municipal Guard and the Gendarmerie of 
Paris and the adjacent departments made up 
a trained force of 15,000 men. The Sergents 
de Ville constituted a compact brigade of about . 
6,000. The Marines, " second to none " for 
their cheerful obedience and courage, made a 
corps of 10,000. The Gardes Champetres and 



204 



ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TROOPS. 



the Gardes Forestiers, had taken refuge in Paris 
to the number of about 3,000. The cadres in 
formation within the radius of the capital at 
the beginning of September certainly ex- 



Chap. LIII. Vol. I, pp. 488-93), we have before 
rouo-hly estimated at 30,000; we have since 
seen their figures stated at 28,000 combatants. 
Besides these trained soldiers, and a division of 




MEN OF THE BARRICADES. 



needed 20,000. The troops brought in from 
Sedan by General Vinoy — troops whose dis- 
cipline, we must remember, had been severely 
tested, and who were ably commanded (see 



cavalry, there were the National Guards who 
had flocked into Paris from the departments 
to the number of 95,000 robust young fellows, 
for the most part loyal and courageous and 



NATIONAL GUARDS AND MOBILES. 



205 



well commanded, as the events previously is absurd to suppose that a soldier of genius, at 



related, in which they bore a part, have amply 
proved. These forces make an aggregate of 
170,000 combatants, to say nothing of the 



a moment of supreme peril, could not have mus- 
tered 100,000 men capable of being led to vic- 
tory against some part of the line of investment. 




PARIS AMAZONS. 



Mobiles, who were estimated at 130,000 more, 
but who were either badly armed, or not 
armed at all till a later period. Out of this 
mass of material, good, bad, and indifferent, it 



We have shown before that Macmahon and 
the Emperor were of one mind as to the neces- 
sity of falling back on Paris before the disas- 
trous march of Macmahon to effect a junction 



206 



THE REVOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL. 



with Bazaine ; and also that the orders which 
overruled this policy came from Paris (chap. LI. 
vol. i. pp. 457 seq.) Whether or not he used all 
the influence which properly belonged to his 
position to control the decision of the Council 
of Regency might well have been doubted, 
Avhen we saw him in the act of succumbing to 
the apparently stronger will and decision of 
the Empress, advised, we may presume, by 
Count Palikao (Ibid. p. 458). But the Gene- 
ral himself confessed to his weakness in the 
speech made by him in the National Assembly 
on the 13th of June, 1871. By way of apolo- 
gizing for his failure, he has informed the world 
that his authority was set at defiance ; that 
Palikao communicated his orders directly to 
his (General Trochu's) subordinate officers, 
without even his knowledge ; that councils of 
war were composed of officers designated in 
the same arbitrary manner, and that their de- 
crees were put in execution without so much 
as communicating with him. Nay, that he was 
left in ignorance of the movements of the 
enemy during the advance on the capital, 
which he was responsible for defending. But 
we have shown that General Trochu was, by 
the logic of facts, himself master of the situ- 
ation, had he possessed the capacity for using 
his powers ; and the very confession that he, 
placed by the Emperor's decree at the head of 
the entire armed force of the capital, and ac- 
knowledged for their chief by that force, never- 
theless allowed himself to be set aside by others, 
and treated in the manner he has indicated, is 
his sufficient condemnation. 

Even if we admitted the reasonableness of 
his apology, so far as it explains the manner 
in which the Emperor's intention to act on the 
defensive was overruled, and the ignorance in 
which he himself was kept of the forced 
marches made by the Crown Prince on Paris, 
his conduct on the 4th September, would still 
have the look of at least inexcusable weakness 
and negligence. The catastrophe of Sedan was 
positively known in Paris on the night of 
September 3rd ; and how did General Trochu 
prepare to face the agitation which was certain 
to shake the capital to the centre on the next 
day? At the least he concerted with the 
Council of Regency the measures necessary to 



preserve the peace of the capital, and sustain 
the Government ? It does not appear that he 
made the least movement in this direction, 
and when on the 4th of September, the Pro- 
visional Government declared itself, he con- 
sented to act with them by becoming President. 
We have related the details of this wretched 
business in a previous chapter (vol. I. pp. 462- 
467), and nothing more is required to show 
the pitiable weakness of the General. It has 
been said that he was taken by surprise, and 
his own plea has always been that he was the 
victim of circumstances. But it is precisely 
because he did not show the energy and skill 
necessary to control the circumstances that he 
is blamed. As for the plea of surprise, it is 
the business of a soldier not to be surprised, 
and we may add, that he was the only obser- 
vant man in Paris, or even in London, that did 
not expect what happened. It must be 
remembered, that in addition to commanding 
the armed force enumerated above, General 
Trochu had the confidence of all the friends of 
order in Paris, and the very insurgents cheered 
him while they yelled for the decheance. 
After a careful review of all the circumstances 
it is impossible to avoid one of two conclusions 
—either that Trochu betrayed his trust, or 
that the part which fell to him was too great 
for his capacity. Of the two hypotheses, we 
give ' the preference to the latter, not only 
because it is the more generous one, but because 
it helps us to understand how it was that he 
failed to save Paris from the humiliation of a 
surrender. 

The Republicans of Belleville to the number 
of a thousand or so, having donned the cos- 
tume of the National Guard, thread their way 
through the excited masses in the streets, pene- 
trate into the palace of the Quai d'Orsay, and 
drive the assembled deputies out of their 
chamber, at the moment when they are about 
to vote on the counter propositions submitted 
to them by M. Thiers and Count de Palikao, 
relative to the future Government (ante, vol. i. pp . 
464-5) : that is the revolution in a nutshell. 
In the same excited crowd a General on horse- 
back trying in vain to make his way to the 
Chamber, and hustled and threatened by men 
with sinister faces, with whom be parleys as 



TROCHU AND HIS "PLAN.' 



207 



if for his life, until M. Jules Favre comes to 
the rescue and leads him off like a lamb to the 
Hotel de Ville, to become the head of the 
suddenly improvized Provisional Government 
— that is General Trochu (ibid. pp. 4G5-466). 
We may pity his weakness, his helplessness, 
in the situation ; but the military governor of 
Paris had no business to be seen struggling in 
the midst of an excited crowd on so momentous 
an occasion. Had he taken precautions before- 
hand to preserve the peace, those very precau- 
tions would have suggested that his place was 
elsewhere. 

Trochu, however, let us judge his political 
conduct as we may, was raised on the shoulders 
of the mob to a virtual dictatorship, for neither 
of his chief colleagues, M. Jules Favre and M. 
Gambetta, possessed any military authority, 
and the rest of the Provisional Government 
consisted of lawyers, journalists, and vaude- 
villists, with a small sprinkling of men of 
business, all too weak to assume the initiative 
in any important matter. The organization of 
the capital for defence, with the forces we have 
enumerated at his disposal, was entirely and 
absolutely in his hands — the regency and the 
Minister of War had fled. But from the very 
first he declares that he had no hope of saving 
Paris, for the simple reason that no besieged 
place ever had or ever could avoid capitulation 
unless succoured from without. The resistance 
of Paris, according to him, was " an act of heroic 
folly necessary to save the honour of France," 
and behind this conviction, he entertained 
a vague expectation that help would come from 
England, Italy, or America. He failed to see 
that the means of help were at his own dis- 
posal, when, in the early days of September, 
the ranks of the National Guard were swelled 
by 2G0,000 citizens of all classes. It was not 
till the end of October or beginning of Novem- 
ber, that he applied himself to the task of 
mobilizing this force, and it was then too late to 
be of much avail. The Germans had in the mean- 
time so strengthened their defences that it was 
as difficult to break out of Paris as to break in. 

Yet General Trochu had his " plan." He 
explained in his defence before the National 
Assembly, that his design was to make a sortie 
by way of Chatou with 50,000 picked troops, 



while feints were made towards Bondy from 
the eastern forts.- Succeeding in this, ho pro- 
posed to establish the centre of operations at 
Rouen. For this idea he was indebted to 
General Ducrot. It will be seen from this 
how little he counted on the National Guards, 
or even on the levies outside of Paris, and yet 
we have seen that the Army of the Loire was 
by no means to be despised. Had he been 
prompt to put his design into execution it 
might have encountered less opposition. 
People could not understand inaction in the 
terrible emergency in which they were placed. 
General Trochu and his "plan" became a 
standing joke. While the men of Belleville 
and other fiery spirits talked only of gigantic 
sorties, the general talked of his "plan," and 
even published a proclamation in which he 
announced with Breton-like naivete that he 
meant to adhere to it. x As time wore on 
the good-humoured satire provoked by this 
announcement gave place to a considerable 
amount of irritation, and this was greatly ag- 
gravated when successes against the enemy 
were announced one day only to be contra- 
dicted the next. One time it would be, says 
M. Sarcy, " If we had only had two batteries 
more !" and the public replied, "then why had 
you not the two batteries ?" The next time it 
would be, "We should have cut off 10,000 
Prussians if we had only started two hours 
sooner," to which the public rejoined, " You 
should not have lost those two houi-s." The 
professional men would say confident